

PRAVACANASĀRA

(Divyadhvani Sāra) | Part 3

(Translation of lectures on Pravacanasāra by Pūjya Gurudeva Śrī Kāñjīsvāmī)



ŚRĪ KUṆDKUṆDA ĀCĀRYADEVĀ



DIVYADHVANISĀRA

(jñeyatattva prajñāpana)

Part - 3

Pravacanasāra gāthās 127-200

**Pravacanasāra written by Śrīmad KuṇḍaKuṇḍĀcārya and
commentary Tattvapradīpikā by Śrīmad Amṛtacaṇḍrācārya,
with lectures by Pūjya Gurudeva Śrī Kanjīsvamī**

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
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Śrīmad Bhagvat Paramapūjya Śrī KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācārya Bhagavāna



Ādhyatma Yugaśraṣṭa
Pujya Gurudeva Śri Kanji Swami

A SHORT BRIEF ON THE LIFE OF PŪJYA GURUDEVA ŚRI KAÑJĪSVĀMĪ

- ♦ Pūjya Gurudeva Śri Kañjīsvāmī was born in Umrāla, Gujarat, on 21st April 1890 (*vaiśākha suda 2, vikrama samvata 1946*) to mother Ujamba and father Moticandbhāi. The young Kañjī took basic education in Umrāla but moved to Palej, near Vadodara, with his father after his mother passed away. At that time, he was merely 11 years old. He joined his father's grocery business at the young age of seventeen. He was very sharp, honest, righteous, and straightforward in business. But the young *Kañjī* was more interested in following the path of Jain saints. Even while running the shop, he somehow found time to read scriptures and meet knowledgeable ascetics. He informed Khuṣalabhāi, his elder brother, about his decision to forsake the worldly trappings, and he took *Śwetāmbara Sthānakvasi* renunciation at the age of twenty-four.
- ♦ *Pūjya Gurudeva Śri Kañjīsvāmī's* conscience was searching for eternal truth, and as destiny would have it, in the year 1912 AD (V.S. 1978), he found the ultimate scripture on spiritual science. 'Samayasāra' written by *KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācāryadeva*. He knew his search had come to an end. With his deep contemplative understanding, the truth, as revealed by the great *Tīrthaṅkara*, opened to him, and he experienced his true self. He left the *Śwetāmbara Sthānakvasi* monastic life and declared himself to be a celibate scholar of the *Digāmbara* path as revealed in the 'Samayasāra'. He stationed himself in the town of Songadh, Gujarat from 1934 onwards.

- ♦ He studied almost 200 scriptures and gave sermons on them thrice a day, continuously, for 45 years. He was able to bring out the basic principles of *dharma*, as revealed in the great scriptures and taught the right path of spiritual progress.
- ♦ *Pūjya Gurudeva Śri Kañjīsvāmī*, is considered to be a revivalist of the path of *Bhagavāna Mahāvīra*. He was instrumental in the revolution of perception and practice of Jainism, thereby propagating the true path of liberation to thousands. Philosophy and truth have always existed, but their actual practice had been eroded by ritualistic teachings. The focus had changed from self-realization to rituals and false beliefs. *Pūjya Gurudeva Śri Kañjīsvāmī* was instrumental in steering the masses towards the true understanding of *dharma*.
- ♦ *Pūjya Gurudeva Śri Kañjīsvāmī*'s life inspires us to seek the path of liberation. His entire assertion was based on the principle that anyone who considers his body or possessions as "I am this, this is mine" is on the wrong road, while one who meditates, thinking the antithesis and "I am not others, they are not mine, I am one knowledge" is on the right road to meditating on the pure self". This was the remedy for ending all future lives in the present life itself. This was the path and the objective he set for his followers. If *Pūjya Gurudeva Śri Kañjīsvāmī* had not explained the true principles, they would probably have been lost entirely. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to our revered *Pūjya Gurudeva Śri* for leading us by practice and perception towards the path of liberation.

EDITORIAL

Pravancanasāra provides a theory of knowledge that is par excellence. There have been two major great commentaries on the text by Amrtcandra and Jaysena Ācārya. Based on these commentaries, the *pravacanas* by Shri Kanji Svami during the mid-20th century have opened new vistas of understanding of this ancient text written about 2000 years ago by Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācāryadeva, a legendary and prolific Jain writer and well-known pioneering monk. This is the third book of the English rendition of *pravachanas* by Shri Kanji Svami, containing verses 127 to 200, which relate to the right perspective on objects of knowledge. The translation of these voluminous lectures into English from Gujarati/Hindi is a herculean task accomplished by the authors, and I had the opportunity to review the same.

The authors have done yeoman service through this volume for the cause of satisfying the thirst for subtle spiritual knowledge. It is excellent, useful, diligent, honest, and the result of hard work. The subject matter of the text is the nature of the pure soul as a knower of intrinsic infinite power existing eternally in it. This power can manifest through the pursuit of acquiring the right kind of knowledge of the pure soul and eliminating the difference between knowledge and the objects of knowledge, i.e., the knowable.

To gauge the depth of the translated subject matter, a few features are highlighted as its essence. The universe is a conglomerate of six

substances, and the soul knows it with its imponderable power of knowledge. There is a succinct analysis of six substances, including their nature of eternal existence, properties, and modifications, and the space they occupy, as well as others, in the verses from 127 to 144. The nature of the soul is determined by the separation of knowledge and objects of knowledge, and focusing on the latter in the remaining verses from 145 to 200. With this nature of knowledge and knowledge of objects, the soul is only entitled to attain *mokṣa*.

At times, the subject becomes so intense, for example, where the word *aliṅgrāhyana* (soul not cognizable by mark/sense) has been used (by Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācārya in *gāthā* 172). It has been done to convey a deeper meaning, so much so that twenty different meanings have been derived. Karmic bondage is caused by *pariṇāma* (modification/disposition), which consists of *moha-rāga-dveṣa* (delusion-attachment-aversion), verse 180. Further, belief, knowledge, and engrossment in the pure *ātmā* is the only single path to liberation, and none other – all omniscient gods, *tirthaṅkaras*, and monks have acquired the path to liberation by following the process of the inclination towards the pure *ātmā* and attained the status of *siddha* through this process (*gāthā* -199). In verse 200, the essence of the text is mentioned, which is so delightful and inspirational when Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācāryadeva declares that 'I am attaining the pure *ātmā*'; the path is the same for all.' From the conventional point of view, it is said that *ātmā* is the knower, and non-self-substance is knowable. From an absolute viewpoint, *ātmā* is knowable, and *ātmā* is the knower; There is no relation between substances. Unblemished conduct manifests

only after such determination, and all *jīvas* can attain such perfect completeness.

In view of the impossibility of discrimination between the knowable and knower, and the uniformity of its nature as a knower of intrinsic infinite power existing eternally in the same state of permanence. The engrossment is vividly described as if it were carved, engraved, implanted, entered within, pinned down, drowned, contained within, reflected in *jñāna* (mirror) - the whole aggregate of things, deep, of un-understandable nature, a multitude of variegated modifications occurring successively, infinite, past, present, and future.

The theory of knowledge sometimes looks quite mystical, but Shri Kanji Svami has meticulously chiseled it out, providing a clear view and helping one acquire the right perception. Finding suitable words for translating Prakrit/Sanskrit/Gujarati/Hindi words into English becomes quite onerous. Although sufficient care has been taken to use the relevant words, sometimes alternate words are mentioned, and the original words are repeated multiple times to convey the relevant meaning. Repetitive use of some words may sound awkward to some, but is done with a larger purpose of promoting a better understanding of the same.

Shri Rajesh Gandhi and Smt. Bhairavi A. Daftary has done exceptional work in translating using appropriate English words and has also worked with great care on publishing this volume. The subject matter of the theory of knowledge is quite interesting among scholars pursuing spiritual

studies. The eternal nature of the soul is to know the infinite objects of the past, present, and future. It is desirable that such knowledge is also made available to a large number of English-speaking scholars across the world. Readers have greatly appreciated the earlier two volumes, and it is expected that this text will also succeed in its objective.

Professor Jayanti Lal Jain

Managalayatan University, Aligarh, India

October 12th 2025

FROM THE DESK OF THE TRANSLATORS

Dear Jain Study Enthusiast,

The Jain Religious Order is an ancient and unique religion. The concepts and tenets we have delved into are truly fascinating and not found in any other religion. Among the various sects of Jainism, the *Digambara* order stands out as the most ancient, dating back to the times of Bhagavāna Ṛṣabhadeva. This unique lineage propagates an unadulterated system, true to the principles propounded exactly as Bhagavāna revealed them. In recent times, KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācāryadeva has emerged as one of the most revered names among saints and evolved ascetics. His writings, from 2000 years ago, continue to hold immense relevance even today. Of the 89 texts he penned, only 16 have survived the ravages of time, but these scriptures are as pertinent today as they were then. Five of them are accepted as a comprehensive collection of the principles of Jainism, a testament to their enduring importance.

One of these five is Pravacanasāra, a detailed explanation of the laws of metaphysics and epistemology. It is the beginning of understanding the basis of Jain Philosophy. It is remarkable in that, though it is the beginning, it is also the ultimate text for understanding the laws of metaphysics as revealed by Bhagavāna. Amṛtacaṇḍra Ācārya, another revered saint dated around 1000 years ago, wrote an exhaustive and comprehensive exposition on it.

A thousand years later came Pūjya Kāñjī Svāmī, a trailblazer of sorts in the *Digambara* sect and the Jain world in general. Pū. Kāñjī Svāmī gave

in-depth lectures on the original verses and their exposition. His perception and subtle understanding of these ancient scriptures are accepted by all eminent scholars of our time. He shared his deep and immense knowledge for 45 years through his lectures. He was prolific in his understanding, and his view was holistic and firm on the true path.

His lectures are available in Hindi and Gujarati. However, to include the milieu of English-speaking enthusiasts of Jain study, we have taken the initiative of translating the lectures on Pravacanasāra by Pū. Kāñjī Svāmī, into English. Our guide and mentor on this journey has been Paṇḍit Hemchandji 'Hem' (Deolali and Bhopal [India]), whose mastery over the understanding of Pravacanasāra is second to almost none. Without him, this journey would not have found its logical path.

About this text

KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācāryadeva wrote the original text. It is divided into three parts, with sub-sections in each. Each verse has meanings and exposition by Amṛtacaṇḍra Ācārya, along with lectures by Pū. Kāñjī Svāmī on each of these. The first chapter, ***jñāna tattva prajñāpana***, which covers verses 1 to 92 and includes two sub-sections, was translated and printed in 2020. The first sub-section, ***dravya sāmānya adhikāra***, of the second chapter, ***jñeya tattva prajñāpana***, covering verses 93 to 126, was translated and printed in 2024. Whereas the translation of the complete original text of Pravacanasāra, written by KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācāryadeva with exposition by Amṛtacaṇḍra Ācārya, was translated and printed in 2022. It is with immense joy that we now bring you the second and third sub-sections of the second chapter- ***jñeya tattva prajñāpana***. It goes by the names of

dravya viśeṣa adhikāra, verses 127 to 144, and ***jnāna-jneya vibhāga adhikāra***, verses 145 to 200. We endeavor to bring you the translation of the rest of the lectures soon. Our translation of the lectures of Pūjya Gurudeva Śrī Kāñjivāmī, on *Pravacanasāra*, under the guidance of Br. Paṇdit Shri Hemachandji Hem ' has been a memorable journey, with the last leg still to go.

The third volume, with the encouragement of Paṇditjī and the dedicated guidance and detailed scrutiny of every word by Professor Jayantilalji Jain (Manglayatan), is now ready. This volume has been even more inspiring for us. We have covered this distance in one and a half years and hope we can complete the remaining part of this onerous task soon. The in-depth study of Gurudeva Śrī's lecture on this great scripture, *Pravacanasāra*, has been a humbling experience. We only wish that we set ourselves on the higher path of self-evolution as has been revealed by the great masters.

The original lectures by Gurudeva Śrī were edited by Late Śrī Amrutlal Narsibhai Mehta and were printed in the daily bulletin “Śrī Sadguru Prasad” in Gujarati. Shri Khimchandbhai Jethalal Sheth rechecked each and every word, and then it was shown to Gurudeva Śrī and finalized. In this way, it was ensured that the printed matter was authentic.

The said lectures were translated into Hindi and printed in five parts. The first three parts have been translated from Gujarati to Hindi by Late Shri Vinod Jain (Chhindwara, M.P.), and we have further translated them into English. This fourth part was translated by Shri Pravinkumar Shastri and edited by Late Shri Sanjeevkumar Godha.

Due to the limitation of English vocabulary, conveying the principles as revealed in the language of the masters has been a continuous challenge. We realised during our work that we needed a standardized system for spelling non-English words to ease our tasks and make reading this text enjoyable for the readers. For this, we turned to using IAST (International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration), which is on par with the Harvard-Kyoto system. This has improved the symmetry of writing non-English words in the English alphabet. The need for the use of original, non-English words in an English translation may seem unnecessary. However, as we study Jain concepts and principles, we must accept that the journey from being an academician to a true learner of this system requires an in-depth and subtle understanding of these concepts, which are best described in the original language.

In the translation, we have tried our best to maintain the flow of the language while keeping the principles intact.

Despite our efforts, if there is any misstep or any unintentional misrepresentation, then that fault is solely due to our limited *kṣāyopṣama jñāna*. We seek forgiveness for that and request our readers to email the mistake to us so that we can duly correct it in the next print.

To ensure the correct pronunciation of the transliterated words, we felt it necessary to provide a soft guide. The chart below shows the Devanagari letters with their corresponding transliterated letter.

अ - a	आ - ā	इ - i	ई - ī	उ - u	ऊ - ū
ऋ - ṛi	ए - e	ऐ - ai	ओ - o	औ - au	अं - am
क - ka	ख - kha	ग - ga	घ - gha	ङ - nga	
च - ca	छ - cha	ज - ja	झ - jha	ञ - ña	
ट - ṭa	ठ - ṭha	ड - ḍa	ढ - ḍha	ण - ṇa	
त - ta	थ - tha	द - da	ध - dha	न - na	
प - pa	फ - pha	ब - ba	भ - bha	म - ma	
य - ya	र - ra	ल - la	व - va	श - śa	ष - ṣa
स - sa	ह - ha	ज्ञ - jña	क्ष - kṣa	त्र - tra	

Below is a guide on the sound associated with each transliterated letter, which is the English alphabet with diacritics.

vowels

अ a - a is pronounced like 'a' in America

आ ā - ā is pronounced like 'a' in barn

इ i - i is pronounced like 'i' in bit

ई ī - ī is pronounced like 'i' in liter

उ u - u is pronounced like 'u' in put

ऊ ū - ū is pronounced like 'u' in dude

ऋ ṛ - ri cerebral, is pronounced like 'ri' in rip

ए e - e is pronounced like 'e' in grey

ऐ ai - ai, is pronounced like 'ai' in aisle

ओ o - o is pronounced like 'o' in over

औ au - au is pronounced like 'ow' in cow

ā, ī, ū, ai, au are prolonged for two beats instead of one

consonants

क ka , ख , kha , ग ga, घ gha, ङ nga are gutturals, arising from the throat
nga is pronounced like 'ni' in onion.

च ca , छ cha, ज ja, झ jha, ञ ña are palatals, arising from the back of the palate

ca palatal, is always pronounced like 'ch' in chop.

ña is pronounced like 'gn' in igneous.

ट ta , ठ tha, ड da, ढ dha , ण ña are cerebrals, with tongue touching the roof of the mouth

ña is a soft echo of the preceding vowel h after a consonant, with an extra breath after the consonant.

त ta, थ th, द da, ध dha, न na are dentals, with tongue touching the back of the teeth

na is pronounced like 'n' in uncle.

प pa , फ pha, ब ba, भ bha, म ma are labials, arising from the lips

य ya, र ra, ल la ,ळ la ,व va, ह ha

ha is alone pronounced like 'h' in honey.

श śa - is pronounced like 'sh' in shout

ष ṣa - is pronounced like 'sh' in leash

स sa - is pronounced like 's' in 'sam'

क्ष kṣa - is pronounced as 'ksha' as in rickshaw

ज्ञ jña - jña is pronounced as 'gna' as in prajña

We hope this will make studying this text extremely enjoyable and engaging for all readers.

Jainam Jayatu Sāśanam

(May the glory of the path of Jina always be ablaze and victorious)

Rajesh Gandhi (Ahmedabad)

Bhairavi Daftary (Mumbai)

September 26th 2025

FROM THE DESK OF THE PUBLISHER

Shri Kund Kund Kahan Digambar Jain Tirtha Surkasha Trust was formed with the objective to protect Digambar Jain pilgrim places and *Jinvāṇī* (scriptures). The initiative was taken during the celebration of the Panch Kalyanak Mahotsav of Paramagam Mandir at Songadh in March 1974. The trust was formed under the guidance of Pt. Shri Babubhaiji C. Mehta (Fatehpur). It was launched on the 87th birth anniversary of Rev. Shri Kanji Swami by Shri Sahu Shantiprasadji Jain, one of the most prominent personalities of Digambar Jain Samaj.

Over the last 52 years, the trust has initiated several activities aimed at conserving Digambar Jain pilgrim sites and sacred texts. A small synopsis of the same is presented below. Restoration of temples:

1. Antariksh Parshwanath, Sirpur, the protracted legal fight is going on, Br. Shri Dhanyakumarji Belokar has served for this cause for around 27 years.
2. For the last 45 years, actively participating in the activities of Bharatvarsiya Digambar Jain Tirthakshetra Committee, Mumbai. Shri Vasantbhai Doshi, our trust's President, is the Sr. Vice-President of this committee and President of its Legal Committee.
3. Work on Neminath Bhagwan's Tonk on Girnarji, Siddhakṣetra
4. Updating the legal documents, land records, and title survey of a large number of our temples and pilgrim centres by Pt. Jnanchandji Jain.
5. We have constructed a magnificent temple of Tirthankar Shri Parshwanath Swami at the eternal Siddha Kṣetra, Sammed-Shikharji, with a grand Panch Kalyanak Mahotsav. Simultaneously, the Kahan-Nagar Society was also constructed there to accommodate *mumukshus*.

6. The trust undertakes jirnoddhāra (renovation) of old Jain pilgrimage sites. We have renovated four temples at Sonagiri Teerth, (M.P.). We have been contributing funds for the construction of svādhyaya bhavans required for daily prayers and preaching of Jain philosophy. We have so far constructed fifty such halls.

Service to Jinvaṇi - shastri pandits

It was observed that there was a dearth of Digambar Jain scholars. Keeping this in mind, Shri Todarmal Digambar Jain Siddhant Mahavidyalaya was started at Pandit Todarmal Smarak Bhavan. The premises were built and offered for use to the trust by Shri Poornachandji Godika, Jaipur. It offers various courses for graduating as Shashtri/Pandit with the sole objective of spreading the message of real metaphysics around the world, as explained by Shri Kanji Svami. This venture is run under the able guidance of Pt. Shri Ratanchandji Bharill and other scholars. More than 600 śastris/scholars have already graduated from this institute.

Recently, we have started coaching students at Mahavidyalaya from across India, helping them grow.

Publication of religious books and literature.

After Gurudev Shri Kanji Svami (1890 -1980 AD) left for the heavenly abode, this trust published the original texts of *Digambara Jain ācārya*, which had previously remained unpublished. Thousands of books have been printed with the increasing demand for *Paramāgams* from the

mumukshu community. We are happy to announce that our Trust has completed 52 years of serving the cause of Jains and Jainism.

Many books have been published in various languages, such as Samaysāra, Pravachansāra, Niyamsāra, Ashtapahud, Panchāsti Kāya (Panch Parmagams of Shri Kundkund Acarya), and Moksha Marg Prakashak, among others. Dr Pt. Shri Uttamchandji Jain (Seoni) made a significant contribution to this endeavour through editing and translating the above texts.

In line with the current trend of communicating in English and in response to the increasing demand for such books from scholars, this trust initiated the translation and publication of a few books in English. Notable among them is Moksha Marg Prakashak.

The trust is happy to publish the English version of the Pravacanasāra text with its exposition, Tattva Pradipika Tika, written by Shri Amritcandra Ācārya, along with *pravacanas* delivered on them by Shri Kanji Svami. Pravacanasāra is one of the most important texts of Digambar Jain philosophy. Currently, the text is being taught and referred to by many scholars worldwide in various universities and colleges interested in learning Jain philosophy and oriental religions. The objective of this exercise is to spread the correct interpretation, as explained by Gurudeva Shri Kanji Svami.

Pravacanasāra is broadly divided into three chapters. This book covers verses 127 to 200 from the second part of the second chapter, specifically

jñeya tattva prajñāpana-dravya viśeṣa adhikāra and jñana-jñneya vibhāga adhikāra. We wish to publish the English version of the last chapter, for which work has already started.

Shri Rajesh Gandhi (Ahmedabad) and Smt. Bhairavi Daftary (Mumbai) has put in a great effort for this book. We thank Dr. Shri Jayantilalji Jain, Dean of Manglayatan University, for editing and reviewing the text. The trust is confident it will benefit scholars, students, and the young generation who have a deep interest in Jain philosophy but are not proficient in Indian languages, especially those residing outside India.

On this occasion, we remember the invaluable contribution made by our past presidents, namely, Shri Babubhai Maheta, Shri Lalchandbhai Modi, Shri Babuji Jugalkishorji Jain, Shri Dhanyakumarji Belokar, and Shri Anantbhai Sheth.

We take this opportunity to thank Shri Rameshchand Ji Jain (Songandh) who have done a great job of printing this book.

Vasantbhai Doshi (President)

Mahipal Jnayaak (Hon Secretary)

Shri Kund Kund Kahan Digambar Jain Tirtha Suraksha Trust, Mumbai

Date: 14th November 2025

INDEX

Sr. No.	Gatha No.	Page No.
1	Gatha 127	1
2	Gatha 128	7
3	Gatha 129	10
4	Gatha 130	14
5	Gatha 131	17
6	Gatha 132	19
7	Gatha 133 & 134	27
8	Gatha 135	35
9	Gatha 136	38
10	Gatha 137	41
11	Gatha 138	45
12	Gatha 139	48
13	Gatha 140	54
14	Gatha 141	58
15	Gatha 142	61
16	Gatha 143	65
17	Gatha 144	67
18	Gatha 145	75
19	Gatha 146	80
20	Gatha 147	85
21	Gatha 148	88
22	Gatha 149	90
23	Gatha 150	93
24	Gatha 151	95

Sr. No.	Gatha No.	Page No.
25	Gatha 152	101
26	Gatha 153	106
27	Gatha 154	109
28	Gatha 155	121
29	Gatha 156	124
30	Gatha 157	127
31	Gatha 158	129
32	Gatha 159	131
33	Gatha 160	134
34	Gatha 161	141
35	Gatha 162	143
36	Gatha 163	146
37	Gatha 164	148
38	Gatha 165	150
39	Gatha 166	153
40	Gatha 167	156
41	Gatha 168	160
42	Gatha 169	163
43	Gatha 170	165
44	Gatha 171	168
45	Gatha 172	169
46	Gatha 173	237
47	Gatha 174	239
48	Gatha 175	246
49	Gatha 176	255
50	Gatha 177	266

Sr. No.	Gatha No.	Page No.
51	Gatha 178	274
52	Gatha 179	277
53	Gatha 180	283
54	Gatha 181	287
55	Gatha 182	291
56	Gatha 183	295
57	Gatha 184	300
58	Gatha 185	303
59	Gatha 186	306
60	Gatha 187	310
61	Gatha 188	314
62	Gatha 189	317
63	Gatha 190	327
64	Gatha 191	334
65	Gatha 192	340
66	Gatha 193	361
67	Gatha 194	364
68	Gatha 195	368
69	Gatha 196	371
70	Gatha 197	374
71	Gatha 198	377
72	Gatha 199	381
73	Gatha 200	384
74	Shloka 10 - 12	397
75	Glossary	403

अथ द्रव्यविशेषप्रज्ञापनम् । तत्र द्रव्यस्य जीवाजीवत्वविशेषं निश्चिनोति-

Now, as there is an exposition of particular qualities of substance (i.e., specific substance and category of substances), it is explained here; in that (exposition), first, particular qualities of *jīva* (sentient) and *ajīva* (non-sentient substances are ascertained (i.e., *jīva* and *ajīva* are the two categories of substances).

**द्वं जीवमजीवं जीवो पुन चेदणोवओगमओ ।
पोगलदव्वप्पमुहं अचेदणं हवदि य अजीवं ॥ १२७ ॥**

*davvaṃ jīvamaājīvaṃ jīvo puṇa cedaṇovaogamao |
poggaladavvappamuhaṃ acedaṇaṃ havadi ya ajīvaṃ || 127 ||*

gāthā: Substances are of two kinds - *jīva* (sentient) and *ajīva* (non-sentient). Those with *cetanā* (sentience) and manifestation of sentience/consciousness (*upayoga*) are *jīva*; *pudgala* (physical matter) and other inanimate substances are *ajīva*.

ṭīkā: Here, in this universe, *dravya* (substance), without forsaking the *sāmānya* (generality) nature of the substance which is the cause of its oneness, while separating from one another by virtue of the presence of distinguishing qualities existing in them, obtains the distinction of *jīvatva* (sentieny) and *ajīvatva* (non-sentieny).

From these two categories of substances, *jīva* substance is of only one kind, having consciousness, and *ajīva*/non-sentient – *pudgala-dravya* (physical matter-substance), *dharma-dravya* (medium of motion), *adharma-dravya* (medium of rest), *kāla-dravya* (time substance/aiding modification), and *ākāśa-dravya* (space substance/aiding accommodation) are of five types. These do not have consciousness. *jīva*'s specific characteristic nature is full of sentience and thought/known activity, and *ajīva*'s specific characteristic nature is insentience (devoid of known activity).

jīva is that in which the self appears as manifested in the form of consciousness pervading in its own traits, illuminated by its own self, imperishable, revered knowledge being realized by sentient nature characterized as an evolution of consciousness, and having the form of functioning of *ātma* substance.

A non-sentient (substance) is that which appears insentient due to the complete absence of

the aforementioned characteristic nature of sentience along with its *upayoga* (knowing activity), either inward or outward.

bhāvārtha: From the view of substantiality/a general point of view, there exists ‘oneness’ in all substances. Nevertheless, from a specific characteristic nature viewpoint, there are two kinds - *jīva* and *ajīva*. The substance which possesses and is constituted of revered knowledge form of sentience and its knowing activity form of functioning - is called *jīva* substance, and the substance which is totally insentient due to the absence of sentience and knowing activity is called *ajīva*. The substance *ātmā* is of one kind only, but non-sentient substances are of five types. A detailed exposition of these follows.

pravacana on gāthā-127

Now, commentary on particularities begins. *dravya viśeṣa*, meaning the division of substances, will be explained. The real nature of the six *dravyas* (substances), known in *Sarvajña Bhagavāna's* omniscience and as explained in His *divyadhvani* (primordial OM sound), will be told. First, *dravyas* (substance) are divided into two categories -- *jīva* (sentient) and *ajīva* (non-sentient). This universe is not made of only *jīva* or only *ajīva*. But both *jīva* and *ajīva* are present.

In the forthcoming verses, dualism will explain the division of substances into sets of two or show their nature. From the viewpoint of substance, all are substances. However, according to their characteristics, they are of two types.

Substances are *jīva* and *ajīva*. Those with *cetanā* (sentience) and *upayoga* (psychic activity) are *jīva*, *pudgala*, etc., non-sentient substances are *ajīva*.

Nature of *ātmā* is to know and see, and is with *upayoga*. It is not said that *ātmā* is with perturbations. Five other non-sentient substances are *pudgala*, etc.

This universe has six substances, which are *jīva* (sentient substance), *pudgala* (physical matter), *dharma* (ether matter aiding the movement of self-moving substances), *adharma* (ether matter aiding stoppage of substances stationary by self), *ākāśa* (space), and *kāla* (time/aiding modification). These are permanent. No one makes that which is permanent, and that which can be made cannot be permanent. Some may say that someone has created this universe. This universe is *pariyāya* (modification), and modification can manifest, isn't it?

Its answer is that the non-self cannot be manifested, but manifests by itself. Substances are not made; they are *anādi-anaṅta* (with no beginning or end).

When substances are seen as substances, then there is no division among them. Despite the state of substance being similar in every substance, due to their own specific characteristics, there are differences among them. By only saying the word ‘*dravya*’ (substance) - *jīva* and *ajīva* are not distinct, but their specific characteristics distinguish them. In this way, distinctions between *jīva* and *ajīva* occur.

jīva is only of one type, which is the substance *ātmā*. Characteristic of *jīva* is the attribute of sentience, which is with *upayoga* (psychic activity), and there are infinite *jīvas* in the universe. There are five types of *ajīva*: *pudgala dravya*, *dharma dravya*, *adharma dravya*, *ākāśa dravya*, and *kāla dravya*.

The unique/specific characteristic of *jīva* is the state of sentience and the state of *upayoga*. The nature of *jīva* is to know all knowables in one *samaya*. By refusing to know one *jñeya* (knowable), the nature of *jñāna* is negated, and then sentience and psychic activity cannot be proved.

- Sentience pervades the infinite attributes of *jīva*, like *astitva* (attribute of existence), *vastutva* (attribute due to which substance has its meaningful activity), *agurulaghutva* (attribute of constancy and individuality), etc. Hence, it illuminates the nature of *jīva*.
- Sentience is never destroyed. *jīva* could be in any state, even if it were the state of *nigoda* (beings with one sense), but sentience is indestructible.
- Sentience is glorious, and all other substances are not so.
- Sentience is in the form of experience, so it is possible to experience it.
- *upayoga*, which is the result of sentience, is the modification of *jīva*.

That substance, made up of the characteristics mentioned above of *cetanā* and *upayoga*, is the substance *jīva*. Sentience is filled in the substance *jīva*, and *upayoga* of sentience inhabits the modification. Sentience exists in every attribute and every modification of the substance *jīva*. That is called the *jīva dravya*. Such sentience is not seen in body, speech, or other non-sentient substances. Attributes of non-sentience are non-sentient, and its modifications are also non-sentient. The non-sentient substance exists as non-sentient,

inside out. Body, speech, sense organs, etc., all are filled with insentience. Therefore, those substances are *ajīva dravya*.

The nature of substance cannot match with those who believe only in *ekānta* (singularity), meaning *ekānta advaita* (only non-duality), or *ekānta nitya* (only permanent), or *anitya* (only impermanent). Nature of *ātmā* is not such that it is - '*brahma satya jagat mithyā*' (only constant is the truth and the entire world is a delusion), or 'all together make the *ātmā*.'

- Saying that *jīva* exists proves that all others are *ajīva* substances. Saying that 'you exist' proves that other substances besides 'you' exist. If one has not understood but wants to understand, it proves that besides him, there exists another *jīva* who can explain. Hence, all together, they do not make an *advaita* (non-duality), and all *jīvas* together do not make one *jīva*.
- That which has sentience is *jīva*, and that which has an absence of sentience is *ajīva*. From the view of generality, all are *dravyas* (substances), and from the view of particularity, there are *jīva* and *ajīva*. In *jīva*, the self is one's own nature of *jīva*, but the self is neither the nature of non-self *jīva* nor *ajīva*. If all together were to become one *jīva*, then with perturbation in one *jīva*, other *jīvas* also would have the same intensity of perturbation. But this does not happen. So, every *jīva* is independent.
- When one wants to understand, it proves that one has not understood, and one also has the same *jñāna*. Hence, the self is *jīva*. *ajñāna*, in the form of a lack of understanding, has a state of existence in the present modification. With this, the concept that the present lack of knowledge and attachment-aversions are all delusions is proved incorrect. From the viewpoint of modification, the state of *saṁsāra* exists.
- In the state of *saṁsāra*, the self is in *ajñāna*. In that state, because of one's *ajñāna*, he also imagines happiness and sorrow because he is unaware of the pure nature of the self. With this, non-self substances like *karma*, etc., have also been proved; due to the focus on these, the self has attachment-aversion.
- Self has not been understood, but he believes that he will understand in the future, so he has come to understand. Due to this, it is proven that there will be a change in the state of self.
- Now, the self has determined that a lack of understanding can be changed into understanding. But if one believes that he will understand when *karma* or non-self

substance will move away, then he will never understand. Because karma and non-self substances will exist from eternity to infinity.

- So, where will understanding come from? Will it come from non-self substance or *deva-guru-śāstra*? No, because they are in the form of absence in the self. Then, will understanding come from the present lack of understanding? No. Self-substance is a mass of pure *jñāna-darśana* (knower-seer). A state of understanding will originate with the focus on this.
- Self existed at the time of lack of understanding, and now, at the time of understanding, also, self is present. The state of self has changed, but the self, which is permanent, exists through both. So, this proves that self-*ātmā* is unchanging and permanently pure.
- It is determined that the self is one from the view of substance, but it is numerous from the perspective of modification of lack of understanding and non-understanding.
- Self has not understood earlier and has understood now, meaning he has the correct belief now, but he feels that he cannot put this into conduct immediately. Despite the substance being one, a distinction of attributes is understood. If one did not have the distinction of attributes, he should attain omniscience the moment understanding arises. But this does not occur. So, a distinction of attributes like *śraddhā guṇa* (attribute of belief), *jñāna guṇa* (attribute of knowledge), *cāritra guṇa* (attribute of conduct), *vīrya guṇa* (attribute of power) is seen. Self has infinite attributes like, being of self or existence, not being non-self or non-existence, etc. Self is not entirely separate from those attributes, so attributes and the beholder of attributes are separate in a certain way.
- Self is understood partially and experienced. Now, that knowing can develop into complete omniscience.
- With this, it is ascertained that there should be omniscients before, and there should also have been seekers who desired to attain the state of omniscience.
- It is said that the knowledge of the omniscient cannot emanate in speech. But saying that – ‘it cannot come in speech’ – that much did come in speech. This proves that the nature of substance can be understood by speech, in a certain way.
- If all those who attain omniscience become *siddhas* immediately after attaining omniscience, then in whose speech will the nature of substance be known? Because no one except the *vītarāga sarvajña* (passionless omniscient) can be complete. This also proves the existence of omniscient is with the vibration of speech.

- If, after attaining the state of *siddha*, all *jīvas* merge into one another like two flames, then the existence of self will not remain. Further, due to this belief, a manifestation of the state of *siddha* by self-effort and independent experience of unperturbed pure happiness does not remain. So, this concept is erroneous. All *siddha jīvas* stay separate and experience their joy independently.

Such is the state of substance, and it has come precisely so in the *jñāna* of omniscient and His speech. Hence, those who believe the state of a substance to be singularly different from this will not have their belief match the nature of the substance.

(The essence here is that even though there is oneness in *dravyas* (substances) from the viewpoint of generality, but from the perspective of the characteristic of particularity, substances are of two types, *jīva* and *ajīva*. Substance with the greatness and psychic activity of sentience is *jīva*; without sentience is *ajīva*.)

jīvas are only of one type. The division is not that one stays ignorant from eternity to infinity, and one stays omniscient. By his effort, *jīva* can manifest the state of omniscience in his modification, and even when there is ignorance in the modification, he is with the efficacy of omniscience. It is not the nature of substance that - he will remain a devotee of *bhagavāna* and remain ignorant. It is possible to become omniscient by manifesting the efficacy of omniscience. (In this way, there is one type of *jīva* and five divisions of *ajīva*.) All of this will be elaborated on in the ensuing verses.

gāthā-128

अथ लोकालोकत्वविशेषं निश्चिनोति-

Now, the distinctive characteristic nature of *loka* (universe) and *aloka* (space beyond occupied universe) is determined:

पोगलजीवणिबद्धो धम्माधम्मत्थिकायकालद्धो ।
वट्टदि आगासे जो लोगो सो सव्वकाले दु ॥१२८॥

poggalajīvaṇibaddho dhammādhmattikāyakāladḍho |
vaṭṭadi āgāse jo logo so savvakāle du || 128 ||

gāthā: That part of *ākāśa* (space) which is occupied by *jīva* (sentient beings) and *pudgalas* (physical matter) and is endowed with *kāla* (time) as well as *dharmāstikāya* and *adharmāstikāya* (mediums of motion and rest) that is the *loka* at all times, and the rest, which is only *ākāśa*, is *aloka*.

tīkā: In fact, substance is with the particularity (distinction) of the state of *loka* and *aloka*, because each of them has its own characteristics. The characteristic of *loka* (universe) is an assimilation of the six kinds of substances (a conglomeration of the six substances), and the characteristic of *aloka* is only the presence of *ākāśa* (only infinite empty space).

That which pervades all substances, being supremely extensive, is *ākāśa*. There, all *jīvas* and *pudgalas*, which are with the attributes of *gati-sthiti* (movement and rest), attain the state of movement and rest, (where, in that part), *dharma* and *adharma* are *nimitta* (instrumental cause) in movement and rest, and they pervade. In that part, said to be *kāla*, which is *nimitta* in modification of all *dravyas*, is always present. That much part is *ākāśa* and conglomeration of the remaining (all) *dravyas*, whose self-characteristic is self-existence, that is, *loka*. In that part of *ākāśa* in which *jīvas* and *pudgalas* do not move or rest, there is no *dharma*, *adharma*, and *kāla* is not present, and where there is only *ākāśa*, whose self-characteristic is by self-existence, is *aloka*.

pravacana on gāthā-128

Now, the substance is divided into two types based on *kṣetra* (area). *loka* is defined as the state of nature of the agglomeration of six substances. This agglomeration of six substances comprises *ākāśa*, which is vast and pervades everything. *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*,

and *kāla* all exist in this *ākāśa*. Thus, the agglomeration of these six substances is known as *loka*.

- (1-2) All substances stay in *ākāśa*. In that, there are *jīvas* and *pudgalas*, which have the characteristics of motion and rest. This shows the nature of *jīvas* and *pudgalas*. It is not that they move because of *dharmāstikāya* and rest because of *adharma*stikāya. The question of why *jīvas* and *pudgalas* sometimes move and sometimes are at rest does not arise because it is their nature.

Some may ask that even though *siddha jīvas* are the most powerful, why do they not go into *aloka*? Do they not go because there is an absence of *dharmāstikāya* in *aloka*? In *Tattvārthasūtra*, it has been said that *siddha jīvas* do not go into the *aloka* due to an absence of *dharmāstikāya* in it.

The answer is that it is the nature of substance that the substance of *loka* will not go into *aloka*. *siddha jīvas* also are substances of the *loka*. So, it is the nature of *siddha jīvas* not to go into *aloka*. The statement of *Tattvārthasūtra* that they do not go due to an absence of *dharmāstikāya* has been said only to impart knowledge of *nimitta*. Even in *loka*, *dharmāstikāya* is merely *nimitta* in those *jīvas* and *pudgalas* that are in motion by themselves. *dharmāstikāya* cannot make them move. Every substance should be seen by its own nature. If *niscaya* is present, then *vyavahāra* will be named. Wherever *upādāna* (substantial cause) is present, *nimitta* (instrumental cause) will be there. But *upādāna* is not there due to *nimitta*.

- (3) When *jīva* and *pudgala* move due to their efficacy, then *dharmāstikāya*, which is an undivided, intangible substance, is the *nimitta*, and it is prevalent throughout the *lokākāśa*.
- (4) When *jīva* and *pudgala* rest due to their efficacy, then *adharma*stikāya, which is an undivided, intangible substance, is the *nimitta*, and it is prevalent throughout the *lokākāśa*.
- (5) All six substances modify by their behavioural nature. In that, the intangible substance *kālāṇu* is *nimitta*. On every space point of *lokākāśa*, there is one *kālāṇu*. In this way, there are innumerable *kālāṇus*.

Question: Don't the *siddhas* also have to modify due to the substance *kāla*? If the substance *kāla* did not exist, would not the modification stop?

Answer: It is the nature of all *jīvas*, including *siddhas*, to modify-change. Is it possible for anyone to leave their nature? The question of what would happen if this were not there is inappropriate. There is nothing to question when it is nature. Here, it has only been explained that every substance modifies itself, and *kāla* is *nimitta* in it. He who believes in dependency will only look for dependency, and the one who focuses on pure nature will look for pure nature.

Now, the characteristics of *aloka* are explained.

In that part of *ākāśa*, in which *jīvas* and *pudgala* do not move or rest by their own self, *dharma* and *adharma* do not exist by their own self, and where there are no *kālāṇus*. That part whose self-characteristic is only *ākāśa* is *aloka*. In *aloka*, except *lokākāśa*, the rest of the *ākāśa* is there. No other *dravyas* are present. This is the nature of *aloka*.

loka is limited, and *aloka* is unlimited. If *jñeyas* (knowables) are not known precisely as they are, then the *jñāna* will be contrary. The belief that there is only one *brahma* in this world and nothing else is present - is contrary *jñāna*. For the greatness of *jñāna*, particularities of *jñeyas* must be understood in the way they are.

अथ क्रियाभावतद्भावविशेषं निश्चिनोति-

Now, it is ascertained that from the viewpoint of *kriyā bhāva* (attribute of motion/action or region-changing capacity) and *tada-bhāva* (attribute of qualitative being/modifying capacity), which are capacities of substances, there is a distinction of substances:

**उप्पादट्टिदिभंगा पोगलजीवप्पगस्स लोगस्स ।
परिणामादो जायंते संघादादो व भेदादो ॥१२९॥**

*uppādatṭhidibhaṅgā poggalajīvappagassa logassa |
pariṇāmādo jāyante saṅghādādo va bhedādo || 129 ||*

gāthā: *utpāda* (origination), *dhrauvya* (permanence), and *vyaya* (destruction) take place in this universe consisting of *ātmā* and matter by way of modification (evolution), combination, and separation.

tīkā: Some substances possess (both capacities) of *kriyā* (action/motion) and *bhāva* (qualitative being/modifying), and some substances possess mere *bhāva* (qualitative/modifying) capacity - from this viewpoint, there is a differentiation of substance. *pudgala* (physical matter) and *jīva* (sentient being) both possess *bhāva* (qualitative being) and *kriyā* (action/motion) because they have origination, permanence, and annihilation by evolution, combination, and separation. But the remaining four substances (*dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *kāla*) possess merely qualitative attributes because they originate, are permanent and are destroyed by their own modification. This is definitive. Here, *bhāva* (qualitative attribute) is characterised as simple modification/evolution, and *kriyā* (action/motion) is characterised as movement. There, all substances are with *bhāva* as (qualitative beings), and because of their modifying nature, they, through modification/evolution, are endowed with *anvaya* (constancy) and *vyatireka* (mutual exclusions), originate, remain permanent and annihilate. But *pudgalas* (matter substances) also possess the *kriyā*-action/motion because of their movement nature. Separate *pudgalas*, through movement, combine by their own system, and the combined *pudgalas* again separate; therefore (from this viewpoint), they originate, remain permanent and are destroyed.

In the same way, *jīvas* (sentient beings), too (besides their being possessed of *bhāva* - qualitative modifying capacity), possess *kriyā* (action/movement) because of their nature

of movement. *jīvas* (sentient beings), though separate from new karmic matter and quasi-karmic matter, combine with them by movement, and later, the same *jīva* separates from these combined karmic-matter and quasi-karmic matter, so, (from this viewpoint) they originate, remain permanent, and are destroyed.

pravacana on gāthā-129

Here, particularities (distinctions) of substances are ascertained by way of the nature of *kriyā* (activity/motion) and *bhāva* (qualitative state).

Some substances are with *kriyā* (activity/modification) and *bhāva* (qualitative state), and some are only with *bhāva* (qualitative state). So, from this viewpoint, substances are of two types. From them, *pudgala* and *jīvas* are with activity/motion, because -

- (1) By way of change (qualification/modification) and
- (2) They originate, remain permanent and annihilate by way of separating and combining.

So, it is ascertained that the rest of the substances, which are *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, and *kāla*, merely originate, remain permanent and annihilate by way of activity in the form of qualification/modification.

The characteristic of *bhāva* is change/modification, and the characteristic of *kriyā* is to separate and combine.

All substances are with *bhāva* (modification/qualification) because the nature of all substances is to modify. As a result of this nature of modification, they originate along with attaining the state of *anvaya* (be at one) and *vyatireka* (separate/distinct).

jīva, who believes that the reason for auspicious thoughts is a temple, the reason for sorrow is the land of *naraka*, or it is because of *bhogabhūmi*, where modification of vows does not arise, or the body moves due to *ātmā*, *dharma* can arise with activity of the body, is an ignorant. This is because *jīva* modifies in the form of an auspicious or inauspicious state due to its nature to modify. To believe modification to be due to non-self substance, space, time, and attributes is ignorance. All substances are with *bhāva*. So, the question that *bhāva* of *ātmā* arose due to the presence of another substance is not valid. Here, the talk is of the modification of every *samaya* and not to the modification of two *samayas*.

All thoughts of dependency, like a stick arose because *jīva* is present, the car stopped as there was no petrol in it, the lion and deer are calm due to the presence of *Bhagavāna*, *kevalajñāna* does not manifest as this is the fifth era, as it is a particular time in the morning,

desire to do *sāmāyika* arises, shows the state of ignorance. In fact, every substance that originates- annihilates- is permanent due to its own modification nature. If its modification/qualification were to occur to any other, then where would the *bhāva* of this substance go? So, it should be ascertained that the nature of *jñeya* substances is that every substance modifies due to its own nature.

jīva and *pudgala* are both with *kriyā* (motion). *pudgala* substance, along with being of the nature to modify, also has the ability to move, which allows it to move from one space to another. Due to this ability, separate *paramāṇus* combine, and the ones that are joined, separate. In this way, by separating and combining, *pudgala* substance originates, stays permanent and annihilates.

First, the *paramāṇus* (smallest unit of physical matter) of *laddoo* (Indian sweet) were separate, in the form of flour, then they combined to form *laddoos*, and at the time of eating, they separated again. This combining and separating of *paramāṇu* is due to its *kriyāvatīśakti* (efficacy of movement), and not due to *jīva*. First, *paramāṇus* were separate; after that, they combined in the form of *karma-skandha* (combining of more than one *paramāṇu*) and were separated again. This combining-separating is due to *kriyāvatīśakti* and not due to *jīva*.

This separating, combining and being permanent occurs constantly. This kind of *kriyāvatīśakti* is present in *pudgala*, and it is due to this that the process of moving from one space to another continues. However, ignorant people do not see this nature of *pudgala*; they see associations and believe that this motion occurred due to the presence of a certain *nimitta*.

It is not that karmic matter particles come into bondage due to the attributes of *ātmā*, and karmic matter particles become non-existent due to pure disposition. Karmic matter particles come into bondage or are released due to their nature of modification and not due to *ātmā*. If it is said that vegetables were cut into pieces with a knife, then it is not due to the knife, but rather the pieces were made due to the efficacy of the motion of the vegetables.

Vibration of the body is not due to *ātmā* but is due to the ability of vibration of *pudgala*. It is not due to *ātmā* or the hand that the book moves up or down. It moves due to the nature of vibration in the book.

Here, vibration means moving from one place to another. Śrīmad Rājcañdrajī has said that ‘we do not have the ability to break into two even a small piece of grass’. By explaining

the nature of *pudgala* (physical matter), it is being told that *jīva* is incapable of doing anything on non-self. In this way, the independent nature of all substances is shown.

It is the nature of *jīva* to modify every *samaya*, and further, *jīva* has *kriyāvatīśakti* (efficacy of motion) also. Modification originates due to its nature to vibrate, is permanent and annihilates. *karma* in the form of *jñānāvarṇa* (knowledge obstructing karma), etc., *nokarma* (quasi karma), physical matter, occupy the same space with *jīva*, and by way of vibration, they separate again. There, combining with *karma* is destroyed, is permanent in the form of *jīva* and originates in the form of separating from it.

It is not so that due to the absence of *karma*, the *jīva* is liberated, and due to the bondage of *karma*, it is in bondage. *jīva* moves from one space to another due to its ability to move, and *karmas* separate at that time due to their efficacy of motion. So, he is said to have originated separately from *karma*. Similarly, *karma* attains a state of bondage due to its own ability of *ek kṣetra avgāha* (to share the same space), and *jīva* attains it due to its ability. This way, it is said that *jīva* is one with *karma*.

ātmā is seen to shrink with the shrinking of the body and to expand with the expansion of the body. In both, the state to be in the form of gross or subtle, and the change of space, are not dependent on each other. In fact, the body shrinks-expands and changes space due to itself (*ātmā* does it due to *ātmā*). In the fourteenth *guṇasthāna* (stage of evolution), despite there being no vibration of *yog* (tremor of space points of *ātmā*), *ātmā* has the movement of separating, whereas *karmas* separate due to their own self.

If *kriyāvatīśakti* (efficacy of motion) of body and *ātmā* is understood correctly, then the false belief that one substance moves due to another, or if *jīva* is not present, then the dead body cannot move, is removed. In fact, both substances assume the state of movement due to their own efficacy to move or be still due to their ability to be stagnant. Such is the independent nature of *jñeyas* (knowables). This kind of appropriate knowing of *jñeyas* is the reason for *samyagjñāna*. Efficacy to modify and efficacy to move is the nature of *jñeyas*. On deciding this, the false belief, since eternity, that the self can shift-move-change non-self substances, and that if non-self is present, only modification can occur, is destroyed. With this correct knowing, the state of *dharma* arises in the self.

अथ द्रव्यविशेषो गुणविशेषादिति प्रज्ञापयति -

Now, it is explained that substances are differentiated by virtue of their specific attributes/qualities: -

**लिंगेहिं जेहिं दव्वं जीवमजीवं च हवदि विण्णादं ।
तेऽतब्भावविसिद्धा मुत्तामुत्ता गुणा पेया ॥१३०॥**

*liṅgehiṃ jehiṃ davvaṃ jīvama jīvaṃ ca havadi viṇṇādaṃ |
tetaḁbhāvavisiṭṭhā muttāmuttā guṇā peyā || 130 ||*

gāthā: Characteristics by which *ātmā* (sentient being) and *pudgala* (non-sentient) substances are recognised/known, these non-identical, corporeal-incorporeal qualities (*mūrta-amūrta guṇa*) should be known.

ṭīkā: Substance is said to be *liṅgita* (with characteristic) - recognised by *liṅgas* (characteristics), which exist with the auspice of *dravya* (substance) and does not exist with the auspice of non-self. Such *liṅgas* (characteristics) are *guṇas* (qualities/attributes). Those (*guṇas*/attributes) are in the form of *atadabhāva* (non-identity/not the same), from the view of ‘that which is *dravya* (substance) is not *guṇas*, and that which is *guṇas* (qualities/attributes) is not *dravya* (substance). In this way, they exist as the particularity of *atadabhāva* (non-identity/not the same), and at the time of being recognised as *liṅga* and *liṅgī* (characteristics and one with characteristics), it attains the state of *liṅgas* (characteristic) of the substance.

And those *guṇas* (qualities) create such a sort of differentiation in the substances that this is *jīva* (sentient), and this is *ajīva* (non-sentient) because they themselves are possessed of the differentiation by their *tada-bhāva* (distinct identity). Whatever the nature of substance, it being its distinctive quality, a substance is differentiated by that nature; therefore, as corporeal and incorporeal substances are differentiated by their distinctive identity of either corporeality or incorporeality, we should ascertain the differentiation of qualities that ‘these qualities are corporeal, and those are incorporeal.’

pravacana on gāthā-130

The *līngas* (characteristics) by which substance is recognised as *jīva* and *ajīva* (sentient and non-sentient), that *atadabhāva* (non-identity/not the same) should be recognised as specific attributes of *mūrta-amūrta* (corporeal/ non-corporeal). *līnga* or attribute, and *cinha* (mark) mean the same.

Attributes take auspices of their self-substance but do not take auspices of non-self. Attributes of *ātmā* and *pudgala* take the auspices of their own self-substance, respectively. Attributes of insentient matter exist without taking the auspice of *ātmā*, and attributes of *ātmā* exist without taking the auspice of insentient matter. That characteristic with which a substance can be recognized is *guṇa* (attribute).

Substance is not an attribute, and attribute is not a substance, even though there is no difference in space points between substance and its attributes; however, there is a difference by name, number, and characteristic.

1. Both have different names—one is called *dravya*, and the other is called *guṇa*. There is a difference due to the difference in name.
2. In number, *dravya* is one, and *guṇas* are many. By this, there is a difference due to the difference in number.
3. *dravya* is generality, and *guṇa* is particularity.
 - *dravya* gives auspice, and *guṇas* takes auspice.
 - *guṇa* can be in a *dravya*, but *dravya* cannot be in only one *guṇa*.
 - *dravya* is a conglomeration of infinite *guṇas*, but there is only one characteristic in one *guṇa*.

Therefore, there is a difference between them due to differences in characteristics. In this way, substance and attribute are not of the same form in some ways, i.e., they are not of that form. Due to this, they remain distinct in some ways. So, attribute is a *līnga* (characteristic mark), meaning a particularity. And substance is a *līngī* (holder of *līnga*) or that which can be recognized by its *lakṣaṇa* (nature). Therefore, attribute is a characteristic of substance.

guṇa creates a division in *dravyas*, like – ‘this is *jīva dravya*’ and ‘this is *ajīva dravya*’. This is because *guṇa*, being with the self/being with particularity, exists as particularity. The way sentience is exclusive to a *jīva* substance, and non-sentience is exclusive to *ajīva* substance. With this, the differentiation between sentient and non-sentient substances is

made. The distinction between the two is known. In the same way, corporeal substances like touch, taste, smell, colour, etc., are *pudgala* substances, and non-corporeal substances are *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, and *kāla*. Corporeal substances have the attribute of corporeality, and non-corporeal substances have the attribute of non-corporeality. Those attributes have the particularity of being corporeal or non-corporeal, and they have this distinction. To decide that *pudgala* substance has corporeality and *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, and *kāla* have non-corporeality is the cause of purity in *jñāna*.

gāthā 131

अथ मूर्तमूर्तगुणानां लक्षणसंबन्धमाख्याति -

Now the definition and relation of corporeal and non-corporeal attributes is explained –

**मुत्ता इंदियगेज्झा पोग्गलदव्वप्पगा अणेगविधा ।
दव्वाणममुत्ताणं गुणा अमुत्ता मुणेदव्वा ॥ १३१ ॥**

*muttā imdiyagejjhā poggaladvappagā aṇegavidhā |
davaṇaṃ amuttāṇaṃ guṇā amuttā muṇedavvā || 131 ||*

gāthā: Corporeal attributes perceived by sense-organs are of the nature of *pudgala* (*mūrtika pudgala dravya*/ physical non-sentient substance) and are of many kinds. The attributes of *amūrta* (incorporeal) substances should be known to be incorporeal.

ṭīka: The characteristics of corporeal attributes are perceptible by sense-organs, and characteristics of incorporeal attributes are just the opposite of that (or incorporeal attributes cannot be known through senses). And corporeal attributes are of *pudgala dravya* (physical matter substance) because *pudgala* alone is *mūrta* (corporeal), and non-corporeal attributes belong to all other substances because all other substances, other than *pudgala* substances, are incorporeal.

pravacana on gāthā-131

Now, the characteristics of corporeal and non-corporeal attributes and their relationship to or association with which substance exists have been explained here.

Corporeal attributes, which are perceived by the senses, are of *pudgala* substance and are of various types. Attributes of non-corporeal substances are known to be non-corporeal. Characteristics of corporeal attributes are known through the senses; for example, touch, taste, smell, sight, etc., are known through the five senses. So, they are corporeal attributes or tangible.

Non-corporeal attributes cannot be known by the senses but can be known by the *ātmā*. One in which touch, taste, smell, or colour is absent – the senses cannot know such non-corporeality.

The attribute of corporeality is in *pudgala* substance, because only the *pudgala* substance is tangible, while non-corporeal attributes are in the other five substances -- *jīva*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *kāla*. Besides *pudgala*, the other five substances are non-corporeal. In this way, *ātmā* does not have touch, taste, smell, or colour. Similarly, the other four substances also do not have it. Thus, correct knowing of the knowables as corporeal-non-corporeal is the trait of knowledge.

अथ मूर्तस्य पुद्गलद्रव्यस्य गुणान् गृणाति --

Now, (specific) qualities/attributes of corporeal matter substance are enumerated: -

**वण्णरसगंधफासा विज्जंते पोग्गलस्स सुहुमादो ।
पुढवीपरियंतस्स य सद्दो सो पोग्गलो चित्तो ॥१३२॥**

*vaṇṇarasagaṇdhaphāsā vijjaṃte poggalassa suhumādo |
puḍhaviṭṭhapaṇṇāyantaṃssa ya saddo so poggalo citto || 132 ||*

gāthā: *varṇa* (colour), *rasa* (taste), *gaṇḍha* (smell), and *sparaśa* (touch) are the qualities found in *pudgalas* (physical matter substances) from the subtlest to the gross earth. Various kinds of sound are modifications of material substances.

ṭīkā: Touch, taste, smell, and colour are perceptible by the sense organs because they are objects of the senses. These may be perceived or not according to the manifested and unmanifested power of the perceptibility of the senses. Nevertheless, these (qualities) are found to be common to all forms of specific qualities in every kind of matter substance, beginning from the smallest unit of matter consisting of one substance (matter) in the most subtle modified form, to the earth, which is an aggregate of gross modification form consisting of innumerable (matter) substances. Because they are *mūrta* (corporeal) and not being inherent in remaining substances, they prove *pudgala* (matter) substance.

Further, one should not have such doubts that sound/words, being perceived/heard by a sense organ (ear) would also be a *guṇa* (attribute); because it is accepted in the form of modification of matter consisting of many matter substances and is seen in various forms due to the variegation in its nature.

Question: If sound/word is accepted to be a *guṇa*/quality (instead of *parayāya*/modification), then ‘why is it not correct’- this is answered:

Answer: Firstly, sound/word is not *guṇa* of incorporeal substance, because incorporeal substance would also be an object of the auditory sense-organ owing to the indivisibility of *pradeśas* (spatial units) of *guṇa* and *guṇi* (possessor of quality) as they both are realised/known by the realisation of sentience. Secondly, sound/word is not a *guṇa* of corporeal substance, also because the characteristic nature of the attribute is eradicated here by the characteristic nature of modification. The nature of modification is momentary and

incidental, and the nature of the attribute is constant. So, (in the case of sound/word), constancy is eradicated by momentariness (i.e., word/sound emits, but not always, and is not durable). Hence, word/sound is not a *guṇa*, and durability is found in several *pudgalas* and their touch, etc., attributes produce it, but its durability is not of modification of word/sound - thus, we should understand this with complete conviction.

Further, if word/sound is the modification of *pudgala* (matter), then it should be with the attribute of touch, sense, etc., just like earth-aggregate in the gross form of several (matter substances), i.e., as modification of *pudgala* in the form of earth-aggregate is known by all sense organs, so in the same way word sound should be known by all the sense organs. (If such logic is given, then) It is not so because water (modification of *pudgala*) is not the object of olfactory (sense related to nose); fire is not an object of olfactory or taste; and air is not the object of the sense of smell, taste, or sight. And it is not so also that water is devoid of smell; fire is devoid of - smell and taste and air is devoid smell, taste and colour; - because it is accepted that all kinds of *pudgalas* possess the four-fold set of qualities – touch, etc., because the same matter parts which give rise to (1) *candrakānta maṇi* (moon-stone), (2) fire-stick (*arani* wood) and (3) barley-corn, which possess four-fold set of qualities, touch, etc., in the *vyakta* (manifested) form - they manifest origination of (1) water with unmanifest smell (2) fire (light) with unmanifest smell and taste and (3) air in the stomach with unmanifest smell, taste and colour.

And by chance somewhere (in some modification), i.e., manifestation or non-manifestation of some *guṇa* occurring due to peculiarity of incidental modification, it does not cause hindrance of the eternal characteristic nature of a substance. (i.e., manifested and non-manifested attributes which occur due to momentary modification do not create any contrary state with a permanent nature of substance).

Therefore, let sound be *parayāya* of *pudgala*.

pravacana on gāthā-132

Colour, taste, smell, and touch attributes are present in all the physical matter particles. They are present in all physical matters, from the subtle to gross forms like the earth; a word/sound of a specific type is *pudgala* -meaning modification of *pudgala*.

Cold, hot, etc., touch, sour, sweet, etc., taste, stench, fragrance, white, red, yellow, etc., colour can be known through the senses because they are objects of the senses.

One matter particle and aggregation of homogenous *karmas*, etc., are a subtle mass, which, while imperceivable by senses, have the ability to be known by the senses. Currently, this ability is not in the state of manifestation, but they have the potential ability to be known through senses. Because *paramānu*, which aggregates when it is in the form of gross mass, on modifying as subtle mass, when assuming the form of gross mass, attains the ability to be known by the senses. If it did not have the ability to be known through the senses, then even assuming the gross form, it would not be known through the senses. But on becoming the gross form, it is known by the senses. Therefore, it is decided that they have the inherent strength of being known by senses, which is present even in the subtle form.

Therefore, from the subtle modification of one *pudgala* substance to the mass of earth, which is in the form of gross substance, all *pudgalas* are in the form of generality. Without leaving out any *pudgala*, the attributes of touch, taste, smell, and colour are specific attributes. Since these attributes are perceived by the senses, they are not present in the other five substances. It means that touch, etc., attributes are specific attributes of *pudgala*, so they denote *pudgala* (physical matter).

Question: Why is it not said that *jīva* and *ajīva* together are one only? Or is the pure nature of the existing sentient state of joy non-dual? What is the purpose of knowing these divisions?

Answer: Listen! One should know the nature of the knowables just the way they are. Accurate knowing arises only by knowing them the way they are. *jñāna*, which is known as - ‘All together is one’, is not correct, and without correct knowing, *dharma* cannot occur. Everything together does not make one substance, nor all *ātmās* together make one *ātmā*. There are six substances in this universe, and all of them together do not make one *dravya* (substance).

- From the viewpoint of a substance, they are common. Still, they have two distinctions - the one with *cetana upayoga* (sentient psychic thought activity) is *jīva*, and the one without sentience is *ajīva*.
- From the aspect of space, there is a division between *loka* and *aloka*.
- From the viewpoint of attributes and efficacy of movement, there is a distinction among substances.
- From the viewpoint of corporeal attributes and non-corporeal attributes, there is a difference between substances. In this way, there is a distinction from the view of

attributes. And substance is not an attribute, and attribute is not a substance. There is *kathañcita atadbhāva* (not the same in a certain way) amongst both.

In this way, it should be known what the difference is between one substance and another, and what is the aspect of distinction and oneness within the self.

Words are not attributes, but they are the modification of many physical matters. Words can be known through the senses, but there should be no doubt that, because of this, they are attributes. Words are manifold and of various types.

- (1) ***bhāṣātmaka śabda*** (linguistic words) – Words spoken by humans, etc., are called linguistic. In that, the language of humans has syllables, the language of *jīvas* having two to four senses, and *tiryāñca* is without syllables. They are both used practically/experimentally.
- (2) ***abhāṣātmaka śabda*** (non-linguistic words) – Non-linguistic is the sound emitted from the collision of two substances. It is of two types- *prāyogika* and *vaistrasika*.
- (3) ***prāyogika*** – When a human is *nimitta* in the arising of such word/sound, it is called *prāyogika*, like the sound of a percussion or a bell.
- (4) ***vaistrasika*** – A word/sound which emits naturally without the *nimitta* of a human is said to be *vaistrasika*, like the thunder of the clouds.

In this way, despite words being shown of diverse types, they are believed to be composed up of many modifications of many *pudgalas*. Words are neither attributes nor modifications of one attribute. Word/sound is the conjoined state of many *pudgala* substances and attributes of touch, etc.

Question: What fault will arise if the word/sound is believed to be an attribute and not the state of *pudgala*?

Answer: Word/sound is not an attribute of a non-corporeal substance. Many believe sound is an attribute of the substance-space, but this is false. Because the attribute and the beholder of attributes do not have separate space points, they are in the same space points. The attribute and beholder of attributes are in the same space points; the senses with which the attribute is known and the beholder of attributes should be known with the same sense. Words can be heard through the ears, meaning they are known through senses; therefore, if words are believed to be the attribute of space substance, then space, which is the beholder of attributes, should also be heard through the ears. But space cannot be heard through the ears and cannot be known through any senses.

If sound/word is considered to be an attribute of space, then the way sound can be captured in audio tapes/CDs, in the same way, it should be possible to capture space in audio tapes/CDs.

Ear and sound have a *nimitta-naimitika* relationship; audio tapes and sound have a *nimitta-naimitika* relationship, but space does not have a *nimitta-naimitika* relationship with either ear or audio tapes. Therefore, it is decided that word is the modification of *pudgala* substance and not an attribute of space, etc., non-corporeal substances.

Question: What if words are believed to be an attribute of *pudgala* substance?

Answer: Word-touch-taste-smell-colour, etc., are modifications of attributes. Word is a modification. By way of the characteristic of that modification, the characteristic of the attribute is established. Therefore, word/sound is not an attribute but a modification. It is as follows-

The characteristic of modification is transience, or to be momentary. A state is not permanent. The characteristics of an attribute are that it is constant and present through the three time phases. In this way, there is a distinction between attribute and modification due to the distinction of characteristics between them.

Sometimes words can be heard, and sometimes not. Its state does not remain forever; therefore, words are transient. On the other hand, touch, taste, smell, colour, etc., which are attributes of *pudgala*, remain forever. It is not possible for these attributes not to be present in a *pudgala* at some point.

Now, if a word/sound is believed to be an attribute, then the characteristic of an attribute is to be constant. Hence, the word should also be constant, but the word is not seen to be constant. Speech or words in the form of chatter sometimes arise and sometimes don't. So, they cannot be called constant. In this way, it is ascertained that words are transient/impermanent, and transience is the characteristic of modifications. Impermanence is not the characteristic of the attribute. As words are impermanent, they are the modification of *pudgala* and not an attribute.

The state of permanence is of the *pudgala* substance and its attributes of touch, etc., which is the originator of the word because the substance *pudgala* and its attributes are eternal; they are never destroyed. Whereas word is destroyed and arises – so it is momentary. Hence, the state of permanence is not present in the modification of words/sounds. If word

is the modification of *pudgala*, then it should be known through all the senses – this doubt is cleared below –

Doubt – If word/sound is a state of *pudgala*, then like the mass of earth, it should be known through all the senses. The way, mass of the earth is cold when touched, can be tasted by the tongue, has a smell of stink or fragrance, which is known through the nose, and its white-black colour can be seen by the eyes. So, earth, which is the modification of *pudgala*, is known through all senses. Similarly, if word/sound is the modification of *pudgala*, then it should also be known through all the senses.

Answer – Listen! Your statement is not true. No such rule is that *pudgala* must be known in the manifested form. An example is as follows.

- Water, despite being a state of *pudgala*, cannot be smelt. The stink or fragrance in water is due to other substances mixed with it. The smell of water is not manifested. There is the manifestation of touch, taste, and colour in water, but smell is not manifested. Therefore, water is not the subject of the sense of smell; it is a state of *pudgala*.
- Fire, despite being a state of *pudgala*, cannot be smelt by the nose or tasted by the tongue. (Many times, the burning in a nose is known by touch, and the tongue can burn by fire, but it cannot be tasted.) Touch and colour are manifested in the fire, but taste and smell are not manifested. So, despite fire not being the subject of the senses of smell and taste, it is the state of *pudgala*.
- Air, despite being a state of *pudgala*, cannot be tasted by the tongue, smelt by the nose, or seen by the eyes. Cold or heat in the air is the manifestation of touch, but a manifestation of colour, taste, and smell is absent. So, though air is not the subject of the sense of taste, smell, or colour, it is the modification of *pudgala*.
- It is not so that, water is devoid of smell, so the nose cannot know it; or that fire is devoid of smell and taste, therefore, it cannot be known by nose and tongue; and that because air is devoid of smell, taste, and colour therefore, it cannot be known by nose, tongue and eyes.
- Smell is unmanifested in water, and the explanation of other examples of unmanifestion is that those attributes are always present in the substance, but they are said to be unmanifested because the senses are unable to grasp the states of certain attributes. It is not so that first is taste and then colour because all *pudgalas* have been accepted to have touch, taste, smell, and colour. The difference is only that all four attributes are perceptible in earth: smell is unmanifested in water, smell and taste are unmanifested in fire, and smell, taste, and colour are unmanifested in air.

Given below is the logic to prove this --

- Earth in the form of *candrakāntamaṇi* (moonstone) in which all four, touch-taste-smell-colour are perceptible, from that water flows, in which smell is unmanifested.
- The *pudgala*, fire, which arises from *araṇī* (two pieces of wood which give fire when rubbed), sticks, in that fire smell and taste are unmanifested.
- The food which gives rise to gas in the stomach, in that air, smell, taste, and colour are unmanifested.

Therefore, it is decided that the four attributes present in (1) the moonstone, (2) *arni* wood (wood used to kindle fire), and (3) barley should be present in (1) water, (2) fire, and (3) air. The difference is only that many attributes are in the unmanifested form. And then -

- Water in which smell is unmanifested and the other three attributes are perceptible; that same water, when it originates as the earth embodied form of pearl, or when,
- Fire in which taste and smell are unmanifested, and the other two attributes are perceptible, that same fire, when it manifests as the earth embodied in the form of *kājala* (kohl) – then, all four attributes are seen manifested.

Therefore, by these examples, it is proved that though all the modifications of *pudgala* are not perceptible by all the senses, there is no problem in calling them modifications of *pudgala*. Even though words are comprehended only by the sense of hearing and not by other senses, the attribute of touch, etc., is present in the modifications of word/sound. Due to this, word/sound is the modification of *pudgala* only.

Manifestation and non-manifestation of the variegated state of any modification of any attribute do not destroy the permanent nature of the substance. Because smell cannot be felt in water, the permanency of smell does not leave. The permanency of smell will always remain in the water; in the same way, since touch, taste, etc., are not felt in words, the permanency of touch, etc., does not go away. Touch, etc., remains permanent in the word/sound.

Question: The Attribute of smell is unmanifested in water, but it does have the attribute of smell. Similarly, what if it were to be believed that when words are unmanifested, even at that time, a special attribute exists in *pudgala* by the name of the word?

Answer: If word were an attribute, then it should remain permanent and be present in the isolated *paramānu* also. When one *paramānu* is isolated, then it never modifies in the form

of a word. Touch, etc., all four attributes are present in one *paramānu*; but a distinct attribute named word is not present. When many *paramānus* accumulate together, then sometimes a word can be heard. So, it is proven that there is no such attribute as a word, but many particulate matters put together result in the form of a word/sound.

This way, words are neither an attribute of non-corporeal nor corporeal substances. It is a state of *pudgala*.

Question: Where is religion in deliberating so much about words/sounds?

Answer: Since eternity, *jīva* has the misconception that *ātmā* can speak and can consequently modify words. In this way, due to ignorance, *ātmā* becomes the doer of word/sound. On having true knowledge, *ātmā* is not the doer of the modification of *pudgala* but is the knower. On deciding so, the arrogance of being the doer of words fades away, and the self remains the knower.

Due to delusion, a *jīva* has attachment - aversion to hearing words of condemnation-praise. He used to believe that certain words give happiness and others give sorrow. But whatever the words, they are the modification of *pudgala*, they are knowables, and *ātmā* is their knower. On having such a true knowledge of the state of knowable, there is an absence of thoughts of oneness with attachment-aversion, and bliss manifests in the self, which is *dharma*.

This is the chapter on knowable. Word is the state of *pudgala*, and it is knowable. It is not the duty of *ātmā* to create that state and to believe in happiness-sorrow because of it, but it is the duty and *dharma* of *ātmā* to know them in the form of knowable.

अथामूर्तानां शेषद्रव्याणां गुणान् गृणाति –

Now, qualities of other incorporeal substances are stated: -

आगासस्सवगाहो धम्मद्वस्स गमणहेदुत्तं ।
धम्मेदरद्वस्स दु गुणो पुणो ठाणकारणदा ॥१३३॥
कालस्स वट्टणा से गुणोवओगो त्ति अप्पणो भणिदो ।
जेया संखेवादो गुणा हि मुत्तिप्पहीणाणं ॥ १३४ ॥ जुगलं ।

āgāsassavagāho dhammaddavvassa gumanaheduttaṃ |
dhammedaradavvassa du guṇo puṇo ṭhāṇakāraṇadā || 133 ||
kālassa vaṭṭaṇā se guṇovaogo tti appaṇo bhaṇido |
neya saṃkhevādo guṇo hi muttipphāṇaṇaṃ || 134 || dual |

gāthā: Specific quality/attribute of *ākāśa* (space substance) is to give room/place; of *dharma dravya* is to be a cause/medium of movement; of *adharma dravya* is to be a cause/medium of rest/being stationary; of *kāla dravya* (time substance) is to be a cause of modifying (of modifications); of *ātmā* is *upayoga* (manifestation of sentience). In short, these attributes are known to be the specific qualities/attributes of non-corporeal substances.

ākā: Specific quality of *ākāśa* is to be the cause of giving space to all substances commonly/simultaneously. The specific quality of *dharma dravya* is to be the cause (medium) of movement to all self-moving *jīvas* and matter substances simultaneously. Specific quality of *adharma dravya* is to be the cause of rest/being stationary, of all self-stopping *jīvas* and matter substances simultaneously (except *kāla*/time substances). Specific quality of *kāla dravya* is to be the cause of the occurrence of *samaya vṛtti* (timely evolution) of each modification of all other substances. Specific quality of *jīva* substance is *caitanya pariṇāma*-which is the evolution of knowing activity/manifestation of sentience.

Thus, knowing the specific qualities of non-corporeal substances proves their existence. (This is explained below).

There, the quality of providing common space for all substances simultaneously is possessed by/belongs only to *ākāśa* (space substance) because it (this quality of giving room to other *dravyas*) does not exist in other substances due to their not being all-

pervasive. Similarly, at the same moment of time, all *jīvas* and *pudgalas* who are modifying as motion (who have modified in the form of movement), that which is being the reason of movement to them, till the end of *loka*, prove the substance *dharma* (but) because *kālāṇu* (time) and *pudgala paramāṇu* (smallest matter particle) possess only one *pradeśa* (spatial unit), so this (quality) is not possible in them; also this (quality) is not possible in a *jīva*, except in the case of *samudghāta**, as besides that it has innumerable space points which are a fraction of *loka*. There is no fluctuation of the limit of *loka* (universe) and *aloka* (infinite space beyond the universe). And this (quality) is not possible in *adharma dravya* also, owing to it being the cause of the exact opposite of *dharma*. (Thus, the quality of movement causation belongs to *dharma dravya* only.)

Similarly, the quality of causing rest - being stationary of all self-stopping *jīvas* and *pudgalas* at the same moment, up to the end of *loka*, belongs to *adharma dravya* because *kālāṇu* (time) and *pudgala* (matter) possess only one *pradeśa*, so this quality is not possible in them. Also, this quality is not possible in a *jīva*, as, except in the case of *samudghāta*, it possesses innumerable space points, which are a fraction of *loka*; and this quality is not possible to be of *ākāśa*, as there is no fluctuation of the limit of *loka* and *aloka*, and this quality is not possible to be of *dharma dravya* either, owing to it being the cause of the exact opposite work *adharma*. (Thus, the quality of rest- being stationary, belongs to *adharma dravya* only).

Similarly, (excepting *kāla dravya*) in all other *dravyas*, the reason for every *pariyāya* to be *samaya-vṛtti* (existing for one *samaya*) proves *kāla* (time substance). Because all other substances have a *samaya*-specific modification, being with a reason (or, it would seem, that their *samaya*-specific modification is due to some other reason besides themselves). So, them being *samaya-vṛtti* is not possible.

Similarly, the evolution/manifestation of sentience proves *jīva*, and as it is sentient, this is not possible in other *dravyas*.

In this way, by specification/distinction of *guṇa*, specification/distinction of *dravyas* should be known.

bhāvārtha: As explained earlier, the existence of *pudgala dravyas* is known by its qualities of touch, taste, smell, and colour. Here (in this stanza), the existence of non-corporeal (*amūrta*) substances is defined by their distinct qualities.

(**emanation of ātma pradeśas from the body*)

The characteristic nature of the form of consciousness-evolution is experienced, so the existence of infinite *jīva dravyas* is known. There must be some such substance by the instrumentality of which *jīvas*, *pudgalas*, etc., substances occupy space. That substance is *ākāśa* (space), which pervades the entire *lokāloka* (universe and beyond endlessly). *jīvas* and *pudgalas* are seen to be moving, so there must be some substance by the instrumentality of which *jīvas* and *pudgalas* can be in motion (in the universe but not beyond it), just like water, which is the instrumental cause in the movement of fish. That substance is *dharma dravya*, which pervades the entire *loka*. Just as the earth is an instrumental cause in the stationary state /rest of a man, similarly, there must be some such substance which is the instrumental cause in the stationary state /rest of *jīvas* and *pudgalas*; that substance is *adharma dravya*, which pervades the entire universe. Just as a stick is the instrumental cause in the revolving of the wheel of a potter, similarly, there must be some such substance (except *kāla dravya*) which is instrumental in the modification of all substances. That substance is innumerable *kālāṇus*/time atoms, the *paryāyas* of which are manifested in the form of *samaya* (one unit of time), *ghadi* (24 minutes), *din* (day of 24 hours), *mahina* (month of 30 days), *varṣa* (a year of 12 months), etc.

In this way, the differentiation of substances is ascertained by the differentiation of their qualities.

pravacana on gāthā 133& 134

The qualities of *amūrta* (non-corporeal) substances should be understood as such. For *ākāśa* (space substance), it is *avgaha* (to give space); for *dharma dravya*, it is *gamana hetutva* (instrument in motion); for *adharma dravya*, it is *sthitī hetutva* (instrument in being stationary); for *kāla*, it is *vartanā* (modifying), and the attribute of *ātmā* is *upayoga* (sentient consciousness).

It is incorrect to believe that only corporeal substances can be known and non-corporeal substances cannot be known. Non-sentients have absolutely no quality of knowing, while *ātmā* has the quality of complete knowing. Then what is it that *ātmā* would not know? So *ātmā* can know all corporeal as well as non-corporeal substances.

Now, attributes of *amūrta* (non-corporeal) substances are being explained.

Attribute of *ākāśa* (space substance) -- The ability to give space to all substances simultaneously is the specific attribute of *ākāśa*. Here, the word ‘*hetu*’ means *nimitta*

(auxiliary cause). When other substances occupy space due to themselves, then *ākāśa* is said to be the *nimitta*. *ākāśa* is all-pervasive, and it is its attribute to be *nimitta* in giving space to all substances. *ākāśa* has infinite space points, covers *loka* and *aloka*, and is unbroken and intangible.

Attribute of *dharma dravya* - When *jīva* and *pudgala* move due to their own self, then *dharma dravya* has the unique attribute of being *nimitta* in the motion of all of them together. *dharma dravya* has innumerable space points, is equal to *loka*, and is intangible. *dharma dravya* does not make *jīva* and *pudgala* move, but when *jīva* and *pudgala* move, then it is *nimitta* to them.

Attribute of *adharma dravya* -- When *jīva* and *pudgala* stop while moving due to their own self, then *adharma dravya* has the unique attribute of being *nimitta* in the stopping of motion of all of them together. *adharma dravya* has innumerable space points, is equal to *loka*, and is intangible. *adharma dravya* does not stop *jīva* and *pudgala* from moving, but when *jīva* and *pudgala* stop moving by themselves, then it is said to be *nimitta*.

The attribute of *kāla dravya* - *nimitta* in the modification of each of the *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, or the reason for modifying, is the unique attribute of the substance *kāla*. On every space point of the space of *loka*, there is one *kālāṇu* (the smallest unit of time/absolute time). There are innumerable such intangible *kālāṇus* in the *loka*.

It is incorrect to believe that *Siddha Bhagavānas* are subordinate to the *kāla* substance, so they must modify. No substance is dependent on any other. *kāla* substance does not modify any substance. But when the substance is modifying due to its nature to modify, then the *kāla* substance is said to be the *nimitta*. This is because it is the unique attribute of *kāla* to be instrumental or *nimitta* in modifying.

The attribute of *jīva dravya* – modification of sentience, or to know-to see, is the unique attribute of *jīva*. *jīva* does not know because other non-self substances are present, and it is impossible that any non-self substance would not be known by *jīva*. In the *loka*, there are infinite *jīvas*, each with innumerable space points. It is the nature of *jñāna* to know *sāmānya* (general) and *viśeṣa* (specific/unique). If an ignorant person believes that knowing so much of the specific gives rise to attachments, then he is rejecting his nature of *jñāna*. The real nature of *jñāna* is *svapara prakāśaka* (illuminating self and non-self). *jīva* has the efficacy to know everything all at once. Knowing specifics is not the reason for attachments, but the ability of the self to be attached is the reason for attachment.

It is not the nature of *jīva* to do good or bad to the non-self. It is not its nature to change anything in the *paramāṇu*. Attachment, aversion, compassion, charity, etc., are also not its nature. They are peculiarities of the unnatural state. The inherent nature of *jīva* is *jñātā-drṣṭā* (to know-to see).

Question: Hasn't *jīva* been called tangible in Dravyasaṅgraha?

Answer: There is no state of tangibleness in *jīva*. But in the state of transmigration, *jīva* is associated with *karma* and body. So, figuratively speaking, it is said to be tangible. But in fact, *jīva* is recognised by its attribute of intangibility and sentience through all three-time phases.

In the state of ignorance, *jīva* imagines a friend to be favourable and a foe to be unfavourable. But they are separate *jīva* substances from the self. They should be recognised by the modification of their sentience. Their body and speech, etc., should be recognised as separate from them. It should not be believed that some *jīva* can give benefit or loss to another.

When specific attributes of the intangible substances are understood, in short, then the characteristics to recognise intangible substances are understood. In other words, those characteristics establish the existence of those intangible substances.

To apply *bheda jñāna* (knowledge of distinction) by way of the characteristics of the substances and to ascertain them is the reason for *samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritra*.

Now, these specific attributes will be explained with clarity.

The attribute of *ākāśa* (space substance) is *avgāhanahetutva* (ability to give space) – *ākāśa* is *nimitta* for giving space to all substances altogether in generality. Other substances, like *jīva* and *pudgala*, are not all-pervasive. *kālāṇu* occupies only one space point. *dharma* and *adharma* are spread throughout the entire *loka*, but are absent in *aloka*. Hence, they, too, are not all-pervasive. So, they cannot be *nimitta* in giving space to all other substances. Only *ākāśa* is the largest in terms of area covered, is spread through *loka* and *aloka*, and has the ability to give space to all others. This is its nature, which has come in the *kevalajñāna* of *Bhagavāna*.

The attribute of *dharma dravya* (ether matter) is *gatihetutva* (*nimitta* in self-moving substances): All *jīvas* and *pudgalas* modify in the form of movement, altogether, until the *loka*; then, it is said that *dharma dravya* is *nimitta* in that motion.

kāla and *pudgala* cover one space point, so *gatihetutva* is not possible in them. Except during *samudghāta*, *jīva* is an innumerable fraction of *loka*, so *gatihetutva* is not possible in *jīva* either. This is because, *gatihetutva* is only possible in that substance which is equal to the space of *loka*.

As the space covered by *loka* and *aloka* is fixed, *gatihetutva* is not possible in *ākāṣa* either. If *gatihetutva* were present in *loka*, then a situation of *jīva* and *pudgala* of *loka* going into *aloka* would arise. If they were to go into *aloka*, then the established characteristics of the principle of the limitation of *loka* and *aloka* would be proved incorrect. But such a state never arises. The substance of *loka* remains in *loka* and never enters *aloka*. So, the attribute of *gatihetutva* is not possible in *ākāṣa*.

The attribute of *adharma dravya* (anti-ether matter) is *sthitihetutva* (*nimitta* in stopping the motion of self-moving substances) -- *adharma dravya* is *nimitta* in the opposite of motion, or it is *nimitta* in *sthi*ti (being stationary). So, it cannot be *nimitta* in motion.

When *jīva* and *pudgala* are in motion, then the characteristic of *dharma dravya* is to be *nimitta* in the motion of all of them together. So, *gatihetutva* is proved to be in *dharma dravya* only.

The attribute of *kāla* (time substance) is *vartanāhetutva* (*nimitta* in modification) – In this way, that which is *nimitta* in the modifying states of all other substances except *kāla*, is the attribute of *vartanāhetutva*, which proves *kāla*. On every space point of *lokākāṣa*, one each such innumerable *kālāṇus* are present.

For any other substance, except for *kāla*, it is said that this state has arisen in one *samaya*; here, *samaya* refers to the conventional *samaya*. So, some substances should be *nimitta*. These five substances modify every *samaya* by themselves, so in the modification of these five, they cannot be *nimitta* to themselves – therefore, *vartanāhetutva* is not present in any of these five – that can be ascertained. Hence, *vartanāhetutva* proves the substance *kāla*.

The attribute of *jīva* is *caitanya pariṇāma* (modification of sentience) – the ability to know-see, which is the modification of sentience, is present only in the *jīva* substance. From *nigoda* to *siddha*, all *jīvas* are recognised by their modification of sentience. The other five substances are non-sentient. Sentience cannot be present in non-sentience, so

sentience is not possible in the other five substances. In this way, *jīva* substance is recognised by sentience.

Sentience is said to be the characteristic of *jīva*, but taking care of money is not a characteristic of *jīva*. This is because someone's desire to take care of money, etc., substances, is not the reason for it to exist and stay. If this were the state, then money would also be destroyed with the annihilation of the desire to take care. But this never happens. Those substances exist, and last by their attributes of touch, taste, smell, colour, etc., and all *jīvas* exist by their attribute of sentience. There is no such attribute in *jīva* that can give protection to any other.

An ignoramus argues that one who helps many is called a *jīva*. Can one who makes no effort and idles on the side be called a *jīva*? The answer to this query: listen! It is not the characteristic of *jīva* to create the state of non-self or to have a desire to make an effort towards it. Characteristic of *jīva* is the sentient modification that knows the modification of non-self and attachments.

In this way, the differentiation of *dravyas* should be understood through specific attributes. In the earlier verse, it was explained that the existence of the *pudgala* (physical matter) is proved by its attributes of touch, taste, smell, and sight. In this verse, the characteristics of intangible substances have been explained.

- 1) Characteristics of knowing-seeing of *jīva* can be experienced, so, with this characteristic, infinite *jīvas* are proved. The body's activity or attachments cannot prove the existence of *jīva*.
- 2) *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, and *kāla* occupy space by themselves; at that time, some substance should be *nimitta*. That substance is the one which pervades through *loka* and *aloka*, has infinite space points, and is one unbroken, intangible *ākāṣa*.
- 3) Water is *nimitta* in the movement of fish; similarly, when *jīva* and *pudgala* move by themselves, there must be some substance as its *nimitta*. That substance is the *dharma dravya* (ether matter), which is all-pervading through *loka*, has innumerable space points, and is one unbroken, intangible substance.
- 4) Earth is *nimitta* in the state of being stationary to humans. Similarly, when *jīva* and *pudgala* become stationary by themselves or while moving, they become stationary; there must be some substance *nimitta* in it. That substance is the *adharma dravya* (anti-

ether matter), which is all-pervading through *loka*, within innumerable space points, and is one unbroken, intangible substance.

- 5) For the potter's wheel to move, the central screw is *nimitta*. Similarly, *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* modify themselves due to their nature of modify. Then, some substances must be *nimitta* in that modification. That substance is intangible *kālāṇu*, which is present on each of the innumerable space points of the *loka*, and there are innumerable such *kālāṇus*. They are known as the state of *samaya*, day, moment, year, etc. *kāla* is proved by it.

If a doubt arises, why do knowables have so many divisions? What if, with so much knowing, *jñāna* becomes conceited? Then why should this extra risk be taken? What is the problem with just knowing only *jñāna*, and nothing else? To this, it is said that it is the nature of the self to know infinite types of *jñeyas*. If one says that he does not want to know distinctions and divisions, then that is the rejection of the pure nature of self by self. Unrestricted knowing of the infinite is the nature of the self. By knowing more, *jñāna* does not become conceited. With a focus on peace, by having control of the mind if *jñeyas* are known, then the state of *vītarāga* manifests.

It is the nature of the self to know all *jñeyas*. So, attachment does not arise due to this. But because there is a prelude to attachment, attachment arises. *kevalī bhagavāna* knows infinite substances along with all their divisions and subdivisions. But they never have any state of attachment. All six substances are 'your' *jñeyas*, and one's *jñāna* is to know that much. If one knows less than all six substances, then he lacks acceptance of his attribute of *jñāna*; due to this, he does not have acceptance of *jīva* either.

It is not the nature of the self to change the modification of the non-self. Neither is it the nature of the self to think that he should bring the modification of the future into the present. The nature of the self is to be the knower-seer. This chapter is on *jñeyatattva prajñāpana* (chapter on knowables). It is the work of the self to know *jñeyas* just how they are. This is the reason for *dharma* and peace.

अथ द्रव्याणां प्रदेशवत्त्वाप्रदेशवत्त्वविशेषं प्रज्ञापयति –

Now, differentiation of substances with respect to their *pradeśas* (spatial points) and *apradeśas* (having only one *pradeśa*) is explained: -

**जीवा पोग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा पुणो य आगासं ।
सपदेसेहिं असंखा णत्थि पदेस त्ति कालस्स ॥१३५॥**

*jīvā poggaalakāyā dhammādhammā puṇo ya āgāsaṃ |
sapadesehiṃ saṅkha ṇatthi padesa tti kālassa || 135 ||*

gāthā: From the aspect of space points, *jīvas*, physical matter form, *dharma*, *adharma*, and *ākāśa* (space), possess innumerable spatial units, but *kāla* (time) substance has no space points or have one space point (*pradeśa*).

ṭīkā: *jīva* (sentient), *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of rest), and *ākāśa* (space), being with numerous *pradeśas* (special points), are called *pradeśavaṇṭa* (having more than one *pradeśa*). *kālāṇu* (time particle) has only one *pradeśa* (space-point), so it is called *apradeśi* (without *pradeśas*). This is explained as under: -

jīva (sentient), being with both contraction and expansion states, never leaves its area of innumerable *pradeśas* (spatial units), which are equal to *pradeśas* (space-points) of *lokākāśa* (space within the three *lokas*). So, it is *pradeśavāna* (with space points). *pudgala*, from the view of the space point of substance, is with one *pradeśa*, due to which it is said to be *apradeśi* (without *pradeśas*). However, from the view of *paryāyas* starting from two *pradeśas* to numerous, innumerable and infinite *pradeśas*, it being of undefined space points, it is said to be *pradeśavāna* (with space points).

dharma dravya, owing to its extending over innumerable spatial units which pervade the whole universe, is *pradeśavāna*.

adharma dravya, owing to its extending over innumerable spatial units which pervade the whole universe, is *pradeśavāna*.

ākāśa dravya, owing to its extending over endless infinite spatial units that pervade everything - not only the universe but also the endless non-physical universe-is *pradeśavāna*.

But *kālāṇu* (incorporeal/ non-material time particle), owing to its covering substantially only one space unit (one *pradeśa* only) and as its modification does not intermingle/bond mutually with other *kālāṇus*, it is *apradeśi* (devoid of *pradeśas*). Therefore, *kālāṇu* (time substance) is without spatial units (*apradeśi*), and the rest of the other substances have spatial units, so they are *pradeśavāna*.

parvacana on gāthā-135

From the view of its space points, *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, and *ākāśa* have innumerable space points. *kāla* does not have space points.

As *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, and *ākāśa* are with space points, they are said to be *pradeśavānta* (with space points). As *kālāṇu* is one *pradeśi* (covering only one space point), it is said to be *apradeśi* (one spatial point). If there are substances with innumerable space points, then there should be a substance that is with one space point. In this way, the state of one and numerous space points shows duality.

jīva attains the state of contraction and expansion. Whether it assumes the diminutive form of an ant or the large form of an elephant, or may he have a *kevalī samudghāta* (expansion of space points of *jīva* equivalent to the three *lokas*, just before attaining *mokṣa*), his space points will never leave innumerable space points equivalent to *lokākāśa* (space which covers the three worlds). Hence, *jīva* is with space points.

dharma dravya pervades through the entire *lokākāśa*. It is an undivided substance with innumerable space points. So, it is with space points. *adharma dravya* pervades through the entire *lokākāśa*. It is an undivided substance with innumerable space points. So, it is with space points. *ākāśa* pervades through *loka* (the three worlds) and *aloka* (unending space outside the three worlds). It is with infinite space points and is unbroken. So, it is with space points.

kālāṇu is with only one space point. When *paramāṇu* joins with another *paramāṇu*, it takes the form of *skandha*, which is with numerous space points. However, *kālāṇu* does not bond with another *kālāṇu* to take the form of *skandha*. The reason is that *kālāṇu* does not have the attributes of stickiness and dryness. *kālāṇu* is an incorporeal substance. Due to this,

even from the view of conventionality, one *kālāṇu* cannot associate with another *kālāṇu*. So be it from the view of *niścaya* (absolute truth) or from the view of *vyavahāra* (conventional truth), *kālāṇu* is with only one space point or is *apradeśī*.

jīva, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, and *kāla* – these five substances do not have the ability to join to become *skāṇḍha* like *paramāṇu*. This ability is present only in *pudgala*. So, substances should be understood with these two divisions as well.

Similarly, it is ascertained that *kāla* is *apradeśī* (with one spatial point), and the other five substances are *pradeśavaṇṭa* (with innumerable or infinite spatial points). No one except the omniscient knows this. One should have the true *jñāna* of *jñeyas* as told by the omniscient and should make one's *jñāna* pure and firm.

This verse is about the spatial points of substances. A gold chain has many links, one after another. This example should be applied to the understanding of space points.

अथ कामी प्रदेशिनोऽप्रदेशाश्चावस्थिता इति प्रज्ञापयति -

Now, where are these “*pradeśavāna* (substance with many *pradeśas*) and *apradeśi* (having one *pradeśa*) substances found? This is explained here:

**लोगालोगेसु णभो धम्माधम्महिं आददो लोगो ।
सेसे पडुच्च कालो जीवा पुण पोगला सेसा ॥ १३६ ॥**

*logālogesu ṇabho dhammādhammehiṃ ādado logo |
sese poḍucca kālo jīvā puṇa poggalā sesā || 136 ||*

gāthā: *ākāśa* is a pervasive entity that extends its reach across the *loka* (universe) and even beyond into the *aloka* (endlessly/empty endless space). The *loka* is filled with forces of *dharma* and *adharma*, the medium of motion and rest. These forces are regulated by the presence of *kāla/kālāṇus* (time particles), which in turn, interact with the other two fundamental substances – *jīva* and *pudgala*.

ṭīkā: *ākāśa* (space) exists in *loka* and *aloka* (in and outside the universe, endlessly/empty, endless space beyond the universe) because it exists undivided in the assemblage and non-assemblage of all six substances.

dharma and *adharma* exist in the entire universe because their instrumentality causes movement and stationariness. Such *jīva*’s and *pudgala*’s movement or stationariness does not occur outside the universe nor in only one region of the universe. *kāla* (time substance) is also in *loka*/universe because the modifications of *jīva* and *pudgala* by which the modification of *kāla*, like *samaya*, etc., occur, and that *kāla* is present on only one space point of *loka* because it is *apradeśī*. *jīvas* (sentient) and *pudgalas* (matter) are, of course, logically in the universe because *loka* is an assemblage of six kinds of substances.

However, it should be further understood that *jīva* possesses the property of contraction-expansion of *pradeśas* (spatial units), and the attributes of stickiness and roughness, which are causes of bondage, are present in *pudgala*. So, there is no rule that *jīvas* and *pudgalas* must be either in the full *loka* or in any one part. Furthermore, *kāla*, *jīva*, and *pudgala*, from the view of one substance, exist in one part of the *loka*. From the view of numerous substances, they exist in the entire *loka*, which should be understood by applying the logic of a small box filled with extremely fine coal powder.

pravacana on gāthā-136

ākāśa (space) exists in *lokāloka* (universe and beyond), *dharma* and *adharma* pervade in the *loka*, *kāla* exists with the auspice of the balance of the two substances, and those balance two substances are *jīva* and *pudgala*.

ākāśa (space) - *ākāśa* exists in *loka* (universe) and *aloka* (beyond the universe). Because they exist without division, be it the assemblage or non-assemblage of the six substances. *ākāśa* is not divided into two parts because of *loka* and *aloka*; it is an undivided one substance.

dharma-adharma – *dharma* and *adharma* substances pervade throughout the *loka*. With their *nimitta*, *jīva* and *pudgala* have the state of motion and being stationary. These *jīvas* and *pudgalas* do not go out of the *loka*. Their motion and state of being stationary are not confined to one part of the *loka* but occur everywhere within the *loka*. So, *dharma* and *adharma* substances pervade the *loka*.

kāla - *kālāṇu* (time-atom particles/unit of physical time) are also in the *loka*. Modifications of *kāla*, like *samaya*, etc., are recognised through the modifications of *jīva* and *pudgala*. *kāla* is present in a single *pradeśa* (space point) of *loka*, because it is *apradeśī*.

jīva and pudgala - *jīva* and *pudgala* are in the *loka* by logic because *loka* is a conglomerate of six substances.

Besides this, it should be understood that it is the nature of *jīva* to contract and expand. If asked whether this contraction and expansion occur due to *karma*, then the answer to it is no! In the mundane state, it is the nature of the modification of *jīva* to contract and expand, due to which he can assume a small or a large form.

It is the nature of *pudgala* to have the attributes of stickiness and dryness, due to which it can join to become *skandha* and can also separate.

There is no rule that *jīva* and *pudgala* must be spread throughout the *loka* or be in one part of the *loka*. For example, when *jīva* does *samudghāta*, it is equal to the size of *loka*, and when it goes to *nigoda*, he assumes a subtle form, where in one body, infinite *nigoda* life forms contract and stay there. The insentient *mahāskandha* of *pudgala* is spread through the *loka*, and its separate one *paramāṇu* stays in one *pradeśa* of *loka*.

From the view of one substance, *kāla*, *jīva*, and *pudgala* are present in one part of the *loka*, and from the view of multiple substances, *kāla*, *jīva*, and *pudgala* are present in the entire *loka*, like a box filled with finely ground coal powder. There is no space point in *loka* where *kāla*, *jīva*, and *pudgala* are absent. *dharma* and *adharma* are, anyway, equal to *loka*, but infinite *jīvas*, infinite *pudgalas*, and innumerable *kālāṇus* are also equal to *loka*.

To have this kind of correct knowledge of the knowables is the reason for the purity of knowledge.

अथ प्रदेशवत्त्वाप्रदेशवत्त्वसंभवप्रकारमासूत्रयति -

Now, it is explained how that which is with *pradeśatva* (spatial units) and *apradeśatva* (those without spatial units) comes into being/is possible? This is explained here: -

**जध ते णभप्पदेसा तधप्पदेसा हवन्ति सेसाणं ।
अपदेसो परमाणू तेण पदेसुब्भवो भणिदो ॥१३७॥**

*jadha te ṇabhappadesā tadhappadesā havanti sesāṇaṁ |
apadeso paramāṇū teṇa padesubbhavo bhaṇido || 137 ||*

gāthā: Just as there are *pradeśas* (spatial units) of *ākāśa* (space), so there are spatial units of other remaining substances. (or the way the spatial units of *ākāśa* are measured by the scale of *paramāṇu* (the smallest unit of physical matter), spatial points of other substances are measured in the same way. As *paramāṇu* is *apradeśī* (covering a single spatial unit), it has been called *pradeśodbhava*.

ṭīkā: Ācārya KuṇḍaKuṇḍa himself will say (in stanza 140) that the characteristic of the *pradeśas* (spatial units) of *ākāśa* is *ekāṇuvyāpyatva* (that which pervades over one *aṇu* [smallest matter]), (or it is the characteristic of *pradeśa* to spread over only one *paramāṇu*); Here (in this verse) it is asserted that ‘the *pradeśas* (spatial units) of other substances are like the *pradeśas* (spatial units) of *ākāśa* (space)’. In this way, the homogeneity of the characteristics of *pradeśas* has been explained. *dharma-adharma* substances are taken as those which spread over one *aṇu* (those which are able to spread over one *paramāṇu*), and one *jīva* which has innumerable *aṇśas*, they each are *asaṅkhyātapradeśī* (with innumerable spatial points). The substances, *dharma-adharma*, have a definite size, and they are *asaṅkhyātapradeśī*. Due to its undefined size, each *jīva* being with the ability to contract and expand, like wet or dry leather, does not decrease or increase in its own *aṇśas*, so it is *asaṅkhāyātapradeśī*.

A question that arises here is how the expansion-contraction of an incorporeal soul is possible. The answer to it is given here.

Contraction-expansion of an incorporeal soul can be understood only by self-realization/consciousness of self because it is understood by self-experience. Whether it is a stout or a lean body, or an infant or a youth, *jīva* pervades through it.

pudgala, although substantially possessing only one *pradeśa* (spatial unit), as explained earlier, is called *apradeśī* (devoid of spatial units or with one spatial unit). However, due to its intrinsic nature of being capable of originating as two *pradeśa*, etc., and having the ability to modify in the form of stickiness-dryness, it has the origination of multiple spatial points. So, from the modification point of view, it possessed the capacity to acquire many spatial units, can have spatial units from two, etc., to innumerable and infinite also.

pravacana on gāthā-137

pradeśatva (with more than one spatial unit) and *apradeśatva* (with only one spatial unit) are key concepts in understanding the measurement and characteristics of spatial units in various substances.

Other substances also have *pradeśa*, just as *ākāśa* (space) has. In other words, the way *pradeśas* of *ākāśa* are measured by *paramāṇu*, *pradeśas* of other substances are also measured in the same way. *paramāṇu* is *apradeśī*; hence, it is said to be the originator of *pradeśas* (*pradeśodbhava*).

In this verse, the reference is from the view of *jñāna*. Without understanding the nature of *jñeyas* (knowables), true belief cannot arise, and true conduct cannot arise without true belief. Without *jñāna*, *jīva* may stay in the forest, may assume the naked form, and can be forgiving, but not even a bit of *dharma* arises with that. The nature of *jñeyas* should be understood as it is. He who refuses to know *jñeyas* is refusing his own knowing nature. So, despite having low passions on the outside, due to ignorance, his transmigration remains. People are stubbornly stuck to external penance and rituals, but there is no *dharma* in those rituals. When the description of *jñeyas* is heard, one must not negate it and should understand the glory of one's own nature of *jñāna*.

Ācārya KuṇḍaKuṇḍa himself will say (in verse 140) that the characteristic of *pradeśas* of *ākāśa* is to pervade with one *aṇu*. Here, the measurement of the area is being explained. What is the measurement of one *pradeśa* of *ākāśa*? The expanse is as much as the area covered by a subtle *paramāṇu*. The way *ākāśa* has *pradeśas*, so do other substances. In this way, the homogeneity of the characteristics of *pradeśa* is explained. The way cloth is measured in yards, similarly, by measuring a yard of knowing how much space *ākāśa* one *paramāṇu* covers, the measurement of *pradeśas* of all substances is calculated.

By counting as many spaces as covered by one *paramāṇus*, the infinite infinitesimal parts

of *ākāśa* are determined. So, *ākāśa* is with infinite space points. By calculating similarly, *dharma-adharma*, and one *jīva* will be with innumerable space points. So, these three substances are with innumerable space points.

The size of *dharma* and *adharma* substances is fixed to be as much as the *loka*. They never decrease or increase. They remain in an irrefutable, balanced state of matter and have innumerable space points. *jīva*, from the view of non-self space, contracts and expands like a piece of wet or dry leather. *jīva*, from the view of non-self space, contracts and expands. So, sometimes he becomes as big as an elephant and sometimes as small as an ant; sometimes, at the time of *samudghāta*, he becomes equal to *loka*, and sometimes, in the body of *nigoda*, he is in the subtle form along with infinite other *jīvas*. Due to this, he has no definite size. Despite this, there is no decrease in the parts of the leather; they remain as is; similarly, whether *jīva* be big or small, its own parts neither reduce nor increase. Due to this, the state of infinite space points of the *jīva* remains the same. It is not possible that when *jīva* does *samudghāta*, the space points increase, and when he goes into *nigoda*, they decrease. They remain unchanging, always with innumerable space points.

Question: Is it true that incorporeal *jīvas* contract and expand in the mundane form due to *karma* or body, and as *siddhas* do not have *karma* or body, they do not contract or expand?

Answer: This is not true. It is the nature of the modification of mundane *jīvas* to contract-expand. That is due to their own ability, which is experienced by every *jīva*. *jīva* does not contract or expand due to *karma* or body. It is a sentient substance. So, the nature of its modification is also not dependent on *karma* or body.

The time of one *paramāṇu* of *pudgala* being steady on one *pradeśa* another *paramāṇu* moving slowly from one *pradeśa* to another and the third *paramāṇu* going fourteen *rajūloka* (entire height of the universe) extremely fast, is the same. Even then, what is the reason for such variegated states? There is only one reason – the present nature of every modification. By this example, a *jīva* expands as much as the *loka* due to *samudghāta*, while another goes into *nigoda* and contracts; some may be in the shape of an elephant and another in the shape of an ant. But what is the reason for such variegated states? The answer to this is that it is due to the nature of the present modification. The present modification of every substance is without any reason; it is causeless.

From the viewpoint of substance, a *paramāṇu* of *pudgala* is with one space point, and it is *apradeśī*. However, it has the attributes of stickiness and dryness; it can join from two space

points up to an infinite number of space points. That is its nature. *paramāṇu* with two attributes of stickiness can join the *skandha* to become the *skandha* of four attributes of stickiness. What is the reason for a *paramāṇu* with one *pradeśa* to become a *skandha* with infinite space points? There is only one reason – the nature of the modification of that *samaya*. Modification arose in the *pudgala* at its own time, then from the view of *vyavahāra kāla* (time) is said to be the reason. In this way, *paramāṇu* has the ability to turn into the form of *skandha*. Therefore, since there is a possibility of modification in the state of numerous space points, *pudgala* is established to have numerous, innumerable, and infinite space points by logical reasoning.

Substances—be they *pradeśī* or *apradeśī*—are *jñeya*, and knowing them as they are is the reason for *samyagdarśana*.

अथ कालाणोरप्रदेशत्वमेवेति नियमयति -

Now, *kāla/kālāṇu* (time particle) is *apradeśi* only; (i.e., it possesses only one spatial-unit/one *pradeśa*)-this is a principle (or that is shown here): -

**समओ दु अप्पदेसो पदेसमेत्तस्स दव्वजादस्स ।
वदिवददो सो वट्ठदि पदेसमागासदव्वस्स ॥१३८॥**

*samao du appdeso padesamettassa davvajādassa |
vadivadado so vaṭṭadi padesamāgāsadvvassa || 138 ||*

gāthā: *kāla* (time) is *apradeśi* (with only one spatial unit). When *paramāṇu* (the smallest unit of physical matter) of *pudgala* traverses the *pradeśa* of *ākāśa*, slowly, then *kāla* manifests, or it modifies in the form of *nimitta*.

ṭīkā: As a substance, *kālāṇu* possesses only one spatial unit, so it is *apradeśi* (covers only one spatial unit). Like *pudgala*, it does not have several space points, even during modifications, just like matter-substance from a modification point of view also; because, though they (*kālāṇus*) are innumerable in number, each covers one space unit, without intermingling with one another and remains stretched in a continuous expanse occupying space-units one by one without mutual interconnection and its manifestation takes place only when an ultimate matter particle (*paramāṇu* occupying space-point) modifies and traverses from one space-point (*pradeśa*) consecutive to the next one.

bhāvārtha: *lokākāśa* (space of *loka*/universe) contains innumerable *pradeśas* (spatial units). On each *pradeśa* of *lokākāśa*, only one *kālāṇu* (time particle) exists. That *kālāṇus*, being devoid of the quality of smooth-rough, exists separately just like a heap of jewels. They do not intermingle with one another.

When *pudgala-paramāṇu* (infinitesimal matter-particle) traverses, by slow movement from one space-point to the consecutive one, then *kālāṇu* situated on that *pradeśa* (spatial-unit) is instrumental in it. In this way, each *kālāṇu* remains co-associated/instrumental in the movement of that *pudgala-paramāṇu* up to one *pradeśa* only, not more than that. From this, it becomes clear that *kāla dravya* does not possess several *pradeśas* even from a modification viewpoint.

pravacana on gāthā-138

Here, the principle that *kālāṇu* (time atoms) is *apradeśī* (with only one space point) is explained.

kāla is *apradeśī*. When *paramāṇu*, which is equal to one space point, traverses the space point of the substance *ākāśa* in slow motion, at that time, *kālāṇu* modifies, meaning it modifies as *nimitta*.

As the substance *kāla* is one *pradeśī* (space-point), it is said to be *apradeśī*. One *paramāṇu* is separate, but it has the attributes of stickiness and dryness, due to which, in the form of modification, it is with numerous *pradeśas*. *kālāṇu* does not possess any attribute of stickiness-dryness. It is an incorporeal substance, due to which it does not have the ability to modify in the form of *skandha*, and it remains where it is from eternity to infinity. It does not move from its space point. Even its modification does not have the ability to take the form of numerous space points. Innumerable *kālāṇus* are present immovably in the entire *loka*. As every space point of *ākāśa* has a *kālāṇu* substance on it, there is no gap amongst them. Even then, one *kālāṇu* does not join with the next *kālāṇu*.

When the *paramāṇu*, which covers one *pradeśa* (space point), traverses any one *pradeśa* of *ākāśa* in a slow motion, at that time, the modification of the *kāla* substance present on that space point of *ākāśa* functions as *nimitta* to it.

Question: There is no space between one *kālāṇu* and the next; even then, it is said that one *pradeśa* does not touch the next *pradeśa*. What is the clarification of this statement?

Answer: Even in *pudgala*, which modifies in the form of *skandha* due to association, one *paramāṇu* does not touch another *paramāṇu*; then how is it possible for the substance *kāla*, which is an incorporeal substance, and which never modifies in the form of *skandha*, to touch another? If one *pradeśa* were to merge with another *pradeśa*, then it is not possible to prove the innumerable, etc., *pradeśas* of *jīva* and other substances. So, despite *jīva* being one, with innumerable space points, its one space point is not the other space point. The existence of every *pradeśa* is separate. *pradeśas* have *anekānta* (confluence of pluralism) in this way. This is also true for other substances.

Modification of *kāla* substance is *nimitta* in the traversing of one *paramāṇu* moving slowly from one space point of *ākāśa* to another. The bearer of the modification, the substance *kāla*, is proved from the modification. If a substance is absent, then only modification

cannot exist. In this way, in one space point of *lokākāśa*, there is one *kālāṇu*, and there are numerous such that are present. Many believe the substance *kāla* to be figurative only, but this is incorrect. The substance *kāla* is a definite substance. In the coming verses, its existence will be proved. Efficacy of *jñāna* cannot be established if *jñeya* are not known just the way they are.

The above explanation summarizes that there are innumerable space points of *lokākāśa*. On every space point, one *kālāṇu* (time atom) is present. As that *kālāṇu* does not have the quality of stickiness-dryness, they do not combine. However, they stay separate at all times, like gemstones. The reason is that this is the ability that *kālāṇu* possesses.

When *pudgala paramāṇu* traverses from one space point of *ākāśa* to another, then the *kālāṇu* which is present in that space point is *nimitta* to it. Here, the reference is not about movement. But reference is the time taken to traverse, and with that modification of *kāla* is ascertained. With that modification, the substance *kālāṇu* is ascertained. In this way, every *kālāṇu* remains in the form of *nimitta*, for the *pudgala paramāṇu* to traverse one space point. One *kālāṇu* cannot be *nimitta* in traversing more than one space point. In the second space point, the second *kālāṇu*, and in the third space point, the third *kālāṇu* will be in the form of *nimitta*. With this, it becomes *clear* that the substance *kāla* is with a single space point even in its modification. It is of one space point and not multiple space points.

If ancestors leave an inheritance of silver, gold, jewellery, or cash, then the ignorant will search for it and will not get free from it. This is because it interests him. Infinite *Tirthaṅkaras* and *Ācāryas* have left the wealth of nature of *jñeyas* (knowables), but *jīva*, who is interested in worldly trappings, does not try to look for it. *jīvas* desirous of *mokṣa* should recognise the elevation of one's pure nature and should make their *jñāna* unblemished.

अथ कालपदार्थस्य द्रव्यपर्यायौ प्रज्ञापयति -

Now, the substance and modification of *kāla padārtha* (time-object) are specified: -

**वदिवददो तं देसं तस्सम समओ तदो परो पुव्वो ।
जो अत्थो सो कालो समओ उप्पण्णपद्धंसी ॥१३९॥**

*vadivadado taṃ deṣaṃ tassama samao tado paro puvvo |
jo attho so kālo samao uppaṇṇapaddhaṃsī || 139 ||*

gāthā: When *paramāṇu* (smallest unit of matter particle), traverses one space-point of *ākāśa* (in a slow movement), then the time equal to that is *samaya* (smallest unit of time). The substance which exists prior to that ‘*samay*’ and after it, that (permanent) substance is *kāla dravya*. *samaya* has origination and annihilation.

tikā: The *pradeśa* of *ākāśa* which is pervaded by a *kāla padārtha* (time object) having only one spatial-unit when a *paramāṇu* (matter particle) traverses that *pradeśa* of *ākāśa* with slow motion then the moment (*samaya*) equal to the duration of that passing through that one spatial-particle is a minute occurrence (*sūkṣmavṛtti*) of that time-object and it is the modification of that time object. And that object whose permanency is manifested by its existence in an occurrence, former and later to the aforesaid modification, is a substance. So *dravya-samaya* (substantial-time, i.e., *kālāṇu*) is not originated and not annihilated, but *paryāya-samaya* (modification-time) is both originated and annihilated (i.e., *samaya paryāya* is of the nature of origination and annihilation). This *samaya* (moment) is devoid of parts; if it were not, then *pradeśa* (spatial-unit) of *ākāśa* would not prove to be devoid of parts.

And though one *paramāṇu* (smallest unit of physical matter) can move to the end of the universe in one *samaya* (moment), *samaya* does not have divisions; because the way *paramāṇu* possesses a specific/unique containment capacity (*viśiṣṭa-avagāha pariṇāma*), in the same way, *paramāṇu* possesses a particular capacity of movement. This is explained as under: -

Due to its specific ability to cover space, a *skandha* of infinite *paramāṇus* is equal to the size of one *paramāṇu*; even then, that *skandha* does not prove infinite parts of a *paramāṇu*, because a *paramāṇu* is *niraṇṣa* (one space point) portions/several spatial units. In the same

way, *samaya*, which is measured by the traversing of one *ākāśa* space point, covered by one *kālāṇu*, when, due to the presence of specific ability of movement, the *paramāṇu* moves from one end of the *loka* to another, at that time (that *paramāṇu* traversing) infinite *kālāṇus* do not prove infinite parts of *samaya*, because *samaya* (moment) is *niraṇśa* (devoid of several time units).

bhāvārtha: Time taken by a *paramāṇu* to slowly traverse in slow motion one *pradeśa* of *ākāśa* to another consecutive *pradeśa* is called one *samaya* (the smallest unit of time). This *samaya* is the minutest modification of *kāla dravya* (time substance). *kāla dravya* is eternal /permanent (but) *samaya* originates and is destroyed. As *pradeśa* (space-point/unit) of *ākāśa* is its minutest unit, and it does not have parts, similarly, *samaya* is the smallest unit of the substance *kāla*, an undivided modification. If *samaya* were to have parts, then *pradeśa* (space-point) of *ākāśa*, which is traversed by a *paramāṇu* in one *samaya*, should also have that many parts, but *ākāśa-pradeśa* is *niraṇśa* (devoid of parts/several space-points); therefore, *samaya* is also *niraṇśa* (without parts).

Here a question can arise that when *pudgala-paramāṇu* by virtue of fast speed, reaches from one end of *loka* (universe) to another within one *samaya*, then it touches all those *kālāṇus* of fourteen *rajuṣ* (innumerable miles) which fall in the linear path of *pradeśas* of *ākāśa*, hence, because of its touching innumerable *kālāṇus*, *samaya* should also have innumerable parts?

Its answer is that as an aggregate of infinite *paramāṇus* gets contained in *pradeśa* of *ākāśa* and measures equal to one *paramāṇu*, which is (possible) due to a specific type of spatial containment capacity of *paramāṇu*, but because of this, a *paramāṇu* does not attain infinite parts. Similarly, if any one *paramāṇu* reaches from one end of *loka* to another end by traversing innumerable *kālāṇus* (time particles) in one *samaya*, it is (possible) due to the specific type of movement capacity of a *paramāṇu*, but because of this (specific movement capacity) *samaya* does not attain innumerable parts.

pravacana on gāthā 139

Here, the modification and substance of *kāla* substance is explained.

When a *paramāṇu* (smallest unit of matter) crosses a *ākāśa pradeśa* (space point of *ākāśa*) at a slow pace, the duration it takes is considered as *kāla* (physical time), the substance before and after that time is known as *kāladravya* (the substance–time); 'time' is said to be with origination and annihilation.

The omniscient *Bhagavāna* has known the six substances by way of the presence of *jñāna* and has accordingly been expressed in His speech; and by way of *samyagjñāna*, true perception of the six substances can be attained. Many *jīvas* assume it to be a mere formality, but that is false. *kāla* is an absolute substance. This will be proved in this verse through logic and reasoning.

In the space of *ākāśa* where particles of *kāla* are there, in that the time taken by one *paramāṇu* to traverse from one space point to another at a slow pace, the subtle modification in the form of *samaya*, which is equal to the substance *kāla* at that time, is the modification of *kālāṇu*. *paramāṇu* traverses from one space point to another, and then the second is done in the second *samaya*, and the third in the third *samaya*. In this way, the state of *kāla* keeps changing. In that, the present time was not there in the past and will not be in the future. This means that the time of modification is seen to be changing – this is ascertained. First modification does not remain in the second *samaya*; in the second space point, it is the second *samaya*, and in the third, the third one. In this way, change is seen in the modification.

Now, whose modification is it? Without the fundamental substance, modification cannot exist even for a moment. That modification was neither in the past nor will it remain in the future – then where did the manifested modification come from? The earlier modification has perished, and the present modification will perish in the future; a different modification will manifest in the next *samaya*. So, there has to be a beholder of the part that is seen manifested every *samaya*, or the form of the efficacy of the beholder of modification, which is the substance that must exist. The modification of one *samaya* is destroyed in the next. So, it is impermanent. But that impermanence must have permanent substance in the form of reason and efficacy. That substance is *kāla*, based on which the state of every *samaya* is seen.

Also, whatever the extent of the state, the entire substance must be present in that total area. The substance cannot be separate from or greater/lesser than that area. Just like the silver in the form of substance in an old rupee (a silver coin), which is as much as the coin's area. Similarly, the state of *kāla* is within one space point; then, the matter particles of *kāla* are present in that one space point. This is ascertained.

In this way, the substance *kāla* does not originate and neither annihilates, but its state originates and annihilates every *samaya*. The substance *kāla* is present wherever there is modification.

Here, ‘*samaya*’ is indivisible; *samaya* cannot be divided into parts. If this were not the case, the indivisibility of one space point of *ākāśa* would not be established.

If one *paramāṇu* were to move at a very high speed, it could reach the end of the universe in one *samaya*; even then, *samaya* is indivisible.

It is not so that if it takes one *samaya* to reach the end of *loka*, then it would take less than a *samaya* to reach midway. It only explains the speed of movement of *paramāṇu*, but *samaya* is not divided.

Just as *paramāṇu* has the special ability to give space, it also possesses the specific ability to modify movement.

In the area of *ākāśa* where one *paramāṇu* lies, other *paramāṇus* in their subtle *skandha* (more than one *paramāṇu*) exist due to their efficacy to give space. Even there, the infinite *paramāṇus* do not merge into one, and that one space point does not expand or increase. As infinite *paramāṇus* come there, does this make the size of one *paramāṇu* infinitely small? No. If *paramāṇu* is alone, it is the size of one space point, and even when countless *paramāṇus* in their subtle modification remain in the same region, their size is of one space point only. That *skandha* does not prove the infinite parts of *paramāṇu*, because it is without divisions. *paramāṇu* cannot be divided.

By the same reasoning, it is not that if one *paramāṇu* traverses from one space point of *ākāśa* to another at a slow pace, takes one *samaya*, and in the same time, due to its ability to move fast, if the *paramāṇu* covers the distance of one end of *loka* to the other, then that *paramāṇu* has covered innumerable particles of *kāla* so it should take innumerable *samayas*. Neither are innumerable parts of *samaya* proved. Because if it takes one *samaya* for a *paramāṇu* to travel at a fast pace, then to reach halfway, *samaya* would be divided? The answer to that is no. When travelling at a swift speed, it crosses countless *kālāṇus* (time particles) in one moment, and similarly, when travelling at a slow speed, it takes the same amount of time to travel from one space point to the next. *samaya* does not get divided. Here, the fast pace is not proven. However, it has been proven that, whether innumerable space points are crossed at a fast pace or one space point is crossed at a slow

pace, *samaya* is not divided into parts in either state because *samaya* is indivisible.

When one *paramāṇu* moves *dharma-dravya* is said to be the *nimitta* in motion, and when moving substances stop, *adharma-dravya* is said to be *nimitta* in rest. In the movement of one *paramāṇu*, at a slow pace, from one space point to the next, one *kālāṇu* is said to be *nimitta* in that modification. When one *paramāṇu* moves from one end of the *loka* to the other at a fast pace, then innumerable *kālāṇus* present on that path are said to be the *nimitta*. When there is a gross mass of infinite *paramāṇus*, then, for giving them space, more than one space point of *ākāśa* is said to be *nimitta*, and when that same gross mass modifies into a subtle mass and remains in a single space point, only that one space point is said to be *nimitta*. Infinite knowables are known in *jñāna*, then in that the infinite *jñeyas* are *nimitta*, and when one *dravya* is known, then at that time that one is the *nimitta*. In this way, the modification occurring in the material cause, that type of rhetorical imposition, is done on the *nimitta*. But *nimitta* can do nothing for the material cause.

- One *paramāṇu* stays in one space point, and infinite can also stay in the same space point.
- One *paramāṇu* moves at a slow pace from one space point to another in one *samaya* and moves at a fast pace until the end of *loka* in the same time.
- An embodied *jīva* can know a few knowables in innumerable *samaya*, but a *kevali* (omniscient being) knows all objects in a single *samaya*.

Thus, who determines the swift motion of *paramāṇu*, the subtle ability to give space to *paramāṇus*, or the knowing of all objects at once? Does *paramāṇu* know that infinite other *paramāṇus* have come together in one space point? Do *jñeyas* know that they are all known all at once in *jñāna*? Do the space points of *ākāśa* know that they are *nimitta* in giving space to all these? Does the *kālāṇu* know that it is *nimitta* in the modification of all? These substances are insentient. *jñāna* is in the form of a bright luminosity. It knows *jñeyas* as they are. The question "Why is this?" does not arise in it. The power of nature of *jñāna* is that it knows the subtle nature of all substances. The one who speaks of disinterest in knowing the nature of *jñeyas* negates (rejects) his own *jñāna*. Therefore, one should understand the nature of *jñeyas* and glorify one's nature of *jñāna*.

Question – What is the cause of the variegated transformations of *jñeyas*?

- When one *paramāṇu* moves slowly, why does it take one *samaya* to travel from one space point to another?

- When one *paramāṇu* moves swiftly, why does it reach from one end of the universe to another in one *samaya*?
- There are infinite *paramāṇus* in the form of subtle *skāṇḍha* in *ākāśa*, and other infinite *paramāṇus* joined them; why does this happen? And why does one *paramāṇu* remain in a space point by itself?
- Why does a *jīva* move from a lower to a higher place in one *samaya*, and why do its luminous and karmic bodies go along with it?

Solution: It is the ability to modify the nature of movement or nature to give space to those *paramāṇus*. There is no other reason. Every modification is causeless and without a reason.

Infinite *paramāṇus* stay in one space point of *ākāśa*, and other substances also stay in the same space point. Even then, the space point of *ākāśa* does not become larger. It remains the same size.

Question: What is the reason that a *jīva* may not understand even gross concepts, and, in the next *samaya*, can understand extremely subtle concepts? What is the cause of such a significant shift in *jñāna*?

Answer: The reason is the *jīva* itself. It is the capability of the modification of *jñāna* at that time – this is the only cause.

Material substances known through the senses are associations, and they are not the inherent nature of those substances. Similarly, the senses are associations, and therefore, the inherent nature of substances cannot come through them; instead, it is through super-sensory *jñāna* (*jñāna* beyond the senses) that one can know the true nature of each substance.

Thus, knowing the nature of each knowable just the way it is the reason for *samyag-jñāna*.

अथाकाशस्य प्रदेशलक्षणं सूत्रयति-

Now, the definition of *pradeśa* of *ākāśa dravya* (infinitesimal portion of space), i.e., spatial-unit/space point, is given in this *gāthā sūtra*:-

**आगासमणुणिविट्ठं आगासपदेससण्णया भणितं ।
सव्वेसिं च अणूणं सक्कदि तं देदुमवगासं ॥ १४० ॥**

*āgāsamaṇuṇivittṭhaṃ āgāsapadesasaṇṇayā bhaṇidaṃ |
savvesiṃ ca aṇūṇaṃ sakkadi taṃ dedumavagāsaṃ || 140 ||*

gāthā: The portion of space occupied by one *paramāṇu* of matter is called one *ākāśa pradeśa* (space-point), and it has the capacity to provide room to all *paramāṇus* of all substances.

tīkā: An infinitesimal part of space which pervades/is covered by one *paramāṇu* (smallest unit of matter) is an *ākāśa pradeśa* (one space point of *ākāśa*). And that space point of *ākāśa* has the ability to give space to the space points of all other five substances, as well as to the aggregation of infinite *paramāṇus* which have been modified in the subtle form. *ākāśa* is a single substance which is undivided; even then, the imagination of division can occur in it in the form of *pradeśas* (space-points), because if it were not so, it would not be possible for it to give space to all *paramāṇus*.

Despite this, if someone were to believe that *ākāśa* does not have parts (or thought of parts should not be done), then, spreading two fingers in space, the question to ask is, “Is the area covered by the two fingers one or more than one?” If it is one, then the question is: -

- (i) Is it one because *ākāśa* (space) is one continuous undivided substance, so parts/regions of two fingers are not distinguishable from one another?
- (ii) Or is it because it is a continuous substance whose parts/regions are distinguishable?
 - (1) If it is said so, that, *ākāśa* (space) is an undivided continuous substance devoid of parts, then the part which is the region of one finger, the same part is the region of the other finger, so one of the two parts does not exist; thus, owing to the absence of two, etc., parts of space, *ākāśa* would prove as containing only one infinitesimal particle, the way an ultimate *paramāṇu* has. (But this does not prove to be correct.) and if it said that - *ākāśa* is an undivided substance whose different parts are

distinguishable; then this proves the supposition of one continuous substance space (*ākāśa dravya*) having many parts.

- (2) If it is said that *ākāśa* is one whole substance with divided parts, then the space covered by both fingers becomes one. And if this is said, then (and it is correct) the assumption of divisions in the undivided substance is proved.

If it is said that two fingers have numerous space areas (or more than one space area, and not one), then it is asked: 1) Are the numerous space areas of two fingers because *ākāśa* is a substance with divisions which are numerous substances? or 2) despite *ākāśa* being an undivided substance, the area covered by two fingers is numerous? 1) if it is believed that *ākāśa* is a substance with divisions, so two fingers have numerous space areas, then *ākāśa*, which is one substance, will be proved to be infinite substances (but that cannot be proved) 2) if it is said that *ākāśa* is an undivided one substance despite that the space area of two fingers is numerous then (that is correct) because then the assumption of division in the whole one substance is proved.

pravacana of gāthā-140

Now, the characteristic of the space points *ākāśa* is explained.

The space in which one *paramāṇu* resides, that much *ākāśa*, is called '*ākāśa pradeśa*,' and it is capable of providing space to all *paramāṇus*.

What does religion have to do with knowing these *jñeyas*? *jñāna* is as per the *jñeyas*. If *jñeyas* are not understood as they are and are understood contrary, then the essence of the substance will not change; however, confusion arises within the self, and as a result, *jīva* has sorrow. *jīva* that denies *jñāna* will become inert, like a plant.

Here, everything is being said according to logic. Even though six substances are indivisible, they still have space points. *kāla* is with one space point. Just because *kāla* is of one space point, it does not mean that there should be only one *kālāṇu*. There are innumerable *kālāṇus* with one space point.

jñāna, which knows *jñeyas* as they are, is called accurate. Objects which are meant to be known will not remain unknown in *jñāna*; therefore, *ātmā* can definitely know them. When this *samyajjñāna* arises, it leads to happiness and peace, and that is the result of knowing *jñeyas*.

The space point of *ākāśa* occupied by one *paramāṇu*, that much part of *ākāśa* is said to be *pradeśa* (space point). *kāla*, *dharma*, *adharma*, and *ākāśa* never leave their fixed places; except for the *siddhas*, all living beings, and *pudgala* (physical matter) in the *loka* move from one place to another.

A single space point of *ākāśa* has the ability to give space to the space points of the other five substances, as well as the infinite subtle mass of physical matter all together. *jīvas* of the entire universe, as well as masses of *pudgala*, the Meru Mountain, and even money, etc., if they were all to become infinitesimally subtle, then also *ākāśa* has the ability to give space to all of them. (Although *jīva* never becomes so subtle, but to explain the ability of giving space by *ākāśa* this is said.) Compared to the gross state of *jīvas*, *jīvas* of *nigoda* are in a subtle form, and their material bodies are also subtle; however, they are not infinitesimally subtle; they cannot fit in one space point. They cover innumerable space points; however, *ākāśa* can give space to the masses of infinitesimally subtle physical matter, which are more subtle than the physical body of the *jīva* of *nigoda*. Such is its ability to give space.

Although *ākāśa* is a single indivisible substance, it can have parts in the form of *pradeśa* (space points). It is visible that *jīva* and *paramāṇu* have resided in separate places. Therefore, the space points of *ākāśa*, which give them space in different places, must be separate. If *jīva* and *paramāṇu* are to be given space, there must be a substance that gives them that space. They are parts of *ākāśa*. Because, if this were not the case, it would not be possible to give space to all *paramāṇus*.

If someone holds the belief that there are no space points of *ākāśa*; instead, *ākāśa* is a single undivided space; on placing two fingers in *ākāśa*, if it is asked, 'Is the space of the two fingers one or many?' What will be the answer?

If it is said that the space of the two fingers is one, then it must be asked: (1) Is the space of two fingers the same because *ākāśa* is an indivisible substance with undivided parts? If it is said that '*ākāśa* is an indivisible substance with undivided parts and thus the space of two fingers is one,' then the part of *ākāśa* that constitutes the space of one finger will be the same part that constitutes the space of the second finger. In such a case, one of the parts will have to be considered absent from these two.

For example, a house with two rooms. Now, if the space of one room is the same as the space of the other room, and without partitioning, the house is said to be one, then the two

rooms of the house cannot be proved. And by considering one room as destroyed, you would have to consider the house to be without rooms, but such is not the nature of the house. Therefore, the statement that the space of one room is the same as that of the other is not valid.

In the same way, if the space of one finger in *ākāśa* is considered to be the same as the space of the other finger, then due to the absence of parts, *ākāśa* would be like a single space, just like a *paramāṇu*. However, this cannot be true because the substance that provides space to all five substances is the largest one. Therefore, it cannot provide space for all others if it were with one space point. Hence, this logic is not valid.

If it is said that, (2) *ākāśa* is an indivisible substance with distinct parts, and thus the space of two fingers is one, then this reasoning is also not correct. The reason is that the parts of the two fingers are distinct. Just as it is appropriate to say that the spaces of the rooms in a house are separate, but the house is one. This is because rooms of a house can be proved to be distinct, and a house with two rooms can be proved. This is the way distinct space points of the substance *ākāśa* are proved.

If it is said that the two fingers have many space points, the question arises: is *ākāśa* many substances in the form of divided parts, and therefore, the space points of the two fingers are many?

A doubter may answer that *ākāśa* is many substances in the form of divided parts, and thus the space points of the two fingers are many; then this belief would lead to the concept of *ākāśa*, which is one substance believed to be infinite in terms of substances. Therefore, this is not correct. Just as saying that a house has many rooms and rooms have many separate areas is not correct, because this would imply that the house has multiple houses. In the same way, *ākāśa* would become many substances. Thus, this statement is not true.

If it is said that the two fingers have numerous space areas, then the question is: even though *ākāśa* is an indivisible substance, are there many space points for the two fingers?

If the answer is that, even though *ākāśa* is an indivisible substance, there are many space points for the two fingers, then your answer is valid. For example, even though the house is indivisible, areas of the rooms are distinct and multiple, which is correct. By this logic, the concept of parts in *ākāśa* is established.

अथ तिर्यगूध् वर्प्रचयावावेदयति -

Now, *tiryaka-pracaya* (conglomeration in horizontal direction) and *ūrdhva pracaya* (conglomeration in vertical direction) are explained (with respect to different substances):-

**एक्को व दुगे बहुगो संखातीदा तदो अणंता य।
दव्वाणं च पदेसा संति हि समय ति कालस्स ॥१४१॥**

*ekko va duge bahugā saṁkhātīdā tado aṇantāya |
dāvvaṇaṁ ca padesā saṁti hi samaya tti kālassa || 141 ||*

gāthā: Substances have one, two, many, innumerable, or infinite *pradeśas* (space-points), and *kālanu* has only one space point. i.e., *samaya*.

tīkā: A Conglomeration of *pradeśas* (space-points/units) in the horizontal direction is called *tiryakpracaya*, and a conglomeration of the modification specific to *samaya* in the vertical direction is called *udharvapracaya*.

ākāśa (sky/space) is a stationary substance possessing infinite *pradeśas*; *dharma* and *adharma* are also stationary substances both possessing innumerable *pradeśas*, *jīva* is an unsteady substance possessing innumerable *pradeśas* and *pudgala* (matter-particle) along with the efficacy to be with numerous space points, is of one *pradeśa* or with many (numerous, innumerable, infinite), and they have mass in horizontal direction. But *kāla dravya* (time particle) does not have *tiryaka-pracaya* (horizontal mass) because it possesses only one *pradeśa* from the view of both *śakti* (capability) and *vyakti* (manifestation).

prūrdhvaacaya (vertical conglomeration) is inevitable in all substances because the occurrence (of modifications) touches its three aspects of time (past, present, and future), so it is with parts. But the difference is that the conglomeration of modifications specific to time is a vertical conglomeration of all five substances except *kāla*. And mass of *samayas* is the vertical conglomeration of the substance *kāla*. Because the modification of other substances is separate from *samaya*, so those modifications are specific to *samaya* and the modification of *kāla* is itself the nature of *samaya*, so its modification is not specific to *samaya*.

pravacana of gāthā-141

Substances have one, two, many, innumerable and infinite *pradeśas* (space points). *kāla* has *samaya* (as modifications).

The word *pracaya* means mass or accumulation. *tiryakpracaya* means *pradeśas* (space points) having a mass or conglomeration horizontally, and *ūrdhvapracaya* means vertical, *samaya* from the view of *kāla* is a conglomeration of specific modifications.

ākāśa – It is a steady substance with infinite space points and is equal to *loka* and *aloka*.

dharma and adharma – It is a substance which is steady and spread over the 14 *brahmāṇḍa* (three *loka*) with innumerable space points.

jīva – It is an unsteady substance with innumerable space points.

pudgala – From the view of substance, it is with one space point, but it has the ability to become with many space points. From the view of modification, they are from two, numerous, to innumerable, to infinite space points.

In this way, as *ākāśa*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *jīva*, and *pudgala* are with numerous space points. They have horizontal space points, meaning they are a heap of space points. But *kāla* is not a heap of space points. This is because, by its efficacy, it can be with only one space point, and even from the view of manifestation, it is with one space point.

Vertical mass is present in all six substances. This is because the modification of substances is present through three time phases: the past, present, and future. It is not possible that at any time, some state of some substance does not exist. So, they are with parts. All six substances have a vertical conglomeration. But the difference is that in the modification of *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, and *ākāśa*, *samaya* is *nimitta*. In all these five substances, by way of *vyvahāra*, in the modifications in which the perspective of *samaya* comes, that is the vertical mass these five substances have. Modification of *kāla* is *nimitta* to itself. Conglomeration of such *samayas* is the vertical conglomeration of the substance *kāla*. In the modification of all five other substances, *samaya* is *nimitta*, so the modification of these five substances is separate from *samaya*, and *samaya* is specific to it. The modification of *kāla* itself is, by nature, *samaya*, so it is not specific to time.

Question: How can one attain such subtle knowledge?

Answer: Till one is poor, one will not get to see expensive jewellery, clothes, etc. But after becoming rich, he does not refuse to see expensive jewellery, clothes, etc.; he sees it with enthusiasm and buys it as well. Similarly, everyone has the efficacy of all-knowing and all-seeing, but it is through *jñānī* that one understands that, however subtle knowables may be, the efficacy to know is always present. This should be accepted. One should not believe that one cannot know some knowables. The meaning is that the correct knowing of knowables is the base of *dharma*.

अथ कालपदार्थोद्धर्षचयनिरन्वयत्वमुपहन्ति -

Now it is refuted that the substance *kāla* is without continuity (*niranvaya*) –

**उप्पादो पद्धंसो विज्जदि जदि तस्स एगसमयमिहि ।
समयस्स सो वि समओ सभावसमवट्ठिदो हवदि ॥ १४२ ॥**

*uppādo paddhamso vijjadi jadi jassa egasamayamhi |
samayassa so vi samao sabhāvasamavattḥhido havadi || 142 ||*

gāthā: If *utpāda* (origination) and *vyaya* (annihilation) are found existing within one moment in any *samaya*, i.e., *kāla-dravya* (time particle/*kālāṇu*), then that *samaya* (smallest unit of time) proves to be well established in its own nature, i.e., it is permanent.

ṭīkā: *samaya* is an infinitesimal occurrence part of the *kāla-padārtha*. In that *ṛtāṇśa* (infinitesimal occurrence part), there is a possibility of the origination and annihilation of some substance. This is because the *ṛtāṇśa* of *samaya*, having originated by the traversing of the *paramāṇu*, it is with a reason. (Traversing of *paramāṇu* from one space point of *ākāśa* to the next, at a slow pace, is the reason, and the occurrence of the infinitesimal part, which is *samaya*, is the effect of that reason). So, some substances should originate and annihilate. What is the need for some substance to undergo origination-annihilation? What is the fault if that *ṛtāṇśa* (infinitesimal part) is accepted to have origination-annihilation in place of some other substance? The answer to this query is given under: -

If origination and annihilation are accepted to be a part of *ṛtāṇśa* (infinitesimal part), then (the question arises) – are origination and annihilation (1) simultaneous or (2) sequential? If they are said to be simultaneous, then that simultaneity cannot be proved because there cannot be two contradictory natures in one (or in one infinitesimal part, there cannot exist two opposing natures, like light and darkness, simultaneously). And if they arise sequentially, then even that cannot be proved because, as that *ṛtāṇśa* (occurrence part) is extremely subtle, there is an absence of the ability to divide. In this way, it is not possible for the *ṛtāṇśa* (occurrence part) – *samaya*, to have origination and annihilation. Hence, a *ṛttimāna* (which has occurrence) should be found. And that *ṛttimāna* is the *kāla padārtha* (*kāla* substance). In that *kāla padārtha*, origination and annihilation can occur even in one *ṛtāṇśa*. Because the origination which occurs from the view of *ṛtāṇśa*, in the *ṛtāṇśa* to

the *ṛttimāna*, that same origination, in the same *ṛtānśa* to the same *ṛttimāna* (holder of infinitesimal parts), is in the form of annihilation from the view of the earlier *ṛtānśa* (or, that which is the form of origination in the present to the *kāla padārtha* that same is in the form of annihilation from the view of the earlier *paryāya* (modification).

If thus origination and annihilation are possible to arise in one *ṛtānśa*, then how can *kāla-padārtha* (time-substance) be *niranvaya* (without continuity)? Owing to this, that *kāla-padārtha* having origination and annihilation simultaneously with respect to former and later *ṛtānśa*, by nature it is indestructible and unoriginated, then should not the *kāla-padārtha* be permanent? (i.e., in the *kāla padārtha*, there is simultaneous origination and annihilation; even in one *ṛtānśa*, origination and annihilation occur simultaneously. Therefore, it is not *nirvāṇa* - without continuity or divisions. So, by nature, it is definitely *dhruva* (permanent/eternal). Thus, it is proved that origination, annihilation, and permanence exist in one *ṛtānśa* of *kāla padārtha*.

pravacana on gāthā 142

Now, the concept that the upper movement of the substance *kāla* is not in one flow and is divided is refuted. In other words, *vyavahāra kāla* does exist. But to say that there is no substance like *niścaya kāla*, except for that which is evident, is refuted here.

If the origination and annihilation of *kāla* are present in one *samaya*, then that is present in *kāla*'s nature meaning is permanent.

samaya is the minutest modification of *kāla*. In that modification, the definite origination or annihilation of any substance is possible. This is because modification in the form of *samaya* originates with the movement of *paramāṇu*. Hence, it is the cause. The time taken for a *paramāṇu* traversing slowly from one space point to another is called *samaya*. So, the traversing of *paramāṇu* in a slow motion is the *kāraṇa* (cause), and *samaya* is the *kārya* (work done). Hence, there should be origination and annihilation of some substance in that. If the existence of one *samaya* was not present earlier and occurred later, then that state should arise from the base of some substance. It cannot originate without any base. Origination is not possible without the base of some substance. It is proven that the beholder of the modification should be in the same space as the modification. So, it is proved that *samaya*, etc., are *vyavahāra kāla* (conventional time), and some substance should be its base. That base is *kālāṇu* (time substance).

Hence, *kāla* is not figurative but a definite, absolute substance.

The doubter argues that – what is the need for any substance to originate and annihilate? Instead, what is the harm in believing that only that one modification has originated and annihilated?

To resolve this doubt, the following questions are asked to the doubter –

- 1) Is origination and annihilation together?
 - 2) Or sequential?
1. Faults which arise in believing in the simultaneous origination-annihilation of the same modification are as follows: -
The doubter says that modification has origination and annihilation simultaneously. But that is not how it occurs. One state cannot have two opposing natures within the same *samaya*. For example, darkness is absent when there is light and vice versa because both are of opposite nature. Similarly, origination and annihilation are opposing natures and cannot be in the same modification at the same *samaya*. So, this doubter's argument is incorrect.
 2. Fault in believing that origination and annihilation of one modification sequentially is as follows: -
If the doubter says that there is a sequential origination and annihilation of one modification, that is not how it occurs. A modification is an infinitesimal changing state, so two parts are absent, like origination and annihilation. So, the argument that one modification has origination and annihilation sequentially is also incorrect.

It is not possible for the extremely subtle modification in the form of *samaya* to have two parts of origination and annihilation. So, one base of that state should be the substance that holds that state. That is the substance *kāla*.

In that substance, which is the *kālāṇu*, origination and annihilation can exist in one modification. In one *samaya*, the new state originates, the earlier state is annihilated, and *kālāṇu* remains permanent. For example, there is origination of the state of *rotī* (Indian bread) in the present, annihilation of the state of dough and *paramāṇu* (the smallest unit of matter) is permanent in both. Till *paramāṇu* is not accepted as permanent, there cannot be a state of *rotī* at the time of the state of dough. This is because they are opposing states. In one subtle state, there cannot be one part of *rotī* and one part of dough. If *paramāṇu* is accepted as permanent, then both the opposing natures are proved to be present in the substance. This is because the origination of one state of substance concerning that

substance, that same origination of that substance is the state of annihilation of that modification for the view of the earlier state. There is origination of *rotī* in the *paramāṇu*; simultaneously, there is state of annihilation from the view of dough. In this way, that which is the state of origination in *kālāṇu*, simultaneously, is the state of annihilation from the view of the earlier state.

In this way, origination and annihilation are possible even in the modification. Hence, the substance *kāla* cannot be devoid of being analogous. In other words, it is proved that it is *dhruva* (permanent). So, that substance *kāla* attains annihilation from the view of the earlier modification and the view of the present modification, it attains origination. Despite having attained origination and annihilation simultaneously, its nature never destroys, nor does it originate. Such is the substance *kāla*. So why should it not exist? Meaning, it does exist.

There is a simultaneous origination and annihilation in the modification in the substance *kāla*, so it is not divided. Hence, the substance *kāla* is definitely permanent by nature.

In this way, in one modification, from the view of earlier modification, there is annihilation; from the view of present modification, there is origination, and from the view of being existent, it is in the form of permanence. This proves that such a substance, *kāla*, is with origination-annihilation and permanence.

The word ‘*kāla*’ exists in the world (worldly parlance), and it is known. The word is a signifier, and there should be a substance in the world that predicates the substantive meaning behind the signifier. Whom will the word signify if there is no predicate? Therefore, ‘*kāla*’ word is a signifier, and the *kāla* substance is a predicate.

He who does not believe the substance *kāla* to be an absolute real substance, in reality, does not believe in his own self-time. *dharma* will never manifest in him because he does not accept the existence of all the substances present in the universe. Hence, his *jnāna* is erroneous, and he does not even accept the existence of the knowing nature of *ātmā*.

gāthā-143

अथ सर्ववृत्त्यंशेषु समयपदार्थस्योत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवत्त्वं साधयति --

Now, the way origination-annihilation-permanence was proved in one *vṛttānśa* (occurrence part) of the *kāla-padārtha*, in the same way, in every *vṛttānśa*, the *kāla-padārtha* is proved to be with origination-annihilation-permanence.

**एगम्हि संति समये संभवठिदिणाससण्णिदा अट्ठा ।
समयस्स सव्वकालं एस हि कालाणुसब्भावो ॥ १४३ ॥**

*egamhi saṃti samaye saṃbhavaṭṭhidināsaṣṇṇidā aṭṭhā |
samayassa savvakālaṃ esa hi kālāṇusabbhāvo || 143 ||*

gāthā: In every *samaya*, the *artha* (things) of origination, permanence, and annihilation are always found in *kāla*. This is the presence of *kāla* (or this proves the existence of *kālāṇu* (time particle)).

ūkā: Every *vṛttānśa* of the *kāla-padārtha* is with origination, annihilation, and permanence because (as proved in the previous *gāthā*-142), these three (*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya*) are seen in one *vṛttānśa*. This is correct because specific/distinctive existence cannot be found without general/eternal existence. This is an acknowledgement of the existence of *kāla-padārtha* (because) if both specific and general existence are proved, then in no way can they be proved without existence (*astitva*).

pravacana on gāthā 143

There is always a presence of the modification of origination-permanence and annihilation in every *samaya* of substance *kāla*. This is the presence of *kālāṇu*, and this proves the existence of *kālāṇu* (time particle).

There is origination-annihilation-permanence in every state of the time substance. The origination of the new state, the annihilation of the earlier state, and remains permanent in its existence in all the states. This way, time substances have origination-annihilation and permanence. This was proved in the 142nd verse. This is correct because a specific state cannot exist without the existence of the general state.

One *paramāṇu* moves from one space point to another at a slow pace, and that time taken is one *samaya*. In that, the new state of *samaya* arises, and the earlier state is annihilated. In this, the origination-annihilation is distinctive, and that specific cannot exist without the general. Further, when it moved, before that, that *samaya* did not exist; when it moved, the earlier *samaya* was annihilated, and a new one arose. The origination and annihilation that arise are opposing natures, and those opposing natures cannot be in one modification. The specific cannot exist without the existence of the general substance. So here, the non-opposing nature of the generality of the *kālāṇu* (time particle) substance is proved.

By ascertaining one *vṛtti anśa* (occurrence part) correctly, all three parts – origination, annihilation, and permanence are proved, and this proves the existence of the substance *kālāṇu*. When deciding on the occurrence part, origination-annihilation and general existence are proved. This is the proof of the existence of *kālāṇu* substance. Particular existence, meaning, origination-annihilation, and general existence, meaning state of permanence, are proved. Therefore, without the existence of *kālāṇu*, nothing is proved. The modification that has gone does not go out of the substance and is not totally annihilated. The efficacy of permanence is the efficacy from which the earlier modification went into, and the new modification arose. Annihilation is not complete absence. On whose basis did the modification arise, and where did it go? If we find the base, permanence is proved.

The way earlier modification went in one *samaya*, present modification is manifested, and permanence remains the same; in the same way, these three natures are present in every *samaya*. It is proven that the time substance was the way it was in the past, is the same in the present, and will remain the same in the future. This way, in the state of all three time phases, the time substance is with origination-annihilation-permanence – so it is determined.

अथ कालपदार्थस्यास्तित्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रदेशमात्रत्वं साधयति -

Now, since the existence of a time-object cannot otherwise be established, it is being proved that the time particle (*kālāṇu*) possesses only one *pradeśa* (space-point): -

**जस्स ण संति पदेसा पदेसमेत्तं व तच्चदो णादुं ।
सुण्णं जाणं तमत्थं अत्थंतरभूदमत्थीदो ॥१४४॥**

*jassa ṇa saṃti padesā padesamettaṃ va taccado ṇādum |
suṇṇaṃ jāṇa tamatthaṃ atthantarabhūdamatthīdo || 144 ||*

gāthā: That substance, in which many *pradeśas* (space points) or even one *pradeśa* is not known, from the view of *paramārtha* (absolute truth), knows that substance to be *śūnya* (void/non-existent). It is *arthāntarabhūta* (separate) from existence.

ṭīkā: First existence is in the form of the occurrence of origination-annihilation-permanence. If it is said that *vṛtti* (modification/existence) is there in *kāla* without *pradeśa* (space points), then that is not possible because, with the absence of *pradeśa*, there will be an absence of *vṛttimāna* (the holder of modification).

Further, if it is argued here that ‘only *vṛtti* (modification) in its form should be accepted, ‘ what is the need of the *kālāṇu* substance?’ The answer to this is given as follows: It cannot be proved that only *vṛtti* (modification of *samaya*) exists. If it is said that *vṛtti* cannot exist without *vṛttimāna*, then it is asked that *vṛtti* should be with the oneness of origination-annihilation-permanence, but how can *vṛtti* alone be with the oneness of origination-annihilation-permanence? If it is said that *anādi-anaṅta* (from eternity to infinity), and in many *anaṅtara* (without any distinction in between, each modification arises one by one), parts, there is a state of oneness, first the first parts are destroyed, and then the later parts are destroyed, and the state of oneness remains permanent, and in this way, *vṛtti* can be with the oneness of origination-annihilation-permanence – but that is not so. (in only the *vṛtti*) The part that is destroyed and the part that originated are not modified together, so where will the oneness of origination-annihilation be? Further, suppose the part that is annihilated is permanently destroyed, and the part that is originating has not got its nature (or has not manifested). Where is the permanence that exists in the oneness of origination and annihilation? In this situation, the threefold characteristic of origination-annihilation-

permanence is destroyed or destroyed in a moment, as accepted by the Buddhist concept of the destruction of the moment becomes triumphant. The permanent substance declines, and momentarily annihilated modifications arise. Therefore, under the fear of having a pandemonium of the nature of substance, it is definitely important to look for and accept the existence of the *ṛttimāna* under whose auspice *ṛtti* exists. That is *pradeśa* (space point) only [means that *ṛttimāna* (one with modification) is definitely with *pradeśa*], because it is not possible to prove *anyvaya* (presence of being) and *vyatireka* (absence/not being) without *pradeśa*. (One without *pradeśa* cannot follow/have permanence and origination-annihilation.).

Question: In this way, if *kāla* (time substance) is one substance with space-points, why should it not be considered to have innumerable *pradeśas* (space-points), which are equal to *lokākāśa*?

Answer: If so, then the modification of *samaya* cannot be established. Hence, it is not appropriate to believe it has innumerable space points. By the *paramāṇu*, traversing of only the space point is the substance *samaya* (means, one *paramāṇu*, traverses from one *pradeśa* to the nearest next *pradeśa* at a slow pace, and that establishes the *paryāya samaya*. If the substance *samaya* were equal to innumerable space points equal to *lokākāśa*, then how can *paryāya samaya* be proved?

If it is said that *dravya samaya* or *kāla-padārtha* (time-substance) is equal to the space of the *lokākāśa*, which is one *dravya* with innumerable space points, even then it is said that when one *paramāṇu* traverses from its one space point to the next, and the time taken by it proves the *paryāya samaya*, it is not so, because it gives rise to two faults-

- 1) Modification of one part of *dravya* will be believed to be the modification of the full *dravya*. To believe *eka deśa ṛtti* (modification of one part) to be the *ṛtti* (modification) of the full *dravya* is contradictory. *samaya* is the subtle part of *ṛtti* of the full *kāla-padārtha*, but part of *ṛtti* of its one part is not *samaya*.
- 2) Moreover, there would arise the question of *tiryaka-pracaya* (conglomeration in horizontal direction) becoming *ūrdhva-parachaya* (conglomeration in vertical direction). It is thus: Firstly, *kāla dravya* modifies in one *pradeśa*, then on the next *pradeśa*, and then again on another *pradeśa* (such a condition arises). In this way, *tiryaka-pracaya* becomes *ūrdhva-pracaya*, establishing *kāla-dravya* (time-particle) to possess only one *pradeśa*. i.e., The condition arises where *tiryaka-pracaya* itself is

believed to be *ūrdhva-pracaya*, and the *kāla dravya* will be proved to have only one *pradeśa*; Therefore, those who do not want to accept that *tiryaka-pracaya* is the same as *ūrdhva-pracaya* must conclude, first of all, that the *kāla-dravya/kālapadārtha/kālāṇu* (time-particle) has only one *pradeśa*.

(Thus, ends the *dravya- viśeṣa prajñāpana* under the second chapter on *jñeya-tattva prajñāpana*)

pravacana on gatha-144

The substance whose space points, or even one space point, is not known by way of supreme truth; that substance should be known as non-existent because it is entirely different from existence.

If it is believed that numerous space points of the substance, or even one space point of the substance, are not in keeping with the supreme truth, meaning it does not have an area of existence, then the existence of that substance does not remain; it becomes a void. That is separate from existence, meaning it becomes non-existent.

Firstly, the unity of origination-annihilation-permanence is the nature of modification. Origination-annihilation-permanence of time has already been established, and they occur in their existence. The question arises: Is the substance *kāla* without space points? – That is not possible. This is because if a space point is absent, then there would be a state of absence of the holder of modifications - substance, and with the absence of substance, there would be a state of void, and void is contrary to existence. The existence of every substance has been proved earlier. By not accepting the existence of *kāla*, there would be a destruction of substance, and with that, substance and existence, both will attain a state of void. Existence and nothingness are opposite states. Therefore, this is not possible. Where there is existence, there must be space points. *kāla* exists in the form of oneness of origination-annihilation-permanence. This has been proved in the earlier verse. Hence, it is not possible that a substance is without spatial points. Therefore, it is not possible that *kāla* is without space points.

Question: We can believe in only the state of modification in the form of *samaya*; what is the need to believe in the *ṛttimāna* substance, which is the *kalāṇu*?

Answer: It is not possible that only modification in the form of *samaya* is the *kāla* substance because modification cannot exist without the holder of modifications. The new

state can't arise, and the earlier state cannot be annihilated without some base. So, the modifications of origination and annihilation are possible only on the base of the substance *kālāṇu*, and without that, it is not possible. Hence, *kāla* is not just an assumed substance but is a real substance.

Even after this, if the doubter says that modifications can arise without the holder of the modification, it is asked that the modification be in the form of the oneness of origination-annihilation-permanence. How can the modification be made in this form by itself? Origination-annihilation-permanence has been proved in the existence of the substance. Then, without accepting the existence of substance, how can modification have the three parts of origination-annihilation-permanence? Explain this.

Then the doubter argues that from eternity to infinity, the *kāla*-substance is modifying in an unbroken chain of one *samaya* after another. As this creates a flow, it has a form of oneness. The earlier state annihilates, and the later state originates. Due to this, an unbroken flow continues. This unbroken flow is permanent. One modification arises and goes – this chain of origination-annihilation continues, and the flow is unbroken. So there remains oneness in it. In this way, only the modification can be in the form of oneness of origination-annihilation-permanence.

The answer to this query is as follows: -

The above statement is incorrect. Without accepting permanence, only the part that originates and the part that annihilates do not occur together in the modification, meaning that these two modifications exist in separate *samaya*. How can there be oneness of origination-annihilation, as suggested above? It has been said that the flow is unbroken in origination and annihilation, so there is oneness, but if the *samaya* of origination and annihilation is separate, how will there be oneness in it? Or there cannot be oneness in them. So, this belief does not prove permanence.

The part that is annihilated is in a state of permanent destruction, and in that *samaya*, the origination part has not manifested by itself because, in the above-said belief, it is said that origination occurs in the next *samaya*. So, when annihilation occurred, there was no origination. These two facets cannot occur at the same *samaya*, so how can there be permanence in the oneness of origination and annihilation? If it is believed that origination of the present and annihilation of the present are in the same *samaya*, then it is possible for the permanence of the present to be there. But if origination and annihilation are assumed

to be in separate *samaya*, then the said oneness of permanence – that state of permanence cannot be proved.

With this belief, the triple characteristics of origination-annihilation-permanence will be destroyed. This is because during the *samaya*, when there is annihilation, origination does not occur, and due to this, permanence is also not proved. The way believers of the momentary state believe that substance is for one *samaya* only. Believes the second one is in the second *samaya*, and the third one is in the third *samaya*. With this, a similar belief arises, and the transient is exalted. No permanent substance remains, and modifications that are destroyed in a moment arise. Thus, a state of chaos arises in understanding the nature of substance. Thus, antitheses develop in the nature of the substance. According to this belief, either everything is destroyed, or everything originates, and nothing remains permanent. No substance remains unbroken. So, this belief is not correct.

If chaos in the understanding of substance needs to stop, then it must be accepted that modification is based on the holder of modification, which is the substance. It is appropriate to ascertain that the base of a part is the holder of parts, and the base of modification is the holder of modification. This holder of modification, which is the *kālāṇu*, is a permanent substance. The holder of modification cannot exist without space points. Hence, it is determined that the holder of modification, the *kālāṇu*, is with a space point.

If *kālāṇu* is believed to be without space points, then substance without space points cannot exist. *aṇvaya* means the substance which stays undivided/uniform, and *vyatireka* means the state which arises one after another. *dhruva* (permanence) stays undivided/uniform, and origination-annihilation are *vyatireka* or states. That which is without space points can neither be undivided nor with divisions or origination-annihilation-permanence. *kālāṇu* is with origination-annihilation-permanence, which has been proved earlier. So, it is proved that the *kālāṇu* substance is with space points.

Thus, the doubter considers *kāla* to be the substance with space points, but now he raises another doubt, which is as follows:

"If *kāla* is indeed *pradeśī* (with spatial units), then why should it not be considered to be a single substance which is with innumerable space points, equal to *lokākāśa* (universe)? That is, why should *kāla* not be considered as a single substance with innumerable space points, like *dharmāstikāya*?"

The solution to this doubt is as follows:

This statement is not correct. Because if *kāla* were to be a single substance with innumerable space points, then the moment of manifestation of modification cannot be decided. Hence, *kāla* cannot be considered one substance with innumerable spatial units.

When one *paramāṇu* moves slowly from one space point of *kāla* to another neighbouring one, then the *samaya* of modification is determined. This pertains to the measurement of *kāla*. If *kāla* were a single substance with innumerable space points like *lokākāśa*, then the determination of the modification of *samaya* would not be possible.

Again, the doubter asks that even if *kāla* is a single substance with innumerable space points like *dharmāstikāya*, which are equal to *lokākāśa*, when one *paramāṇu* crosses one *pradeśa* of *ākāśa*, the modification of *samaya* would still be determined.

Thus, he argues. But his statement is not correct. Because two faults arise in this:

- 1 According to the above statement, the state of considering one part of the substance to be the entire substance would arise. This is because *kāla* has been considered to be like *dharmāstikāya*, which is equal to *lokākāśa*. When one *paramāṇu* crosses one space point of *ākāśa*, one *samaya* is complete. Its state is equal to one part. This is because the measurement of *kāla* is being taken here.

How much is the measurement of *kāla*? It is equal to the time one *paramāṇu* takes to cross one space point. Then the modification of *kāla* is completed here. Hence, according to the statement of the doubter, if it is believed that the substance *kāla* exists throughout the universe and its modification exists in one part, then this statement contradicts itself. Even though there is a distinction of characteristics between the substance and modification, there is no distinction in terms of the spatial units covered. The area covered by the modification has to be as much as that covered by the substance.

Just as the modification of *dharmāstikāya* (ether matter *nimitta* in movement) exists throughout its entire substance, the modification of *kāla* should also exist throughout the substance. However, if the statement of the doubter is accepted, then this does not happen in *kāla*. The modification of the substance *kāla* is complete in just one part. Thus, the statement of the doubter is contradictory. If it is said that sugar exists in the entire gravel, but the sweet taste of sugar is present only in a small part, then this is discernibly contradictory. Similarly, a substance can't be high while its modification is lower.

Likewise, the substance *kāla* can't exist as much as *lokākāśa*, while its modification remains in a small part. The area of substance and its modification are not separate, nor is one greater or lesser. The substance - *dharmāstikāya* is equal to *loka*, and its modification is also equal to *loka*. However, the modification of *kāla* is never equal to *loka*. The modification of *kāla* exists in one part and finishes there. So, the bearer of that modification, which is the substance-*kāla*, cannot be proved to be with innumerable space points which are equal to the *loka*. Rather, the part of the modification of *kāla* exists in one space point. Hence, the bearer of modification, the *kāla* substance, is also determined to be in one part.

(2) By considering *kāla* to be with innumerable space points, a situation of *tiryaka-pracaya* (horizontal occurrence) to become *ūrdhva-pracaya* arises, which is as follows:

If *kāla* is considered to be with innumerable space points, then in one *samaya*, *kāla* will modify in one space point; in the second *samaya*, it will modify with a second space point; and in the third, the third space point. This is because the doubter has assumed that when a substance crosses one space point, one *samaya* is proven. If this were the case, it would lead to *tiryakpracaya* doing the work of the *ūrdhvapracaya* (vertical occurrence). One after another, or mass in context to the area, is considered *tiryakpracaya* (horizontal occurrence). Its work is to show the area covered. But it is not the work of *tiryakpracaya* to show from the context of *kāla*. One *samaya*...second *samaya*... in this way to show the context of *kāla*, is the work of *ūrdhva-pracaya*. Now, if the doubter considers *kāla* to be innumerable space points, and modifies in one space point in one *samaya*, the second space point in the second *samaya*, then *tiryak-pracaya* will convert to *ūrdhva-pracaya*, and will prove the substance to be only as much as only a space point. Or the situation will arise that *tiryakpracaya* will have to be believed to be *ūrdhva-pracaya*. With this, the substance will be proved to be only as much as a space point.

The doubter desires to establish the innumerable space points of the *kāla* substance. An attempt has been made to establish the width of the area covered by seeing the second part after the first, the third after the second, and so on, but it has not been proved. Because in one *samaya*, the whole substance is complete in one part. Thus, the *tiryak* state in relation to the area covered has been attempted to establish. However, that is not proven. The reason is that, at any one time, the entire substance is completed by way of one part. Due to this, the width, in relation to the area, cannot be established. When it is said that in one *samaya*, one part and the second *samaya*, the second part, verticality, or relation to *kāla* or *ūrdhva-*

pracaya, is proven. The doubter wishes to establish the correlation to the area covered, but that has not been proven. The relation to *kāla* is proven. Due to this, the situation of assuming *tiryak-pracaya* or relation to area, to be *ūrdhvapracaya* – relation to *kāla*. Therefore, in *kāla* substance, the correlation to *kāla* is established, but the correlation to area/ space is not.

So he who does not want to believe *tiryakpracaya* to be *ūrdhvapracaya*, must believe the *kāla* substance to be with only one space point.

In this manner, *kāla* is a definite substance, and it is of a single *pradeśa* (space point) - this has been established. *kāla* is also a *jñeya*, and to know *jñeya* just the way they are is *samyagjñāna*.

jñeyatattva - prajñāpana
(*jñāna - jñeya vibhāga adhikāra*)

gāthā-145

**अथैवं ज्ञेयतत्त्वमुक्त्वा ज्ञानज्ञेयविभागेनात्मानं निश्चन्वन्नात्मनोऽत्यन्तविभक्तत्वाय
व्यवहारजीवत्वहेतुमालोचयति -**

Now, after having mentioned *jñeya-tattva* (truth related to knowables) ascertaining *ātmā* by distinction between *jñāna* and *jñeya* and for separating *ātmā* completely, the reason for holding *vyavahāra jīvatva* (conventional-consciousness) is being discussed: -

**सपदेसेहिं समग्गो लोगो अट्ठेहिं णिट्ठिदो णिच्चो ।
जो तं जाणदि जीवो पाणचदुक्काभिसंबद्धो ॥ 145 ॥**

sapadesehiṃ samaggo logo aṭṭhehiṃṇiṭṭhi do ṇicco |
jo taṃ jāṇadi jīvo paṇacadukkāhimsambaddho || 145 ||

ṭīkā: The entire *loka* (universe) in which there is nothing beyond the six substances is wholly filled with them. These substances are with space points, and the entire universe is eternal. He who knows it is *jīva* (*ātmā*). In the state of *saṁsāra*, it is connected to four *prāṇas* (four-fold vital life forces).

ṭīkā: In this way, the complete *loka*, from such *pradeśas* of *ākāśa* whose existence has been proved, to the *kāla* substance, all substances are spread in the entire *loka*. Beyond them, there is nothing more in the *loka*. In that complete *loka*, *jīva*, despite being a part of it, has the efficacy of being able to know self and non-self, which is incomprehensible by the mind, and none of the other substances can know. Hence, the other substances are *jñeya* (knowables), and the substance *jīva* is *jñeya* (knowable) as well as *jñāna* (knower). Such is the distinction of *jñāna* and *jñeya*.

Now to this *jīva* (*ātmā*), the efficacy of *jñāna*, which is manifested, is its inherent nature. This efficacy of infinite *jñāna* is its cause, and its characteristic is its existence through all three *kālas*. Such being the nature of the substance, despite it being the indestructible absolutely definite state of *jīva*, in the state of *saṁsāra*, due to the flow of *pudgala*, which is since eternity, as it is agglutinated with it, getting defiled, it gets connected to the four

prāṇas (four-fold life principles). They together are the reason for *vyavahāra jīvatva* (conventional consciousness), and hence, it is worth separating.

bhāvārtha: Conglomeration of substances is called *loka* (universe). *jīva* knows it through the efficacy of *jñāna*, which is mentally incomprehensible. Therefore, all substances excepting *jīva* are *jñeya*, but *jīva* is both *jñāna* (knower) as well as *jñeya* (knowable).

That being the characteristic of *jīva*, it is never destroyed, and that kind of *niścaya-jīvatva* (true/absolute consciousness) always exists. The reason for that *niścaya-jīvatva* is the natural infinite efficacy of *jñāna*. Despite always *jīva* having such *niścaya-jīvatva*, he, in his mundane state, being vitiated by adhesion of karmic matter, he is connected with four *prāṇas* (vital forces), and so he has *vyavahāra jīvatva* (conventional consciousness) too. The cause of that *vyavahāra-jīvatva* is the connection with the four-fold *prāṇas*. *jīva* should separate itself from that.

pravacana on gāthā 145

By explaining the principle of *jñeyas*, the nature of *ātmā* is determined by separating *jñāna* and *jñeya*. Six substances are *jñeyas* (knowables), and from that, one's *jīva* is both *jñāna* and *jñeya*. Therefore, he knows all six substances. So, to determine the self as separate from the six substances, the concept of *vyavahāra-jīvatva* (conventional consciousness) is explained.

loka, which is wholly filled with substances that has space points, is permanent. He who knows this is *jīva*. In the state of *saṁsāra* (mundane existence), it is connected with four *prāṇas*.

loka has six substances. *ākāśa* is with infinite space points, *jīva*, *dharma*, and *adharma* are with innumerable space points, *paramāṇu* substance is with one space point, and with its modification is with numerous space points, and *kālāṇu* is with one space point. This has been proven. Without a part, the existence of substance itself cannot be proven. *kāla* is also with one space point; therefore, the six substances are all with *pradeśas* (space points). The universe is without beginning or end. No one has created it. The one who knows it is a *jīva* (sentient). A *samakīrti* (one with experience of the self) frog does not know the names of the six substances, but by knowing that the self is *jīva*, he understands that the self is not any other external substance. In this kind of correct knowledge, the knowables come in the section of non-self, and this is known in an unexpressed form.

The existence of all these knowables is proved, and then it is said that *jñāna* is not due to these *jñeyas*, but *jñāna* is there due to the efficacy of *jñāna*. *jñāna* is due to the nature of *caitanya* (nature of consciousness), and the doer of *jñāna* is *jīva*. It is not the nature of *jīva* to create, preserve, protect, sustain, or destroy any of the six substances. There is origination-annihilation-permanence in a *jīva* every *samaya*. *jīva*, who by nature knows and sees, is bound to transmigration with the four *prāṇa* due to his ignorance.

pravacana on tīkā

All substances, from *ākāśa* to *kāla*, have determined space points. It is impossible for any substance not to have space points. Without a space point, a substance would cease to exist. Therefore, all substances are with space points. The entire universe is filled with these six substances. *jīva* is included in *loka*, and it is capable of knowing others; a *jīva* (sentient) is knower and knowable.

"Through its wealth in the form of the inconceivable ability to know self and non-self, *jīva* alone knows." This is a great principle. *jīva* knows that the self is with the nature of substance-attribute-modification, and the non-self is with the substance-attribute-modification of non-self. In the world, there are substances like money, etc., *pudgala* (matter), and *jīva* has the ability to know them. But it is not the nature of *jīva* to know that the rupees belong to *jīva*.

Here, the nature of knowing is described. It has not been said that *jīva* knows through *nimitta*, due to the presence of non-self substances, with the mind, senses, or attachments.; rather, it knows through its innate, profound power, through its ability to illuminate both the self and the non-self.

The thought that one should earn in youth so that it can be of use in old age or that one should organise the family, house, business, etc., in a certain way is not present in the profound power of *jīva*. The *jīva* may experience attachment due to his own weakness, and to know that as well is the nature of *jīva*. But to have an attachment with the racing of thoughts, or to try and make changes in non-self, by believing them to be his own, is not the nature of *jīva*. *jīva*'s nature is simply to know things as they are.

The ignorant person believes that if the body is in good condition, then it is suitable for him. But body and clothing are external substances; *jīva* can neither take nor discard them,

nor can he cover them. But by believing that the body and clothes are his own, having them is good for him; *jīva* is obscuring his own *jñāna*.

jñānī says that *jīva* does not have the power to break even a piece of straw into two. Things assumed to be wealth, like money, house, body, family, clan, etc., are not a part of *ātmā*. *ātmā* is only the knower and seer. *jīva*, who has experienced the gloriousness of the profound power of the nature of *jñāna*, does not desire to change non-self; his attachment to non-self is sure to reduce.

jīva has the ability to know both the self and non-self, but no one else possesses this power. Apart from *jīva*, other five substances are knowable, and the *jīva* substance is both knowable and knower, because it knows both the self and non-self. Thus, there is a division between knower and knowable.

jīva always exists by its efficacy of purity and *jīvatva* (efficacy by which the *jīva* exists), which is indestructible. The reason for this absolute *jīvatva* is the infinite efficacy of *jñāna* in its pure form. External *prāṇa* – the senses, mind, body, food, etc., are not due to *jīvatva*. Even though every *jīva* has this absolute *jīvatva*, due to his own ignorance, since eternity, being associated with the modifying flow of *pudagala*, and conjoining with *nimitta*, he has defiled himself with the state of transmigration. As a result, the *jīva* is associated with the four *prāṇas*: *indriya* (senses), *bala* (ability of mind, speech, body), *āyu* (life span), *svāsocchavāsa* (breath), meaning they share the same space. They are the reason for *vyavahāra jīvatva* (conventional existence of *jīva*) and should be separated.

Thus, the reason for *nīścaya jīvatva* (absolute existence of *jīva*) is the efficacy of infinite *jñāna*, and the reason for *vyavahāra jīvatva* (conventional existence of *jīva*) is the association of the four *prāṇas*.

The implication here is that this chapter is about the knowable. One must know the self-knowable, which is the *jīva* existing with the efficacy of infinite *jñāna*. *jīva* exists in the mundane state of transmigration with the *nimitta* of four *prāṇas*, and such a modification is also the self knowable. This should also be known. But this is not the real nature of the self. To exist by *caitanya prāṇa* (consciousness energy) is the nature of the self. Knowing this, one must separate from the association of the four *prāṇas*.

Since the senses, mind, etc., have come into association, the belief that the use of senses is appropriate and that it will give happiness is a delusion which should be discarded. The

self should be separated from the attachment of *nimitta* and should exist by way of its consciousness energy.

The essence of the entire above statement is that the universe is a combination of the six substances. *jīva*, with its unimaginable efficacy of infinite *jñāna*, knows the universe. Therefore, apart from the *jīva*, the other five substances are knowable, and the *jīva* is both knower and knowable.

The true nature of substance is *niścaya jīvatva* (absolute existence of *jīva*). It is never destroyed, and *jīva* always has it. The reason for that *niścaya jīvatva* (absolute existence of *jīva*) is the efficacy of infinite *jñāna*, etc. Although it always exists in the state of worldly existence, it is tainted with the *nimitta* of *pudgala*. *pudgala* has not tainted it, but when *jīva* itself commits the wrong, the connection of the four *prāṇas* comes into the same space. Hence, *jīva* has *vyavahāra jīvatva* (conventional existence of *jīva*). Due to this *vyavahāra jīvatva*, there is an association with four *prāṇas*. *jīva* should be completely separated from it. *pudgala prāṇas* (non-sentient/ material power) are non-self substances. They are entirely separate from *ātmā*; however, as long as the *jīva*, with ignorance, continues to consider the material world as either beneficial or harmful, the association remains. But if the *jīva* focuses on the infinite, eternal power of consciousness and attains true *jñāna*, then *saṃsāra* ceases. It no longer remains associated with the four *prāṇas*. Hence, it is stated, from the view of *nimitta*, that the *jīva* should be separated from the four *prāṇas*.

In this way, both *niścaya jīvatva* and *vyavahāra jīvatva* are self-knowables. Understanding them correctly is the cause of the purity of *jñāna*.

अथ के प्राणा इत्यावेदयति -

Now, “what are the *prāṇas*?” - this is being explained here: -

**इंद्रियपाणो य तथा बलपाणो तह य आउपाणो य ।
आणप्पाणप्पाणो जोवाणं होति पाणा ते ॥ १४६ ॥**

*indriyapāno ya tadhā balapāṇo taha ya āupāṇo ya |
āṇappāṇappāṇo jīvāṇaṁ hoṁti pāṇā te || 146 ||*

gāthā: *prāṇa* of *indriyas* (senses), *prāṇa* of *bala* (force/channels of activity through mind, speech, and body), *prāṇa* of *āyu* (duration of life/age of a body), and *prāṇa* of *śvāsocchvāsa* – inhalation/exhaling of breath. These four are *prāṇas* of *jīvas* (mundane beings).

ṭīkā: Touch, taste, smell, eye and ear - these five are *prāṇas* of the *indriyas* (senses); body, speech and mind - these three are *prāṇas* of *bala* (force or channels of activity) and *nimitta* cause of attaining a particular life is *āyu prāṇas* (duration of life) and breathe characterised by inhaling and exhaling is *prāṇa* of respiration- *śvāsocchvāsa*.

pravacana on gāthā 146

indriya prāṇa, bala prāṇa, āyu prāṇa, śvāsocchvāsa prāṇa, these four are the *prāṇas* (power) of *jīvas*. In short, there are four *prāṇas*, and when elaborated, they include five senses, mind, speech, body, breath, and life span. In the mundane state, since eternity, the ignorant *jīva* believes the body, senses, etc., physical *prāṇa* to be his own and desires happiness from them. Due to this, his transmigration does not end. As a result of perturbations, he creates bondage with the physical karmic matter, and as fruits of that physical karmic matter, no-karma (quasi karmas) in the form of the ten *prāṇas*, get a relationship of coming into the same space as *jīva*. If an ignorant person believes that in the mundane state, a relationship with the ten *prāṇas* does not exist even from the view of conventionality, then that is a mistake. Though *jīva* has ten *prāṇas* from the view of conventionality, it is not the real nature of *jīva*. The understanding of *vyavahāra prāṇa* (conventional power of life) is given for moving the focus away from the ten *prāṇas* and bringing into focus the *caitanya prāṇa* (sentient power).

Here, if someone says that it has been said in the scriptures that one should do dharma before the arising of inauspicious *karma* and before the senses weaken, then is it true that strong senses, a firm body, and youth will help in *dharma*? And is it that, as senses and body weaken in old age, the *jīva* cannot do *dharma*?

Answer: This statement is only for preaching. It is important to understand the subtle meaning and the underlying principles. The meaning is that when inauspicious karmas arise, maybe due to one's own inability, he may not be able to put in the appropriate effort. So, till there is origination of auspicious karmas, he should put in the appropriate effort. This way, a statement of *nimitta* has been made to turn the *jīva*, without *puruṣārtha*, towards it.

Strength or feebleness of senses is not in the control of *ātmā*. So, strong senses are not the reason for *dharma*, and weak senses are not the reason for *adharma*. The reason for dharma is the *ātmā*, devoid of senses, and is an observer, with the nature to know and see.

1. Nature of *īndriya prāṇa*

There are five types of *īndriya prāṇa*.

- 1.1. ***sparsā* (touch)** – The ignorant believes happiness to be in the sense of touch. He believes that if the senses are good, then *dharma* will arise. But the sense of touch is *jada* (physical matter), and *ātmā* by nature is *jñāna*. It should be known that *ātmā* is separate from touch.
- 1.2. ***rasnā* (taste)** – The ignorant believes that if *rasnā īndriya* – the sense of taste is good, then benediction of *Bhagavāna* can be done well, and only then can it be said that one has benefited from the sense of taste. But the sense of taste is *jada* (physical matter), and *bhāṣā* (speech) is also *jada*. The desire to do *bhakti* is a distortion of *puṇya* (auspicious karma), and *ātmā* by nature is *jñāna*.
- 1.3. ***ghrāṇa* (smell)** – The ignorant believes that with a strong sense of smell, it is possible to know the decayed food, due to which he can be compassionate towards the *jīvās* present in it. But the sense of smell is physical, and *ātmā* by nature is *jñāna*.
- 1.4. ***cakṣu* (sight)** – The ignorant believe that he can have the auspicious viewing of *Bhagavāna* with the sense of sight, and due to that, this life attains its desired result. By seeing the passionless idol of *Bhagavāna*, the passionless state will manifest in him as well. But this is *mithyā* (untrue).

Eyes are a physical sense, and *ātmā*, by nature, is *jñāna*. *ātmā* is separate from the physical eye. This life will attain its desired goal by seeing the nature of *ātmā*, which is with such eyes of *jñāna*, and a passionless state will manifest.

- 1.5. **śrotra (hearing)**—The ignorant believes that if the sense of hearing is good, then the teachings of the *deva-guru* can be heard well, and dharma will manifest. But this is incorrect. Ears are a physical sense. *ātmā* by nature is *jñāna*. It should be known that *ātmā* is separate from the sense of hearing.

The correct knowing of *indriya prāṇa*, that these five senses are separate from *ātmā*, should be known.

2. Nature of *bala prāṇa*.

There are three types of *bala prāṇa*.

- 2.1. **kāyabala (power of body)** – The ignorant believes that, till the body is strong, one must follow activities of penance and take the benefit of dharma. But this is incorrect. He who believes that *ātmā* will benefit by the austerities of the body, his *ātmā* will become austere, *mithyātva* flourishes. *ātmā* cannot benefit from the austerities of the body. The body is physical matter, and *ātmā* is by nature sentient. So, the power of *ātmā* is completely different from the power of the body.
- 2.2. **vacanabala (power of speech)** – The ignorant believes that if there is the power of speech, then he can sing benediction of *Bhagavāna*, and then dharma will arise. But this is incorrect. Speech is insentient, and *ātmā* is by nature sentient. The power of *ātmā* does not support the expression of speech. This is because the power of *ātmā* is separate from the power of speech. This appropriate knowledge of the power of speech should be acquired.
- 2.3. **manabala (power of mind)** – The ignorant believes that with the power of mind, one can think and decide on good or bad, and *samakita* can be attained. Further, he believes that *jñānīs* give sermons to the *jīvas* with all five senses and mind, and in this way, are beneficial to them. But this is incorrect.

2.4.

The thoughts of *jñānīs* are due to their self. Speech comes out on its own. *jīva* does not understand due to speech or mind. When he understands due to the ability of his *jñāna*, then speech and mind are said to be *nimitta* in it. Mind is *jada* (physical matter), and *ātmā* is *jñāna* by nature. In this way, the power of the mind is completely separate from the power of *ātmā*. This appropriate knowledge should be acquired.

āyu prāṇa (power of life span) – The time that the modification of *manuṣya*, *tiryāṇca*, *deva*, *nārakī* stays, in that *āyu prāṇa* is said to be *nimitta*. *āyu prāṇa* does not make that state stay. But the time that these states stay due to themselves, in that *āyu prāṇa* is said to be *nimitta*. Here, for bread, lentils, rice, medicines, air, etc., nothing has been said to be *nimitta* cause for keeping the body. The body stays due to itself, and the time that *ātmā* will stay with the body shows the *āyu*. No one can increase or decrease it. Despite this, ignorant wants to increase his life span, and he harbours delusions in the belief that a long life is beneficial, and a short one is not. He also believes that liberation is in a human life form, and says that even *devas* (celestial life forms) also want to be humans. But this is not true. One has attained the state of being human infinite times. But because his focus is on the human body and *bhava* (life with a body), his transmigration is continuing. *bhava* is non-self. *ātmā* does not have *bhava*, and when this belief without any uncertainty or doubt arises, then *dharma* will manifest. The life of a human is said to be *nimitta* for those who put their effort in this way.

Question: What does the term *akāla mṛtyu* (death before time), which is mentioned in the Tattvārtha Sūtra, mean?

Answer: No death occurs before time. That *jīva* had to stay with that body for that long. It is not that the death was not supposed to happen, but it did. The time span of that modification was that much only. In saying, *udīrṇā/akāla mṛtyu* in relation to *āyu*, it gives information about the outer *nokarma* at the time of death. Whether someone dies by consuming poison or dies prematurely in a car accident, this is said only to give information about *nokarma* (quasi karma), which is the statement of *nimitta*.

There should be a proper understanding that *āyu prāṇa* is *jada* (non-sentient) and *ātmā*, by nature, is sentient.

śvāsocchvāsa (inhalation-exhalation of breath) – The inhalation and exhalation of air is said to be *śvāsocchvāsa prāṇa*. But *ātmā* cannot breathe. Breathing is the action of *jada*. Many believe that by exercising deep breath control or by taking deep breaths, one will have a healthy body and a long life. But this belief is a delusion.

Many also believe that standing under a neem tree, one can get more oxygen, which will be energising for the body, but this is also incorrect. Inhalation and exhalation of air are not in the scope of what *ātmā* can do. Breath is *jada* (non-sentient). If it is neither beneficial

nor harmful to the body, then how can it benefit *ātmā*? Breath is not the power of *jīva*. *ātmā* is sentient by nature. So, it should be appropriately understood that *śvāsocchvāsa prāṇa* is completely separate from *cetanā prāṇa* (power of sentience).

From the view of *vyavahāra* (conventionality), the four, *indriya*, *bala*, *āyu*, *śvāsocchvāsa prāṇa*, are of *jīva*, in the mundane state. They have ten sub-sections. Ignorants believe food to be the eleventh and wealth to be the twelfth *prāṇa*, which is gross ignorance. They are not *prāṇa* but are separate *pudgala* substance.

In the mundane state, from the view of conventionality, *jīva* has 10 *prāṇas* in the same space. But they are non-sentient. They are neither beneficial nor harmful to *ātmā*. So, the essence of this verse is that one should remove focus from these and turn the focus on the *anādi-ananta caitanya prāṇa*.

gāthā-147

अथ प्राणानां निरुक्त्या जीवत्वहेतुत्वं पौद्गलिकत्वं च सूत्रयति –

Now, through etymology, *prāṇas* (life principles) are interpreted as possessing instrumentality/causality of *jīvatva* (consciousness), and these are formed from material substances: -

**पाणेहिं चटुहिं जीवदि जीविस्सदि जो हि जीविदो पुव्वं ।
सो जीवो पाणा पुण पोग्गलदव्वेहिं णिव्वत्ता ॥१४७॥**

*pāṇehiṃ caduhiṃ jīvadi jīviṣṣadi jo hi jīvido puvvaṃ |
so jīvo pāṇā puṇa poggaladavvehīṃ ṇivvattā || 147 ||*

***gāthā*:** That which lives now in the present, will live in the future, and has lived in the past with the *prāṇas* (four-fold life principles) is *jīva* (sentient). However, these *prāṇas* are formed from *pudgala-dravyas* (physical matter particles).

***tīkā*:** (as per etymology) *jīva* (sentient being) is that which lives by the *sāmānya* (generality) of *prāṇas*, will live, and has lived so in the past. Thus, *prāṇas* – by generality, being continuous since eternity, in the state of *saṃsāra*, existing through the three *kālas* (past-present-future), the *prāṇasāmānya* (state of generality of *prāṇas*) is the reason of *jīvatva* for *jīva*. Even then, *prāṇa-sāmānya* is not the intrinsic nature of *jīva* (sentient) because it is formed from *pudgala-dravya* (physical matter particles)

***bhāvārtha*:** Although this *jīva* always lives really by his *bhāva* (sentient) *prāṇas* (force), in the mundane state, it is said to be living by senses, etc., *dravya-prāṇas* (material life principles) which conventionally are the instrumental cause of conventional consciousness. This being so, *dravya-prāṇas* (material-life principles) are not at all *svarūpa* (intrinsic nature) of *ātmā* because *dravya-prāṇas* are made of *pudgala-dravya*.

pravacana of gāthā 147

Now, it is said that *prāṇa* is the cause for *jīvatva* (state of living), and it is *paudgalika* (physical matter).

In the mundane state, from the view of *vyavahāra*, *jīva* is said to have the ten *prāṇas*, which are the five senses, three *bala* (powers), life span, and breath. But this is not the real nature of *jīva* because they are *jaḍa* (non-living physical matter). Though this is the state, the

ignorant person believes them to be his own, believes them to be beneficial, and immerses himself in delusion. He believes that if the five senses are in a good state, then they help attain knowledge, or the mind-speech-body is energetic, then his power will remain; or if the breath is not steady, then it is not good, or if life is long, then *dharma* can be done properly. Since eternity, he has been at one with these and believes these *prāṇas* to be his life. He does not know that the sentient *prāṇa* is the real *prāṇa* and that he exists because of his own power. Since eternity, he has believed himself to be one with the *jaḍa-prāṇa*. Due to this, his transmigration is continuing. Till he continues this state of ignorance, his transmigration will continue, and as a rule, he will come in association with the ten *prāṇas*. So, here it is said that ignorant *jīva* exists with general *prāṇas*, will exist, and existed due to it.

Till *jīva* is ignorant, the general *prāṇa* will continue to be present in a flow, in the form of *nimitta*. So, from the view of *vyavahāra*, they are the reason for *jīvavatva* (state of living).

In the state of transmigration, when *jīva* goes from one life form to another, then all *prāṇas* are not present in the form of *nimitta*. In *vigrahagati* (the journey from one body to the next), there is an absence of five senses: mind, speech, *audarika śarīra* (physical body), and breath. It encompasses the karmic body, auric body, and lifespan karmas. But even there, the one that is living is *jīva*. So one must forsake the belief that *ātmā* lives with the support of the body and senses.

Ignorant believes that *ātmā* leaves the body, with the stopping of breath, or that *ātmā* weakens when senses become weak, or that *dharma* can be done only when the five senses are strong. But the *jaḍa-prāṇa* is derived from the *pudgala* substance and is a mass of physical matter. They are made of non-sentient touch, taste, smell, and colour. These are not the nature of *jīva*, and neither can *dharma* be done by them. *dharma* can arise from the base of belief and knowledge that *ātmā* is with sentient *prāṇa*.

In reality, *jīva* always lives by its knowing-seeing sentient nature. However, until he is in the mundane state of transmigration, from the view of *vyavahāra*, it is said that he lives with the *nimitta* of *vyavahāra jīvavatva*, which are sense, etc., *dravyaprāṇa* (physical living).

Even then, *dravyaprāṇa* is not at all the nature of *jīva*, because by nature, they are made of *pudgala*. They are with touch-taste-smell-colour, while *ātmā* is non-physical and its nature is *jñāna*, *darśana*, *cetanā prāṇa*.

The meaning here is that to say that *ātmā* lives by *cetana prāṇa* is *niścaya*, and to say that in the mundane state, it lives by *jada prāṇa* is *yavahāra*. But the *jada prāṇa* is not the real nature of *ātmā*. This should be known, and belief and knowing of the *ātmā*, which is with *cetana prāṇa*, should be done.

अथ प्राणानां पौद्गलिकत्वं साधयति -

Now, the *pudgala* state of *prāṇas* is proved: -

**जीवो पाणणिबद्धो बद्धो मोहादिएहिं कम्मेहिं ।
उवभुंजं कम्मफलं बज्झदि अण्णेहिं कम्मेहिं ॥१४८॥**

*jīvo pāṇaṇibaddho baddho mohādiehiṃ kammehiṃ |
uvabhunjaṃ kammaphalaṃ bajjhadi aṇṇehiṃ kammehiṃ ||148||*

gāthā: If this *jīva* is bound with delusion, etc., karmic matter is connected with *prāṇas*, and because he enjoys the fruit of karmas, he gets bound with other new karmic matter.

ṭīkā: (1) Being bonded with the physical matter of *moha*, etc., *jīva* is connected to *prāṇas*. (2) Being connected to *prāṇas*, enjoying the fruits of the *pudgala* (physical) karmic matter (*jīva* connected to *moha, rāga, dveṣa*, modifies with *moha, rāga, dveṣa*), gets bonded again with new karmic matter. Therefore, (1) being the work of *pudgala karma* and (2) being the reason for *pudgala karmas*, *prāṇas* are definitely material matter.

pravacana on gāthā 148

- 1). *jīva* has delusional thoughts and feelings, and hence, he has bondage with *mohanīya*, etc., eight karmas. Here, the explanation is with the predominance of *mohanīya-jñānāvaraṇa*, etc., are taken as secondary here. *karma* is said to be *nimitta* in the state of ignorance of *jīva*. The fruits of those karmas are the attainment of the five senses, three powers, breath, and the power of life span. *ātmā* is not the reason for attaining the *prāṇas*, because karma is destroyed with the focus on *ātmā*. With the destruction of karmas, one does not get *prāṇas* but attains the state of liberation. The reason for *prāṇas* is physical karma.
- 2). In the mundane state, there is a conjoining of *prāṇas*, and as fruits of karma, one gets body, senses, wealth, shop, spouse, family, etc. The ignorant is steeped in the delusion that he can attain happiness through these non-self substances. In reality, even the ignorant cannot enjoy these non-self substances. But he has the thoughts and desires that he will be happy if he gets conducive substances and removes non-conductive ones.

He has an attachment to the belief that his expertise brings him financial gain, and he has an aversion to the belief that someone has harassed him. But neither money nor a healthy body is the reason for happiness. Ignorant believes that he is not cured of his illness due to his wrong eating, and he does not have money because he is not intelligent. The actual situation is that the disease will occur when it is meant to and will be cured when it has to. Similarly, money comes due to money, and physical karmic matter is *nimitta* in it. An ignorant person lacks this correct understanding of the existing situation and is attached to favourable circumstances and averse to unfavourable situations. He delights in the distorted thoughts and feelings and creates bondage with new physical karmic matter.

By acquiring the correct understanding that the fruit of *karma* comes in *karma*, and, at that time, the outer substances will be just how they are meant to be, *jīva* must foster a belief in his knowing-seeing nature. An ignorant person does not do this, so he becomes perturbed and has bondage of new *karmas*.

- 3). In this way, all four *prāṇas* are attained due to physical karmic matter and not due to the nature of *ātmā*. *prāṇa* and *pudgala* (physical matter) are two different substances. Due to its efficacy, *prāṇa* comes into the same space as *ātmā*, and physical karmic matter is *nimitta* in it. They do not force *prāṇa* to come, but physical karmic matter is *nimitta* to *prāṇa*. This is why *prāṇa* has been said to be the work of the physical *karma*.

Due to ignorance, in the mundane state, the *jīva* becomes bound by new karma. With focus on *ātmā*, the modification of the passionless state will arise. New karma does not come into bondage due to this. In the state of ignorance, *prāṇa* is conjoined, due to which new *karma* comes into bondage. This is the *nimitta-naimitika* relationship. According to this, it is said that this is the reason for the bondage of new *karmas*.

The reason for attaining *prāṇa* is physical karmas, and the reason for the bondage of new *karmas* is *prāṇa*. This proves that *prāṇa*, by nature, is *pudgala*.

अथ प्राणानां पौद्गलिककर्मकारणत्वमुन्मीलयति -

Now, it is revealed that *prāṇas* are the cause of physical/material *karmas* (or, how *prāṇas* are the reason for physical karmic matter): -

**पाणाबाधं जीवो मोहपदेसेहिं कुणदि जीवाणं।
जदि सो हवदि हि बंधो णाणावरणादिकम्मेहिं ॥१४९॥**

*pānābādhaṃ jīvo mohapadesehiṃ kuṇadi jīvāṇaṃ |
jadi so havadi hi baṇdho ṇāṇāvaraṇadikammehiṃ || 149 ||*

gāthā: If this *jīva* causes injury to the *prāṇas* (life principles) of self and non-self, by delusion and hatred/aversion, then (fresh) bondage occurs by way of *jñānāvarṇiya*, etc., *karmas*, which is physical karmic matter.

ṭīkā: First, this *jīva* (embodied sentient being) enjoys the fruit of *karmas*. Enjoying them, he develops *moha* (delusion) and *dveṣa* (aversion); by these - *moha* and *dveṣa*, he causes harm/injury to self and non-self *jīvas*.

Sometimes, causing harm/injury to the *dravya prāṇas* (material life principles) of other beings or sometimes not causing harm to the *dravya prāṇas* (material life principles) of other beings - he always causes injury to his own *bhāva prāṇas* (sentient life-principles), he attains bondage of *jñānāvarṇiya*, etc., *karmas*. Thus, *prāṇas* become the cause of (bondage of) physical *karmas* (*pudgala karmas*).

pravacana on gāthā 149

Now it is explained how physical karmic matter is the reason for *prāṇa*. Ignorant *jīva*, due to his ignorance, does only the *bhāva* (desire) for foods, house, jewellery, clothes, etc., outer associations, which are the fruits of *karma*, and believes that he is enjoying them. An ignorant person cannot enjoy non-self substance. However, he experiences only his desires due to his ignorance. This is told as “*jīvas* experience the fruits of *karma* by way of *prāṇa*.” It means that *jīva*, which is tilted towards *nimitta*, will experience *nimitta* – so it is said.

Ignorant *jīva* has attachment to spouse, family, disease-free body, etc., favourable associations, and has aversion to unfavourable associations like disease, enemy, etc. In this way, he obstructs himself and other *jīvas* with attachment and aversion. He misses the focus

of his self, which is the sentient, knowing-seeing, joyous form of nature of self, and violates his own sentient *prāṇa* due to the belief that he can attain happiness due to non-self substance, or he can make non-self, sad-happy, or he can protect other *jīvas*. Due to this, he becomes *nimitta* in the obstruction to other *jīvas*.

For example, if someone wants to burn another person with a hot iron ball, his hand will first burn. And there is no rule whether the other person will burn or suffer. Similarly, ignorant *jīva* modifies into attachment or aversion, which are like a hot ball of iron. At that point, he first destroys the pure modification of the unperturbed experience of the knowing nature of the self. In other words, instead of experiencing peace within, he experiences perplexity/pain, and grief. However, there is no rule that it will entrap other *jīva*. A person, due to hatred, may have the desire to attack another person, but that person moves away, and due to the arising of *sātā* (pleasure-giving karma)/*punya* (auspicious *karma*), he is not attacked. However, the person who desires to attack feels perplexed or anxious, so he has violated his attribute of peace.

Though here it is said that one *prāṇa* afflicts another *jīva*'s *dravya-prāṇa* with obstruction, it does not mean that one *jīva* can kill another *jīva* or make it unhappy. In reality, one *jīva* cannot be an obstruction to another *jīva*. But if the life of other *jīva* is meant to be over, then due to the arising of *asātā* (pain afflicting) *karmas*, there is a manifestation of an unfavourable state, then from the view of *nimitta*, it is said that one *jīva* has obstructed the other *jīva*. The desire to obstruct the other *jīva* is one's own, and no one else has made him do it. Its fruit is perplexity, and he experiences that by himself.

An ignorant *jīva* believes that he has benefited from the teachings of another or that the work of *upādāna* (substantive cause) is due to the presence of *nimitta* (auxiliary cause). Due to this, he has numerous erroneous thoughts, such as being able to work in this world, take care of the shop, his children, and manage for them; money will stay if he takes care, and he can serve his country. But he is incapable of changing the modification of the non-self. He only creates turmoil within. Another *jīva* is dependent on his *punya* to get favourable associations. Management of money is dependent on the *paramāṇu* (smallest unit of matter) of money. No *jīva* can take or leave non-self. *jīva* only forgets his own nature, and by taking pride in the doer-ship of non-self, he experiences perplexity, which is violence against his *bhava-prāṇa* (modification of attribute of power).

Question: It is said that *ātmā* cannot take or leave any non-self substance. But did not the *Tīrthāṅkaras* and *munis* leave wealth, etc., to accept *cāritra*?

Answer: Neither *jñānī* nor *ajñānī* can forsake non-self substance. Spouse, wealth, family, kingdom, etc., are separate substances from *ātmā*. The auspicious-inauspicious desires that arise are also not the nature of the self. This belief arises in the state of the householder, and when there is a deeper immersion into the inner self, he accepts the vows of a *muni*. When *jīva* immerses within his pure nature, then it is said that he has left attachments. When attachments leave, it is said that he has left outer substances in name only. In reality, substances were always separate. When focus does not remain on them and one immerses oneself in the self, then it is said that he has left the kingdom, etc.

If an astrologer were to say that certain days would be difficult, then, on believing him, one would give away the work of the shop or house to someone else, and he himself would experience perturbation. Here, it can be seen that the prediction of the astrologer may or may not be true. Assuming that if it were known, even then, the modification which was to arise during that *samaya* cannot be changed by anyone, be it a king, an emperor, or a *Tīrthāṅkara*. So, it is said that once, the words of the omniscient astrologer should be believed. He says Listen! The self, by nature, is seeing and knowing, and taking or leaving the non-self is not within the self's ability. He is incapable of changing even the state of the body.

One with lesser knowledge may not know the future, including when, where, how, and what will happen, but *jīva* does not have the ability to alter its life span. At whichever time and at whichever place, separation from the body is meant to be at that time and place, the separation will occur. So, if he moves his focus from non-self, makes thoughts secondary and affirms the belief of the knowing-seeing nature of self, then he has kept his *jñāna prāṇa* alive. This is the real peace and *ahimsā*, and that is when there is no bondage of *karma*.

The ignorant do not believe in the sentient, joyous nature of the self, and with the desire for doer-ship of the non-self, he experiences anxiety within himself. He destroys his *caitanya prāṇa* and has karmic bondage of *jñānāvaraṇīya*, *mohanīya*, etc., due to which his transmigration continues.

himsā of the *caitanya prāṇa* or *bhāva himsā* is the reason for the bondage of new *karmas*. *dravyapraṇa* is not the real reason for the bondage of new karma. However, *jīva* believes in the benefit or loss resulting from *dravyapraṇa* and has attachments and aversions. Therefore, by transferring this to *dravya-prāṇa*, it is said that *dravya-prāṇa* is the reason for new *karmas*. So *prāṇa* is the reason for new *karmas*.

gāthā-150

अथ पुद्गलप्राणसन्ततिप्रवृत्तिहेतुमन्तरङ्गमासूत्रयति -

Now, the inner instrumental cause of the progeny of continuity of *pudgala prāṇa* is explained here -

**आदा कम्ममलिमसो धरेदि पाणे पुणो पुणो अण्णे ।
ण चयदि जाव ममत्तिं देहपधाणेषु विसयेसु ॥१५०॥**

*ādā kammamalimaso dhāredi paṇe puṇo puṇo aṇṇe |
ṇa jahadi jāva mamattiṃ dehapadhāṇesu visaesu || 150 ||*

gāthā: *jīva* is tainted with physical karmas, so long as it does not give up attachment to objects of senses, mainly the body, and continues holding *prāṇas* again and again.

ṭīkā: Proclivity of a continued succession of *dravya-prāṇas* (material life principles) is found with *jīva* (mundane being). Its internal cause is an attachment in the form of a sense of ownership of the body, etc. The root cause, since eternity, is proximity to physical *karma*.

bhāvārtha: The internal cause of the continuation of the tradition of *dravyaprāṇas* is *jīva*’s tainted evolution/modification, the instrument of which is eternal physical *karmas*. So long as this *jīva* does not give up the tainted evolution in the form of ownership in the objects of the body (senses), etc., till then, due to this instrumentality, the bondage of material karmas occurs again and again, and because of that *dravyaprāṇas* continues repeatedly.

pravacana on gāthā-150

Now, the inherent reason for the continuous modification of *pudgalik-prana* (physical matter) is explained.

ātmā, defiled by *karma*, will keep attaining different *prāṇas* again and again till he does not leave his attachment to objects which are related to the body.

ātmā, by nature, is the knowing-seeing joyous of self, *jñāna* is its body, and its focus is the complete pure nature. However, an ignorant person is unaware of this focus. So, he has a contrary focus, where he affirms that the body is his self. He has shifted the focus from

ātmā to the body, making it the primary focus. He has left the subject of *ātmā* and made the body his primary subject. In this way, the belief of oneness with body, etc., is the inherent reason for the continuity of the *prāṇa* of *pudgala*, and physical karmic matter is its *nimitta*.

ātmā is with the *upayoga* (psychic activity of *ātmā*) of *jñāna-darśana*. The ignorant misses this nature of *ātmā* and believes his benefit to be in body-mind-speech. Thoughts like 'it is possible to do compassionate activities with the body' or 'desires and thoughts can help in dharma' are called addiction to the attachments of the body (*dehādhyāsa*). Missing the passionless sentient activity of *ātmā* and having an attachment to passions is said to be the focus of modification. *audārika śarīra* is the physical body. However, desires and thoughts arise due to the impurities of the body, which are *nimitta*. Therefore, they have been categorized as part of the body. Missing the focus of sentient nature, the ignorant focus on objects related to the body, which requires him to assume new *prāṇa*, and with numerous types of *bhāva* (thoughts/perceptions), he must take numerous types of bodies, and the transmigration continues.

The *ajñānī* continues to possess new *prāṇas* in the state of transmigration. The inherent reason for it is the perturbed *bhāva* (thoughts/perceptions) due to the *nimitta* of physical karmic matter.

The knowing-seeing nature is not the reason for perturbation. The reason for perturbation is *aśuddha upādāna*, or the present thoughts of modification of a *jīva* is the real reason for perturbation, and its auxiliary cause is physical karmic matter. Karma cannot cause the *jīva* to modify into an impure state. He modifies into an impure state due to his own focus on modification, and karma is *nimitta* in it. Transmigration continues due to this.

Without the experience of the sentient nature, the ignorant *jīva* has a sense of ownership towards spouse, child, etc. Believing that dharma will arise due to *deva-śāstra-guru* or due to compassion and charity, he has an attachment towards these. Till *jīva* does not forsake this perturbed modification in the form of attachment and ownership, till then, with the *nimitta* of perturbation, he gets bondage of all eight karmas, again and again, and due to this, he gets associated with *dravya-prāṇa* again and again.

अथ पुद्गलप्राणसंततिनिवृत्तिहेतुमन्तरङ्गं ग्राहयति -

Now, the internal cause of getting released from the continuous succession of the *dravya prāṇas* (material life state) is explained: -

**जो इंदियादिविजई भवीय उवओगमप्पगं झादि ।
कम्मेहिं सो ण रज्जदि किह तं पाणा अणुचरंति ॥ १५१ ॥**

*jo indiyādivijaī bhavīya uvaogamappagam jhādi |
kammehim so ṇa rājjadi kiha tam pāṇā aṇucaramti || 151||*

gāthā: He who conquers the senses, etc., and meditates on self-soul as a pure knowing-entity, does not get tainted by the karmas. How could then *dravya-prāṇas* (material life state) follow him?

ṭīkā: The internal cause of getting released from a continued succession of *dravya-prāṇas* is the absence of being tainted with attachment, which is the root cause of physical *karmas*. And this absence (of attachment) arises in him who conquers (the tainted evolution caused with the shelter of) all the senses, etc., and other non-self substances - just like a quartz gem when removed from all sorts of coloured modifications which manifest according to the shelter of different coloured objects and it dwells immovably in the completely pure *ātmā* possessing knowing activity only.

Here, the purport is this: - For effectuating the complete separation of the self (from all non-self things), *dravya-prāṇas*, which are the cause of *vyavahāra-jīvatva* (conventional consciousness), they are worth annihilating.

bhāvārtha: A quartz gem modifies into different colours according to the colour of the object it is placed with or comes in contact with. Still, when it is totally separated from that object, then there is the complete absence of the coloured state. Similarly, *jīva* (sentient being) modifies into different types of tainted modifications according to (the rise of) different *karmas* and senses, etc., of which shelter is taken of, but the complete absence of attachment (tainted state) arises in that *ātmā* which dwells immovably in completely pure state of *ātmā* possessed of knowing activity only. Due to that absence (of tainted state), the tradition of the continued succession of *dravya-prāṇas* stops immediately. Thus, *dravya-prāṇas* are worth discarding.

pravacana on gāthā-151

Now, the discontinuation of the succession of *dravya-prānās* (material life state) is explained-

By knowing that physical senses are not the nature of *ātmā*, the thoughts of happiness from the senses are removed. This is called winning over the senses. The statement is that the thought of happiness from other substances is removed from the view of non-existence. Here, initially, it is stated from the view of non-existence; subsequently, it is stated from the view of existence. When *ātmā* focuses on its knowing-seeing nature through active psychic activity, at that time, his focus moves away from modification and both these occur simultaneously.

Question: First, one should win over the senses, then leave for the forest?

Answer: Senses are insentient, and the forest is also an insentient place. Wife, son, body, senses – they all are external substances; leave aside the external possessions here, even the thoughts of winning over possessions are not discussed. With the notion of leaving internal possessions or focusing on *paryāya*, the thoughts of possessions do not go. Mind is insentient; it cannot be left; and further, the impure dispositions that occur due to the *nimitta* of mind are not to be restrained. *ātmā* is a knower-seer – by knowing so and joining the psychic thought activity with the sentient nature, one leans towards *ātmā*, and at that time, the thoughts of possessions leave, and mind is restrained.

It is not so that – by thoughts of non-existence of one, the existence of another will be known. The thought that internal possessions are not within me, such thoughts of non-existence, does not establish the knowing-seeing nature; but by focusing on such an existence that the nature of self is the psychic thought activity, then automatically non-existence of attachment, etc., occurs. To say that one has moved away from internal possessions and delusion is just from the view of *nimitta*.

External substances are absolutely different from *ātmā*. Therefore, they cannot be won over. What remains is to win over passions; the passions that were in the past have been annihilated, they cannot be won over, and the future passions have not appeared; therefore, their winning is not possible; but the passion that originates in the present and exists in the present, how can that be won over? By applying the *upayoga* to the pure nature, and the *ātmā* is focused upon, then attachment does not originate. Then, it is stated that attachment and senses have been won over.

jīva believes that he can destroy attachment during its existence, but he does not believe in the existence of *paryāya* and indulges in *mithyātva*. Attachment cannot be destroyed by focusing on it. By realizing that my nature is passionless knowledge-psychic thought activity and by focusing within, these notions are destroyed.

In this verse, *ātmā* with only pure psychic activity is worthy of being meditated upon. The weightage is on ‘only psychic activity’. *ātmā* is not in the form of the five senses and in the form of material life state, but it is also not in the form of desire, thoughts, piety, and charity. He has an inherent nature to know and see. By focusing on the *ātmā*, which is *upayoga mātra* (only pure psychic activity), *karma*, body, and breath will not attach to the *ātmā*. To believe that *ātmā* will benefit from the material life states is false. It is due to this that the material life states stick to *ātmā*, just as it is said in the mundane world, that if a witch calls and the person answers, then the witch will harass him; and if one does not answer, she does not harass that person. (This is an example; no one can harass another.) In the same way, material vitality sticks to the one who believes the material vitality to be his.

By focusing on impure dispositions in the form of impure thoughts of *punya* and having an interest in them, or in the belief that *vyavahāra* is required for *dharma*, is akin to calling the attachments which are in the form of a witch. And the thought ‘I want to leave the passions’ is like replying to a witch. This is the reason that attachment in the form of a witch is harassing an ignorant *ātmā* and is destroying his *jñāna-prāna*, and *dravya-prāna* arise one by one behind the witch in the form of attachments, which gives misery to the mundane *ātmā*. But if once the *bhagawāna ātmā* leaves attachment of body, senses, etc., and attachment of meritorious-demeritorious actions, he focuses totally on his knowing nature and takes auspices of just the *upayoga-mātra ātmā* then the witch in the form of attachment will not harass, and *karma* along with the insentient material vitality will not get stuck on that righteous *jīva*.

ajñānī jīva becomes extremely anxious if there is even a slightest pain in the finger. He is attached to each and every particle of the body. What will happen when the time is ripe to leave the body? He is unaware of his sentient nature. Because of this, he experiences extreme anxiety and possesses a new body. When once he believes himself to be an ocean of believer-seer, focuses on it, and leaves attachment to the body, then he will get the state which is free of any body. Then, he will no longer have to possess a body.

pravacana on tīkā

Due to ignorance, this *jīva* possesses ten types of material vitality, such as the five senses: mind, speech, body, breath, and age, repeatedly. If one wants to be free of these successive births, then one has to try to be free of *mithyātvā*, attachment-aversion, etc., which are the internal causes.

The vitiated thoughts in the form of a discriminative state, which arise due to the proximity of *karma*, are called *upārāga* (coloured with attachment) or *uparakta* (distressed/afflicted). Till the focus is on *karma* and body, etc., impurity will remain. And when the focus is removed from that and shifted towards pure nature, it will be free from impurity. With the absence of impurity, there will be an absence of successive births. Hence, the reason for the absence of successive births is the absence of impurity.

Looking towards pure nature is the remedy to the absence of impurity.

If a *javā* (hibiscus) flower is kept near a clear crystal, then the distortion of the crystal in the form of redness is due to its ability at that *samaya*. However, upon removing the flower, the crystal is revealed in its original form, which is a white, transparent colour. At that time, the distorted form of redness is absent.

Similarly, a *jīva* believes there is happiness in external substances, emulates accordingly, and has distortion. (Here, it is not stated that distortion is due to external substances). One, while having the dispositions of *mithyātvā*, attachment-aversion, and meritorious-de-meritorious dispositions, leans towards the extremely pure knowing-seeing nature with perseverance, he will be devoid of the distortions of *mithyātvā*, negligence, passions, etc.

Of what sort is the nature? It is devoid of external substances. Attachment, aversion, and their states are not the nature of *ātmā*. Just as the crystal is pure, in the same way, *ātmā* is pure. Its nature is to know and see; it is an ocean of bliss. One who immerses in it is devoid of transmigration.

This chapter is on the knowable. Here understanding of both *asti-nāsti* is given. To win over senses and attachment is a statement from the view of *nāsti*. To say that one who wins over passions is a Jain is also from the view of *nāsti*. Whom to win over? Transmigration is the state of arising of karmas, and it is a substance; then how can that be won? On what

basis can it be won? The external substance is not a *jīva*, and it is a distorted state of meritorious-demeritorious matter. *ātmā* by itself is in the form of a self-existent, undivided substance, which is pure and immersed in pure psychic activity. By turning towards such a pure nature and focusing on it with oneness and equanimity, the state of origination, in the form of transmigration or the focus on modification, does not manifest, and attachment and aversion are overcome. Further, as senses are conquered, the defiled state does not have to be annihilated. The phrase ‘to conquer’ is from the view of *vyavahāra-naya* (conventional viewpoint).

A monkey sitting on a tree believed that tree to be his. Whenever dry leaves fell due to the wind, he would cry; similarly, an ignorant person believes he owns external substances. If he loses any one of the substances, he cries. A *jñānī* asks that, if one has such anguished thoughts at the loss of one object, what will happen if all objects are lost? When one has to leave everything, how will he be at peace? Therefore, none of the substances is of the self. The effort to hold onto body, wealth, and meritorious and de-meritorious states, etc., is the focus of modification; leaving that the focus should be towards the self. *ātmā* is an ocean of bliss; ensure to stay and be steady within, then there will be no relationship with thoughts. There will be a lack of state of impurity, and one will always be free of the ten material vitalities and will live with the vitality of *jñāna*.

In this way, leaning towards the *ātmā*, which is pure *upayoga*, is the only inner cause for the cessation of conventional senses. It is said in verse 150 that the predominant focus on the body is the conventional cause of the senses. In verse 151, it is stated that belief in the knowing nature is the sole cause of the absence of senses, implying it is the remedy for the destruction of transmigration.

This means that whoever wants to realize the *ātmā* as distinct from others or achieve the state of *siddha* should destroy the *prānas* (material vitalities), which are the cause of *vyavahāra-jivatva* (conventional consciousness). The five senses, body, mind, and speech, all are insentient; they are not the nature of *ātmā*. *ātmā*’s nature is *jñāna*, focusing and believing in that is the means to achieving the complete state. In all three phases, the path to absolute truth is one only, and only with that, can one be free of the senses.

Pravacana on bhāvārtha

If a crystal is kept with multi-coloured objects, it will appear according to those colours. However, when the crystal is moved away from them, the multi-coloured state is no longer

visible; instead, it appears as white or transparent because the impurity is absent. Similarly, *ātmā* is transformed according to the impure form of various *karmas*, senses, etc. One who stays within the knowing-believing nature of psychic activity does not have impure dispositions. He is detached from *vikāra* (perturbation); there is no impurity, and the tradition of conventional *prānas* (vitalities) is over.

samyaktva does not occur without right understanding, *cāritra* does not occur without *samyaktva*, *kevalajñāna* does not occur without *cāritra*, and the *siddha* state does not manifest without *kevalajñāna*. Therefore, know the way *Siddha Bhagavāna* has spoken and known. This is the only way to be separate from the senses. There is no other way.

अथ पुनरप्यात्मनोऽत्यन्तविभक्तत्वसिद्धये गतिविशिष्टव्यवहारजीवत्वहेतुपर्यायस्वरूप -
मुपवर्णयति -

Now again, for effectuating the complete separation of self (soul), the characteristic nature of the heterogeneous substantial modifications - (celestial being, human, etc.) termed as *gati* (specific states of soul's existence) which are the cause of *vyavahāra-jīvatva* (conventional consciousness) is described: -

अत्यन्तविभक्तस्मिन् हि अत्यन्तस्वतन्त्रमस्मिन् संभूदो ।
अथो पञ्जाओ सो संठाणादिष्वभेदेहि ॥ १५२ ॥

atthittanīcchidassa hi atthassatthamāntarammhi sambhūdo |
attho pajjāo so saṁthāṇādippabhedehiṃ || 152 ||

gāthā: The transformation of one state into another state, in the case of the substance *ātmā*, whose eternal existence is already ascertained, is the modification (heterogeneous substantial modification) which is found with *saṁsthāna* (configuration of body), etc., many kinds (of states of existence).

tīkā: When a substance having the existence of its definite characteristic nature originates with a specific form into another substance possessing the existence of its definite characteristic nature, then that originated specific form consisting of more than one substance is a modification termed as *aneka-dravyātmaka-paryāya* (multiple substantial modification).

That *aneka-dravyātmaka-paryāya* – is seen the way *pudgala* originates in other *pudgala* (*aneka-dravyātmaka*). Similarly, *jīva* is experienced as originating with *pudgala*, along with the specific characteristics of *saṁsthāna* (configuration of the body), etc. (along with the distinctions of the body's configuration, etc.) And that *paryāya* is appropriate, manifested, and logical. Because that which is exclusive of *jīva* alone - such an unimpaired modification of the *ātmā* substance is clearly realised as an unwavering one *dravya-paryāya* only, along with the association of many *dravyas*.

bhāvārtha: *svarūpa-astitva* (existence of intrinsic nature) of every substance always remains separate, even then as a *pudgala* modifies as *skandha-paryāya* (an aggregate

formation of matter particles) when it connects to other *pudgalas*. Similarly, *jīva* connects with *pudgala* in the form of the modification of *deva*, etc. The *aneka-dravyātmaka paryāya* of *deva*, etc., is not unconnected. Because when seen within, despite the association with many *dravyas*, the *jīva* never modifies as one with the modification of *pudgala*. There is also one *jīva* (separate from the modification of *pudgala*), unimpeded, (not fallen from itself), and only this *dravya paryāya* remains prevalent.

pravacana on gāthā 152

ātmā is an eternal, existing substance. No one has created it. *ātmā* is the same; it has not originated. It is ascertained by its nature.

Where infinite *jīvas* stay together, each *ātmā* is distinct by its nature of existence, and his *kārmaṇa* and *taijasa* (karmic and luminous) bodies are separate by their nature of existence. Body, mind, speech, etc., *pudgala* substances are separate because of their nature of existence. In transmigration, a *jīva* and a body are seen as one. *ātmā*'s shape takes the body it possesses. This is his *aneka dravyātmaka paryāya* (multiple substantial modification).

One insentient substance, together with another insentient substance, possesses substantial modification. It is seen that because of the *paramāṇus* of roti, lentils, and rice, the body maintains a state of substantial modification. Many other *pudgala paramāṇus* (the smallest unit of matter) in the form of a book and a building are seen attaining the state of substantial modification; similarly, substantial modifications in the form of *paryāya* are seen arising in the state of transmigration of the *ātmā*. Be it *jīva* of a single sense, or a human, he takes the shape of the body it is with, and he is seen attaining the state of substantial modification. It is erroneous to believe that a *jīva* never has conjugated *paryāya*. Because it can be clearly seen that a *jīva* comes forth in the shape of different bodies. In the state of transmigration, it never happens that a *jīva* is without a conjunction of a body. Even while moving in the *vigraha gati* from one *gati* (life form) to another *gati*, karmic and luminous bodies are present. Therefore, the presence of conjugated *paryāya* is proved and can be experienced.

Although substantial modifications occur in a *jīva*, it remains distinct from its sentient nature. It differs from tangible substances, such as the body and *karma*, etc. This can be illustrated with a *pudgala*. Even when one *pudgal-paramāṇu* is seen alongside another *pudgala-paramāṇu* in the form of a *skandha* (mass), the nature of existence of both is different. Combining turmeric with lime results in a state of redness, but the redness does

not arise from lime. It is the inherent capability of turmeric that causes its color to change from yellow to red.

Therefore, each *paramāṇu* exists due to its independent nature. Each *paramāṇu* of silver in a coin exists because of this independence. From a broader perspective of non-self, all *paryāyas* appear to undergo significant modification, yet the *paryāya* of each *paramāṇu* is unique. Similarly, various forms of life are observed in the body acquired by *ātmā*. However, at an internal level, the *ātmā* and body are distinct. The shape of the body is attributed to the body, while the shape of the *ātmā* is attributed to the *ātmā*. The *jīva*'s shape does not result from the body's shape, nor does the body's shape arise from the shape of the *ātmā*.

ātmā's own *catuṣṭaya* (substance-space-time-modification) is in the *ātmā*, not in the body.

1. In this way, a mass of infinite *guṇa-paryāya* (attribute-modification) is in the *dravya* of *ātmā*. A body is not the *dravya* of *ātmā*. *ātmā* is totally absent from the body.
2. The state of innumerable space points is the space of *ātmā*; the space of the body is totally absent from the *ātmā*. There is a total absence of *ātmā*'s space in the body's space.
3. The state of every *samaya* of *ātmā* is his. The state of the body is not of the *ātmā*. *ātmā*'s time is totally absent from the time of the body.
4. *ātmā*'s eternal attributes of *jñāna*, *darśana*, *cāritra*, *vīrya*, etc., are the attributes of *ātmā*; but touch, taste, smell, color, etc., attributes are not in it. There is a total absence of *ātmā*'s attributes in the attributes of the body.

In this way, *ātmā*'s *svacatuṣṭaya* (four attributes of self) is absent in the *svacatuṣṭaya* of body and *karma*. The substance-space-time modification of body and karma is absent in the *ātmā*. *ātmā*'s four *catuṣṭaya* (four attributes of self) are in the *ātmā*, and the body's *svacatuṣṭaya* are in the body.

Here, someone questions whether separation occurs after one becomes a *siddha*. But since the body is there, are *ātmā* and body one until then?

To him, it is said that who is one can never be separated. One who is separate cannot be mixed. A body lies here after death, and the *jīva* leaves. This proves the state of distinction. If body and *ātmā* were to be one, they can never be separated. What happens in one *samaya* remains in 100 *samayas*. If the *ātmā* and body are separate for one *samaya*, they are separate through the three time phases (past, present, and future). If, even for one *samaya*,

the nature of existence of *ātmā* is for the external substances, then *ātmā*'s existence cannot be proved.

Since eternity, an ignorant person has not left the thoughts of the body. He has an affinity towards the body. Since time immemorial, due to ignorance, he has harbored a misconception – how can a *jīva* exist without a body? He has oneness with external substances; therefore, he is transmigrating. He believes he is happy with his oneness and convenience in *samsāra*. Still, he has never accepted his oneness, away from the external substance, never focused, never thought, and never experienced internally.

In all these substance-modifications, the pure, knowing-seeing nature of *ātmā* is continuously evident. Just as water flows in the form of a stream, *jñāna* flows like an uninterrupted stream within all modifications and shapes. It is distinct from the body and *karmas*. Here, emphasis is placed on the word "uninterrupted." *ātmā* never touches the substance, attributes, or modifications of the body; it remains different and identical with its own substance-attribute-modification. On deciding this, the focus on association of non-self goes away, and the focus on self arises. Even though there is an attachment to the state of lesser *jñāna* of self, if it is decided that the earlier stated state is momentary and not the eternal form of self, then the focus is sure to shift towards the pure substance-attribute, which is from eternity to infinity. With this, thoughts of association and attachment are destroyed. The self is experienced as it is, and *samyag darśana-jñāna* manifests. When he immerses completely within the self, the state of passionless-ness in the form of absence of new birth and the state of *siddha* manifest.

pravacana on bhāvārtha

The nature of every *ātmā* and every insentient substance is different. *ātmā* is distinct from karma and body. Just as one *paramāṇu* together with another *paramāṇu* is seen in the form of *skandha*, similarly, a *jīva* is seen in the form of a celestial being, hellish being, human, etc.; he is suited to be in the state of *samsāra*. Whatever thoughts a *jīva* experiences, it becomes bonded by karmas accordingly, resulting in a *nimittika* relationship with the body, etc. Just as each *paramāṇu* is distinct in the *skandha*, similarly, *ātmā*, which is separate from the modification of *pudgalas*, present in many bodies, is seen as undivided from its own substance-attribute-modification. It is seen as a distinct substance modification from all others.

Without knowing one's nature, an ignorant recites *sāmāyika* and does *kāyotsarga* (meditation), but that is not the true *sāmāyika*. There is a word, 'visallikaraṇeṇam,' but he does not know its meaning and recites it. The meaning is to be free from false belief, deceit, and austerity for material gains (*nidāna*) – such are the three types of thorns (*shalya*).

Without knowing the meaning, how can one be free of the thorns of ignorance?

The belief that *jīva* can carry out the body's activities, karma can trouble a *jīva*, and *deva-guru-śāstra* can help attain dharma; such ignorant beliefs are the thorns (cause of misery/pain).

A *jīva* carries out the activities of a body; karmas harass a soul; *deva-śāstra-guru* helps in dharma, etc. These beliefs are the thorns. The scriptures say that to believe *ajīva* to be a *jīva* and *jīva* to be *ajīva* is false belief. Without experiencing the sentient distinct from body, mind, and speech, *sāmāyika* or *dharma* cannot occur. *ātmā* exists despite being associated with numerous bodies in different life forms; it exists internally in the nature of *jñāna*-sentience unimpeded, without destroying its distinct nature. *ātmā* has not become one with the body or *karma*. *ātmā* cannot carry out the work of the body, etc. The belief that – such a mass of pronounced and distinct knowledge, belief, conduct, etc., attributes are eternally lighted inside – is *samyagdarśana-sāmāyika dharma*. No other *sāmāyika* is true, and without the *sāmāyika* explained above, there is no true conduct and penance. *punya* occurs with the reduction of attachments, but it is not *dharma* and does not end transmigration.

In this way, *ātmā* is a different knowable substance in the associated *paryāyas* – having such a belief, and knowledge is the cause of *dharma*.

अथ पर्यायव्यक्तीर्दर्शयति -

Now, different kinds of *paryāyas* (*jīvas*’ states of existence) are shown: -

**णरणारयतिरियसुरा संठाणादीहिं अण्णहा जादा ।
पज्जाया जीवाणं उदयादिहिं णामकम्मस्स ॥ १५३ ॥**

***ṇaraṇārayatiriyasurā samṭhādihiṃ aṇṇahā jādā |
pajjāyā jīvāṇam udayādihiṃ ṇāmakammaṣṣa ||153||***

gāthā: Due to the manifestation of the *nāma karma* (physique making *karma*), human beings, hellish beings (denizens of hell), *tiryāṇca* (beings of the animal kingdom, including insects, etc.), and *devas* (celestial beings) are the *paryāyas* (modification) of embodied *jīvas* (sentient beings). They are of different kinds due to *saṁsthāna*, etc., (type of physic making karma).

ṭīkā: *nāraka* (beings of hell), *tiryāṇca* (animal kingdom), *manuṣya* (human-being), and *devas* (celestial beings) are all *parayāyas* (modifications) of *jīva*. Due to the state of giving fruits of the *pudgala* (non-sentient physical karmic matter) *nāma karma*, they are associated with numerous *dravyas*. Therefore, the way the modifications of ignited fire of husk, coal, etc., could be in the form of husk, scrap, etc., are different in their configuration. Similarly, *naraka*, etc., *paryāyas* of the *jīva* are found mutually different by their configuration of the body, etc.

pravacana on gāthā 153

A *jīva* assumes the state of hell, animals, humans, or celestial beings during transmigration. All these states are *jīva*’s arising of karmic dispositions. A *jīva* takes different intangible shapes due to its capability. Whatever dispositions had risen in the past, a bondage of that type of *nāma karma* (physique-making *karma*) occurs. Then, with the rising of *nimitta* of that *nāma karma*, a *jīva* stays in the form which is in conjugation with different bodies during different life forms. The way water taking the shape of the vessel in which it is stored is due to its capability. In the same way, when an *ātmā* enters whichever body, it takes the shape accordingly due to its association – this is a discernible experience.

The way fire is generic in all its shapes, but due to its capability, it is seen in various shapes during different circumstances; similarly, a *jīva* is seen changing and taking different shapes in modifications of hell, heaven, animal, and human. Various shapes are seen during the same life form as well. When the hand or leg is trembling, at that time, *ātmā*'s shape contracts on its own and not due to the body. In this way, a *jīva* has different shapes, and its conventional cause is *nāma karma*.

The various shapes of a *jīva* do not arise from *nāma karma*. *nāma karma* is particulate matter, while *jīva* is sentient. In essence, the emergence of *karma* lies within *karma* itself, and the development of a life form's disposition in a *jīva* originates from the *jīva*. Its forms are not attributed to *karma*. It is not the case that different bodies, such as those in the shape of a *deva*, result from *karma*; thus, the *ātmā* assumes its shape accordingly. The transformation of the *ātmā*'s shape and the alteration of the body's shape are distinct processes. There is a perpetual absence of *paryāyas* of one *dravya* in another. Just as water, stored in a vessel, takes the form of the vessel, it does not become the vessel itself. Water and the vessel are fundamentally different. Fire that arises from wood, though taking the form of wood, is not the same as wood. If timber and fire were one, then the wood would be destroyed upon extinguishing the fire, which does not occur. Therefore, wood and fire are indeed separate. Similarly, a sentient *ātmā* moves from one place to another of its own volition while the body remains behind. If the body and the *ātmā* were one, then the body should leave with the *ātmā*, but it is clearly observed that the body stays here. If both were unified, separation would be impossible. They are distinct. Thus, they remain separate.

If someone doubts that the *ātmā* resides in a body and is not seen as distinct from it, how can they believe it as different? Listen! The *ātmā* is a formless mass of knowledge, belief, and much more; a body is tangible with touch, taste, smell, and colour. Even though they occupy the same space, the formless *ātmā* does not remain in that body. *ātmā* exists within itself. When a fire erupts from the shell of a bomb, the shell remains; similarly, when the sentient departs, the body stays here, revealing the dissimilarity. Even from a conventional perspective, the body does not belong to *ātmā*. The body is like a structure, and *ātmā* resides in it like a guest for one lifetime. However, if a *jīva* believes that the body is his own, as if he is its owner, then he is foolish and a thief. The body belongs to the realm of *pudgala* (physical matter). If a *jīva* considers it to be his, then he fosters an infinite inauspicious disposition of misbelief.

Question: An ignorant person argues that eating and speaking cannot occur simultaneously; likewise, the workings of *samsara* and dharma cannot take place at the same time.

Answer: *jīva* does not perform any physical actions; it engages in the work of its thoughts and dispositions. For eternity, the *jīva* has mistaken the body as its own, which must be changed through the right belief. An ignorant person assumes the role of the doer of the body, leading to transmigration. Considering the body to be separate from *ātmā* is *dharma*. By thinking this way, *jñāna* focuses on the self and becomes subtle.

अथात्मनोऽन्यद्रव्यसंकीर्णत्वेऽप्यर्थनिश्चायकमस्तित्वं स्वपरविभागहेतुत्वेनोद्योतयति -

Now, *ātmā*'s conjoining with other *dravyas* exists; even then, the existence which determines the essence of *dravya* is referred to as the reason for the distinction of self and non-self.

**तं सभावणिबद्धं दव्वसहावं तिहा समक्खादं ।
जाणदि जो सवियप्पं ण मुहदि सो अण्णदवियम्हि ॥१५४ ॥**

***taṃ sabbhāvaṇibaddhaṃ davvasahāvaṃ tihā samakkhādam |
jāṇadi jo saviyappam ṇa muhadi so aṇṇadaviyamhi || 154 ||***

gāthā: He who knows the intrinsic nature of substance as established is stated to be three-fold (consisting of origination, destruction, and permanence), and does not get deluded or infatuated with other substances.

tīkā: The existence of characteristic nature, which is the deciding factor of a substance, is the intrinsic nature of the substance because the nature of the substance is established in its existence. This *dravya svabhāva* (nature of substance) is comprehended as being established on the three-fold type of *dravya-guṇa-paryāya* (substance-attribute-modification) and *dhrauvya-utpāda-vyaya* (permanence-origination-annihilation). When one knows one's own such nature, then he dispels the delusion of other substances, and so it becomes the cause (means) of the distinction of self and other (non-self). Therefore, at every step, the existence of intrinsic nature should be kept in mind to effectuate the distinction between self and other (non-self). It is thus: That which has the existence of *svarūpa astitva* (characteristic of existence) definitely possesses the three-fold divisions-

1. *dravya*, which is characterized by *anvaya* (sameness) or *cetanatva* (eternal presence of sentience/consciousness).
2. *guṇa* (attribute or quality) is characterized by *cetana* ("specialty of being sentient") or having the power to know-see.
3. *paryāya* (modification) is characterized by the changing of states with *vyatirekas* (mutual exclusions) of sentience /consciousness.

Also, three-fold divisions of *svarūpa astitva* (characteristic of existence of nature) are (1) *dhrauvya* (permanence) by way of pervading/extending of sentience/consciousness to the former and posterior *vyatirekas* (modifications), and (2-3) *utpāda* (origination) and *vyaya*

(annihilation) by way of posterior and former *vyatirekas* (modifications) of sentient-self - such *svarūpa astitva* is the nature of the own self - so the self is different from *pudgala*-matter substance. And (1) *dravya* characterised by *anvaya* of *acetanatva* (sameness of insentience). *guṇa* is characterised by the specialty of being *acetanā* (insentient), and (2) *paryāya* is characterised by *vyatireka* of *acetanatva* (changing of states with mutual exclusions of insentient matter). Further, three-fold divisions of existence of *svarūpa-astitva* (characteristic of existence) are (1) *dhrauvya* by way of pervading extending of *acetanatva* (insentience) to the *vyatirekas* (former and posterior modifications) and (2) *utpāda* and (3) *vyaya* by way of *vyatirekas* (posterior and former modifications) of insentient-matter. Such *svarūpa astitva* is the nature of *pudgala*-matter, which is fundamentally different from the self. Therefore, the “I” has no delusion or infatuation; this is the fundamental distinction between self and other (non-self) matter, etc.

bhāvārtha: Existence of *svarūpa-astitva* of *jīva* (sentient being) and the existence of *svarūpa-astitva* of every *paramāṇu* (matter-particle), even in several composite (heterogeneous) modifications of human, celestial being, etc., are entirely separate. Upon careful observation, the *svarūpa-astitva* of *jīva* and *pudgala* are known to be clearly distinct. For discriminating self from non-self (matter, etc.), this *jīva* must be alert at every step. This is *svarūpa-astitva*. For instance – on being known (realized) ‘I’, whose characteristic nature is *cetana dravya-guṇa-paryāya* (sentient substance-attribute-modification) and *cetana dhrauvya-utpāda-vyaya* (sentient permanence-origination-annihilation), is a completely separate entity from *pudgala* (body) and this *pudgala* (matter), whose characteristic nature is *acetana* (insentient) *dravya-guṇa-parayāya* and *acetana* (insentient) *dhrauvya-utpāda-vyaya* is, as such, entirely separate from the self. Therefore, the ‘I’ has no delusion or infatuation towards other non-self things; instead, there is a distinction between self and other non-self.

pravacana on gāthā-154

The characteristic nature of the existence of each substance defines the substance. *ātmā*’s nature of existence ascertains the *ātma*, and the insentient’s nature of existence ascertains the insentient. *ātmā* substance can be known by itself. *ātmā* cannot be determined by particulate matter, and particulate matter cannot determine *ātmā*. The actual nature of a substance is the existence of self because the nature of a substance is existence.

The nature of a substance has three divisions in the form of *dravya-guna-paryāya* (substance-attribute-modification) and *utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya* (origination-annihilation-permanence).

Substance is a mass of infinite efficacies. *jñāna-darśana*, etc., efficacies or touch, taste, etc., are attributes. The states occurring every *samaya* are *paryāyas*. (modifications). The attribute is eternal, meaning *dhrouvya* (permanence) is a constant. The origination of a new state is *utpāda*; the annihilation of the previous state is *vyaya*. Substance-attribute-modification and origination-annihilation-permanence of *jīva* are because of the *jīva*. *pudgala*'s substance-attribute-modification and origination-annihilation-permanence are because of itself.

Even modification of particulate matter is not because of *jīva*; similarly, the modification of another particulate matter is also not because of a *jīva*. A *jīva* cannot do the work of speaking and cannot move the body. Wife, family, house, *deva*, *guru*, and *śāstra*'s substance, attributes, and modifications are within them, respectively. A *jīva* has no relationship with infinite other substances – its nature decides it. Knowing the substance's nature destroys the delusion in the form of pleasure in external substances. It is also the cause of discriminative knowledge between the self and the non-self. No other activity or pious attachment can be its cause. Knowledge of the nature of the self-substance is the only reason for the discriminative knowledge.

An ignorant person does not acquire true knowledge and believes *dharma* is the activity of the gross body. It is written in *Tattvārtha Sūtra – ni: shalyovruti*,” meaning dispositions of penance, etc., should be devoid of false belief. Dharma cannot occur without leaving false beliefs, and his penance, repentance, etc., are also false. To believe that modification of the insentient is done by *ātmā*, and *ātmā*'s modification is done by the insentient, is the thorn of ignorance. Attention toward external substances is a thorn. A son who does not listen to his father's instructions is not obedient. He is disobedient. Similarly, by continuously chanting the name of the father *Bhagavāna Mahāvīra* devotedly but not exerting the efforts to know truthfully the commandment that every substance is separate because of his nature of existence, and by not following that commandment, he does not believe in *Bhagavāna*; therefore, he is not a Jain.

One should correctly decide about each knowable by their nature of existence. *ātmā* always stays in his substance-attribute-modification and does not even touch the substance-attribute-modification of the body. Even though *chadmastha* (non-omniscient) *jīva* may

not directly know the substance-space, etc., but he can ascertain it indirectly, just the way omniscient *Bhagavāna* knows it. Discriminative knowledge that – every moment, *ātmā* is separate from the body, etc., is experienced. Therefore, for completeness of self and non-self, the nature of existence should be taken into account in every modification.

Here, the statement is - take care of every *samaya*. The weightage is on the word ‘every *samaya*’. This chapter is on the knowable. The intent is that every modification of a *jīva* is knowable, so the self must remain alert through every modification and put in that effort. Believing that if *kṣāyika samyagdarśana* (the state where all karmas obstructing right belief are destroyed) is present, then true conduct will follow, a state of monkhood will occur, and omniscience will occur, one should not become dependent on it. Till this self-substance becomes completely pure and attains omniscience, he must continue to perform the discriminative knowledge between self and non-self in each manifesting modification. The effort should continue in every modification that the self is distinct from the non-self. In this way, the discriminative knowledge of self and non-self arises due to the nature of existence.

Each *ātmā* and *paramāṇu* is a different substance. No one is the doer of another. *ātmā*’s nature is to just know and see. The science of discriminative knowledge between the self and non-self occurs by knowing each substance through its nature of existence. Nature, which is the characteristic of existence, is with substance-attribute-modification and origination-annihilation-permeance. Here, the state of sentient *dravya* is stated in three ways. How a *jīva* with discriminative knowledge believes his *ātmā* – is stated here: -

Nature of *dravya-guna-paryāya* (substance-attribute-modification) of *cetana* (sentience)

***cetanadravya*:**

The nature of *ātmā* is sentient, eternal, and being in one form of homogeneity. Body, wealth, family, *karma* – are not the substance *ātmā*; they are insentient substances. Dispositions of piety-charity, etc., are pious tenets, and violence, lies, theft, etc., are tenets of inauspicious dispositions. Both are tenets of *āsrava* (inflow of *karmas*), *bandha* (bondage), and *vikāra* (perturbations), which are not sentient substances. That which will manifest new is *samvara* (stoppage of *karma*) and *nirjarā* (shedding of *karma*), which is modification and not substance. *ātmā* - the sentient substance is the one who knows the nine tenets or six substances, whose characteristic is to be the one with no beginning or end, whose nature is to know-see, and whose generality is sentience.

attribute of *cetana*

cetana (sentience) is a special attribute of *ātmā*. Attachment-aversion, meritorious and non-meritorious deeds/thoughts are not the attributes of *ātmā*. It is not in the nature of *ātmā* to accept or renounce insentient substances. It is not the nature of *ātmā* that it can do the work of another *ātmā* or provide benefit or loss, or another *ātmā* can work for this *ātmā* or can give benefit or loss to this *ātmā*. The way yellowness, stickiness, and weight are the attributes of gold; similarly, *jñāna-darśana*, etc., attributes are present in *ātmā*. *ātmā*'s nature is to know the states of other *jīvas*, the insentient body, etc., which occur. But it is not in the nature of *jīva* to change the modification of other substances.

modification of *cetana*

The characteristic of the modification of *ātmā* is to keep knowing. The state of sentience is the distinctive attribute of *jīva*. The annihilation of previous state of *jñāna* and the origination of a new state is the modification of sentience. Only the activity of knowing can be experienced in all three phases.

Modification of the body or speech is not the modification of *ātmā*; even modification of auspicious and non-auspicious dispositions is not of *ātmā*. The path of *mokṣa* is to have faith in *ātmā* distinct from insentience and blemishes, to know, and be steady in it. State of sentience is the characteristic of modification of sentience. The modification that knows the state of *mahāvratas* is the modification of sentience.

In this way, that substance-attribute-modification – sentience, which is in the form of the cluster of these three, is the nature of existence. Now, *cetana*'s nature of *dhrouya-utpādayaya* (permanence-origination-annihilation) is explained.

***dhrouya* (permanence)**

cetana touches the first and subsequent *paryāyas*; from this point of view, *cetana* is an unchanging constant (*dhruva*). *dhruva* means an eternal, immovable substance that exists through all three time phases. The old state is annihilated, and the new state originates in the sentient, that which remains permanent in both states and is sentient. The sentient touches the previous and present states, but it does not touch the states of money, body, speech, senses, etc., insentient substances, and it does not touch other *ātmā*'s modifications. *punya-pāpa* is a temporary external condition; the sentient does not touch those blemished modifications because the blemished modification is not the state of sentience. *Bharat Cakravarti* was a householder who had many auspicious and inauspicious modifications,

but he had *samyakjñāna* that the bodies of his wives were insentient; he could not touch those bodies, nor could he touch the *ātmā* of his wives. He could not even touch the food articles. Transient articles are in the form of fruits of *punya-pāpa*, and these cannot be touched. He knew agglomeration of magnificence and blemishes; the self's sentient modifications occur one after another, and the self touches them; the self is the constant that holds the sentient nature eternally. Such a belief in constant nature can be experienced even as a householder.

***utpāda-vyaya* (origination-annihilation)**

The origination of the state of sentience and the annihilation of the previous state is the nature of *utpāda-vyaya*. Origination in the form of a state from the body is not the origination of the sentient. Even auspicious-inauspicious dispositions are not of the sentient. The state of knowing the disposition of piety-charity is the origination of the sentient. The state of annihilation of the body and auspicious-inauspicious states is not the annihilation of the sentient. The state of a body was present in the past, and so were auspicious-inauspicious states. Its knowledge, which was in the past, was destroyed in the present state. Its knowing in the previous state is destroyed in the present state. From the view of modification, that destruction is said to be of the sentient.

In this way, *dhrouvya-utpāda-vyaya* together is known as the nature of the *cetana*.

Without understanding the nature of existence, having outer renunciation is like crying in the middle of a desert. An ignorant person does not understand the difference between a body and *ātmā*. He believes that if *ātmā* is present, then language can be spoken, but both *ātmā* and insentient substance are axiomatic, having distinct natures of existence. The origination-annihilation-permanence of the insentient is in itself, and the origination-annihilation-permanence of the sentient is in the sentient. Dispositions of charity-piety are blemishes, but an ignorant person believes them to be *dharma*. He does not understand the nature of existence. One can get heaven with pious dispositions, but *dharma* does not occur. The way one cries in a forest, but there is no one around to take care of him or make him stop crying. This means that the crying won't stop; similarly, if one practices outer penance and vows without experiencing the nature of existence, then transmigration will continue, and *dharma* will not be achieved. Those vows. etc., will be meaningless.

See! A *dharmī jīva* thinks about *ānyatva* (otherness). He believes that his substance-attribute-modification and origination-annihilation-permanence are because of him and in him. The substance-attribute-modification and origination-annihilation-permanence of the

insentient are because of the insentient and in the insentient. Self is sentient, and the state of self is not because of the insentient; the state of insentient is not because of the sentient self. The self is separate from money, house, shop, *deva-guru-śāstra*, body, and *karma*. Their substance-attribute-modification is in them. There is no connection between the self and the other non-self substances. Auspicious and inauspicious thoughts are not in the modification of sentient. Modification of the sentient self is the knower of everything. The self is merely the knower. Self is a sentient substance who, by nature, is *jñāna* and is separate from the perturbation of body and *karma*. *dharmī jīva* believes that the self is separate from all.

Infinite *jñānīs* have said that having discriminative knowledge by means of the nature of existence is *dharma*. A *jñānī* immerses within and believes so by going within the self by the science of discriminative knowledge. Self is neither favourable nor adverse associations, nor is the self in the form of a body, etc. Whatever little attachment-aversion occurs, they are not the self. The sentient self exists in the form of *jñāna* within the temple, which is the body. Only a worthy *jīva* can understand this. First, such knowledge should arise; then equanimity arises; thereafter, by adopting the monastic life, he attains the passionless state.

In this way, to know the sentient substance with the nature of existence as self-knowable and to know the non-self knowable in the form of non-self is *samyagjñāna*, and only that is *dharma*.

The state of annihilation of the body and auspicious-inauspicious states is not the annihilation of the sentient.

One who is inclined towards *dharma* thinks that he is, by nature, the knower-seer, sentient *ātmā*. Body, wealth, mind, speech, family, etc., are not his, and he has no relation to them. The body is an insentient matter substance made of lentils, rice, roti, etc.; ultimately, it turns into ashes. The self gives auspices to knowledge, belief, conduct, and knowledge, belief, and conduct take auspices of the self. External substances – wealth, money, house, wife, family, etc., sentient and insentient substances do not stay with the auspices of the sentient self, and the self does not give auspices to them. Self is not the doer of different states of those substances. Auspicious-inauspicious dispositions are not *jīva* substance. He does not believe that he manages the family or moves the body. The self is distinct from body, etc., insentient substances.

A *dharmī jīva* believes himself to be separate from the substance-attribute-modification of the insentient. Now, the nature of the substance-attribute-modification of the insentient is explained.

***acetana dravya* (substance) –**

State of insentience means being without *jñāna* – inanimate. *acetandravya* is that whose characteristic is uniformly insentient; Body, mind, speech, karma, etc., are *insentient*.

A disease occurs in a body, not in *ātmā*. But an ignorant *jīva* believing the body to be his, wrongly imagines pleasure and pain in it. Even though he has a strong desire to cure the disease, he cannot cure it. He may spend millions of Rupees to heal his stomach ache, but can it be cured? The wife and son both try hard, but neither has the ability to heal it.

An ignorant *jīva* believes that he will attain greatness by earning money. Without knowing the *ātmā*, a millionaire is a more hard working labourer and a beggar. A common man is a smaller labourer and a beggar. The way no one thinks that it is desirable to gather excreta from a washroom. Similarly, money is considered to be the same as excreta, and one who believes happiness in that is ignorant. In the same way, one who is attached to money and believes happiness is in the same is also ignorant. A *dharmī jīva* thinks that his happiness is not in the insentient but separate from it.

***guṇa* (attribute)**

The attribute of an insentient substance is inanimateness; it is not its attribute to provide happiness. Money, body, *karma*, food, etc., inanimate substances cannot benefit or harm *ātmā*. An ignorant *jīva* believes that the house and family run because money is earned, and the family cannot run if money goes away. But listen! Money is not self-substance; it comes due to the *nimitta* of an auspicious state and goes due to the *nimitta* of an inauspicious state. It does not have the attribute to give pleasure and pain.

A *dharmī jīva* thinks that his attributes of knowledge, bliss, etc., are in him and are not in *karma* of body, money, etc. They have inanimateness in them. His *cetana guṇa* is separate from the *acetana guṇa*.

***paryāya* (modification)**

The characteristic of the modification of an insentient substance is the *vyatireka* (changing state) of insentience. The states of body, mind, speech, and *karma* occur one after another

and not because of a *jīva*. They occur because of an insentient substance. An ignorant person believes that caring for the body frees the body from sickness. ‘With changing times, everyone changes.’ He feels that many people would come and meet earlier, but now, since his wealth is gone, no one comes. He is told that the change was in the insentient, in wealth, and in inauspicious karmas. That is not in anyone’s hands. A healthy body is the modification of the insentient; it is not due to anyone’s smartness.

A *dharmi jīva* thinks that his *jñāna paryāya* changes, but he does not change the states of the insentient *dravya*. The self’s *cetana paryāya* is separate from the insentient *dravya*.

In this way, the insentient’s *dravya-guna-paryāya* are in the insentient. The self’s *dravya-guna-paryāya* is separate from the insentient’s *dravya-guna-paryāya*.

Thus, a *dharmi jīva* believes himself to be separate from the *dhrouvya-utpāda-vyaya* of the insentient.

dhrouvya (permanence)

There is continuity in the insentient state in the previous and subsequent modifications of the insentient *dravya*. In both states, the common concord insentience remains. As – lentils, *roti*, and rice change into blood form, and in both states, those *paramāṇus* prevail. Similarly, those the body turns to ashes; in these two states, insentience remains.

An ignorant person believes that a body lasts because of *ātmā*. *ātmā* ensures that house, wealth, etc., last; the body keeps the *ātmā* steady. But body, house, wealth, etc., are insentient substances; their condition changes one by one, and only insentient substances can touch them. *ātmā* cannot touch them, meaning it cannot hold them. The body’s condition can change from good to bad; insentient *paramāṇu* is constant in the change. The state of a body changes after movement, and the body touches both these states. *ātmā* does not touch them. So, dharma of *ātmā* cannot arise by keeping the body steady.

Bharat Cakravarti was a *jñānī*. He believed that kingdoms, gardens, palaces, and the like were all insentient substances. He did not have the strength to protect them. Those substances are lasting due to their constancy. ‘I’ have the sentience in the form of constancy, which lasts in all the states of being a knower. A *jñāni* believes he is separate from the constant of sentience and the constant of insentience.

utpāda-vyaya (origination-annihilation)

Insentience is present during both the destruction of the previous state and the origination of the new state. In a state, the matter particles of *bhāṣa varganā* are present; then, they are destroyed, and it originates in the form of words, or when there is a destruction of the young body and origination of the old state, in both states, the insentient substance is in the form of annihilation and origination. But annihilation- origination of the insentient substance did not occur due to the presence of *ātmā*.

An ignorant person argues that he has earned money on his strength. Speech arises due to the presence of *ātmā*. How can there be speech without *ātmā*? Is it possible to make a dead body speak?

He is told, Listen! Speech is insentient; its origination-annihilation is due to the *paramāṇu* and not due to the sentient. *ātmā* is not a goldmine of words. Words are modifications of *acetana*, and *ātmā* is *cetana*; therefore, *ātmā* does not speak. Money is insentient. If storing it was within *ātmā*'s control, then during the inauspicious states, why does one let it go? Is it possible to hold it? But this cannot happen. Therefore, it should be understood that the state of insentience arises from insentience.

A *dharmī jīva* thinks that origination-annihilation of the insentient body, money, speech, etc., are from insentient substances and not because of him. He is a *cetana* substance, and his sentient origination-annihilation is because of him. Origination-annihilation *cetana* is separate from the origination-annihilation of *acetana*.

In this way, *dhrouvya-utpāda-vyaya* of insentient is in the insentient.

Infinite transmigration is destroyed by the spark of *samyagjñāna*

ātmā cannot retain, save, or destroy the insentient substance. Although in the state of a seeker, a little attachment is present, but that attachment is not due to these objects, and neither is it that these objects come due to the presence of attachment. Auspicious thoughts and activities are not *dharma*, and neither are they present in *ātmā*. If it were present in *ātmā*, then it should also be present in the state of *siddha*. But *siddha* is free of auspicious attachments; therefore, auspicious-inauspicious thought and activity are not the nature of *ātmā*. To know this *cetana dravya* is separate from *acetana dravya* and attachment is *dharma*.

The way, in a matchstick, fire cannot occur from the white portion, but fire erupts by rubbing the red gunpowder on its tip. Similarly, body, mind, speech, and inauspicious

thoughts are like the white portion of a matchstick; by rubbing them, meaning concentrating on them, *dharma* does not occur. *ātmā* is separate from the insentient, nature of sentience and joy, which is different from auspicious-inauspicious thoughts. By focusing on it, *paryāya* in the form of *dharma* arises. A tiny matchstick can burn millions of tons of grass; similarly, just one modification of *samyag darśana-jñāna-caritra* can destroy infinite *samsāra*. **On understanding, everything is simple.** Or, with understanding, everything becomes simple. Just as a person spends many years in worldly studies, one should spend time on spiritual studies in the same way.

A *dharmī jīva* contemplates that all insentient substances are separate from me. Therefore, he has no attachment to them. He does not believe happiness is to be found through them. He is a *cetana* substance, and body, money, mind, speech, etc., are insentient and separate. This is the division between self and non-self.

Thus, *samyagjñāna* is the division between self and non-self, and that is *dharma*.

bhāvārtha

In many *dravyātmāka paryāyas* (modifications of substance/*dravya*), the modifications of numerous humans, *devas*, etc the nature of existence of *jīva* and the nature of existence of a *paramāṇu* is totally different. On thinking carefully, the substance-attribute-modification and permanence-origination-annihilation modify because of themselves, respectively.

Self is of the nature of *siddhas*. The discriminative knowledge of self and non-self that the external body of human-celestial, which is seen, is not the natural disposition of self, is *dharma*.

In a worldly way, one does not forget that one belongs to the sub-sect of *Daśāsṛīmālī Bania* (a community). Similarly, *ātmā* is of the race of the sentient *siddha*. First, it should be decided that the nature of the self is the knower-observer, unwavering psychic activity. The state of *siddha* manifests from the self, not from outside.

Karma accumulates by association, not by effort. A *jīva* cannot create the states of an insentient substance. It is not so - money is earned by carefully attending to the business, and by not paying attention, money is not earned. Money is earned due to the previous auspicious disposition. A saying is, ‘On every grain, the name of who will consume is written.’ This means each grain of food, at whichever time, whichever area, in whatever

association has to come, will do so at that time. And when it is not meant to reach, it will not do so. The effort of the *jīva* cannot work on external substances.

dharma occurs due to efforts and not due to *karmas*. If someone believes that *dharma* will arise if it is in his fate, then this is a fallacy. Circumstances are due to the *nimitta* of auspicious *karmas*. However, having attachments or a correct understanding is not dependent on *karma*. A *jīva* does auspicious-inauspicious dispositions himself. They are not reliant on non-self. Whatever dispositions a *jīva* has, they arise accordingly. One can have dispositions of *dharma* by leaving the dispositions of *samsāra*. The body, insentient substances, and other *jīvas* are separate from the self *ātmā*, and auspicious-inauspicious thoughts are distorted states. Having the belief, knowledge, and stability that the nature of *ātmā* is of a knower-seer, free from auspicious-inauspicious thoughts, is *dharma*. It is not dependent on karma or other *jīvas* or other substances. It is dependent on his true effort.

A *dharmī jīva* compartmentalizes the sentient and the insentient. He contemplates that his substance-attribute-modification and origination-annihilation-permanence are, by nature, sentient, and the substance-attribute-modification and origination-annihilation-permanence of *pudagala* are insentient. The body, which is insentient by nature, is separate from the self.

The way, a businessman who does not have an heir to his business will not adopt a stranger from a lower caste, but will adopt someone from his caste who is related to him. This example leads us to think that a *dharmī jīva* contemplates that he belongs to the caste of the pure sentient *siddha*. Auspicious-inauspicious thoughts belong to the lower caste. Body, wealth, and auspicious-inauspicious thoughts cannot be heirs to his sentient nature. They do not have the capability to be his heirs. If someone wants to keep the insentient bungalow forever as it is, it cannot be kept. The self-substance is one with its own substance-attribute-modification. It has no relationship with others. Hence, he has no attachment to other substances. *jñānī jīva* makes his divisions the way two brothers divide their wealth. Knower-seer *ātmā*, the efficacy of *jñāna-darśana*, and modification of sentience are his. Body, wealth, and *karma* being insentient are not his. A retinue of servants, son, and family is non-self. He has no relationship with them. Auspicious-inauspicious are postulated thoughts, and there is no bliss in them. Bliss is within the nature of the self. Hence, the *dharmī jīva* divides between the self and the non-self. In this way, knowing the nature of existence to be separate from each knowable is *samyakjñāna*, and it is the cause of *dharma*.

अथात्मनोऽत्यन्तविभक्तत्वाय परद्रव्यसंयोगकारणस्वरूपमालोचयति –

Now, for completely detaching the self (soul), the characteristics of the cause of its conjunction with other substances is considered: -

**अप्पा उवओगप्पा उवओगो णाणदंसणं भणिदो ।
सो वि सुहो असुहो वा उवओगो अप्पणो हवदि ॥१५५॥**

*appā uvaogappā uvaogo ṇāṇadaṁsaṇaṁ bhaṇido |
so vi suho asuho vā uvaogo appaṇo havadi || 155 ||*

gāthā: *ātmā* is characterized by/constituted of *upayoga* (manifestation of consciousness/psychic activity); *upayoga* (manifestation of consciousness) is stated as *jñāna* and *darśana* (knowledge and perception). And this *upayoga* of *ātmā* is either good (auspicious) or bad (inauspicious).

tīkā: In reality, the reason for the conjunction of *ātmā* with other substances is the distinction of *upayoga*.

First, this *upayoga* is the eternal characteristic nature of *ātmā* because it conforms to the modification of the sentient substance. (or *upayoga* modifies according to the sentient nature). And that *upayoga* is *jñāna* and *darśana* because *caitanya* (sentience/consciousness) is of two forms – *sākāra* (knowing substances with their particulars differentiated and distinguished, *jñānopayoga*); *nirākāra* (perceiving substances without their particulars, undifferentiated-undistinguished *darśana-upayoga*). Now, this *upayoga* is divided into two types- pure and impure. Of these, *śuddhopayoga* (pure manifestation of consciousness) is *niruparāga* (without attachment/without perturbation), and *aśuddhopayoga* (impure manifestation of consciousness) is *soparāga* (with attachment/ with perturbation). And this *aśuddhopayoga* is again two-fold – auspicious and inauspicious because this attachment is of two forms, it being either *viśuddhirūpa* (good intentioned/auspicious form) and *sankaleshrūpa* (ill-intentioned/inauspicious form). This means *vikāra* is of two types: *maṇḍakaṣāyarūpa* (mellow passions) and *tīvrakaṣāyarūpa* (intense passions).

bhāvārtha: *ātmā* is with the form of *upayoga* (manifestation of consciousness/psychic activity). Primarily, this *upayoga* is two-fold, pure and impure *upayoga*, and impure *upayoga* is of two types – *śubha* (auspicious) and *aśubha* (inauspicious).

pravacana on gāthā 155

In reality, *aśudhhopayoga* (impure manifestation of consciousness or psychic activity) is the cause of the attainment of associated things and circumstances, such as the body, family, money, etc. Dispositions of charity-piety, prayers, etc., are auspicious dispositions, and violence, falsehood, theft, etc., are inauspicious dispositions. Both of these are inauspicious psychic activities. New insentient *karmas* get bonded, and outer circumstances are obtained because of them, but the nature of *ātmā* is not attained because of them.

upayoga (psychic activity) is the nature of *ātmā*. Many *jīvas* are unaware of *upayoga*. It is the state of *jñāna* (to know) and *darśana* (to see) of the self. One's understanding of a work can be enhanced by seeking advice from a senior. But as he does not know what is present in his own nature, he does not attain dharma or peace.

A *jīva* cannot use external substances because they are non-self substances. To acquire or not to acquire them is not in the hands of a *jīva*. Non-self substances cannot be acquired and used. An ignorant, due to *ajñāna*, thinks that he has used all those substances. But he has contrary thoughts and contemplates accordingly.

upayoga is the nature of *ātmā*. It modifies according to the sentient nature. This state does not follow body, senses, and mind, but follows the sentient, so it is said. This statement should be focused upon. *upayoga* is of two types.

jñāna upayoga – To know in a specific form is *jñānopayoga*. Here, form does not mean that the form of insentient enters *jñāna*, but *jñāna* knows every substance with its divisions and sub-divisions individually. Therefore, *jñānopayoga* is called *sākāra* (specific). Knowing the divisions that distinguish this as a *jīva*, this is the insentient, etc., is *jñāna*.

darśana upayoga- the state of incorporeality is called *darśanopayoga*. Incorporeality does not mean that there is no division in any substance. The contemplation of *sāmānya sattā* (state of generality) is *darśanopayoga*. Without any division, that-this is a *jīva* or *ajīva*, or this is a *dravya* – having an *upayoga* of such a form of general contemplation is

darśanopyoga. Here, *darśana* does not mean the attribute of belief. *śraddhā* (attribute of belief) does not have *upayoga*. *darśana* means general contemplation.

Now, *upayoga*'s divisions are stated principally from the view of *cāritra* (conduct).

1. *śuddhopayoga* – *ātmā*'s nature is *jñāna* - body, etc., are insentient, *pūnya-pāpa* is not the nature of *ātmā* – engrossment in the pure nature with such a realization and knowledge is called *śuddhopayoga*, and that is *dharma*.
2. *aśuddhopayoga* - not knowing that – *ātmā*'s nature is *jñāna* – having the self's defiled modifications towards non-self is called *aśuddhopayoga*. *aśuddhopayoga* is of two types: 1. *śubhopayoga*, 2. *aśubhopayoga*.
3. *śubhopayoga* – By not having the *upayoga* towards oneself, a *jīva* joins in the modifications in the form of mellow passions of piety-charity is called *śubhopayoga*, and that *pūnya* is *adharma* (not religion).
4. *aśubhopayoga*- By not having the *upayoga* towards the self, a *jīva* joins in modifications of intense passions, which is called *aśubhopayoga*, which is *pāpa*.

People refer to dispositions of charity, piety, penance, and prayer as *dharma*, and *mokṣa* can be achieved through them. Here, *Bhagavāna* has called those dispositions *aśuddhopayoga*, which is *adharma* and the cause of transmigration. *Bhagavāna* says that such an *ajñāni jīva* does not listen, but if he were to listen, he himself would become *Bhagavāna*.

bhāvārtha: *ātmā*'s nature is *upayoga*. First, there are two divisions of *upayoga* – *śuddha* and *aśuddha*. *aśuddhopayoga* has two divisions – one, *śubhopayoga*, and the second, *aśubhopayoga*.

This chapter is on the knowable. Incorporeal *śuddhopayoga* devoid of *pūnya-pāpa* is the cause of *dharma* and blemished *aśuddhopayoga* inclusive of *pūnya-pāpa* is the cause of *samsāra*, meaning reason for new associations.

gāthā-156

अथात्र क उपयोगः परद्रव्यसंयोगकारणमित्यावेदयति -

Now, it is stated that “which *upayoga*” is the cause of conjunction with other substances: -

**उवओगो जदि हि सुहो पुण्णं जीवस्स संचयं जादि ।
असुहो वा तध पावं तेसिमभावे ण चयमत्थि ।॥१५६॥**

*uvaogo jadi hi suho puṇṇaṃ jīvassa saṁcayaṃ jādi |
asuho vā tadha pāvaṃ tesimabhāve ṇa cayamatthi ||156 ||*

gāthā: If the *upayoga* (manifestation of consciousness) is *śubha* (auspicious), *jīva* accumulates meritorious *karma*, and if it is *aśubha* (inauspicious), then demeritorious *karma* is accumulated; in the absence of both, there is no accumulation of *karma*.

ṭīkā: The cause of the conjunction of *jīva* with other substances is *asuddhopayoga* (impure thought activity). And due to good (auspicious) and harmful (inauspicious) forms of attachment, it is divided into two forms – *śubha* (causing well-being) and *aśubha* (causing ill effect) and acts as the cause of conjunction with other substance which receives dual aspect as *punya* (merit) and *pāpa* (sin/demerit). But when both types of *asuddhopayoga* do not evolve/are not caused to arise, then only pure *upayoga* (*śuddhopayoga*) remains, which is not the cause of conjunction with other substances; [this means *śuddhopayoga* (pure soul activity) is not the cause of conjunction with other].

pravacana on gatha 156

asuddhopayoga (impure thought activity) is the cause of transmigration. During transmigration, a *jīva* coalesces body, mind, speech, etc. Its reason is impure thought activity. Impure thought activity is the result of having pleasure in non-self substances while not knowing the self. It is of two types.

1. *śubhopayoga*: Disposition of mellow passions is an auspicious disposition. Its result is the bondage of *punya*. Because of this, one obtains the form of a celestial being, a human, etc., and favourable conditions, but there is no *dharma*.

2. *aśubhopayoga*: The intensity of passions is an inauspicious disposition. It results in *asātāvedanīya* (an unpleasant effect), etc., and bondage of inauspicious *karma* occurs. With its *nimitta* life form of *naraka*, etc., and bondage of unfavourable associations occurs.

If there is severe flooding, then the person caught in it will stiffen. Similarly, ignorant *jīva* stiffens with assumed air with the arrogance of *punya*, or is engrossed in the lowliness of *pāpa*, and that's why his transmigration continues. Thoughts that are the reason for the bondage of karma, even if they are extremely auspicious, cannot be the reason for *dharma*. Auspicious thoughts are the reason for a life as a *deva*, and inauspicious thoughts are the reason for a life in *naraka*, etc. But in both situations, the state without a life form is not manifested.

Who is the supreme good in this world? In the way of the world, a person with riches is said to be the best. But he is not the best. He who has experienced the *ātmā* accepts himself to be the *jñāna* by nature, and does not believe the impure psychic activity of auspicious and inauspicious thoughts to be worth doing; he removes his interest from auspicious activities and believes only his pure nature to be worth honouring. Only he is supremely transcendental, and *jīvas* with *mithyātva* are lower.

The way, fluid or solid excretion, is not the root nature of the body, and is not something to keep aside carefully. Similarly, auspicious-inauspicious thoughts/activities are like fluid and solid excretions, as they are not a part of the *jñāna* body of *ātmā*. Auspicious-inauspicious thoughts/activities are not signs of a disease-free *ātmā* but are the disease. *jīva*, who believes this impure psychic activity to be worth abandoning and believes his own nature of *jñāna* to be eternally worth partaking, is the supreme transcendental good, or he is a *jñānī*.

In this way, pure psychic activity is to know that the auspicious and inauspicious psychic activity, both are worth removing, and to accept the pure nature of *jñāna* and immerse in it. *jñānī jīva*, right at the start, refuses to believe in the auspicious and inauspicious. Though auspicious and inauspicious thoughts/activities do exist in the state of a seeker, there is an inherent negation of them. *śuddhopayoga* (pure psychic activity) is *samkita* (experience of self), *jñāna* (knowing of self), and *svarūpācaraṇa* (immersing in the pure nature of self). When *jīva* moves further into the immersing of self in the pure nature, then the *śuddhopayoga* (pure psychic activity) increases. It is not the reason for the bondage of *karma*, and neither is it the reason for the association of non-self substances. With the manifestation of complete *śubhāpayoga* (pure psychic activity), the complete state of *mokṣa* manifests due to which association of non-self substance goes away.

In this way, pure psychic activity is not the reason for the association of non-self substance, but it is the reason for *dharma* and is the reason for attaining *mokṣa*.

In this way, both *śubha* and *aśubha upayoga* are perturbed modifications and are the reason for transmigration. *śuddhaopayoga* (pure psychic activity) is the unblemished modification of *ātmā*, and that is the reason for *mokṣa*. All three of these modifications are *jñeya* (knowable). Dharma manifests by understanding these three modifications and manifesting *śuddhopayoga*. This is the summary of this verse.

अथ शुभोपयोगस्वरूपं प्ररूपयति-

Now, the characteristic form of *śubhopayoga* (auspicious thought activity) is described: -

**जो जाणादि जिणिंदे पेच्छदि सिद्धे तहेव अणगारे।
जीवेसु साणुकंपो उवओगो सो सुहो तस्स ॥१५७॥**

*jo jānādi jiṇinde pecchadi siddhe taheva aṇagāre |
jīvesu sāṇukaṃpo uvaogo so suho tassa || 157 ||*

gāthā: He, who knows *jineṇdra* (omniscient *arīhaṇṭa*), has faith in *siddhas* (disembodied omniscient supremely pure *ātmā*) and *anagāranas* possession-less ascetics - (*ācāryas*, *upādhyāyas*, *sādhus*) and is compassionate towards living beings, has *śubhopayoga*, as his *upayoga* (thought activity) is auspicious.

ṭīkā: The specific (particular kind of) state of *kṣayopśama*, he who is modifying in accordance to the *pudgalas* in the form of *darśanamohanīya* (faith deluding karmas), *cāritramohanīya* (conduct deluding karmas), and has partaken *uparāga* (perturbation), and whose *upayoga* (psychic activity) modifies towards belief of Him who is a supreme *bhattāraka* (supreme *muni*), the great *deva* of all *devas*, *parameśwara*—who is *arihanta*, has belief in *siddhas* (disembodied omniscient Gods) and believes in the true *sādhus* (sky-clad/ Digambar Jain monks). He observes the conduct of compassion towards all living beings is *śubhopayoga* (auspicious thought and conduct activity).

pravacana on gāthā 157

In *gāthā* 80 of *Pravacanasāra* in the chapter of *jñāna*, it has been stated that on knowing *arihanta*’s state of *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *paryāya* (substance-attribute-modification), he knows his *ātmā*, and his delusion indeed gets destroyed. That was the chapter on *jñāna*. One who knows *arihanta*’s substance-attribute-modification in his *jñāna* is free from notions, and his faith-deluding *karma* gets destroyed. Here, *pañcaparameṣṭhī* (five supreme beings) is the external knowable in the *jñāna* of self, and it is not self-knowable. By focusing on external knowables, auspicious attachment is generated. A *jñānī jīva* knows his nature, and after that, the thoughts of *pañcaparameṣṭhī* are called auspicious attachment. Here, the discussion is about a *śubhopayoga* (auspicious thought activity) of a *jñānī jīva*, and not of

an ignorant, because the belief of an ignorant in the *pañcaparameṣṭhī*, which is without knowing the self-*ātmā*, is not a true belief. Here, a particular type of state of *kṣayopśama* (destruction cum subsidence) has been referred to. An ignorant person may have a general understanding due to a lower intensity of attachment, but here, the discussion is not about that. But it is about the state of *kṣayopśama* of a *jñāni*.

In *kṣayopśama samyaktva*, the rise of *mithyātva* (erroneous belief) and *miśra mohaniya* (mixed erroneous belief) is not there, but there is a rising of the disposition of *samyak mohaniya*; therefore, the rising of *darśana mohaniya* (erroneous belief) has been mentioned in this verse.

When a *jīva* cannot remain stable within his nature, then, on getting the *nimitta* of disposition of *samyaktva mohaniya* and *cāritra mohaniya*, a *kṣayopśama dristi jīva*'s focus settles on the *pañcaparameṣṭhī*, Attachment is not due to the accumulation of karma, and attachment does not arise when one abides in his pure nature. But when the focus is on the non-self at that time, the rising of disposition in the form of *samyaktva mohaniya* and *cārtira mohaniya* is the auxiliary cause. The disposition that brings about the belief in *pañcaparameṣṭhī* and compassion towards all *jīvas* is called *śubhabhāva*.

He who is omniscient, supremely venerable, lord of all lords, the highest one who has conquered all karmas, and to whom the *jñāna* of three-time phases and three *lokas* has arisen clearly, such supreme, venerable ones are *arhaṇta* (omniscient with body), and *siddha* (omniscient without body). Those who follow their path are the *munis - ācārya*, *upādhyāya*, and *sādhu*. *jñānī* has a belief in such *pañcaparameṣṭhī*, and he is sure to have deep compassion towards all *jīvas*. Although it is not possible to have compassion for infinite *jīvas*, but as the thoughts of compassion along with the *jñāna* of the self-nature are possible, so it is said that there is compassion towards all. In this way, the occurrence of *śubha upayoga* to a *jñāni* is the cause of the bondage of *punya*.

In *Samaysāra*, it is not said that the occurrence of auspicious thoughts of a right believer causes bondage. The text, primarily from the view of belief, negates the arising of auspicious thoughts due to unsteadiness by considering them unessential. From this point of view, auspicious thoughts are not said to be the cause of bondage. Here, the knowledge imparted is that the *śubhabhāva* of an enlightened one is auspicious, but it is just a knowable, and it results in the bondage of *pūnya*.

अथाशुभोपयोगस्वरूपं प्ररूपयति -

Now, the characteristic of *aśubhopayoga* (inauspicious thought and conduct activity) is described: -

**विसयकसाओगाढो दुस्सुदिदुच्चित्तदुट्ठगोढीजुदो ।
उग्गो उम्मग्गपरो उवओगो जस्स सो असुहो ॥१५८॥**

*visayakasāogāḍho dussudiduccittaduṭṭhagoḍhijudo |
uggo ummaggaparo uvaogo jassa so asuho || 158 ||*

gāthā: He whose *upayoga* (psychic thought activity) is absorbed in passion and thoughts of sensual pleasures, addicted to hearing ill words, evil thoughts, bad companions, is vehemently inclined to tread on the perverse path, is *aśubhopayoga* (inauspicious thought activity and conduct).

tīkā: The *upayoga* (attention), attached to thought activity according to the *pudgalas* of *darśanamohanīya* and *cāritramohanīya*, partakes inauspicious perturbation. Due to this, that *upayoga* has faith in everything except *arhaṇta* and *siddha*, who are the supreme *muni*, the lord of lords, supremely venerable *sādhus*. As he has perverse faith, he is astray from the true path and behaves in accordance with sensual pleasures, passions, ill-spoken words, ill thoughts, wrong companions, and acrimony with anger; it is *aśubhopayoga*. (inauspicious thought, activity, and conduct).

pravacana on gāthā 158

In this verse, the inauspicious thought activity of an ignorant person is mentioned. During the rise of faith deluding and conduct deluding *karmas*, an ignorant person has inauspicious thought activity with false beliefs.

An ignorant person does not believe in the omniscient Lord of the lords, *arhaṇta*, *siddha*, and *muni*. He believes in statements that are against the omniscient. A *jīva* who believes *dharma* in *punya* and benefits because of *nimitta* is not a Jain. He has no faith in *pañcaparameṣṭhī*, and he is against *Bhagavāna*. An ignorant person engages in desires, passions, immoral hearing, evil thoughts, wicked company, and vehemence; this is *aśubha upayoga* (inauspicious disposition).

kaṣāya: Dispositions of false belief, anger, ego, deception, and greed are called *kaṣāya*.

kuśravana: To listen to the so-called *deva* or *guru's* words, which are with worldly passions, is called depraved hearing. Even after reading true texts, if one listens to the preaching, “benefit is due to the *nimitta*, *dharma* is through *punya*,” then that is also called depraved hearing.

kuvicāra: After depraved hearing, one thinks that ‘this was a very good discourse.’ Nourishing the belief and conduct which is against the self’s nature of *jñāna* is opposing *jñāna* (knowledge), *śraddhā* (belief), and conduct – having such wrong thoughts again and again is *kuvicāra*.

kusaṅga: Having interest and devotion to false *deva*, false *guru*, and false *śāstra*, believing them to be *dharma*, and associating with them and their followers is *kusaṅga*.

ugratā: Vehement thoughts of violence, falsity, and theft with false belief are *ugratā*. While *sarvajña deva* explains this form of truth, an ignorant person believes precisely the opposite of that path. The omniscient Lord has said that all substances are independent. However, an ignorant person claims that *ātmā* moves because of the body, *dharma* arises due to the body’s activity, and external factors, etc. This is a deviation from the right path. A *jīva* who believes in such a deviated path praises the wrong path and observes desires, passions, depraved hearing, wrong thoughts, evil fellowship, and conduct in the form of vehemence, is ignorant. This is called *aśubha upayoga*.

Opposition to the knowing nature of soul constitutes intense *aśubha upayoga*. An ignorant *jīva* spends millions of rupees on charity, goes on pilgrimage, constructs temples, and people praise him, saying that he is the pillar of religion, and promulgates religion, etc. However, an ignorant person, without realizing the knowing nature of *ātmā* and believing external activities to be *dharma*, does not promulgate religion in terms of substance or disposition. Instead, he propagates *pāpa* in the form of *mithyātva* because he is hostile toward the *ātma*-substance, which represents a highly inauspicious modification.

In this way, an ignorant person has inauspicious thought activity. One should realize this and know the true nature of substance, as said by the *pancaparameṣṭhi*.

gāthā-159

अथ परद्रव्यसंयोगकारणविनाशमभ्यस्यति -

Now, the exercise for the destruction of *aśuddhopayoga* (inauspicious thought activity and conduct), which is the cause of the soul's conjunction with other substances, is described:-

**असुहोवओगरहिदो सुहोवजुत्तो ण अण्णदवियम्हि ।
होज्जं मज्झत्थोऽहं णाणप्पगमप्पगं झाए ॥१५९॥**

*asuhovaogarahido suhovajutto ña aṇṇadaviyamhi |
hojjaṃ majjhatthoSham ṇāṇappagamappagaṃ jhāe ||159 ||*

gāthā: Becoming free from *aśubhopayoga* (inauspicious thought and conduct activity) and not uniting with *śubhopayoga* (auspicious thought and conduct activity) with other (non-self) substance and remaining neutral/indifferent, 'I' meditate on the (self-*ātmā*), which is constituted of knowledge (an embodiment of knowledge).

ṭīkā: *aśuddhopayoga* (impure thought activity), which is set forth as the cause of conjunction with other substances, proceeds only by depending on the condition of other substances resting in a state of *udaya* (vehemently-low operative state) and not due to anything else. Therefore, the self becomes neutral to all other substances. Thus, by becoming neutral, the self, not relying on conditions related to other substances, is released from *aśuddhopayoga* (impure thought activity) of *śubha* (auspicious) or *aśubha* (inauspicious), (both types of impure thought activities) and, by accepting thought-activity according to self-substance only, *śuddhopayoga* (pure psychic activity) manifests in the self. In this state, the self always remains engrossed in the self-*ātmā* immovably through self-*upayoga*. This is the endeavour of the self to eliminate the cause of conjunction with other substances.

pravacana on gāthā 159

Taking the auspices of nature of self eliminates both auspicious and inauspicious thoughts. It was said in *gāthā* 156 that psychic thought activity that deviates from the self and focuses on external substances is impure. It is due to its conjunction with external substances that it does not follow nature. But *ātmā* is stuck because he follows the operative state of intense-mellow *dravya karmas*; at that time, impure thought activity occurs, but it is not

because of any other substance or *karma*. *ācārya* says he is equanimous towards *pañcaparameṣṭhī*, etc., all the non-self substances.

In this way, the self becomes equanimous, whereby his modification does not occur according to the non-self substance and is free from the auspicious and inauspicious thought activity. Further, the self leans towards the pure *ātma-dravya*. Pure psychic activity has arisen in the self, and because of that, the self is steady in the self-nature *ātmā*, which is in the form of *śuddhopayoga* (pure psychic thought activity). To be in *śuddhopayoga* is the reason for the destruction of *aśuddhopayoga*, which occurs due to the connection with external substances. It is not the case that pure psychic activity arises due to the mellowness of karma.

Question: In the exposition, there is a text that says, as modification is not dependent on non-self substance, hence he is free of the impure *upayoga* in the form of auspicious and inauspicious. What is its meaning? Modification has occurred depending on the external *dravya*, and after that, it is not dependent – is that so? Or now *aśubhopayoga* arises, and then will it be free from it?

Answer: No, it is not so; it is explained from the viewpoint of *nāsti* (non-existence). By leaning towards one's nature, modification does not arise according to the non-self substance. According to that statement, modification is not dependent on the non-self substance. By focusing on the self-nature, auspicious and inauspicious dispositions do not arise. According to this statement, it was free from impure dispositions, or impure dispositions were destroyed – hence the statement has been made.

Question: Someone asks that in *śukladhyāna*, the thoughts of the division of *guṇa-paryāya* (attribute-modification) of six *dravyas* (substance) also occur. There, it is not said, 'comprehension of only self-substance.' Then why is 'modification only according to self-substance' spoken of in the lower stages?

Answer: In *śukladhyāna* (unwavering meditation), the thoughts of substance-attribute-modification in the subconscious mind can only be seen by the omniscient. However, these thoughts do occur; therefore, to impart the knowledge of the subtle modifications, it is mentioned that one has not entirely immersed oneself in the self-substance. Here, by shifting focus from non-self substance to consciously embracing the self-substance, it is stated that the modification aligns with the self-substance.

In certain texts, the discourse of God or bowing to the idol, meaning auspicious disposition, is called *nimitta* to *samyaktva* (correct belief). Here, *pañcaparmeṣṭhī* is called *nimitta* to auspicious disposition. Whatever act occurs in the substantial cause, whether in the form of auspicious or pure, is attributed to the external substance. Therefore, it is essential to understand the viewpoint.

While writing this verse, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* has an auspicious disposition; however, in his mind, there is a negation of the auspicious. The emphasis is on pure nature; therefore, by considering auspiciousness as secondary, it is said that he experiences the knowing nature of *ātmā*.

This chapter is on the knowable. *pañcaparmeṣṭhī* is external knowable, not self-knowable. Therefore, when *śuddhopayoga* arises, *aśuddhopayoga* does not rise. And the circumstantiality of non-self substance does not remain. Therefore, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* says that he remains in *śuddhopayoga*, which is a practice for the destruction of *aśuddha upayoga*.

अथ शरीरादावपि परद्रव्ये माध्यस्थं प्रकटयति -

Now, *ācārya* declares neutrality even towards the body, etc., other (non-self) substance: -

**णाहं देहो ण मणो ण चेव वाणी ण कारणं तेसिं ।
कत्ता ण ण कारयिदा अणुमंता णेव कत्तीणं ॥१६०॥**

*ṇāhaṃ deho ṇa maṇo ṇa ceva vāṇī ṇa kāraṇaṃ tesim |
kattā ṇa ṇa kārayidā aṇumaṃtā ṇeva kattīṇaṃ || 160 ||*

gāthā: Self (myself) is neither body, nor mind, nor voice/speech, nor the cause of these, nor doer (agent), nor causer of these, nor approver/consenter of the doers.

tīkā: Self understands body, speech, and mind as other (non-self) substances; therefore, he has no partiality for them at all. He is totally neutral towards all these. It is thus –

Self is not an *acetana dravya* [insentient (non-living) substance], acting as the basis of the characteristic nature of body, speech, and mind. As a matter of fact, they possess/maintain their characteristic forms even without self as a substance being the basis of their characteristic forms. Hence, having given up partiality of body, speech, and mind, he is totally neutral. And the self is not an insentient substance which is the cause of body, speech, and mind. In fact, they themselves have causality (of their existence) even without self being their cause. Hence, he is totally neutral, having forsaken partiality of being their cause. And the self is not such an insentient substance which independently is a *kartā* (doer) of body, speech, and mind. In fact, they modify by themselves even without the self being the *kartā* (doer). Hence, having forsaken the partiality of their doer-ship, the self is totally neutral.

Furthermore, the self is not *kāraka* (*kartā*) (instigator-doer) of insentient substance, which independently serves as *kārtā-prayojaka* (promoter-doer) of body, speech, and mind. In fact, they themselves are their own cause and doer, even without the self being the instigator-doer. Hence, having forsaken the partiality of their instigator-doer-ship, the self is entirely neutral.

And, the self is not the *kartā/anumodaka* (doer-sympathetic approver) of insentient substance, which independently is the *kartā/anumodaka* (doer-sympathetic approver) of

body, speech, and mind. They are done by themselves, even without the self being its doer. Hence, having forsaken the partiality of their doer-ship self is totally neutral.

pravacana on gāthā 160

A *dharmī jīva* is a knower-observer of the state of mind and speech. *ācārya bhagavāna* says that the self knows body, mind, and speech as non-self substances. In relation to the association with the pure self, at the time of writing, the connection with the mind is seen as secondary. The self does not have the thoughts of *anumodanā* (sympathetic approver), that with the arising of speech, many *jīvas* will be benefited. The self does not have such partiality toward speech, etc.

The self does not believe that – because *ātmā* is there, body, mind, and speech’s activity occur. They are non-self substances, and the cause of their modification is because of them. ‘I’(self) am equanimous towards them.

Many ignorant *jīvas* believe that *Tirthaṅkara Bhagavāna* first takes in the matter particles of speech and then releases them to explain to other *jīvas*, but this is not true. Whereas, here, in a lower state, when attachment occurs, *ātmā* is not the doer, base, and cause of body, mind, and speech, then with the arising of the state of passionlessness and omniscience, the talk of *Tirthaṅkara’s ātmā* accepting and leaving speech is gross ignorance.

Now, one asks, if *ātmā* is not the doer of speech, then why does a wall not have speech?

Answer: Listen, the *nimitta-naimittika* relationship between *ātmā* and speech has been shown, meaning that *ātmā* is never the doer of speech. *nimitta-naimittika* relationship only shows the distinctiveness between *ātmā* and speech. *ātmā* is not the doer of speech even from the view of conventionality; there is a total absence of one in the other.

ātmā is not the base of body, mind, or speech. The base of body, mind, and speech is the insentient substance; the self is not an insentient substance. Whatever state of body, mind, and speech occurs is due to their basis. It is false to say that their states are due to *ātmā* because they arise from themselves without self being the base. Speech does not arise due to thoughts and knowledge of oneself. It flows with its base. *bhagavāna* is not the basis for the release of the Om sound. Its base is the insentient *dravya*, meaning particles of speech.

An enlightened *jīva* thinks that body, mind, and speech are non-self-knowable. They modify independently without the *jīva*'s base. Because of this, on leaving the partiality of seeing them as base, the self remains only as the knower-observer.

In this verse, the discussion is about the belief and knowledge of a *dharmī* (enlightened) *jīva*. *ātmā* is not the base of body, mind, and speech. Without the base of self, they possess their own nature. The base of nature of all three – body, mind, and speech is insentience. They occur due to insentience. *ātmā* is distinct from them – this has already been informed here, and now the cause is being explained -

The cause of body, mind, and speech is solely the insentient substance. The self's *ātmā* is not an insentient substance. All three continue to change without the self's *ātmā* being the cause. Speech emanates without the *ātmā* being the cause. A body moves, and the mind's *paramāṇus* change due to themselves. Here, the discussion does not concern auxiliary causes. From the above statement, it is concluded that *upādāna* (substantial cause) is singular. Similarly, the real *mokṣa mārga* is also one; in the same way, there is only one substantial cause.

There is only one *mokṣa mārga*: the absolute path of *mokṣa*, which is free of the distorted states of body, etc., as well as auspicious and inauspicious states. *ātmā* is the complete nature of *jñāna*, whose belief is free of attachments, whose *jñāna* of the experience of self is also free of attachments, and whose inner state is devoid of all attachments, is singular. At that time, belief in the true *deva-guru-śāstra*, knowledge of scriptures, and the state of the five great vows, etc., are seen to be *nimitta* or beneficial; therefore, through symbolism, they are said to represent the path of *mokṣa*. However, it is not the absolute path of *mokṣa*; it is the path of bondage. Only when *niścaya* (absolute truth) arises they are termed as *vyavahāra*. Therefore, it is decided that there are no two *mokṣa mārgas* - *niścaya mokṣa mārga* and *vyavahāra mokṣa mārga*. There is only *niścaya mokṣa mārga* in the form of the oneness of *samyak darśana-jñāna-cāritra*.

In this way, there is only one real cause for any activity. It is said that body, mind, and speech modify because of themselves; *ātmā* is an auxiliary cause. To say that the body moves or speech emanates because of *ātmā* is totally false. They modify without *ātmā* being their cause. It was decided before that *dravya* is the substantial cause of any activity. If any associated substance is present, then metaphorically it is said to be the auxiliary cause. Metaphorically means symbolically speaking from a particular viewpoint. Even

though substantial and auxiliary are spoken about, only the substantial cause is the real cause.

There are no two Jain *mokṣa mārga*; but there is only one *niścaya mokṣa mārga*, in that only the substantial cause is the real cause.

Question: In the past, due to the *nimitta* of *vītarāgatā*, many *jīvas* attained *vītarāgatā*; so, for the arising of the state of *vītarāga* in the self, what is the harm if a seeker searches for *vītarāgī nimitta*?

Answer: There is a great fault. The thought of searching for a *vītarāgī nimitta* is false. It is not in the hands of a *jīva* to encounter *nimitta*. The thought that one can get non-self by searching is untrue.

To whom passionless state arose in the past, to him, *jñānī* was a *nimitta* – such superimposition arises. But when one does not have the state of *vītarāga* in the present modification, then to him, what is the *nimitta*? The one who has the state of attachment in the present modification will say that he wants to look for the *nimitta* of the state of *vītarāga*. But this is untrue/false. State of *vītarāga* arises with the auspice of the self.

A passionless state has not arisen, and in searching for a *nimitta*, he believes simultaneously in the modification of attachment and passionlessness. Such a *jīva* does not know the sequence of *paryāya* and the order of *dravya*. He does not understand the nature of *kramabaddha* (sequence-bound).

1. He, in whom the state of passionlessness has manifested, does not need to look for the passionless one as *nimitta*.
2. One who is in the state of attachment-aversion in the present does not have to look for a *nimitta*. This is because the symbolic imposition of *nimitta* on the passionless one occurs when the work of the manifestation of the passionless state occurs in the *upādāna* (substantial cause). *paryāya* with attachment and passionlessness both cannot occur at the same time.

In this way, the thought of searching for a passionless *nimitta* cause is false. Taking the auspice of the self's pure self-supported substance is the disposition of *samyaktva*.

Question: If it is said not to look for passionless *nimitta*, then should the *mumukṣu* (desirous of *mokṣa*) remain as he is?

Answer: Listen! No one can find *nimitta* because the self-knowing nature is distinct from body, mind, and speech. In reality, *ātmā* does not stay in the body. *ātmā* is capable of knowing the state of non-self and to remain in the self, *ātmā*, meaning to stabilize, is in the hands of *ātmā*, and that is *dharma*. Thus, to search for passionless *nimitta* is not in the hands of a *jīva*.

Question: Then, what prevents the self from focusing on the passionless *nimitta* and knowing just the non-self?

Answer: This is akin to saying that if one were to shut his eyes and look at the body of another, then what is the obstacle?

Listen! The way a *jīva* closes his eyes and cannot see himself and others; in the same way, *ātmā*, which is the nature of *jñāna*, without knowing it, meaning, without the *sva-prakāśaka* (illuminator of self) *jñāna*, if he has only *para-prakāśaka* (illuminator of non-self) *jñāna*, then that *jñāna* is not correct. That *jīva* is blind to the self-illuminating *jñāna*. Knowing the passionless *nimitta* is the *jñāna* which illuminates the non-self. Without blossoming the *ātmā*'s self-knowing efficacy and without knowing the ability to illuminate the self and non-self nature, a one-sided knowing of illumination of non-self is false.

samyak dristi jīvas know the *ātmā*. Their efficacy in illuminating self and non-self has blossomed. Because of this, while knowing the self, keeping the knowing non-self substances in the *jñāna* of the self is to know realistically. They do not believe that they can bring external *nimitta* or that if external *nimitta* arrives, then *dharma* occurs. On learning about the independent nature, *nimitta* is always passionless and never ignorant during the state of *dharma*. So, it should be truthfully decided in the *jñāna*, which illuminates the non-self.

ātmā is not the cause of the state of body, mind, and speech. He is just a witness. A *dharmī jīva* thinks the self's knowledge does not occur due to *nimitta*. The self's knowing is because of the self. Food items, money, etc., are insentient independent substances. They have *kriyāvatī śakti* (efficacy of movement), so they move. But he does not believe that they modify because of the presence of *ātmā*.

An evolved one thinks that he knows the self-non-self without the physical, insentient mind. Non-self is not the reason for my knowledge. When the self is not the cause of the state of body, mind, and speech, then how could 'I' - the self be the cause of substances which are far off from the body? Therefore, leaving the partiality of those substances, the

self remains in the form of the knower-seer. Self knows their state while being within itself.

A *dharmī jīva* thinks that the doer of body, mind, and speech is the insentient substance. ‘I’- the self is not the insentient substance. The state of the insentient is due to the insentient.

An ignorant *jīva* claims that although the activities of the body or speech arise from the insentient, their modification can only occur if the *ātmā* is the doer in the form of *nimitta*. In contrast, a *dharmī jīva* asserts that the doer of bodily movement and the emanation or non-emanation of speech is solely an inanimate substance. *ātmā* is not the doer; speaking or remaining silent does not depend on the self-*ātmā*. In fact, insentient substances can be modified without the *nimitta* of the self-*ātmā*. The body and *ātmā* share a very intimate *nimitta-naimittika* relationship. When the body moves, *ātmā*’s space points also shift due to itself. Despite this *nimitta-naimittika* relationship, *ātmā* is not responsible for the state of the body. Then how can it be the doer of the state of wealth, buildings, etc., which are distinctly separate substances? Therefore, the self, leaving the bias of being the doer of insentient substances, remains solely the knower-seer.

An ignorant person often holds contradictory beliefs, such as the notion that with proper planning, a business can run smoothly, earn respect, manage the household effectively, and that all systems will function properly. He asserts that exercise strengthens the body and that one should speak pleasing and measured words because that is what is written in the scriptures. What purpose does lowliness in words serve? He believes that a *jīva* can speak as much as he wishes, and he holds many such beliefs.

A *dharmī* thinks that the particular condition of insentient substances depends on the insentient. Brains are not required for their arrangement. Those substances modify their form without any planning from the self. When an *ātmā* cannot speak, where is the question of speaking pleasing and measured words? The statement is from the view of *vyavahāra* of *bhāṣā samiti* (carefulness in observing the vows). The self is not the doer of shop, house, language, body, etc., any substance. Because those substances acquire their states independently, without any planning on the part of *ātmā*. The self leaves the partiality of being the causality of those substances and becomes equanimous towards them, becoming a witness.

ātmā is not the approver of body, mind, and speech because their doer is the insentient substance. They modify without my approval/acceptance.

An ignorant *jīva* believes a certain *jīva* speaks well, so he should be praised. Whereas a *dharmi jīva* thinks the self has no authority to speak, then where is the need for my acceptance? I have no right over my body, mind, and speech. He does not believe that any modification of insentient substance can occur because of his approval. They modify independently of any approval from the self. Therefore, he leaves the partiality of being the doer and retains deep equanimity.

An ignorant may believe himself to be the doer and the cause of the insentient, etc., but he is neither the base, reason, doer, work done, or approver of the physical body, mind, or speech. To know this and to know that the non-self knowable is independent is *samyak jñāna* and *dharma*.

gāthā-161

अथ शरीरवाङ्मनसां परद्रव्यत्वं, निश्चिनोति -

Now, it is ascertained that body, speech, and mind are the other (non-self) substance: -

देहो य मणो वाणी पोग्गलदव्वप्पग त्ति णिद्धिट्ठा ।
पोग्गलदव्वं हि पुणो पिंडो परमाणुदव्व्वाणं ॥१६१॥

*deho ya maṇo vāṇī poggaladavvappaga tti ṇiddiṭṭhā |
poggaladavvaṃ hi puṇo piṇḍo paramāṇudavvāṇaṃ ||161||*

gāthā: It is declared that body, mind, and speech are constituted of *pudgala* (physical matter) substances, and the material substance is an aggregate (mass) of *paramāṇus* (smallest unit of physical matter particle).

tīkā: Body, speech, and mind, all three are other (non-self) substances because they are constituted of *pudgala dravya* (material substance). They being constituted of material substance is definite because they possess a characteristic nature of existence, which has the mark of material substance. Such material substance is the result of/evolution of many matter particles modified into a single mass because, even besides the existence of the characteristic nature of many matter particles, it has the mark of material substance. Individually, there are numerous, but they appear to have oneness in form.

pravacana on gāthā 161

Body, mind, and speech are non-self substances because they represent the state of *pudgala dravya* (physical non-living matter substance). They exhibit a state of non-livingness, which encompasses the characteristics of touch, taste, and colour. Every particle of matter remains within its characteristic and nature of existence. The state of walking cannot be equated with the state of speech. The nature of the body's existence is due to itself and not because of *ātmā*. Non-living substances, such as the body, occur as a mass of *paramāṇus* (particulate matter) and can be perceived as a single modification.

There are two types of mass of *paramāṇus*. That which is *nimitta* to the *jīva* in the formation of the state of bondage of *paramāṇu* is called *prāyogika* (impure); for example, the body. And that which is not *nimitta* to *jīva* in the formation of bondage with *paramāṇu* is called *vaistrasika* (pure). For example, clouds. *prāyogika* does not mean that when the *jīva* has a

state of bondage of *paramāṇu*, because the *jīva* was the *nimitta* so the body manifested. This is because the state of bondage arises due to *pudgala* (physical matter) by itself. And showing the *nimitta* of *jīva* at that time, it is said to be *prāyogika*.

paramāṇus of body, mind, and speech are separate by their nature of characteristic existence. They seem in one form because of bondage due to dryness or stickiness, but their mass state is not due to *ātmā*. When the state of one *paramāṇu* is not due to the other *pudgala paramāṇu*, then to believe the state of body occurs due to *ātmā* is ignorance. It means that because of dryness and stickiness, many *paramāṇus* get together and look like one from a conventional point of view. But even from a conventional viewpoint, they are not one due to *ātmā*.

gāthā-162

अथात्मनः परद्रव्यत्वाभावं परद्रव्यकर्तृत्वाभावं च साधयति -

Now, it is established that self (soul) is not other (non-self) substance, and it does not have doer-ship of other substances: -

**णाहं पोगलमइओ ण ते मया पोगगला कया पिंडं ।
तम्हा हि ण देहोऽहं कत्ता वा तस्स देहस्स ॥१६२॥**

*ṇāhaṃ poggalamaio ṇa te mayā poggalā kayā piṇḍaṃ |
tamhā hi ṇa dehosaṃ kattā vā tassa dehassa || 162 ||*

gāthā: I/self (*jīva*) is not constituted of matter-particles, nor are those matter-particles composed/created by self into a mass form; therefore, self is neither body nor doer/maker of that body.

ṭīkā: First, as ascertained by the current context, this other substance called body comprising of material substance - in which speech and mind both fit in - (but) ‘I’ (self) is not that, because there is incompatibility with it – the non-material substance, because body is composed of matter (material-substance). And in the same way, self is not doer of body in any way, whether by way of cause, or by way of agent, or by way of instigator of the agent, or by way of doer of agent, because self is not the doer of modification as a mass-form of many matter-particles, so it is in every way incompatible to say that self should be doer of body which consists of an ever-changing mass/form of many matter particles.

pravacana on gāthā 162

A notable aspect of this chapter is that it has been established that the body is a substance composed of particulate matter. Speech emanating is inanimate, and the mind is in the shape of a subtle eight-leaved lotus, at the centre of the heart, which also is inanimate. Here, both mind and speech assimilate in the body. The body is a mass of particles, which is not the self. *ātmā*’s nature is *jñāna* because *ātmā* is not a mass of particles, meaning it is without the body. Because of this, there is an incompatibility between the self’s nature and the body.

Nature of the *ātmā* is knowledge and sentience, while the body is insentient and devoid of *jñāna*.

1. *ātmā* is incorporeal – devoid of touch, taste, smell, and colour, and a body is corporeal with touch-taste.
2. *ātmā* is in the form of one and undivided. The body, though being a whole, as it has the characteristics of separating, is divided

Because of this, there is an incompatibility between *ātmā* and being a body.

There is a complete contradiction in saying that *ātmā* is the doer of the body. Even from the conventional viewpoint, *ātmā* is not the doer of the body. The doer of the state of a body is the body. The self is not the doer, cause, agent, or instigator of making the body. Because many particles have the capability to turn into a form of mass, they turn into that form. The particles of speech themselves form a mass and transform into words. Among the ninety-three types of *nāma karma prakṛti*, there are two *prakṛti* (types): *bañdhana* (that due to which space points of the body come into bondage) and *saṅghāta* (that due to which space points of the body join without holes). Through their *nimitta*, the body becomes unified and seamless. *ātmā* does not join the body, because *karmas* are inanimate.

The body consists of a mass of many particles; its doer is those particles, not the *ātmā*. There is a complete incompatibility in the *ātmā* being the doer of the body. Here, the emphasis is on the word ‘complete.’ It is not suggested that the *ātmā* is somehow a doer of the body. An ignorant person argues that saying ‘somehow’ is *syādavāda* (quodammodo). However, this is a false statement. To say that to be ‘in some way’ is a false *ekānta* (one-sided view). *ātmā* is not the doer of the body, neither from an absolute nor from a conventional point of view. Therefore, by saying ‘complete,’ *anekānta* (multifaceted-ness) occurs.

Even though *ātmā* exists within the body, the condition of the body is still determined by its nature. Whether *ātmā* is present or not, the state of the body manifests according to its capabilities. The body remains insentient across all three time phases; it has no connection with the *ātmā*. Although the *ātmā* inspires auspicious thoughts, the action of folding the hands does not arise from the *ātmā*. One may entertain thoughts of speaking a measured, salutary language, but the speech does not originate from those thoughts. *ātmā* is not the active agent of the body, mind, speech, etc. There is a complete contradiction in the *ātmā*'s role as the doer concerning the body.

Question: Body pains when it is pinched, right?

Answer: The body is a matter (insentient). Therefore, it cannot have pain. *ātmā* does not perform any act of the body because the *ātmā*'s substance, space, time, and disposition are in the *ātmā*, and the body's substance, space, time, and disposition are in the body. When one *paramāṇu* of the body cannot modify another *paramāṇu* of the body, then to say *ātmā* is the doer of the body is ignorance.

The cause of sorrow is attachment to the body. An ignorant person believes that when there are changes in the body, at that time, there are also changes in *ātmā*. When a disease occurs in the body, then there is pain in *ātmā*, and on consuming poison, there is extreme sorrow, but all these statements are false.

In reality, the thoughts of oneness-attachment with the body are the cause of sorrow. '*chute dehādhyāsa to nahi kartā tu karma.*' By leaving the false imagination of mine-ness in the body, he does not become the doer of attachment-aversion, and *dharma* occurs.

gāthā-163

अथ कथं परमाणुद्रव्याणां पिण्डपर्यायपरिणतिरिति संदेहमपनुदति-

Now, there could be a doubt about how modification is caused in the mass form of many matter particles. That doubt is removed here: -

**अपदेसो परमाणू पदेसमेत्तो य सयमसद्दो जो।
णिद्धो वा लुक्खो वा दुपदेसादित्तमणुभवदि ।।१६३॥**

*apadeso paramāṇū padesametto ya sayamasaddo jo |
ṇiddho vā lukkho vā dupadesādittamaṇubhavadi || 163 ||*

gāthā: A *paramāṇu* (ultimate matter particle) being *apradeśa* (not having spatial units), having only one unit of space point (one spatial unit only), and it being *aśabda* (soundless), be it cohesive smooth or rough, experiences the condition of having two or more space points (spatial units).

tīkā: A *paramāṇu* (matter-particle), because of not having two or more spatial units is *apradeśa* - without spatial units; since it has only one spatial unit, so it is of the extent of one *pradeśa* (spatial-unit) only; it is *aśabda* (soundless) because of absence of manifestation of *śabda-paryāya* (modification of sound) which consists of many matter-particles. (That matter-particle/*paramāṇu*) is smooth or rough because of the existence of the four types of touch, five types of tastes, two types of smells, and five types of colours without any incompatibility; therefore, it experiences the state of having two or more spatial units in the form of evolution of a mass modification (a combined modification of many matter particles). Thus, smoothness-roughness is the cause of (many matter-particles) modifying into a state of mass.

pravacana on gāthā 163

The smallest of the smallest *aṇu* (matter particle) cannot have two, three, or more space points; therefore, it is called *apradeśi* (without space point), but it does have one space point, meaning it is limited to one space point only. A word/sound is not in the form of a single matter particle, but rather occurs in the state of a mass of word matter particles. One matter particle does not possess the strength to produce a word. Hence, one matter particle is not a word. In one *paramāṇu*, there exist eight types of touch: light-heavy, rough-sticky,

hard-soft, and cold-hot, five types of tastes, two types of aromas, and five types of colours. Due to its characteristics of stickiness or roughness, a *paramāṇu* joins to form a *skandha* (mass) with two space points and potentially a mass with numerous space points. One *paramāṇu* joining with another single *paramāṇu* is *dvipradeśī* (with two space points). When one *paramāṇu* connects with two additional *paramāṇus*, it is termed *tripradeśī*.

In this way, one *paramāṇu* modifies with other *paramāṇus* in the state of mass, then it is in the form of numerous state points. With this, it is proved that the state of the *skandha* (mass) of *pudgalas* is only due to the roughness and stickiness.

ātmā is not the cause of a mass of matter particles. The body, mind, and speech consist of a mass of matter particles. The state of being a mass is due to its roughness and stickiness, not due to the *ātmā*. The mass of karma is also due to its roughness and stickiness. The *ātmā* has not bonded the karmas, and karma does not create the mass of a body. One matter particle is not an instrument for other matter particles to form a mass. Hence, it is false to believe that the state of *paramāṇu* is because of the *ātmā*. The *ātmā* neither accepts or abandons non-self substances. A *jīva* who thinks that God is an administrator, claims that He creates matter particles and their mass. If a *jīva* in any Jain sect does not understand the nature of the substance and asserts that the presence of *ātmā* leads to the formation of a mass of matter particles, then both types of *jīvas* are under an illusion. They do not grasp the nature of the substance. Even if one *paryāya* of a mass of particles occurs because of the *ātmā*, its current *paryāya* is not substantiated. Because if the *paryāya* is not proven, it must be believed that *dravya* will also be destroyed.

ātmā is not the cause of the state of mass of body, mind, or speech. But it has roughness and stickiness – by having such a true knowledge of knowables, the ego of creating non-self substances will be broken, and *samyagjñāna* will occur.

gāthā-164

अथ कीदृशं तस्मिंश्चिरूक्षत्वं परमाणोरित्यावेदयति -

Now, it is explained - what type of stickiness-dryness is of *paramāṇu* (ultimate matter particle): -

**एगुत्तरमेगादी अणुस्स णिद्धत्तणं च लुक्खत्तं ।
परिणामादो भणिदं जाव अणंतत्तमणुभवदि ।।१६४॥**

*eguttaramegādi aṇussa ṇiddhatthaṇaṃ ca lukkhattaṃ |
pariṇāmādo bhaṇidaṃ jāva aṇāntattamaṇubhavadi ||164||*

gāthā: Lord *Jineṇdra* has stated that, just as *paramāṇu* undergoes modification, beginning from one (the smallest indivisible unit) and consecutively increasing one by one until it reaches the state of infinitesimal (indivisible units), it exhibits both stickiness and dryness.

tīkā: First, the ultimate *paramāṇu* possesses a modifying nature (evolution) as it cannot escape the intrinsic nature of things. And due to that modifying evolution, it is subjected to variation from time to time - the infinitesimal units/degrees of stickiness-dryness pervading in a *paramāṇu* continue increasing one by one beginning with one indivisible unit/degree until it attains infinite indivisible units/degrees (*ananta avibhāga praticcheda*), because a *paramāṇu* is adapted to have diverse qualities.

bhāvārtha: *paramāṇu* (indivisible matter-particle) possesses a modifying nature; hence, its stickiness-dryness continues varying sequentially from one indivisible unit/degree until it attains an infinite number of indivisible units/degrees.

pravacana on gāthā 164

The first principle states that the nature of *paramāṇu* (matter particle) is to modify. This is the essence of substance. If nature arises from something else, then it cannot be called nature. Therefore, it should be understood that when we refer to nature, it indicates modification due to its inherent capability. Because of this modification, there are various types of increase and decrease in mass. In that, there is an increase in the number of *guṇas* having stickiness from one to infinity. Similarly, there is an increase in the number of *guṇas* having dryness from one to infinity.

Here, the question is how it is possible to have one *paramānu* in one *samaya* and infinite *paramānus* of stickiness in the second *samaya*?

Such a change does not occur because of *ātmā* or other external substances. Those matter particles modify at that time due to the ability of those *paramānus*’s sticky and dry *guṇas*. In this way, know, believe, and experience the insentient external knowable are from the self-knowable. This is *dharma*.

bhāvārtha: *ātmā* has not assembled the particles of the body. *ātmā*’s nature is *jñāna*, and the body is insentient. The body’s particles assemble and disintegrate due to their stickiness and dryness. *ātmā* does not have any authority over the insentient. Due to the changing nature of matter particles, their dry *guṇas* shift from one to infinite, and their sticky *guṇas* fluctuate from one to infinite. The increase or decrease from one *avibhāga praticcheda* to *ananta avibhāga praticcheda* occurs in the substance because of its modifying nature. Envision the smallest part of any modification of any characteristic. It is referred to as the *avibhāga praticcheda* of the *paryāya* of that *guṇa*. For instance, compared to goat’s milk, cow’s milk has more, and compared to cow’s milk, buffalo’s milk has even more *avibhāga praticcheda* of that stickiness. Ash contains more than dust, and sand possesses more than ash in terms of dry *avibhāga praticcheda*.

In this way, the increase and decrease in the mass are due to the sticky and dry characteristics; it should be understood accordingly.

**ananta avibhāga praticcheda – when thinking of paryaya of any guṇa, its smallest possible part, that is called ananta avibhāga praticcheda. (a cow’s milk has more than sheep’s milk, and a buffalo’s milk has stickier avibhāga praitecheda than cow’s milk. Ash has more than dust, and sand has more than ash’s dry avibhāga praticcheda)*

gāthā-165

अथात्र कीदृशात् स्निग्धरूक्षत्वात्पिण्डत्वमित्यावेदयति –

Now, it is explained - from what sort of stickiness-dryness the state of mass (of matter particles) originates: -

**णिद्धा वा लुक्खा वा अणुपरिणामा समा व विसमा वा।
समदो दुराधिगा यदि बज्झन्ति हि आदिपरिहीणा ॥१६५॥**

*ṇiddhā vā lukkhā vā aṇupariṇāmā samā va visamā vā |
samado durādhigā jadi bajjhaṁti hi ādiparihīṇā || 165 ||*

gāthā: The evolution of combining (indivisible parts/degrees of) *paramāṇus* may either be smooth or rough, even or odd. If they exceed two of an even or equal number of units indivisible units, then they are combined, but if they differ by only one part of smoothness or roughness, then they do not combine.

ṭīkā: If smoothness or roughness exceeds two degrees from an equal number of indivisible parts, they are combined. This is the general rule for combining matter particles, as a difference of two degrees in smoothness or roughness causes the evolution of the combination.

If the stickiness-dryness is at the lowest degree or unit, then no combination occurs—this is an exception to the previous general rule because smoothness or roughness in the first degree, due to not having the cause of evolution in the material object to be evolved, lacks the causality of combination.

pravacana on gāthā 165

In general, if more than two attributes are sticky, then they come into bondage. This is because the attributes of stickiness and dryness act as *nimitta* in modification. Three parts of roughness can modify to five parts of roughness, with the one containing five parts being *nimitta*. This should be understood in all states.

paramāṇu, which has two parts more, can be *nimitta* in modifying another *paramāṇu* in the form of two parts more. One *paramāṇu* is not the doer of the modification of another *paramāṇu*. It is merely *nimitta* (auxiliary cause). Here *nimitta-naimittika* relationship has

been shown. A *paramāṇu*'s nature is to change from one part of roughness to infinite parts of roughness, and it can change from infinite parts of roughness to a lower form of modification to one part in the next *samaya* – this is the nature of a particulate matter. However, after reaching the complete state, *ātmā* never returns to a lower state.

ātmā is undoubtedly neither the doer nor a *nimitta* of the mass of particulate matter. *kevalajñānī*, non-omniscient or ignorant, none are the doers of *pudgala*. An omniscient being is full of strength but cannot do anything to the *skandha* of *pudgala*. A *jīva* can possess valour or cowardice within himself, but his valour is of no use in the states of bread, lentil, rice, body, or speech. The state of the mass of *pudgalas* is due to its smoothness and roughness. When two or more attributes in a *paramāṇu* exhibit stickiness or dryness, they can act as *nimitta* in modifying *paramāṇu* that have two lesser attributes with stickiness or dryness. *ātmā* is neither the doer nor the *nimitta* of *skandha*.

A *paramāṇu* with one *guṇa* of smoothness or one *guṇa* of roughness can never exist as a mass of particles. An entity with only one attribute, whether it is sticky or dry, is incapable of modification and cannot serve as a *nimitta* for others to change. It should be understood that those possessing stickiness or dryness in two or more attributes are considered the cause of bondage. Conversely, that which has stickiness or dryness in only one part cannot enter into bondage.

A matter particle with ten parts of smoothness becomes a matter particle with twelve parts of roughness by binding with it. The way a particle with ten parts smoothness changes its form to twelve parts roughness, in the same way, a particle with ten parts smoothness modifies into twelve parts smoothness. Therefore, a particle with fewer parts is *pariṇāmya* (resultant), and a particle with two more parts is *pariṇāmaka* (effector). A particle with one part of smoothness or roughness is not only not the effector but, because of having lower quality, is not even the resultant. Thus, the lower characteristic is not the reason for binding. Resultant means capable of modifying, and effector means being *nimitta* for others in modifying. Here, the word '*guṇa*' used above does not mean the eternal characteristic, but it means a part.

A particle with one part is itself not the resultant, and it is not a *nimitta* to others in modifying. A particle with two parts can be a resultant by itself with a particle with four parts, but it cannot be a *nimitta* to modify others. A particle with three parts can be a resultant by itself with a particle with five parts, but it cannot be a *nimitta* to others in

modifying. A particle with four parts has the ability to bind with a particle with six parts, so it is a resultant, and it is a *nimitta* to a particle with two parts, so it is an effector. This way, it should be understood with all particles.

Thus, this is the nature of knowables. *jñāna* knows the nature of the knowable but cannot do anything to them. Having such proper knowledge destroys the ego of being a doer, and the self attains peace.

अथ परमाणूनां पिण्डत्वस्य यथोदितहेतुत्वमवधारयति –

Now it is ascertained that in the mass of state of *paramāṇus* the aforesaid causality prevails:

**णिद्धत्तणेण दुगुणो चदुगुणणिद्धेण बंधमणुभवदि ।
लुक्खेण वा तिगुणिदो अणु बज्झदि पंचगुणजुत्तो ॥१६६॥**

***ṇiddhattaṇeṇa duguṇo caduguṇaṇiddheṇa bhaṇdhamañubhavadi |
lukkheṇa vā tiguṇido aṇu bajjhadi paṇcaguṇajutto ||166||***

gāthā: A *paramāṇu* having two units/degrees of stickiness experiences combination with a *paramāṇu* of four units/degrees of smoothness and roughness. A *paramāṇu* having three units/degrees of roughness gets combined with another *paramāṇu* of five degrees of dryness.

ṭīkā: One should ascertain/recognise that the state of mass of *paramāṇus* (matter-particles) is formed as per the above-stated cause because the combination of two *paramāṇus* having two and four degrees and having three and five degrees of smoothness or roughness or both smoothness and roughness is admitted, i.e., if both *paramāṇus* are smooth or both are rough or one is smooth and the other is rough; the combination of two *paramāṇus* is accepted thus. And it is said also: -

The *pudgala* found is of two types - *rūpi* (having similar degrees) and *arūpi* (having dissimilar degrees). Material particles (*paramāṇus*) are combined smooth with smooth, rough with rough, and also smooth with rough, similar and dissimilar in degrees.

(*Gommatasāra-Jīvakāṇḍa gāthā* 612 and 615).

***ṇiddhā ṇiddheṇa bajjhaṁti lukkhā ya poggalā
ṇiddhalukkhā ya bajjhaṁti rūvārūvī ya poggalā
ṇiddhassa ṇiddheṇa durāhieṇa lukkhassa lukkheṇa durāhieṇa
ṇiddhassa lukkheṇa havedi baṇdho jahaṇṇavajje visame same vā ||***

A combination of smooth with smooth, having two degrees higher, and of rough with rough, having two degrees higher, takes place. And the combination of smooth with rough, in case of odd and even degrees, excepting the lowest degree, takes place”

bhāvārtha: A *paramāṇu* beginning from two degrees up to infinite degrees of smoothness or roughness, by getting combined with another *paramāṇu* having two degrees higher of smoothness or roughness, an aggregate of many *paramāṇus* called *skandha* is formed. For example - a combination of two *paramāṇus* having two and four degrees/having 91 and 93 degrees/having 533 and 535 degrees/having 7006 and 7008 degrees of smoothness or roughness with smoothness or roughness is admitted. This general rule of a combination of two *paramāṇus* must be understood beginning from two to infinite degrees, excepting a *paramāṇu* having the lowest one degree of smoothness or roughness, as it does not possess the capacity of combining with other *paramāṇus*; i.e., a combination between 1 and 3 degrees cannot take place. Thus, if the difference is of two degrees between two *paramāṇus*, then only they are combined, but if the difference of degrees (between two *paramāṇus*) be either more or less than two degrees, then no combination can take place, e.g., - just as one *paramāṇu* of five degrees of smoothness or roughness is combined with another *paramāṇu* of seven degrees, but it (*paramāṇu* of five degrees) does not combine with another *paramāṇu* of eight or six degrees. (This is the summary of the combination between two *paramāṇus*).

pravacana on gāthā-166

Clarification on rūpī (tangible) and arūpī (intangible)

Compared to one *paramāṇu*, another *paramāṇu* having different qualities (compared to roughness, smoothness, and compared to smoothness, roughness is called of a different species) but with the same units is called *rūpī* (tangible), and all other *paramāṇus* are called *arūpī* (intangible). For example, for a particle with five units of smoothness, a particle with five units of roughness is ‘tangible,’ and all other particles are ‘intangible.’ This means that *paramāṇus* with mutually dissimilar qualities, but the same number of units, are called *rūpī*; *paramāṇus* with the same attributes or with different units mutually are called *arūpī*. (Here, the meaning of *arūpī* (intangible) is not as *ātmā* is *arūpī*, without touch-taste-smell-colour).

arūpī-

1. For a particle with roughness, all other particles with roughness are *arūpī*.
2. For a particle with smoothness, all other particles with smoothness are *arūpī*.
3. Rough or smooth particles having different units are *arūpī* for each other.
4. Only rough and smooth particles having the same number of units are *rūpī*. Like a particle with four units of roughness for a particle with four units of smoothness.

Leaving aside a particle with the lowest one unit, particles with two or three degrees get bonded with particles having two extra degrees of roughness, roughness with smoothness, smoothness with smoothness in the form of a mass.

bhāvārtha - skandha is formed with the bondage of particles having two to infinite units of roughness and smoothness, with a particle having two more units of roughness or smoothness. Such as a particle with two units of smoothness with four units of smoothness, the one with eleven units to the one with thirteen units, one with five hundred thirty-three units with five hundred thirty-five units, and one with seven thousand and six units with seven thousand and eight units get bonded. According to this example, this must be applied from two to an infinite number of units or degrees.

The lowest unit is not the cause of bondage.

A particle with just one unit of roughness and smoothness has the lowest characteristic. Therefore, it does not have the ability to be in the form of a mass. Hence, a particle with one unit of smoothness or roughness does not bind with a particle with three units of smoothness or roughness.

Similarly, units of equanimity, anger, ego, deceit, and greed do not arise due to the *ātmā*. This means the nature of *ātmā*'s disposition is not *nimitta* in the new physical bondage of such nature, just as greed in the tenth *guṇasthāna* is not *nimitta* in the bondage of temperament of greed.

Particles bind when there is a difference between the two of them of two units, except for a particle having one unit. If there is a difference of more or less than two units, they do not bind just as one with five units binds with one with seven units, but does not bind with one with eight or six units.

The result of purpose of knowing the mass

The form of binding or release of the state of writing the name, state of cleaning the house, utensils, state of coming and going of karmas, the state of the *paramānus* of body, mind, speech, etc., and all such states occur due to their roughness or smoothness. *jīva* has no right over this. Hence, one must know the nature of *skandha*, leave the ego of doer-ship, reside within the *ātmā*, and become a knower-seer; this is the purpose of this discussion. This is the reason for peace and *dharma*.

gāthā-167

अथात्मनः पुद्गलपिण्डकर्तृत्वाभावमवधारयति -

Now, it is ascertained that *ātmā* is not the doer or agent of the mass (aggregate) of *pudgala* (matter particles):-

**दुपदेसादी खंधा सुहमा वा बादरा ससंठाणा ।
पुढविजलतेउवाऊ सगपरिणामेहिं जायंते ॥१६७॥**

*dupadesādī khaṇdhā suhumā vā bādarā sasamṭhāṇā |
puḍhavijalateuvāū sagapariṇāmehiṁ jāyamte || 167 ||*

gāthā: *skāṇḍha* (aggregates of matter) that have two or more *pradeśas* (spatial units), which are either *sukṣma* (subtle) or *bādara* (gross), can be found in different configurations and originate in the forms of earth, water, fire, and air through their own evolution.

ṭīkā: These, so originated aggregates of matter particles (*skāṇḍha*) extending over two or more spatial units (*pradeśas*) which possess the division of subtlety and grossness forms by virtue of their spatial accommodation power and which have assumed *saṁsthāna* (variegated configurations), governed by the power of holding particular shapes, - they, as per their suitability, gaining the self-power of manifesting or veiling the four-fold set of touch, etc., become, earth, water, fire, air simply by their own evolutions/modifications. Therefore, it is ascertained that *ātmā* (soul) is not the doer of the material mass (aggregate of matter particles) beginning with two or more *paramāṇus* and ending with infinite times infinite *paramāṇus*

pravacana on gāthā 167

The way water condenses and rains occurs on its own; those matter particles, due to their nature of modification, modify, and infinite particles conjoin and evolve into gross body form. Clouds have different shapes; soil breaks into pieces, fountains burst, and so on. All these states occur due to their state of dryness or stickiness. An ignorant person does not help in the modification. It is not true that because *ātmā* was present, the modification occurred. God has not created earth, fire, etc. An ignorant *jīva*, by having a false ego, transmigrates in *saṁsāra*. Therefore, having the actual knowledge of the mass of matter particles and believing *ātmā* to be its non-doer is the reason for peace.

Cause of roughness-smoothness in the mass of matter particles

Body, mind, speech, and *karma* are all inanimate substances, and they are capable of being known in *jñāna*. To be in a state of aggregate-ness or disintegration is due to the roughness-smoothness. When there are two extra units in a *paramāṇu*, then a bond occurs. *ātmā* cannot be the doer of that state. An ignorant *jīva* believes that ‘since the self is there, so the inanimate state occurred, and the self can write with a pen.’ This is his false belief. In reality, *jīva* cannot modify the state of a *pudgala*; it occurs due to its state of roughness-smoothness.

Specific space-occupying efficacy of mass matter particles

A *skandha* (mass of matter particles) is of subtle or gross form because of its distinct efficacy of occupying space. Body, stick, etc., are gross mass, and particles of speech, karmic particles, etc., are subtle mass.

1. Gross and subtle *paramāṇus* are not of a different class. All *paramāṇus* are of the same class. From them, a few evolve into a subtle form and a few into a gross form.
2. There is no such difference that gross mass has more *paramāṇus*, and subtle mass has less *paramāṇus*, because, many times, subtle mass has more *paramāṇus*, and gross mass has less *paramāṇus*. To exist in a subtle or gross form is due to the space-occupying efficacy of the *paramāṇu*. It has no relation to less-more *paramāṇus*.
3. It is not so that, when the state of smoothness-roughness occurs in the subtle mass, it becomes gross. Mass can be subtle or gross, but when the roughness and stickiness have two more units, then it binds. This is an eternal rule. The distinction between gross and subtle is due to the space-occupying efficacy.
4. It is not correct to say that *ātmā* is a *nimitta* in gross mass. The evolution of very gross or subtle mass states occurs independently of one another. Where *ātmā* is not even in the form of a *nimitta*, no one modifies them; they change into gross or subtle forms themselves.
5. *skandhas* have an exceptional, distinct space-occupying efficacy; because of this, they assume a subtle or gross form. *ātmā* is not its maker or destroyer. It is a false belief that because *ātmā* is present, the gross state of the body, stick, or house, etc., occurs. *ātmā* is neither the doer, annihilator, or effector of either gross or subtle mass.

The exceptional efficacy of the mass of matter particles to assume a special shape -

A mass assumes different shapes because of its efficacy to assume specific shapes. *ātmā* is not the cause of it being in that shape. A pitcher takes shape from a mass of clay. It is

because of clay, and not because of a potter. *rotī* (Indian bread) takes shape from a dough, not because of a rolling pin or a lady. Vegetables are cut into pieces, not because of a knife, and not even because of the person's willingness to cut. The shape of a lotus, which is made from stone, is not the artisan's doing. This should be understood from these illustrations. Because of the specific efficacy of assuming shapes, *paramāṇus* assume shapes. *ātmā* is not its doer.

An ignorant's delusion -

An ignorant person does not know the knowable nature; therefore, he believes that 'because of his presence, matter particles take different shapes.' To believe that some god has created different shapes is also a gross mistake. But to think that if *nimitta* is present, then the shape changes, and if *nimitta* is not present, then it does not change, is also a big mistake.

Efficacy of modification of every *samaya*

Here, the discussion is not about eternal efficacy but about the efficacy of the modification of every *samaya*. *paramāṇu* assumes various shapes according to the ability of that time. Ten particulate matter can stay in ten space points, and a mass of infinite particle matter can stay in one space point – they can assume such a shape by themselves. By knowing the shapes of such a knowable nature of *paryāya*, the thought of being the effector is destroyed, and peace is attained.

Earth, water, etc., are not matter particles of different species -

According to the efficacy of manifestation and latent state of touch, taste, smell, and colour, a particulate mass has the ability to be in the form of earth, water, or air. The word 'ability' is used in this chapter to highlight the ability of matter particles. A *jīva* or another particle is not the cause of water, etc.

Many people believe that the *paramāṇus* of earth stay in the form of the earth only, the *paramāṇus* of water remains in the form of water only, the *paramāṇus* of fire remains in the form of fire only, and the *paramāṇus* of air stays in the form of air only, but that is a false belief. Manifestation or non-manifestation of touch, etc., that arise in them are due to the ability of the mass of the matter particles. Because smell cannot be evidently felt in water but can be felt in the earth, in this way, the perception or non-perception of touch, etc., in matter particles is because of the efficacy of matter particles, and because of that, they are in the form of earth, water, etc. However, different sorts of matter particles are not present together in the same mass.

The cause of dharma is to look at the nature of things -

Thus, it is certain that from a mass of two to infinite times-infinite particles, they all modify because of themselves; *ātmā* is not its doer. An ignorant *jīva* believes that the state of *pudgalas* takes place because of him. But this is his delusion. A believer in coalition always sees the self and non-self from the view of connection. But this *ātmā* is devoid of connection, devoid of *nimitta* and delusion. A *jīva* who sees his *ātmā* as a knowing-seeing nature sees the non-self substances as per their nature. Thus, *ātmā* is not the doer-destroyer or administrator of different states. But the inanimate mass is the doer-destroyer and administrator of itself. To know *skandha* (mass of matter particles) as knowables as they are, is *dharma*.

gāthā-168

अथात्मनः पुद्गलपिण्डानेतृत्वाभावमवधारयति -

Now, it is ascertained that (the way *ātmā* is not the doer of the mass of matter particles) *ātmā* is not the effector of the mass of matter particles also.

**ओगाढगाढणिचिदो पोग्गलकायेहिं सव्वदो लोगो।
सुहुमेहि बादरेहि य अप्पाओग्गेहिं जोग्गेहिं ॥१६८॥**

*ogāḍhagāḍhaṇicido poggalakāyehim savvado logo |
suhumehim bādarehi ya appāoggehim joggehim || 168 ||*

gāthā: The universe (physical world) is densely packed everywhere, in all directions, with material bodies, be it subtle or gross, or be it incapable and capable (of being modified into karmic matter).

ṭīkā: Since this universe is densely packed with *pradeśas* with material-bodies – which modify into subtle and gross and owing to not being excessively subtle and gross, possessing the power of modifying into karmic matter form, and owing to being excessively subtle and gross, not possessing the power of modifying into karmic matter-form, without mutually impeding one another owing to being possessed of the special virtue of accommodation-power; therefore it is ascertained that *ātmā* is not the conveyor/effector of material-mass.

bhāvārtha: In this *loka* (universe), embodied *jīvas* exist everywhere, and *pudgala-vargaṇā* (specific karmic matter) capable of karmic bondage also exists everywhere. As dispositions of *jīva* rise, so accordingly, karmic bondage occurs. It is not so that this *jīva* (*ātmā*) does bondage by bringing the matter particles capable of modification into karmic matter from somewhere else.

pravacana on gāthā 168

This cosmos is filled with subtle and gross masses. From them, many are worthy of being *karmas*, and many are not. It is not that *jīva* brings karma by having attachment-aversion. This cosmos is packed with material mass.

Particles have the ability to be *karma*

paramānus, having the ability to be *karma*, are never too subtle because *karma* is a mass of infinite *paramānus*. One *paramāṇu* to innumerable *paramānus* is not capable of being in the form of *karma*. Infinite *paramānus* together form *karma*. Thus, too gross *paramāṇu* also does not modify into *karma*. This way *karma*'s *paramānus* are neither too subtle nor too gross.

paramāṇu* incapable of being *karma

Too subtle or too gross *paramāṇu* cannot evolve in the form of *karma*.

It is not so that, when a *jīva* achieves the state of being a *siddha*, then *paramānus* do not have the ability to be in the form of *karma*, and when it is in the state of transmigration, then *paramānus* have the ability to be in the state of *karma*. To modify or not to modify in the form of *karma* is due to the ability of *paramānus*. Here, the statement is of the ability of *paramānus* every *samaya*. The subtle karmic form of that *paramānus* is due to their ability. A *jīva* has no domination over it.

Unique efficacy of *avgāhana* (accommodation) of *paramāṇu*

Subtle and gross mass stay together without hindering each other because of the efficacy of *avgāhana* (accommodation). Too gross mass stays in the same place as too subtle mass, and where too subtle mass is present, too gross mass also stays. They do not impede each other. *ākāśa* gives space to all *dravyas*, but *paramāṇu* has a unique accommodation efficacy, which allows them to remain in the same space. The way an ocean is filled with water, in the same way, in this cosmos, luminous, insentient, etc., non-living matter substances are densely filled in all the space points. There is none who obstructs anyone.

ātmā* does not bring the masses of *pudgala

It is not that the way wood has to be brought from outside to build a house; similarly, when *ātmā* has attachment-aversion, he brings the 'wood of *karma*' from outside. To whatever degree of attachment-aversion occurs in a *jīva*, in the same degree, according to the ability of *karma*, as many *paramānus* modify because of themselves. *ātmā* does not bring them from outside.

Question: If someone says that in *Ātmasiddhi*, it is said that '*jīva virya ni sphurnā grahana kare jada dhūpa*' means that when *jīva*'s contrary effort is displayed, it attracts inanimate *paramānu*. How should this be understood? What does it mean to say that, due to passions, when there is bondage with *sthiti* (ability of *karma* to stay with *ātmā* for a specific time

span) and bondage with *anubhāga* (ability of karma to give fruit as low or intense state) occurs due to passions and the type of karma and their quantity occurs due to *yog* (vibration of the space points of *ātmā*)?

Answer: Listen! All these statements are from the viewpoint of *nimitta*. None of the *ātmā*'s dispositions or vibrations attract inanimate *paramānu*. It is incorrect to say that *ātmā* can absorb subtle karma or gross *paramānu*. Inanimate *paramānus* bind because of themselves. The *nimitta-naimitika* relationship of what kind of modification a *jīva* has at that time has been told. *ātmā* does not bring the mass of particles.

There are *jīvas* in every space of this *loka*. Where there are *siddhas* in the same place, there are *jīvas* of *nigoda*. And in the seventh *naraka* also, there are *jīvas* of *nigoda*. Gross is in the place of gross, and the *pudgala* has the ability to be *karma*. All are present in their space points. The cause-effect relationship of inanimate *karmas* binding in the space according to the disposition of a *jīva* is there. But this does not mean that *ātmā* pulls and gets the inanimate *karmas*. Thus, *ātmā* cannot bring inanimate mass of matter particles; therefore, to have the correct knowledge of knowables is the cause of *dharma*.

gāthā-169

अथात्मनः पुद्गलपिण्डानां कर्मत्वकर्तृत्वाभावमवधारयति –

Now, it is determined that *ātmā* does not transform *pudgala-piṇḍa* (aggregate of matter-particles) into karmic form: -

**कम्मत्तणपाओग्गा खंधा जीवस्स परिणइं पप्पा।
गच्छंति कम्मभावं ण हि ते जीवेण परिणमिदा ॥१६९॥**

*kammattaṇapāoggā khaṇḍhā jīvassa pariṇaiṃ pappā |
gacchaṃti kammabhāvaṃ ṇa hi te jīveṇa pariṇamidā ||169||*

gāthā: *skandha* (aggregate of matter particles), capable of modifying into a karmic state on getting into contact with the dispositions (impure thought-activity) of *ātmā*, are transformed into karmic-matter form, but *jīva* does not change them.

ṭīkā: *pudgala-skandhas* (material masses) are with the ability to modify as karmic matter particles, cover space accordingly, and take the auspice of the modification of *jīva*, which is the outer instrument (the outer cause). And even without modifying *jīva*, it can change into karmic matter particles all by itself. This proves that *ātmā* does not transform *pudgala-piṇḍas* into karmic matter particles.

bhāvārtha: Being in the same space as the *vikārī* (perturbed) modification of *jīva*, the *kārmaṇa vargaṇā* (masses of the same type of karmic matter particles), on getting the instrumentality of *jīva*'s impure modification, by way of its inner efficacy, automatically modify as *jñānāvarṇa*, etc., *karmas*. *jīva* does not modify it into *karmas*.

pravacana on gāthā 169

ātmā* is not the transformer of *pudgala skandhas* into the form of *karma

Body, *karma*, etc., are distinct from *ātmā*. Their modification of every *samaya* is because of their inanimate state. Diverse modifications in the inanimate are not because of diverse modifications of *ātmā*; it is due to the diversity of the *pudgala* itself. Masses that have the ability to modify as *karma* stay in the same space as *jīva*, but their modification is not dependent on the attachment-aversion, vibration, etc., of *jīva*. *jīva* and particle matter are eternally separate. However, it is shown that the modification of the smallest unit of matter also exists. If a particulate matter's current existence occurs because of a *jīva*'s attachment,

then that current existence will not remain. And if the existence of one *samaya* does not exist, then the eternal existence will not be there. Then, the incidence of destruction of a substance will occur. But it does not happen so.

A *jīva*'s impure disposition and *pudgala*'s modification in *karma* form have a *nimitta-naimittika* relationship – a mass of *pudgalas* is formed because of its roughness-stickiness. *pudgala skandha*, which has the ability to be in the form of *karma*, is in the same space as *jīva*. They modify in the form of *karma* on deriving the modification of the *jīva*. To be of knowledge obscuring, etc., form is the internal instrument of the *skandhas*, and *jīva*'s disposition is just an outer instrument. A lesson says, 'By taking the auspice of change, the mass modifies into *karma* form. *nimitta-naimittika* relation between a *jīva*'s impure disposition and one *samaya* is shown there. By stating *nimitta-naimittika*, the separateness of both is proved. Hence, since attachment occurred, so *karma* occurred, and the question that if attachment does not arise, *karma* will not get bonded, does not remain. There is no question of before-and-after. There is no such sequence that initially, attachment occurs, and *karma* binds in the next *samaya*. Both modify independently at the same *samaya*. There is no difference in time. From this, it is proved that an *ātmā* does not change the mass of *pudgala* into the form of *karma*.

pravacana on bhāvārtha:

pudgalas, which stay in the same space point as a *jīva* and have the ability to transform into *karma*, make the impure disposition of *jīva* just as a *nimitta*. However, with their internal efficacy, they modify into the form of knowledge obscuring, etc., *karma* form. A *jīva* does not change them.

gāthā-170

अथात्मनः कर्मत्वपरिणतपुद्गलद्रव्यात्मकशरीरकर्तृत्वाभावमवधारयति –

Now, it is ascertained that *ātmā* is not the doer/maker of a body consisting of material substance evolved in karmic-matter condition: -

**ते ते कम्मत्तगदा पोगलकाया पुणो वि जीवस्स ।
संजायंते देहा देहंतरसंकमं पप्पा ॥१७०॥**

*te te kammattagadā poggalakāyā puṇo vi jīvassa |
saṁjāyaṁte dehā dehaṁtarasaṁkaṁ pappā || 170 ||*

gāthā: That material masses/aggregates which have evolved into karmic matter condition, give rise to bodies which the *jīva* gets, again and again, in its transitions (from present body) to other bodies.

tīkā: Whatever material bodies, simply on getting the instrumentality of *jīva*'s disposition, automatically evolve/modify themselves in karmic-matter condition; they, depending upon *jīva*'s transition to another body in the course of its beginning-less, continuous activity, themselves give rise to *jīva*'s bodies. Therefore, it is ascertained that the *jīva* is not the doer/maker of the body, which consists of material substances modified in karmic matter conditions.

bhāvārtha: *pudgala* (matter-particles), on getting mere instrumentality of *jīva*'s disposition automatically evolve into karmic-matter condition; the same *pudgala* (of karmic-matter condition) become an instrumental cause in giving rise to the body of next birth, and the quasi-karma *pudgala* (no-karma matter particles) themselves modify into body/physique. Hence, *jīva* is not the doer/maker of the body.

pravacana on gāthā 170

karma is the cause for body, mind, and speech –

On getting the *nimitta* of *jīva*, the mass of matter particles modifies by themselves into the form of the eight types of karmas. karma is not a single matter particle; instead, it comprises numerous matter particles. Hence, its body is made of *pudgala* (physical matter particle). A *jīva* in transmigration attains a different body in different life forms. In the *saṁaya* after its manifestation, the karma matter particles are modified in the form of *audārika* (gross

body) and take the auspice of the body. In that karma is *nimitta*. Here, it is stated with the predominance of a body, and the matter particles of mind and speech should also be understood in the same manner. Hence, karma is *nimitta* in the *paramānus*, which modifies into mind or speech forms.

ātmā is not the doer or cause of body, mind, or speech – when matter particles modify into body, mind, or speech form, in that, some matter particle was in *karma* form, which becomes body, mind, speech form, or new matter particles occur. Here, karma is *nimitta*, but *ātmā* is not its doer. It is a false statement that since *ātmā* was there, the body moved, speech was spoken, etc. It is also incorrect to say that, as there is delusion or vibration in a *jīva*, the body, mind, and speech occur. The existence of *jīva* is different from the existence of the body. Here, particulate *karma* is taken as the reason for body, mind, speech, etc., *nokarma* (quasi *karma*), but *ātmā* is not even in the form of *nimitta* for this. Hence, *ātmā* is not its doer.

Some question the definition of conventional carefulness in speaking. It is mentioned in the texts that one should talk favourably and use fewer words. Another *jīva* does not use harsh words and should speak kind and desirable words. *Bhagavāna*'s speech emanates without desire, but a non-omniscient being has desire. Hence, he can say the words he likes and speak kind words. If a non-omniscient being cannot speak according to their wish, then why is it mentioned in the texts that “such favourable and few words should be spoken?”

Answer: Listen! Speech is inanimate. The rule is the same for a *jīva* with or without desire. There cannot be different rules for an Omniscient's speech and for the one in transmigration. The way *divyadhvani* emanates because of itself, in the same way, *pudgala* of speech of a *jīva* in transmigration occurs because of itself during its self-time in the form of speech. The objective of saying – respect others, speak softly, and never speak with disdain is to show the disposition of a *jīva*. However, the aim is not to suggest that speech occurs solely due to those dispositions. ***Tirthaṅkara Bhagavāna, with infinite strength, cannot do the paryāya of speech. So it is impossible that a saṃsārī jīva with infinite times lower strength can do the paryāya of speech.***

How is a proper scholarly attitude manifested? A foolish *jīva* speaks without thinking, but a scholar has to communicate proficiently. Similarly, a sensible person will not publicly discuss his household matters – so it is written in the texts. All these are statements from the viewpoint of *nimitta*. Speech emanates because of speech. At that time, to impart the knowledge of the existing notions of the *jīva*, this statement of *nimitta* is made. An evolved

person is not the doer of speech or silence. *jñānī* does not have the predominance of the auspicious thoughts of speaking thoughtfully or gently. Even at that time, he has the predominance of the experience of ‘I am the nature of *jñāna*’. With this focus, the true scholarly state arises.

***jīva* cannot change the sequential attachment, so how can it change a body?** The text says that one should be careful while walking. It means that one should not have negligent dispositions within oneself while walking. A *jīva* does not have the strength to move the leg forward or backward. The cause for the *paryāya* of that time is *pudgala*, it should be understood accordingly at that time, what a *jīva*’s disposition should be. Who can modify a body? **Attachment-aversion occurs within the self; they are also sequential. The nature of a substance does not have the strength to change it. By focusing on the nature of the self and being indivisible, attachment tends to move away, but by focusing on removing attachment, it does not necessarily disappear. So, the disposition that the self can change body or speech is ignorance.** A *jñānī* can have the division of *ātmā* being *kartā* (a doer) and pure modification being its *kārya* (work done) at the time of the thought process, but during an indivisible thought-free state, there is no such division of *ātmā* being *kartā* and pure modification being its karma. Therefore, to say that *ātmā* is the doer, and body-mind-speech its act, is gross ignorance.

The result of true knowledge of knowables – knowables change because of themselves. *jñāna* is clouded by believing that, because of attachment-aversion in the *ātmā*, changes occur in the knowables.

gāthā-171

अथात्मनः शरीरत्वाभावमवधारयति-

Now, it is ascertained that *ātmā* is not the body: -

**ओरालिओ य देहो देहो वेउव्विओ य तेजसिओ।
आहारय कम्मइओ पोग्गलदव्वप्पगा सव्वे ॥१७१॥**

*orālio ya deho deho veuvvio ya tejasio |
āhāraya kammaio poggaladvappagā savve || 171 ||*

gāthā: *audārika* body (physical-gross body), *vaikriyika* (transformable body), *āhāraka* body (miraculous projectable/translocation body), *tejas* body (luminous body), and *kārmaṇa* body (karmic-matter body) - all these consist of *pudgala* material-substance.

ṭīkā: *audārika* (physical gross body), *vaikriyika* (fluid transformable body), *āhāraka* (miraculous projectable body), *taijas* (luminous, ody), and *kārmaṇa* (karmic-matter body) - all these bodies consist of material substance; therefore, it is ascertained that *ātmā* is not the body.

pravacana on gāthā-171

It is said in Jain Siddhant Praveshika (a text) that humans and *tiryāṇca* (animals) have *audarika* (physical) body, denizens of hell and celestial beings have *vaikriyika* (transformable) body, and a few *munis* have *āhāraka* (miraculous projectile) body. But all *saṃsārī jīvas* have *taijas* and *kārmaṇa* bodies. Here, it is said that a *jīva* does not have a body. A body is made of the smallest indivisible particle matter. In Jain Siddhant Praveshika, the knowledge of the circumstances of a body during transmigration is imparted, but the intent was not to say that the body is of an *ātmā*. All five bodies are made of *pudgala* matter particles. *pudgala* turns to a mass due to its dryness and stickiness; because of *avagāhana* (ability of accommodation), they are either gross or subtle. Because of shape, they attain different shapes of the body. Because of the ability of *karma*, mass turns into the form of *karma*, and with the *nimitta* of *karma*, different bodies are formed. *ātmā* is not its doer; therefore, *ātmā* is not a body – so it is determined.

अथ किं तर्हि जीवस्य शरीरादिसर्वपरद्रव्यविभागसाधनमसाधारणं स्वलक्षणमित्यावेदयति-

What, then, is the extraordinary-unusual characteristic of the soul which differentiates it from the body, etc., other all substances: -

**अरसमरूवमगंधं अव्वत्तं चेदणागुणमसद्धं ।
जाण अलिंगगहणं जीवमणिद्धिसंठाणं ॥१७२॥**

*arasamarūvamagaṇḍhaṁ avvattaṁ cedaṇāguṇamasaddhaṁ |
jāṇa aliṅgaggahaṇaṁ jīvamaṇiddhiṭṭhasaṁṭhāṇaṁ || 172 ||*

gāthā: Know that the pure soul is devoid of qualities of taste, color, smell, touch, and sound (speech). It possesses the quality of sentience/consciousness. It is not cognizable by any physical sense or mark and has no definable configuration.

ṭīkā: A pure soul's intrinsic characteristic nature is to be without qualities of taste, color, and smell (odor), to be without manifestation of touch, to be without *śabda* modification (evolution/modification of sound/speech), and consequently it is not cognizable by any physical mark/sense, and it has no definable shape or configuration.

Thus, the means of differentiating the soul from material substances are (1) tastelessness, (2) colorlessness, (3) lack of smell, (4) no physical manifestation (untouchable-ness), (5) sound/speechlessness (6) non-cognizable by any mark or sense, and (7) shapelessness/non-configuration.

The only means of differentiating the soul from all non-soul substances, irrespective of whether material or non-material, is its quality of sentience. This itself holds a self-characteristic nature, owing to its dependence on the self-soul substance, which differentiates *ātmā* from other remaining substances.

Where the word *aliṅgrāhya* (not cognizable by mark/sense) might have been used, but there's no cognition by mark/sense (*aliṅgrahaṇa*) is used (by KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācārya in this *gāthā*), it has been used to convey a deeper meaning. Thus: -

1. *grāhaka* [*jñāyaka* (knower-soul)] whose knowing is not caused by *liṅgas* (marks), i.e., by sense organs, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa** – thus *ātmā* is full of *atīndriyajñāna* (non-sensory knowledge) – such a meaning is conceived.

2. *grāhya* [*jñeya* (knowable soul)] who is not known by *līngas* (marks), i.e., by sense organs, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa* – thus *ātmā* is not an object to be *īndriyapratyakṣa* (known directly by senses), such a meaning is conceived.
3. As fire is known by (seeing) smoke, in the same manner, *ātmā* is not known by *līngass*, i.e., by any mark perceptible by senses, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, *ātmā* is not the subject of being perceptible by sense and mind - such a meaning is conceived.
4. *ātmā* is not inferred by others simply through a mark (*līnga*), i.e., inference (*anumāna*), so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, this *ātmā* is not merely things inferred (*anumeya*). Such a meaning is conceived.
5. *ātmā*, whose inferring by others is not merely through a mark (*līnga*), i.e., inference (*anumāna*), so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus *ātmā* is not simply an inferer (*anumātā*) – such a meaning is conceived.
6. *ātmā*, whose knowing/realization takes place by its characteristic nature, not through any mark (*līnga*), so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, this *ātmā* is the direct knower – such a meaning is conceived.
7. *ātmā*, whose knowing is not caused by a *līnga* (a mark); i.e., its characteristic is called thought activity (*upayoga*); i.e., which is not dependent on external knowable objects, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* does not have its knowledge based on external things – such a meaning is conceived.
8. *ātmā*, which does not accept its *līnga* (mark) - i.e., the characteristic termed as *upayoga* (disposition), i.e., does not bring itself *upayoga* from outside, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, *ātmā* possesses non-extrinsic knowledge (which is not brought from anywhere else) - such a meaning is conceived.
9. *ātmā* from whom *līnga* (mark), i.e., characteristic termed as *upayoga* (knowledge) cannot be accepted, i.e., cannot be appropriated/stolen by another, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*, thus knowledge of *ātmā* cannot be taken away by another - such a meaning is conceived.
10. *ātmā* whose *līnga* (mark), i.e., in the characteristic termed as *upayoga* (knowledge), there is no receiving of blemish of attachment, the way, there is no blemish in the sun; so, it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, this *ātmā* possesses an intrinsic nature as pure *upayoga* (*śuddhopayoga*) - such a meaning is conceived.

aliṅgrahaṇa = (*a* = not, *līnga* = sense organs (five senses and mind), *grahaṇa* = knowing/cognizing)—thus *ātmā* is not the subject of inference implying perception by sense; such a meaning is conceived.

11. *ātmā* by the *līṅga* (mark) of which, i.e., by the characteristic termed as *upayoga* (*śuddhopayoga*) of which, there is no receiving of karmic-matter, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, this *ātmā* is not connected (not tied) with *substance-karma* (karmic-matter), such a meaning is conceived.
12. *ātmā*, which does not take enjoyment of objects through its *līṅgas* (marks), i.e., sense organs, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*, thus this *ātmā* is not the enjoyer of objects - such a meaning is conceived.
13. *ātmā*, which does not hold *jīvatva* (sentience) by its *līṅgas* (marks), i.e., by its mind and senses, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, this *ātmā* is not governed by semen and menstruation - such a meaning is conceived.
14. *ātmā*, which has not assumed a *līṅga* (mark), i.e., *mehānākāra* (genital appearance), so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, this *ātmā* is not merely worldly expedient - such a meaning is conceived.
15. *ātmā*, which has not assumed a *līṅga* (mark), i.e., by *amehānākāra* (non-genital appearance), i.e., which is not pervasive in the universe (*loka*), thus this *ātmā* is not of the appearance of pervading in *loka*, which is a familiar expedient of the hypocrites - such a meaning is conceived.
16. *ātmā*, which does not assume sensations of female, male, and neuter genders, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, this *ātmā* is neither female nor male nor neuter by substance (physically) and by *bhāvas* (spiritually) - such a meaning is conceived.
17. *ātmā*, which does not assume *līṅgas* (marks), i.e., religious titles, so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, this *ātmā* does not possess the external marks/religious titles of ascetics - such a meaning is conceived.
18. *ātmā*, whose *arthāvabodha* [awareness (knowing) of substance] is not a (distinction of) *līṅga*- a mark or *guṇa* (attribute/quality), so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*, thus, this *ātmā*, not being embraced by particular quality, is a pure substance - such a meaning is conceived.
19. *ātmā*, whose *arthāvabodha viśeṣa* [particular awareness (knowledge) of substance] is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, this *ātmā*, not being embraced by particular modification, is a pure substance - such a meaning is conceived.
20. *ātmā*, whose *arthāvabodha sāmānya* [general awareness (knowledge) of substance] is not a (distinction of) *līṅga* - a mark - *pratyabhi jñāna* (cause of recognition), so it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, this *ātmā*, not being embraced by substance, is a pure modification – such a meaning is conceived.

pravacana on gāthā 172

The Exceptional own characteristics of *jīva* as the basis for differentiating from non-self substances.

A *jīva* does not have taste, smell, or touch in any manifested form. It is with the attribute of sentience. *ātmā* does not speak words, and in the same way, neither is it the cause of words; it is incapable of cognising sense organs, and it is devoid of the shape of non-self. One should understand this. *Ācārya Bhagavāna* is directing that you know your *ātmā* as such.

1. *ātmā* is tasteless –

There is no taste in *ātmā* because its nature is devoid of the attribute of taste.

2. *ātmā* is intangible –

ātmā has no physical form because its nature is devoid of the attributes of physical form.

The reason for making a *upacāra* (figuratively), that an *ātmā* has a physical form-

Question: What is the explanation for calling an *ātmā* as having a physical or tangible form in the *vyavahāra śāstra* (conventional texts), even though it does not have a physical form?

Answer: In fact, *ātmā* is formless, but from the conventional viewpoint of conjunction with *karma*, it is said to be with form; but it does not mean that it indeed turns into a form. Statements in the texts are from many viewpoints.

When *jīva* by himself transforms into a perturbed state, at that time, physical *karmas* are present in the form of *nimitta*. From the perspective of the conjunction of those physical *karmas*, *ātmā* is treated as having a physical appearance form. If the ability of the perturbed modification of a *jīva* and the ability of the *karma* in the form of *nimitta* do not have the relationship of being in the same space at the same time, then even figuratively, they could be said to have a form.

Just as there is no ability to have delusion in the state of a *siddha*, and no *karmas* in the form of *nimitta*, hence, in the state of a *siddha*, there is no physical form, even figuratively speaking. However, in the state of transmigration, there is the ability to perturb, which is impossible without the *nimitta* of physical *karmas*. If a *jīva* is without the *nimitta* of *karma*, he will become a *siddha*. *vikāra* is *āsuddha pārināmika bhāva* (impure disposition of eternal nature). A *jīva* deviates from his nature, takes *karma's* auspices, so

perturbation arises. But karma does not cause perturbation because *ātmā* and *karma* are totally distinct.

Inanimate karma does not know that *jīva* is modifying in a perturbed state because of its auspices. It is the fault of a *jīva* that modifies in a perturbed state. But it is not a *jīva*'s eternal nature. Without focusing on the physical substance, perturbation does not occur. A *jīva* has such an ability, and the conjunction of physical *karmas* is the *nimitta*. Hence, figuratively, it is said to have a physical form.

3. There is no smell in *ātmā*-

ātmā is devoid of smell. Fragrance and foul smell are not in *ātmā*.

4. *ātmā* is *avyaktapanā* (does not manifest) –

ātmā is devoid of the manifestation of touch. To turn from cold to hot, from rough to smooth, from gross to subtle, from light to heavy, from coarse to soft – all these are inanimate states. There is an absence of attributes that manifest touch in *ātmā*. Hence, *ātmā* does not manifest.

5. There is an absence of words in *ātmā*

Modification is absent in the form of speech in *ātmā*. An ignorant person believes that one should speak a language that favors the *jīva*. Speaking harsh words is defilement of *jīva*; therefore, such speech should not be uttered. But listen! To utter speech or not to utter it is not under the control of the *jīva*. Speech is independent, and the *jīva* is independent. There is no gain or loss from speech; however, the ignorant fears that if speech is considered independent this way, then no *jīva* will respect the *guru*, no one will accept the favours done to another, and everyone will become indifferent. But no *jīva* respects another.

A *dharmī jīva* respects his own nature in his disposition, and when he is unable to remain stable in his own nature, then respect for the *guru* arises in auspicious thoughts. It is also false to say that the speech of the *Kevalī Bhagavāna* emerges without intention, but the speech of mundane *jīvas* can emerge with intention, because the speech-form modification is entirely absent in all *jīvas* in all three phases of time.

6. *ātmā* is *alīṅagrāhaya* (ungraspability by signs)

Due to the absence of the form, taste, smell, etc., in *ātmā*, *ātmā* cannot be recognised by any sign. In the body, a specific type of colour identifies a certain *Bhagavāna*; a

particular kind of speech identifies a *muni*; a *parama audārika śarīra* identifies a *Kevalī Bhagavāna*; and the divine Om sound identifies a *Tīrthaṅkara Bhagavāna*.

Question: Can these signs recognize a *jīva*?

Answer: No, all these signs belong to *jaḍa* (inanimate matter). *ātmā* is not recognised by them. Its own quality of sentient consciousness recognizes each *ātmā*. One who does not recognize oneself does not recognize others either. One who recognises oneself can truly recognise others. *ātmā* is not recognized by any external *liṅga*.

7. There is *asaṁsthānanā* (formlessness) in *ātmā* -

ātmā cannot be recognized by the different forms (*saṁsthānas*) of the body. The nature of *ātmā* is devoid of all forms of physical matter. In this way, the distinction between *ātmā* and *pudgala* (physical matter) is stated as: (1) *araspanā* (absence of taste), (2) *arūpapanā* (absence of form), (3) *agaṇḍhapanā* (absence of smell), (4) *avyaktapanā* (absence of manifestation), (5) *aśabdapanā* (absence of sound), (6) *aliṅgagrāhyapanā* (not graspable by gender), and (7) *asaṁsthānapanā* (absence of shape).

The means of distinguishing *jīva* (living being) from *ajīva* (non-living being) – *cetanāmayatva* (consciousness).

The means of distinguishing *ātmā* from *pudgala* have been stated. Now, the means of distinguishing *ātmā* from *pudgala* and *apudgala* that is, *dharma* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of rest), *ākāśa* (space), and *kāla* (time). The instrument to separate these *ajīva* substances (non-living substances) is the attribute of *cetanāguṇamayatva* (being full of the quality of consciousness). The means of distinguishing from *pudgala* and other *ajīva* is not said to be perversion, desire, anger, etc. Consciousness is a quality, and the conscious being is the substance that possesses this quality. *ātmā* is inseparable from its nature of knowing and seeing, and by that means, it is the *dharma* (inherent nature) to distinguish it from all *ajīva*.

The means of distinguishing *jīva* from other *jīvas* – *svadṛavyāśrita cetanāmayatva* (consciousness dependent on one's own substance).

First, *ātmā* was distinguished from *pudgalas*. It was then distinguished from other *ajīvas*. Now, it is being distinguished from other *jīvas*. One's own quality of consciousness resides in one's own *ātmā*, not in the *ātmā* of another. That own quality of consciousness distinguishes oneself from infinite *kevalīs*, *siddhas*, infinite beings of *nigodas*, etc., because

one's own quality of consciousness is one's unique characteristic. It always holds onto itself. In the state of seeker, the quality of consciousness is used for the practice of *dharma*.

Question: Where does the observance of compassion come in this?

Answer: To ascertain one's own *jīva* through one's own quality of consciousness is *svadayā* (self-compassion). *jīva* cannot observe compassion for others. When it is said to be distinct from others, it means that it cannot do anything to others, and *jīva* is not said to have the characteristics of compassion and charity, but it is said to be with sentience. By saying this, it is determined that the perturbation of compassion, charity, etc., is momentary; it is not its eternal nature. To consider the other and oneself as one is the path of worldly existence, and to ascertain oneself as separate from non-self is the path of liberation.

Where it is meant to say '*aliṅagrāhya*' (that which a mark cannot grasp), the use of '*aliṅagrahaṇa*' (that which cannot be experienced through external signs) serves to convey (attainment, exposition) many meanings. It is as follows:

aliṅagrahaṇa (that which cannot be experienced through the external signs), meaning that *jīva* cannot be experienced through external signs or external gender; *ātmā* (self) cannot be known through any sign or instrumental cause.

Where it is meant to say '*aliṅagrāhya*', the use of '*aliṅagrahaṇa*' is for the purpose of conveying many meanings. The word '*aliṅagrahaṇa*' is the *vācaka* (signifier) for expounding many meanings, and the thoughts that can be expressed by that word are *vācya* (signified). Knowing that state and distinguishing and determining *ātmā* (self) as separate from the *liṅga* (mark, characteristic) is *dharma*.

First *bolo* (point): *grāhaka* (knower) *grahaṇa* (knowing)

That *grāhaka-jñāyaka* (knowable) of which *grahaṇa* (knowing) is not done by the *liṅgas* (marks, characteristics), that is, by the *indriyas* (senses), is *aliṅagrahaṇa* (non-grasping by a mark of another); in this way, the meaning that '*ātmā* (self) is characterised by transcendental knowledge which is beyond the senses is attained.

***ātmā* (self) does not know through the senses:**

ātmā (self) does not know the self and non-self through *indriyas* (senses). Both the self and the non-self are *jñeyas*. *ātmā* (self), being the knower of both self and non-self knowable objects, does not have *jñāna* through the senses. Here, *atīndriyajñāna* (transcendental knowledge beyond senses) is established.

An ignorant argues that a watch runs by winding the key, body moves because there is *ātmā*, water became hot because there was fire, the motor ran because there was petrol, *rotī* (Indian bread) was made because there was a woman, wood was lifted high because there was a hand; So, all this is directly seen through senses.

However, this belief is erroneous. The ignorant *jīva* sees associations through the screen of senses. *jñāna* is not of associations. *jñāna* is not of the senses. However, not believing that *jñāna* belongs to *ātmā* (self), one who believes that *jñāna* arises from the senses, sees only the associations. *ātmā* (self) has the inherent nature of illuminating the self and non-self. It is not his inherent nature to know the non-self with the help of the senses. It does not know the self through senses, and neither does it know non-self external substances through the five senses of eyes, ears, nose, etc.

***sva-para-prakāśaka jñāna* (knowing the illumination of self and non-self) nature is due to self, not due to senses.**

Question: Should a cataract be removed from the eye or not? If it is removed, one sees, and if not, one does not see.

Answer: Listen, one cannot see with the eye either before or after the cataract removal. *jñāna* is present in *ātmā* (self), not in the senses. Even before the cataract removal, one knows according to the degree of manifestation of one's *jñāna*, and even afterwards, one knows according to one's own ability.

Is the *sva-para-prakāśaka* nature of the self due to the senses?

Is *para-prakāśaka* nature due to the senses? No, the nature of *jñāna* does not belong to the senses; it is not due to the senses. It is the nature of the self to know both the self and the non-self. Missing this (deviating from this), the ignorant *jīva* believes that knowledge arises through the senses; this is delusion.

Without the reputation of the experience of the *jñāyaka* (knowing nature), *jñāna* cannot become *samyak* -

If any customer goes to the market to buy goods, they must have cash or prestige to obtain the goods. Goods are obtained with cash; if there is no cash, goods are obtained with 'nose' (reputation). However, if neither of these is present, a beggar does not get goods. Similarly, this *ātmā* is the customer; it must take the goods, that is, perform the function of grasping and knowing. If it has the cash of *kevalajñāna* (omniscience), it directly knows everything. If that is not present, in the state of limited knowledge, if he has the prestige of the

experience of the pure nature of *jñāna*, then he can do the work of knowing correctly. But he who does not have the cash of omniscience, and there is no prestige in the form of the experience of the undivided knower, he, like a beggar, will not have the correct *jñāna* of *jñeya*.

- 1) Ignorant *jīvas* believe that *jñāna* arises from senses; that belief is false because inert senses are entirely absent in *ātmā*. Therefore, senses cannot help *ātmā* even in the slightest.
- 2) Senses lack the nature of *jñāna*. How can that which does not have the nature of *jñāna* (knowing) know? That is, they know nothing at all.
Hence, *jñātā* (knower), that is, *grāhaka* (taker), or the one who does *grahaṇa* (partakes), should be known precisely and correctly in this way. This section deals with the knowable. *ātmā* does not know through the senses even a single one of its substance-attribute-modification of the self and non-self; but it knows through its own *jñāna*. One who determines this has *samyak jñāna*.

The ignorant does the knowing of present modification through associations:

Due to the lack of awareness of the nature of the knower, the ignorant one indulges in delusion and believes that wood was lifted by this hand, the eye directly saw it, knowledge arose from the word, and money came when one was at the shop. In this way, he sees through association. *jīva*, who believes that the modification of his *jñāna* arises from senses, also sees modification of non-self substances through association; he is not called *ātmā*. Even if the ignorant *jīva* believes that knowledge arises in him through the senses, in reality, his *jñāna* also arises from *ātmā* (self) itself; but he does not believe in that way, therefore, he does not have the auspice of sentience. In this way, *jīva*, who does not consider his own modifications to be independent, does not develop the ability to see the modification of non-self as independent.

Even if the ignorant one holds a contrary belief, the nature of the object does not change; but he gives rise to faults in his own beliefs and becomes sorrowful.

When will it be said that 'the true knowledge of the present modification' has been attained?

When will it be said that 'the true knowledge of the present state of self and non-self substances has been attained? It is said that when one knows the inherent nature of each substance, then *jīva* believes his *jñāna* arises with the auspice of his own knowing nature,

and not from the support of senses and other non-self substances. That *jīva* also believes that the modifications of other non-self substances arise with the auspice of their own substance, but not from the support of others. Believing in this way, he decides that a car works due to its own cause when it is running and stops due to its own cause when it stops. The car has no relation to petrol. Wood moves up or down due to its own cause, not due to the living being. The modification of a student's study is due to the student, not due to the teacher.

Those modifications occur with the auspice of the self-substance. A *paryāya* belongs to the *paryāyavāna* (substance possessing modification) and is not due to another. **From *nigoda* (lowest life form) onwards, all living beings know through their own *ātmā*, but they do not know through the senses.** It is wrong to say that *ekēndriya* (one-sensed), *dvīndriya* (two-sensed), and *trīndriya* (three-sensed) beings do not have eyes; therefore, they cannot see, and *caturindriya* (four-sensed) and *pañcēndriya* (five-sensed) beings have eyes; hence, they can see.

The manifestation of the extent of *jñāna* is not dependent on non-self; similarly, it does not come from non-self. That modification of knowledge comes from the *paryāyanvāna* substance (substance possessing modification). Is the *ātmā* ever devoid of its nature of knowing and seeing that it would need to see-know through the senses? Never. Even in *nigoda*, its nature exists; there too, it knows by itself. In this way, if one determines that a modification belongs to the substance possessing the modification, then it is said to have attained the true knowledge of the present modification.

Question: Here it is said that *jñāna* occurs without the senses, but the scriptures mention that *matijñāna* (sensory knowledge) and *śrutajñāna* (knowing through words) arise with the auspice of the senses and mind. Then that will become false.

Answer: *vyavahāranaya* (conventional viewpoint) makes one aware of associations. *matijñāna* (sensory knowledge) occurs through the senses and mind: this is a statement from the conventional viewpoint. From the conventional perspective, many distinctions arise in *matijñāna* (sensory knowledge); however, if it is not known in the context of *nimitta*, then *jñāna* is one only. *vyavahāranaya* (conventional viewpoint) gives the knowledge of which other substances are present when *jīva* knows through its own *ātmā*. All these distinctions arise due to the respective capability of one's own modification. The distinctions are not due to external associations, such as the senses, etc., but when distinctions arise due to one's own cause, external causes are superimposed.

Here, even the distinctions are negated. *jñāna* never arises due to *nimitta*. *jñāna* develops based on the support of *jñāyaka*. **The senses and external objects do not touch *ātmā* in the three phases of time. Therefore, *ātmā* cannot know through them, but it knows through its own existential nature of *jñāna*.** Due to his own delusion, the ignorant believes he knows through association; this belief destroys the viewpoint of inherent nature. That one sees all objects through association. If it is determined that *jñānī* knows his pure self by way of his present *jñāna*, then he can determine to know non-self substances through their own nature.

During the state of limited knowledge, the senses, mind, etc., are *nimitta*, and in the state of omniscience, the senses, mind, etc., are not *nimitta*; But to believe that in the state of limited knowledge, the senses, mind are *nimitta*; therefore, one knows through them is flawed. No *jīva* touches with the sense of touch, does not hear with the ears, and does not think with the mind; **but *ātmā* itself performs the act of knowing by its ownself. To show the association of *vyavahāranaya*, it is said that *jñāna* occurred through the senses and the mind. Understand this as the meaning of *vyavahāranaya* (conventional viewpoint), and to understand that *jñāna* of *ātmā* occurs without any associations is the meaning of *niscayanaya* (real viewpoint).** Scriptures do not say the meanings of *nayas* (viewpoints). But by way of his own *jñāna*, *ātmā* understands the various viewpoints. The sensory and auditory knowledge is not false, but they are balanced *jñāna*. In this way, one should understand reality through the auspices of the self.

The *ātmā* is with *jñāna*, which is *atīndriya* (beyond sensory knowledge)

In this first statement, the meaning of *aliṅgagrahaṇa* (non-sensory perception) is as follows: *a* = not, *liṅga* = senses, and *grahaṇa* = knowing. That is, *ātmā* does not know through the senses, hence it is *aliṅgagrahaṇa* (non-sensory perception). Hence, the thought that *ātmā* is *atīndriya jñānamaya* (beyond sensory knowledge) is attained. *atīndriya jñānamaya* (beyond sensory knowledge) means that without senses and mind, such determination arises. When? After attaining omniscience? No. *kevalajñānī* is indeed beyond sensory knowledge, but a mundane *jīva* with a body, in the mundane state, also does not know through the senses. Despite this being the case, due to ignorance, the ignorant one believes that he knows through the senses. This belief results in *saṁsāra*. His focus from the senses and moves to the knowing nature truly attains the *atīndriya jñāna* within themselves.

The one who knows the self truly knows the *deva-śāstra-guru* -

Question: If one believes in such independence, they will not take anyone's help, will become hardened, uncaring toward the experience of self, and will not believe in *deva-śāstra-guru*.

Answer: Listen! All this is your delusion. The one who knows the truth understands *deva-śāstra-guru* truly, because *deva-śāstra-guru* says that you know through your knowing nature and not through the senses or *deva-śāstra-guru*. All living beings, from the one-sensed to the five-sensed, have the power to know the self and non-self by themselves. In this way, a *jīva* that truly knows his own knowing nature truly knows non-self. It is not true that external substances are known because *deva-śāstra-guru*, etc., exist; **but upon knowing one's own *ātmā*, non-self substances are known in the self. The development towards omniscience is only due to such true conviction and knowledge.**

deva-śāstra-guru are non-self, and when is it appropriate to believe in them? *deva-śāstra-guru* and senses are non-self, and the self does not know through them. But when one determines that, on knowing the self, the non-self is known with it, then it is said that the *jīva* knows and believes *deva-śāstra-guru* in the correct way.

From this understanding, upon attaining non-sensory *jñāna*, dependence on non-self ceases and self-reliance arises, and from that, modifications of *samyag darśana-jñāna-cāritra*) manifest.

Second *bola* (point)

grāhya (knowable), which is not perceived (known) through the *liṅgas* (means), that is, through the senses, is *aliṅgagrahaṇa* (non-sensory perception); in this way, the meaning that *ātmā* is not an object of sensory perception is derived.

ātmā is not fit to be known by the senses -

In the second statement, it is said that the *ātmā* is not fit to be known by the senses. *ātmā* does not know the self and non-self through the senses, but it knows both the self and non-self by itself, as has been said in the first statement. Now, in this second statement, it is said that such a *prameya* (knowable) *ātmā* is not such that it can be known by the senses.

In this second statement, the meaning of *aliṅgagrahaṇa* (non-sensory perception) is as follows: *a* = not, *liṅga* = only through the senses, *grahaṇa* = knowing, *ātmā* is not fit to be known only through the senses, that is, *ātmā* is fit to be known by its own knowing nature.

(1) Some *jīvas* believe that *ātmā* is not known in knowledge at all; that belief is proven wrong by this (second statement), because *ātmā* also has the attribute of *prameyatva* (knowability), and if the attribute of knowability is not accepted, then the *guṇī*

(substantive/holder of attributes), that is, *ātmā*, would be destroyed; therefore, this belief is wrong. **Due to the attribute of *prameyatva* (knowability), *ātmā* is known by way of *jñāna*; thus, it is such a *prameya* (knowable) substance.**

(2) Some *jīvas* believe that *ātmā* can be known by the senses; that too is proven wrong by this (second statement); because *ātmā* is fit to be known by its own knowing nature, but it is not fit to be known by the senses. The knowing nature belongs to *ātmā*, and not to the senses.

Religion does arise from scriptures and speech -

Question: How can a *jīva* know *ātmā* if he does not listen to the speech of *Bhagavāna* or the scriptures, because without *deśanālabdhi* (good fortune of obtaining the teachings of *Bhagavāna*), *jñāna* of *ātmā* does not occur, and *dharma* is not attained, right?

Answer: Listen! Speech and scriptures are non-self; they are inert matter, and *jñāna* does not arise from them. Similarly, ears are also inert matter. It is not the inherent nature of *ātmā* that *jñāna* should arise from the senses, and *ātmā* would be known through them. *ātmā* is fit to be known by its own *atīndriya* (transcendental/ beyond senses) nature, which is without speech and senses. And upon knowing the self, *jñāna* of non-self entities, such as scriptures and speech, also comes into the right focus, realizing that in the past, the focus was on scriptures and speech. As the nature of *sva-par-prakāśaka* (illumination of self and non-self) develops, the true *jñāna* of non-self also arises. If *ātmā* is not in scriptures, words, ears, or eyes, then how can *ātmā* be known through scriptures and speech? It will certainly not be known. But it is such that *ātmā* is known only by its own *jñāyakaśvabhāva* (knowing nature). People have not even heard about it, nor have they actually heard it. Therefore, it seems complicated.

If *dharma* does not originate from speech, then what is the necessity of listening to teachings?

Question: Just now, it was said that *jñāna* does not arise from the ears and speech, and that this matter has not even reached the ears. As it is being told that *jñāna* of *ātmā* does not arise from the ears and speech, then, what is the necessity of this matter reaching the ears and being heard?

Answer: When it is said that 'has not fallen into the ears,' it is told from the perspective of *nimitta* (external cause) and association. It means that such a matter has not even been heard; that is, *jīva* does not even possess such an ability, understand that. Modification of the understanding of every *samaya* exists and it the truth. That modification is not due to the ears and words. When one does not have the ability to understand at that point in time,

it is said that 'the matter has not fallen into the ears.' If one were to hear these words and understand them by one's ability, even then, that *jñāna* is divided. Even from that, the undivided *ātmā* is not attained because the benefit of the whole cannot be attained from a part.

If one removes his focus from the capability of fragmented, incomplete *jñāna* and focuses on the indivisible, complete *ātmā*, then *ātmā* attains *dharma*. So then, one who has not even attained the capability of fragmented *jñāna*, he who has not heard, even as *nimitta*, the unopposed speech, that is, who has not obtained *nimitta*, from the conventional viewpoint, of *deśanālabdhi* (good fortune of obtaining the teachings of *Bhagavāna*), how can he attain *dharma*? The implication is that such a *jīva* will never attain *dharma*. Saying this, here also, the inherent capability of that *jīva* is being indicated.

***ātmā* is not an object of sensory perception -**

In this way, *ātmā* is *aliṅgagrahaṇa* (non-sensory perception). *ātmā* is not graspable by the senses; that is, it is not fit to be known by the senses. Therefore, the meaning that *ātmā* is not an object of sensory perception is attained.

The ignorant *jīva* believes that *ātmā* is not known without non-self entities, without words, without ears; but his belief is false. This belief itself is contrary to the nature of *ātmā*. It is the nature of *ātmā* that *jñāna* occurs without non-self entities. *ātmā* is not an object of sensory perception, but it is an object of direct *jñāna*, from where this perception arises. *ātmā* is not known by dependency on the senses, but *ātmā* is known dependent on *ātmā*. As soon as such an awareness arises, the focus on senses is released, and upon having faith and *jñāna* in one's own nature of direct perception, *dharma* is attained. *ātmā* is knowable, which is a substance fit to be known by *jñāna*. It is not known through *liṅgas* (marks).

In the first statement, it was said that this *jñeya padārtha* (knowable substance) – *ātmā* - is not such that it can be known by the senses -

ātmā does not have knowledge through the senses; such is the nature of this *jñeya* substance – *ātmā*. The reason for stating *aliṅgagrahaṇa* (non-sensory perception) in this chapter on the principle of *jñeya* is that *ātmā* is a mass of infinite attributes and modifications. The knowable substance's nature is not to work through the senses. It works without the support of the senses. That is its nature. If *jñeya* is known in the way its nature is, and has the belief by turning towards the self, then *dharma* is attained.

Knowing the nature of the knowable, the way it is, and having the belief on being self-oriented, then dharma occurs. How can *dharma* occur by knowing the opposite? It never will. Hence, *ātmā* is not such a knowable substance that it can be known through the senses. **In the second point, it was said that *ātmā* can be known through the senses; it is not such a substance.**

ātmā is not such a knowable that it can be known through the senses. It can be known by looking inwards. This is a chapter on knowable, which can also be stated in another way: this is, a chapter on *samyagdarśana*. One which can be known through the senses is not *ātmā*. The subject of *samyagdarśana* is *ātmā*; hence, *samyagdarśana* cannot occur through the senses, meaning *dharma* cannot occur.

ātmā-substance is knowable. Be it *jñeya* or *prameya* – both are the same. All the self-non-self *prameya* of the universe are indeed the subject of some or the other *jñāna* because they have an attribute of *prameyatva* (knowability). It is not in *ātmā*'s nature to know through the senses. If it is known through the senses, then it is not *pramāṇa* (comprehensive) *jñāna*. *prameya* (knowable) is capable of being known in *jñāna*, so it has been said, but it is never said that it can be known through the senses. All six substances are the subject of some or the other *jñāna* because of their respective attribute of *prameyatva*, so it has been said. It is not their nature to know through the senses.

ātmā substance is a mass of infinite efficacies of knowledge, belief, conduct, etc. This knowable is not the subject of the senses. *ātmā* is both the knower and knowable. Substances of the cosmos are knowable, and sensory organs are knowable. Those knowables are not capable of knowing *ātmā*, and *ātmā* is self-knowable. Its nature is not to be known by the senses.

Question: Then why did *jīva* get the senses? And why is *jīva* said to be with the senses?

Answer: No substance gets another substance. **No substance goes or moves away from another substance. Knowable substances of the cosmos come and leave because of themselves. Modification of a *paramāṇu* entered the same space as that of the *ātmā* and has been identified.**

From the absolute point of view, senses are modifications of *paramāṇu*, but in their present state, it is distinct from other modifications of *pudgala*. Hence, it has been recognised in the form of senses. From the point of view of *nīścaya*, they are no different from *pudgala paramāṇu*. The statement on sensory *jñāna* is made to illustrate the association of senses

from a conventional point of view. However, that does not mean one can attain *jñāna* solely because of this. But at the time of the ability of the expanse of knowing of *jñāna*, it has been told that the senses are *nimitta*.

***śraddhā* (belief) accepts that *ātmā* can be known through *jñāna* -**

ātmā is the self-knowable. It is not a knowable substance that can be known through the senses. Hence, it is not a subject of sensory perception, but it is a subject of direct *jñāna*. This is a chapter on *samyagdarśana*. *ātmā* is a subject of belief, meaning *samyagdarśana*. Hence, *śraddhā* accepts that *ātma*-substance is such that senses cannot know it. **However, it is such that it can be known directly through *jñāna*.** To accept the belief through self-auspice is *dharma*. Without such a belief and *jñāna*, vows, penance, etc., cannot be true.

Third *bola* (point) -

The way fire can be known by smoke, in the same way one which cannot be known by *liṅga*, meaning which is not *grahaṇa* (perceptible) by senses, is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. In this way, *ātmā* is not the subject of being inferred/conjectured directly by senses; such a meaning is arrived at.

***ātmā* is not the one that can be known by direct inference/conjecture of senses -**

Fire can be known by smoke. Where there's smoke, there's fire. In the same way, *ātmā*'s *jñāna* is not worthy of knowing by any external/non-self senses. It is such a knowable. Can *ātmā* be genuinely known by such signs as movement of the body, speaking, and growth in a womb? No, *ātmā* cannot be known by such traits. Fever can be known by measuring it with a thermometer; in the same way, *ātmā* cannot be recognized by any outer signs. Here, it is said that inference of senses is not required to know the *ātmā*.

If someone says that *ātmā* can be known by *jñāna*, and non-self substances can be known through the senses, then it is gross ignorance. The senses cannot know the substance; it is known by *jñāna*. And to say that *ātmā* can be known by *ātmā* from the view of absolute truth and can be known by senses from the view of conventional truth is also a false statement. It is false multifacetedness. ***ātmā* is known only by *ātmā* and not through any other signs or senses or inference of senses. This is *samyak anekānta*, and only this is *dharma*.**

In this third point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is as follows: a = not, *liṅga* = sign capable of being known by senses, *grahaṇa* = to know. Meaning that *ātmā* cannot be known by signs understood through the senses. *ātmā* cannot be decided by external signs like how a

body grows from small to big; Hence, *ātmā* is not the subject of direct inference/conjecture of senses – such a meaning is derived. *ātmā* is such a knowable substance that it can be known directly through *jñāna* – it doesn't need to be inferred by the senses.

Fourth bola (point)

That which is not known by others, one which is not known just by sense organs, is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. In this way, *ātmā* is not just deducible (it cannot be known by perception); such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* is not such a knowable that it can be known only by perception –**

In this fourth point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is – a = no, *liṅga* = knowing through perception, and *grahaṇa* = to know. This means that *ātmā* is not such a knowable that it would be a subject of knowing only through perception/inference. Here, the word ‘just inference’ is used. The purpose of using the word ‘just’ is that *ātmā* is the subject of inference with partial self-perception, but it is not the subject of just conjecture.

If *ātmā* were to be the subject of just perception, it could never be the subject of direct *jñāna*. It is entirely and directly known in *kevaljñāna*, and in the incomplete state, it is realized in *śrutajñāna*. In the seeker's state also, it is incapable of being known through inference/perception. If it can be known only through inference in a seeker's state, then the self-perception cannot be partially direct. **If the self-perception *jñāna* is not partially direct in a seeker's state, then it cannot manifest as totally direct.** Hence, *ātmā* is the subject of direct self-perceptible inferred knowledge.

Those who want to know *ātmā* should have self-perceptible *jñāna*; only then can they know *ātmā*. If *jīvas* were to have the knowing through perception, along with the experience of self, and then extend/develop their *jñāna*, then it is correct. But without the experience of self, if they were to try to know the *ātmā* only through perception, then this *ātmā* is not such a knowable that it would be known through that.

Fifth bola (point)

One who does not *grahaṇa* (know) only through *liṅgas* (sense organs) is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, *ātmā* is not just deducible (being just the deducer), such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* was to be known just by inference; it is not such a knowable substance -**

In this fifth point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is thus – a = not, *liṅga* = inferring knowledge, and *grahaṇa* = to know. *ātmā* is not such that it can know the self and non-self only through perception. Hence, direct perceptive knowing should be there to know

both the self and the non-self. If *ātmā* itself were only the inferer, then direct *jñāna* would never manifest. *anumāna jñāna* is there, but it is not true that direct knowledge can manifest just by *anumāna jñāna*. Along with knowing through inference, a partial experience of self is present, that is direct, and that will increase to become completely direct, *kevaljñāna*. Then, inferring knowledge is absent. Hence, it is said that it cannot be known by just inference.

Correct knowledge of non-self substance is absent without self-perceptive knowledge (*svasamvedana jñāna*) –

ātmā does not know the self through inference; its nature is not to know other *jīvas*, bodies, and other non-self substances by inferring knowledge. Knowing non-self substances by just inferring knowledge is an incorrect belief. Thus, *ātmā* is not the doer of just inference; such a meaning is ascertained.

To know, *deva-guru-śāstra*, family, relatives, and all other *jīvas* from *nigoda* to *siddha*, through inference, is not the nature of those knowables. Partial self-perceptive knowledge should be there. To know through inference knowledge with self-perception is the correct knowing. Inference without self-perception is not even the correct inference.

Nature of *kriya* (action)

Question: After knowing all these things, is it correct to carry out the activities that we assume to believe in? What is the obstacle to carrying out the activity with understanding?

Answer: Attachment and body activities are not included in the activity with understanding. What can be termed as ritual, without the knowing of *ātmā*? If one had the correct understanding, this question would not arise; understanding means the activity of knowing, and the activity of the body and attachment is negated.

Question: What if with the activity of *jñāna*, the activity of assumed belief is included?

Answer: Listen! Adding a little poison to *dōdhapāka* (a sweet made of milk), the whole sweet turns poisonous and cannot be consumed. Similarly, having knowledge of outer manifestation and adding the activity of the body and attachment is *ekānta mithyātva* (singular erroneous belief).

A *jīva* cannot perform the activities of the body, and in the incomplete state, attachment occurs. A *jñānī* does not have the intention of doing attachment. *ātmā*'s nature is to be the knower of body and attachment. To understand so, is the activity

of understanding. By saying the activity of understanding, the activity of body and attachment is automatically negated. Any outer sign cannot know *ātmā*; it is such a knowable substance. To know accordingly is the correct activity.

Here, it is stated that it is not so that the *ātmā* can be known just by *anumāna jñāna mātra* (only knowledge of inference). This results in the following principles.

Principle of direct and indirect *jñāna* –

1. If *ātmā* is capable of being known by just inference, then direct *jñāna* and its subject (its existence) will not remain. But it is not so.
2. *kevalajñāna* is completely direct, and in that *ātmā* and all other substances are known clearly. However, it is not wholly manifested currently in the mundane state with the physical body. If it manifests totally in the present, total bliss should manifest.
3. A seeker has *svasamvedana pratyakṣa jñāna* (direct self-perception *jñāna*), and its inference knowing is correct/comprehensive because inference *jñāna* without self-perception cannot be correct. **Hence, to a seeker, partial direct and partial indirect *jñāna* stay together.**
4. If only indirect *jñāna* is believed to be present in a seeker's state, then direct *jñāna* can never occur. But it is not so. Hence, *svasamvedana anśa-pratyakṣa* (partially direct self-perception with experience) *jñāna* exists. That is what increases to becoming the complete and direct *kevalajñāna*.
5. *anśa pratyakṣa svasamvedan jñāna* (partially direct self-perception with experience) is present during the seeker's state. With its sequential increase, there is an absence of indirect *jñāna*, and on the manifestation of completely direct *jñāna*, the indirect *jñāna* becomes non-existent.
6. Inference knowledge can never be alone. If it is alone, it will remain eternal, and direct *jñāna* will never occur.
7. **Totally, direct *jñāna* can be present alone because there is a total absence of indirect *jñāna*.**

Inference without self-perception is not *jñāna*. Hence, *ātmā* cannot be known with just inferential knowledge. Similarly, with just inference, *ātmā* cannot know the self and the non-self. Comprehending this, *ātmā* is not just the inferer.

It is not the nature of *jñāna* to know just by inference. Similarly, it is not the nature of the knowable to be known by just inference. Thus, *ātmā* is not a knowable substance that can be inferred. Knowing oneself is the cause of *dharma*.

A great saint was staying in the jungle. From one word, ‘*aliṅgrahāṇa*,’ twenty points emerged. It is as if a pure soul is manifesting from it. A wonderful thing has been said. In worldly affairs, if one distributes *laddu* (an Indian sweet) and someone does not know how to eat it, that person is stupid; similarly, it is presented wonderfully how the *ātmā* can be manifested. Still, a *jīva* is stupid, if he does not think, believe, or enjoy the joyful nature.

In the first point, it was said *ātmā* is full of non-sensory *jñāna*; know him accordingly This *ātmā* is different from the body, etc., how is that? Body, etc., are non-self-knowable, and *ātmā* is self-knowable. By knowing the self through the self, *ātmā* is known by his nature, and non-self substance is known as non-self. *ātmā* cannot be known through external signs and should be known accordingly. Here, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* is ordering. This *ātmā* in the form of knowable is a mass of *jñāna*, *darśana*, *cāritra*, *anand*, *astitva* (existence), *vibhūta* (omnipresence), *prabhūta* (supremacy, lordship), etc., infinite efficacies, and *aliṅgrahāṇa* is present; know this accordingly. *ātmā* is non-sensory, meaning it does not take the auspice of senses, cannot be known through the senses; So, it should be known that he does not know through the senses.

When a revered Guru tells his disciple ‘You can know’ it establishes that *ātmā* can know. **If it were not possible for a disciple to know, then the Guru would not have said, ‘You know.’ On saying ‘you know,’ the disciple can know such an *ātmā*; such a decision is arrived at.**

How can *ātmā* be known through the senses that are absent in it?

This *ātmā*’s nature is sentience and joy. He does not know through the senses. This should be known. **There is an absence of senses in *ātmā*. It cannot be that the substance which is absent in one can work through it. There is an absence of senses in the *bhagavāna ātmā*; if it is said that one knows through that which is absent in him, then it is akin to saying that sorrow arises by getting hit with a rabbit with horns.** Rabbits do not have horns, so how can that cause happiness and sorrow? It cannot be.

Similarly, if *ātmā* lacks senses, then how can it be that he knows through that which is absent in his nature? It cannot be. Hence, *ātmā* is of a non-sensory nature; know accordingly. This is called *samyagdarśana* and *dharma*.

In the second point, it was said that *ātmā* is not the subject to be known directly through the senses. This should be known -

ātmā cannot be known through the senses; This should be known. There are no senses in *ātmā*. It is impossible that a substance is known by that which is not present in it at all. The

senses are not in the *ātmā*; hence, it is not the subject of being directly known through the senses. One should understand that *ātmā* is capable of being known by himself.

In the third point, it was said that *ātmā* is not a subject that can be inferred directly by the senses; this should be known -

The body is moving; speech emanates; therefore, *ātmā* is present; *ātmā* is not capable of being inferred directly by the senses in this way. Senses are not present in *ātmā*. Hence, *ātmā* cannot be known through *jñāna*, which is discernible by the senses; this should be known.

The way fire can be known through smoke, in the same way, *ātmā* cannot be known by any sign that is perceptible by the senses. But it should be understood that *ātmā* is known through self-perceptible *jñāna*;

By saying '*tū jāna*' (you know it), such a meaning is ascertained that a disciple is the one who can know *ātmā*. When a diamond merchant starts a diamond shop, he has in mind that there are customers for diamonds worldwide. He has faith that those customers will come to him to buy diamonds. But the doubt, 'I start a diamond shop; but what if no customer comes to buy diamonds?' does not occur to him.

Similarly, when *Ācārya Bhagavāna* (revered teacher) said 'you know it', he has faith that there are *jīvas* who can know *ātmā* in the way he is saying. He does not have doubts that if there are no *jīvas* in the future, who can know *ātmā* the way he has described? It is not true that, as this subject is very subtle and complicated; therefore, it cannot be known. Hence, one can definitely have such knowledge and faith.

The *ātmā* is *svatattva* (self-substance); it does not know through *paratattva* (non-self-substances). Similarly, it is not known even through inference of non-self substances, but it knows and is known only by its own self-substance. This should be understood accordingly.

In the fourth statement, it was said that the *ātmā* is not such that it is known only by inference; know this -

ātmā is not so that other *jīvas* may infer, and *ātmā* will be known. If others (*jīva*) decide what the *ātmā* is like only through inferential knowledge, then that *jñāna* of the *ātmā* is not true. *ātmā* is such that it is known by the *svasamvedana jñāna* (self-experiential knowledge), which is *jñānānanda*, without attachments, and is the pure sentient.

pañca parameṣṭhī bhagavāna cannot be known just by inference (anumāna).

Other *jīvas* merely infer and say that these are *vītarāgadeva*, *nirgrantha* (possessionless and occupationless) gurus, but it's essential to understand that they cannot be recognized in this way. *ātmā* of the omniscient *deva* of *devas*, *arahaṇta*, *siddha*, and *ācārya*, *upādhyaya*, *muni*, etc., cannot be known by just inference.

One will not be able to buy diamonds and jewels if one goes to buy them with two pennies. If a beggar begs, he will get the leftover of a *laddu* (an Indian sweet) and not a full *laddu*, and he does not have the courage to ask for a full *laddu*. He lacks the courage to ask to see the house, wealth, or diamonds, etc.

In the same way, inference **knowledge is like a beggar; the *ātmās* of *pañca parameṣṭhī*, who are similar to diamonds, cannot be verified by it.** Just as a beggar does not dare to ask to be shown the diamonds, in the same way, **inference knowledge cannot verify the *ātmās* of *pañca parameṣṭhī*.**

The nature of self-*ātmā* is pure. A *jīva* who does not have belief, knowledge, and partial self-perception, free of attachment, that *jīva* cannot know the *ātmā* of the *pañca parameṣṭhī* merely through inference knowledge. A *mithyādrṣṭi* without self-perception *jñāna* may be an expert in *śāstras*. But by that *jñāna*, he just infers that *arahaṇta* should be so, or *munis* should be so. His total inference knowledge is not knowledge. Such an *ātmā* can never recognise the *pañca parameṣṭhī*.

pañca parameṣṭhī bhagavāna can be known through self-perception jñāna –

If *pañca parameṣṭhī* cannot be known just by inference *jñāna*, then through which *jñāna* would those *ātmās* be known? So it is said, 'Listen!' If you want to know these *ātmās*, then first manifest self-perception *jñāna* within you, and then through that *jñāna*, they can be known. *ātmā* is devoid of body, senses, and attachment without the support of non-self substance and mind. Have reverence and knowledge for such a self-*ātmā*.

1. By expanding the *jñāna* which is with self-perception and then inferring that an infinitesimal part of self-*jñāna* has opened, this infinitesimal *jñāna* will increase to become completely direct, which is capable of knowing the three time phases and three *lokas* in one *samaya*. If one believes this, then he can infer that *arahaṇta* and *siddhas* should be with this kind of completely direct *jñāna*. Their state of omniscience is one of detachment and independence. That state of omniscience should be accompanied by the ability to know the three times phases and three *lokas* in one *samaya*.

2. Partial self-perception *jñāna* manifests itself to the self; When other *sādhaka* (seeker) *jīva* manifests the self-perception *jñāna*, in its infinitesimal form, by taking auspice of the pure, independent substance which is without attachment, then they too are similar to the self. Those who are manifesting the pure state in its infinitesimal form and after that will manifest the complete pure state, those *sādhaka jīvas* are *ācārya upādhyāya*, and *muni*.

In this way, by expanding the *jñāna* of self-perception and deciding that in the *pañca parameṣṭhī*, how are the ones with complete omniscience and how are the *jñānī* who are not yet omniscient, then his determination is correct. In that *jñāna*, *pañca parameṣṭhī* are known. A *mithyādrashti*'s inferring knowledge devoid of self-perception does not know the *ātmās* of *pañca parameṣṭhīs*. Hence, by calling inferring knowledge to be in the form of a sign, with that sign, other *ātmās* cannot be known. This is the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa*. This, O disciple! should be known.

Just *anumāna* (inference) without *svasaṁvedana* (self-perception) is not *pramāṇa* (comprehensive) *jñāna*; instead, it is *mithyā jñāna* (false knowing) -

1. Activity in every substance's current modification occurs due to its ability; at that time, another circumstantial substance is called a *nimitta*. If no activity exists in *upādāna* (substantial cause), then other substances cannot be called *nimitta*. This means that without having activity in *upādāna*, another circumstantial substance cannot be alleged to be *nimitta*.
2. When a *jīva* manifests the right modification of *samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritra* at that time, the auspicious attachments towards *deva-śāstra-guru* are alleged to be *vyavahāra*. On the manifestation of true, unblemished modification, auspicious attachment is called *vyavahāra* by transferred epithet. If unblemished true modification is not manifested, then even the previous modification of *rāga* cannot be called *vyavahāra*. This means that there cannot be any *vyavahāra* without *nīścaya*.

With this logic, when a *jīva* manifests self-perception *jñāna* under the auspices of pure self, inference knowledge, along with self-perception *jñāna*, is said to be *pramāṇa jñāna* (comprehensive knowledge). Only inference knowledge without manifestation of self-perception *jñāna* is not said to be comprehensive knowledge; instead, it is called *mithyā jñāna*.

Nature of *bhāva namaskāra* (salutation/reverence with spiritual disposition) and its result –

One should know that *ātmā* of *pañca parameṣṭhī* is not known just by your *anumāna* (inference) *jñāna*. If one wants to know *pañca parameṣṭhī* and wants to pay salutation with a spiritual disposition, then the way a *muni* moves ahead with internal equanimity, along with *jñāna* and *arahaṇta*, *siddha* has become full *paramātmās*, the same way one, having *sraddhā-jñāna*, manifests self-perception. He will be able to infer with perception that *sarvajña bhagavāna* has achieved a perfect state.

It should be known that true knowing is *jñāna* of oneness of being knower-seer, with a pure nature devoid of *pūnya*, *vyavahāra*, and thought activity. After having such a self-perception *jñāna*, correct inference knowledge arises. Omniscients have attained the perfect status, and seekers have realized partially, and moving forward, they will achieve the perfect state. Therefore, *pañca parameṣṭhis*, who are non-self *ātmās*, have such an attribute of being knowable, and know accordingly.

Whichever *jīva* knows that the knowable attribute of *pañca parameṣṭhi* is such, has recognised them in the correct form and has performed the *bhāva namaskāra* (spiritual veneration).

Question: Will not the *kriyās* (religious activities), which one believes will stop if this is known in such detail?

Answer: Listen! Does one want peace and happiness? Want to follow dharma? Be it dharma, peace, happiness – all are one and the same. This peace can be attained by taking recourse of the true substance and not of the false substance. Hence, know the substance the way it is and experience the pure *ātmā* with self-perception *jñāna*. This is the reason for peace, and this is what continually increases to become perfect *kevaljñāna*. With this, total happiness and peace are attained; this is the *dhārmic* activity.

In this fifth point, it has been stated that one should understand that *ātmā* does not just make an inference.

In the fourth point, it was said that if another *jīva* tries to know ‘your *ātmā*’ or *ātmā* of *pañca parameṣṭhī* through just inference, they cannot be known. Here, in this fifth point, it is explained how the self is. Self is not the one to have just inference. If *ātmā* is with just inference, then there will not be an opportunity to manifest direct *kevaljñāna*, which is devoid of inference. The way the doer of the disposition of just *punya-pāpa* believes it to be the entirety, he is not called an *ātmā*. Similarly, one who just infers is not called the *ātmā*. With this, the following logic emerges –

1. If only manifested *pratyakṣa jñāna* is in the present modification, then the inferior *jñāna*, seen in the present modification of a non-omniscient, should not exist, but inferior *jñāna* is seen currently. Hence, *kevala pratyakṣa jñāna* does not exist in the present modification of a non-omniscient being. Such a decision is arrived at. Hence, there should be some such state in which partial direct and partial indirect *jñāna* can occur, which is the state of a seeker.
2. If partial direct and partial indirect *jñāna* are not there in a seeker's state, then the partial direct *jñāna* cannot increase to become fully direct, and there cannot be an absence of partial indirect *jñāna*. Hence, it is ascertained that in the state of the seeker, partial direct *jñāna* does exist.
3. In the state of a seeker, pure modification of right belief, knowledge, and conduct is partially manifested. At that time, concomitant *vyavahāra* is present in the form of attachment for *deva-śāstra-guru*.
4. And with exceptional effort, when modification of belief-knowledge-conduct is fully manifested, then *vyavahāra* in the form of auspicious attachment towards *deva-śāstra-guru* is entirely absent, and only *niscaya* (absolute truth) remains.

This means in a seeker's state, by concentrating on the knowing nature of *ātmā*, total direct *kevaljñāna* manifests. Then, indirect *jñāna* is entirely absent, and only complete direct *kevaljñāna* remains.

The meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* in this fifth point is thus: a = not, *liṅga* = only just inference, *grahaṇa* = know. 'You' are not the one who just infers. According to what has been said above, *kevaljñāna* will not occur with just inference. Hence, inference is always associated with self-perception in the state of the seeker. If the self *jñāna* does not have the action of knowing with self-perception, whether knowing the self or non-self, then that knowing is not correct. And *ātmā*, along with being the knower, is knowable, as well. He is not merely the inferer, but knows the self and non-self, insentient and sentient substances with self-perception. Such a nature of knowable *ātmā* should be known.

The secret of the term 'tū jān' (you should know)

Śrī Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācārya Bhagavāna has said 'know' in the *gāthā*. Afterwards, Shri Amritcandra Ācārya explained the concept of *aliṅgrahaṇa* in twenty points, elaborating on different *bhāvas* (spiritual understandings) and stating, "know such a *ātmā*." He is a *muni* of the fifth era. The fifth era is challenging; therefore, the question arises whether these words are intended for the *jīvas* of the fourth era? Listen! That is not how it is. If a *jīva* of the fifth era would not be able to understand this lesson and exposition, then how can the

guru order that ‘you should know’? This exposition is intended for *jīvas* of the fifth era, and he is confident that they will understand it. A natural coincidence has taken place. **When an evolved guru orders, ‘you should know,’ at that time, it is not possible that there would be no knower of these secrets.** There is a mutual *nimitta-naimittika* relationship between the explainer and the percipient. Ācārya said, ‘You should know’; hence, the self *ātmā* can be known, and no period or era can be an obstruction to that. Thinking so, an effort should be made to understand the nature of *ātmā* just the way it is.

The way a *jīva* who believes that there is benefit from *pūnya-pāpa* does not know the *ātmā*. Similarly, a *jīva* who believes that *jñāna* is through the senses and is just an inference does not know the *ātmā*. If one knows the correct nature of the *jīva*, then *dharma* arises.

These five points are over. The explanation was from the viewpoint of *nāsti* (non-existence) in these. In the sixth point, the narration is from the viewpoint of *asti* (existence).

Sixth *bola* (point)

One who is not perceived through *līṅga* (mark) but is known by the pure nature of the substance is *alīṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* is the direct knower. Such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* is a direct knower; this should be understood accordingly -**

ātmā cannot be known through any outer sign, inference, etc., the five signs mentioned above. But he is known by his nature. ***ātmā* is known by his nature – by stating so, he is incapable of being known through just indirect inference. In the same way, he cannot be known through the support of the senses and the mind. Such a statement from the view of non-existence is implied within.** This point is stated from the view of existence.

Even though indirectness is present, why was it said that *ātmā* is the direct knower?

Here, the discussion is about a seeker’s state. There is nothing left for the *kevalī* to know, because he has become the complete direct knower. Then what is it here that brings out the meaning that he is the direct knower? Though *kevalī* is the direct knower, even then, why has it been said ‘the direct knower’ here? **Because a seeker believes his *ātmā* is a direct knower. A seeker has partial indirectness; here, that is taken as secondary. Directness is primary.** One who does not believe his *ātmā* to be free from attachment and support of the mind does not believe himself to be the direct knower. He will never have *dharma*.

It has been said that *ātmā* does not know the self and non-self through the senses. Senses cannot know *ātmā*. Signs perceptible by the senses cannot know *ātmā*. *ātmā* cannot be

known by just inferring knowledge. *ātmā* cannot know the self and non-self by just inferring knowledge. *ātmā* cannot be known through these five *liṅgas* (marks). Hence, *ātmā* is the direct knower; such a meaning is derived.

The result of the belief and knowledge that *ātmā* is a direct knower is *kevalajñāna* –
If a *jīva* believes attachment to be his nature, he can never be free from attachment. But **despite having attachment at that time, his eternal nature is devoid of attachment. If he has such a belief-knowledge, then partial detachment manifests. After that, with increasing equanimity, a state of total passionlessness manifests.**

From this logic, if *ātmā*'s nature is indirect *jñāna*, then *ātmā* cannot be free from it. Because a substance that is eternally mine cannot be separated. Numerous *jīvas* have attained omniscience by annihilating indirect *jñāna* and manifesting complete direct *jñāna*. Hence, indirect *jñāna* is not the eternal nature of *ātmā*; this is decided. Therefore, *ātmā* cannot be known by the five signs mentioned above. Then what is *ātmā*? *ātmā* is a direct knower. **Even though indirect *jñāna* is present currently, my nature is to be a direct knower. By believing so and having such knowledge, partial direct *jñāna* manifests, and on increasing exceptionally, *kevalajñāna* is attained.**

In this sixth point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is thus – a = not, *liṅga* = by just indirect *jñāna*, and *grahaṇa* = know. *ātmā* does not remain as just an indirect knower; he is a direct knower.

The nature of activity –

Question: After understanding this, should the activity of *paṣadha* (fasting along with extended meditation), *pratikramaṇa* (seeking forgiveness), etc., be done?

Answer: *ātmā* can never perform a bodily activity. The auspicious disposition of devotion, etc., is the auspicious inflow of *karmas*, which is a blemished activity and an impure disposition. How can a disposition that is against nature help nature? It can never help. Auspicious disposition is a protection from inauspiciousness, but believing it to be *dharma* or that it assists in *dharma* is falsity. *ātmā* is the direct knower-seer; this belief-knowledge should arise first. This is the first religious activity, and thereafter, focusing on it and manifesting direct *kevalajñāna* is the activity of *mokṣa*.

The result of true belief is that only *kevalajñāna* will exist -

Here, the discussion is on the belief in the direct nature of *jñāna*. The way, on the completion of a seeker's state, only absolute truth remains, and there is an absence of

conventionality, meaning attachment. But it is not possible that only *vyavahāra* exists. In the same way, it never happens that there is only inferential knowledge. **But *ātmā* is the direct knower; by entirely concentrating on it, direct *jñāna* manifests, and that always exists by itself.** However, indirect *jñāna* is completely annihilated. In this way, the meaning is derived that *ātmā* is the direct knower. A *jīva* who imbibes this understanding within himself (establishes it) can be a direct knower in his modification.

Question: Who gets such a disposition? *bhagavāna*?

Answer: *bhagavāna* has already achieved this. There is nothing left for Him to do. One who does not have partial direct *jñāna* is a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*. Here, he has not been counted as *ātmā*. He is unaware of the powers he is filled with. But a seeker thinks that his *ātmā* is a direct knower with self-perception, devoid of attachment. He does not need body, mind, speech, *deva-śāstra-guru*, auspicious attachments, etc. His need is restricted to only his *ātmā*. He does not require any outer *liṅga* (marks/characteristics) for his *jñāna*. His nature is just being a direct knower. By having such a belief-knowledge, he achieves a state of *dharma*. Thus, *ātmā*, who has attained *dharma*, brings out the essence from the word *aliṅgrahāṇa*.

Ācārya Bhagavāna tells his disciple with the same thoughts, Oh disciple! ‘Your *ātmā* is a direct knower’. *ātmā* is the direct knower, and this should be known.

Seventh *bola* (point)

That which does not have *grahāṇa* of (is not known) by way of *liṅga* (mark/sign/characteristic) or by the characteristic of *upayoga* (psychic activity) or does not have the auspice of the knowables substances is *aliṅgrahāṇa*. Thus, ‘*jñāna* does not take the support of external substances’; such a meaning is derived.

***upayoga* does not have the auspice of knowable substances; one should have such knowledge –**

In the first five points, substance (*ātmā*) has been mentioned from the view of *nāsti* (non-existence). *ātmā* is not such that it can be known by any external characteristics. In this way, *ātmā* has been explained from the point of *nāsti* (non-existence). In the sixth point, *ātmā* is discussed from the viewpoint of *asti*. **Now, in the seventh point, *ātmā* is explained by the modification of the attribute of knowledge - *upayoga*.**

Here, the meaning of *liṅga* is psychic thought activity. One who does not have the support of *liṅga*, meaning an attribute named *upayoga*, meaning does not have the focus on

knowable substance, is *alingrahaṇa*. This way, *jñāna* is one that does not require the support of substances outside of *ātmā*. Such a meaning is derived.

Question: If there is no support from *deva-śāstra-guru*, etc., knowable substances, then why should temples be built and have *pañca kalyaṇaka*, etc.?

Answer: *ātmā* who has attained dharma, that *jīva* takes auspices of his nature and reveres the pure nature. Auspicious attachments arise for a seeker to save him from an inauspicious disposition. It has been explained at that time what kind of *nimittas* are present. But that does not mean that his *jñāna* has arisen with the auspice of *deva*, *guru*, or temples. *jñāna* cannot occur because of *deva-śāstra-guru* because they are non-self-knowable, meaning that a *dharmātmā jīva* is not dependent on them.

From the view of absolute truth, *jīva* does not pay obeisance to *deva*, *śāstra*, *guru*, but he bows to his pure nature. When *vikalpa* (thoughts/psychic activity) arises, then attention moves towards the *deva* and *guru*. But even at that time, he does not deviate from the reverence of his pure nature.

In today's world, the talk of truth is rare. When the truth is revealed, there are both types of people: those who understand and those who oppose. What is there to talk about in today's times? Before Ṛṣabhaveda Bhagavāna's discourse emanated, there were *yugaliyas* (twins) who had only one *gati*, which was of *deva*. *jīva* had such associated dispositions. But when Ṛṣabhaveda Bhagavāna's speech emanated and *jīvas* heard it, four *gatis* (life forms) started. *ātmās* started going to twenty-four *daṇḍaka* (all places of *loka* and all classifications of living beings), and to *siddha gati* as well. Few attained *siddha gati*, few became *sādhakas*, and few even went to *nāraka-nigoda*. This did not happen due to speech, but rather according to their capabilities. When this happened during *Bhagavāna*'s time, it is unsurprising that this happens today.

***upayoga* does not take the support of an external substance –**

Here, *upayoga* is being discussed. Psychic activity is the attribute or sign of sentience. It takes the support of *ātmā*. The substance *ātmā* is knowable, attribute is also knowable, and the modification is also knowable. Psychic activity is also knowable. The nature of psychic activity is to know-see; it does not support non-self knowables because they do not have psychic activity. How can one take the support of one that is not within the self? Non-self-knowables do not possess the nature of knowing-seeing, meaning they lack *upayoga*. Hence, the nature of *upayoga* is not to take the support of the non-self.

Question: What if one believes that because he follows vows and has gained the *pratimā* (stages of spiritual development), he does not need to understand all this, and he cannot see any mistake in his beliefs.

Answer: **One who believes there is no mistake within himself can never be free of mistakes.** One who recognizes he has a deficiency has an opportunity to overcome it. But thinking there is no deficiency does not allow overcoming it. Till there is no passionlessness in a *samsārī jīva*, mistakes will remain. **Accept that mistakes are within oneself, and then the mistakes can be corrected.** However, believing that there is no mistake in the self and that the self is devoid of it, thus having pride in outer rituals, is a mistake. **Hence, what is a mistake in the self-jīva? By acknowledging and accepting this, he should strive to remove them.**

Here, the distinguishing characteristic of *upayoga* is to know and see, and that characteristic imparts knowledge of *lakṣya* (final cause), one to be attained, so it is said.

Question: *ātmā*'s *upayoga* has been on non-self since eternity, but when will he improve? Will he improve with auspicious dispositions or with the support of *deva-śāstra-guru*?

Answer: **Modification of *upayoga* is without any cause/reason.** It is a misconception to believe that *upayoga* can change with the support of auspicious attachment or the support of *deva-śāstra-guru*. *upayoga* only takes the support of *ātmā*. The way the *ātmā* substance is without cause, his attributes are also without cause. They have no cause. Similarly, modification is also without any cause. *upayoga* is the modification of the attribute of *jñāna*, and there is no reason for it. It never happens that modification of *upayoga* can improve due to *deva-śāstra-guru* or auspicious attachments. **Modification in the form of *upayoga* is causeless; hence, *upayoga* becomes clean by taking the auspice of his pure *ātmā*.**

***jñāna* is free from *jñeya* –**

ātmā does not take the support of non-self knowables, but his modification of *jñāna* is *upayoga*, and that too does not take the support of knowables. The nature of *upayoga* is to know and see. It does not know because of knowables. One should know that this is the nature of *upayoga*. *upayoga* is causeless, know so. If there is an absence of non-self-knowables in *upayoga*, how can it take their support? It never happens, but the statement can be from the view of *vyavahāra*. There, the *jīva* makes a mistake due to ignorance.

Question: Does *jñāna* take the support of knowables or not?

Answer: When modification of *jñāna* occurs, at that time, *jñeya* are *nimitta*; in this way, understanding of *nimitta* is imparted.

1. *jñāna* is not so dependent that it occurs with the support of infinite knowables.
2. A *jīva* knows in the present, so knowables had to come. That is not true as neither is so dependent.
3. When *upayoga* takes the support of those *jñeya*, it improves; this also is incorrect. **Because *jñāna* never takes the support of the *jñeyas*.**
4. It is not so because there are infinite non-self *jñeyas*, so *upayoga* attempts to know the non-self. **Because the nature of *upayoga* is to know both self and non-self, and not because of the presence of non-self.** *upayoga* is active due to the support of its independent *ātmā*.

***jñāna*, which focuses only on non-self, is not *jñāna* –**

jñāna, which manifests only with the focus on non-self, with the auspice of non-self, is not *jñāna*. Singularly, one-sided *jñāna* accompanied by *nimitta*, with the support of mind, with the support of senses, with the support of *pañca parmeṣṭhī*, with the support of scriptures, is not called *jñāna*. It is called erroneous *jñāna*. Here, it has not been included in *upayoga*.

The nature of *vyavahāra* (conventionality) and *nimitta* in the state of a seeker –

The pure *ātmā* is a knower-seer. By believing in and knowing him, the *jñāna*, which looks inwards, is called *jñāna*. Until a *samyagdrṣṭi* attains a state of complete passionlessness, auspicious attachments arise, and the thought of following true *deva-śāstra-guru* emerges. Due to the role of attachment, focus shifts on the non-self; however, since *deva-śāstra-guru* are present, the focus is on them. Such is not the belief of a religious person.

In a seeker's state, *vyavahāra* coexists with *niścaya*, during which there is a focus on true *deva-guru-śāstra*, but never on false *deva-guru-śāstra*. It is not the case that attachment arises simply because true *deva-śāstra-gurus* are present. Instead, in conjunction with the understanding of the state of *niścaya*, attachment occurs to the *jīvas*. The relationship between *nimitta-naimittika* is illustrated in this state in relation to attachment and true *deva-guru-śāstra*.

Question: Is there any difference between the cause of bondage of *karma* due to auspicious *vyavahāra* in the form of believing in true *deva-śāstra-guru* and the bondage of *karma* in the form of inauspicious *vyavahāra* of believing in *kudeva*, etc.?

Answer: Both types of attachments are futile. Both cause bondage of *karma*; *ātmā* does not attain *dharma* by any kind of attachment. The way water exists due to water, even then, there is the presence of a pot to fill water, and it cannot be filled in a cloth; there is such a coalescence. In the same way, both the auspicious attachment of true *deva-śāstra-guru* and the inauspicious attachment related to false *deva-śāstra-guru* are futile for the nature of sentience. Both are the cause of bondage. Still, true *deva-śāstra-guru* are present in the form of *nimitta* to a *sādhaka jīva*. It is not so that because an auspicious attachment occurred, a true *deva-śāstra-guru* has to come. It is also not so that, because true *deva-gurus* are present, auspicious attachments occur. Still, true *deva-śāstra-guru*, and non-else, are always a *nimitta* during auspicious attachment – such is the coalescence.

***jñāna upayoga* does not take the support of auspicious attachment –**

Here, it has been highlighted that **although attachment is present in the state of thought activity, there is no focus on *raga* in the *jñāna upayoga* of one who has attained the experience of self. During that time, the self's nature is a knower-seer, and *upayoga* only takes its support.** Attachment is knowable, and in the *jñāna*, there is an eternal absence of knowable. Hence, *upayoga* is devoid of attachment.

***jñeya* is in *jñeya*, *jñeya* is not in the *jñāna upayoga* –**

Question: Did you remove all the *jñeyas* by saying so?

Answer: There is no question of removing *jñeyas*. The question of removal arises only when a substance has mixed with another or has entered it. However, when a substance is not contained within another, there is no question of removing it. *pañca parmeṣṭhī*, etc., are externally knowable and are within themselves. They are absent in *jñāna upayoga*. Auspicious attachment is also knowable and is absent in *jñāna upayoga*. *upayoga* belongs to self-*ātmā*; it can be said that it is within the *ātmā*.

The meaning of *alīṅgrahaṇa* in this seventh point is – a = not, *liṅga* = *upayoga*, *grahaṇa* = support of *jñeya* substances. *upayoga* does not take the support of *jñeya* substances. This is the meaning of *alīṅgrahaṇa*.

***upayoga*, which does not have the support of knowable substances but has the support of the self-*ātmā*, that *ātmā* which has the characteristics of this *upayoga*, thus known your self-knowable.** Thus, *ātmā* does not have *jñāna* combined with the support of external substances, but his *jñāna* is with the support of the self; This self-*jñeya* should be known in the form of *ātmā*.

Eighth bola (point)

One who does not know or bring (*grahaṇa*) the *līṅga* (sign) meaning attribute named *upayoga*, meaning he does not obtain it from outside, is *alīṅgrahaṇa*; such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* does not bring *upayoga* from outside, so you should know -**

In this eighth point, it is said that *upayoga* cannot be brought from outside. Since eternity, the *upayoga* (focus) of a false believer has been towards the non-self. Would the *upayoga* (focus) of the one with erroneous beliefs improve if he were to attend religious discourses, listen to them, etc., and have auspicious thoughts, etc.? It will not improve. ***upayoga* cannot be brought from outside; it manifests from within. It does not manifest due to any external reason. Hence, it is without any cause.**

Thus, to have the true belief-knowledge of *ātmā*'s *upayoga* is the cause of *dharma*.

***jñāna upayoga* is without any support, that should be known –**

- In the first point, it was said that *ātmā* is a substance; it is not its nature to know the self and non-self through the senses.
- In the second point, it was said that it is not the nature of *ātmā* to be known through the senses.
- In the third point, it is said that fire can be known by way of smoke, but it is not the nature of *ātmā* to be known by inference through the senses.
- In the fourth point, it was said that *ātmā* is not a knowable substance that can be known just by inference of another. If another *jīva* were to know *ātmā* through self-perception *jñāna*, devoid of attachments, then it can be known.
- In the fifth point, it was said that *ātmā*'s nature is not to know other *ātmā* just through inference. He can know through self-perception *jñāna*.
- In the sixth point, it was stated that *ātmā* is a discernible/direct knower. Its knowing nature is devoid of any correlation with non-self substance. It is its nature to know directly the self by way of self.
- In the seventh point, it was stated that the substance is explained in the preceding six points. In the seventh point, *jñāna upayoga* is explained. *upayoga* is also knowable.

The nature of that knowable is stated as follows –

Initially, *jñāna* was incomplete, but it later developed. At that time, *nimitta* and external substances were present. So, did it grow because of them? Or did it grow by taking support of the other substances? The answer is no. *upayoga* does not rely on external non-self

substances for support. Similarly, *jñāna* does not occur due to the *nimitta* of *jñeya* in *jñāna*. That *jñāna* occurs due to the support of his knower-seer nature.

Now, in this eighth point, it is said that the increase in *jñāna upayoga* does not come from outside. It should be understood so -

One that does not bring the *līṅga* (sign) or the attribute of *upayoga*, or does not bring it from outside, he himself, is *alīṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* is with such a *jñāna* which is not brought from anywhere else. Such a meaning is derived.

First, there was a deficiency in *jñāna*'s modification. Subsequently, there was an increase in *jñāna*. Did that increase come from outside? In the seventh point, it was said that *jñāna upayoga* does not have the support of *deva-śāstra-guru*; then how did the increase occur without their support?

Listen! It does not come from outside but rather from the internal *tattva*. In the eighth point, it is said that *jñāna* cannot be brought from non-self. That *jñāna*, which actively leaves the support of knower-seer pure nature and focuses on *nimitta*, is not called *jñāna upayoga*. Just as acquiring knowledge through the senses is not called *ātmā*; similarly, *upayoga*, which takes the support of non-self, is not called *upayoga*.

An ignorant person argues that the statement that substance-*guṇa* is eternal in one form, which does not require support, is correct. However, the sequential modifications are not of one form, and *jñāna*'s unique, unblemished state is of many types. Will they not be occurring with the support of *jñeyas*? Is it because of the support of the mind and auspicious attachment that purity increases? No, the increase in purity does not come from non-self substance or auspicious attachment. It comes from the constant nature of the self. As inner equanimity continues to increase, it becomes more evident on the outside.

Why is it said that the majesty of *jñāna* is due to the legacy of past *ācāryas*?

Question: If it is said that purity manifests from within, then KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācārya Bhagavāna has said in the fifth verse of *Samayasāra* that 'birth of my *saṁvedana jñāna* is because of the grace of preaching of past *ācāryas*, and I have got this magnificence due to the legacy of those *ācāryas*' – why is that so?

Answer: Whenever a *jñānī* with the auspice of his sentience, whose nature is *jñāna*, maintains the unabated flow of his *jñāna*, then he imparts the knowledge of what kind of *ācāryas* were those who are in the form of *nimitta*, to this *jñāna*. Every *ātmā* maintains the flow of his *jñāna*. What sort of *nimitta* was present during that time is

informed. The way there is an alliance in the tradition of *jñānīs* of maintaining the *jñāna*. Similarly, by showing a coalition of the tradition of *nimitta*, the *nimitta-naimittika* relationship is shown.

Who is the cause of a sudden increase in the *jñāna upayoga*?

Before Gautam Gaṇadhara approached Mahāvīra Prabhu, his *jñāna* was significantly inferior. Then he went to *Bhagavāna's samvaśaraṇa*. After listening to *Bhagavāna's* discourse, the *jñāna* of twelve *angas* and fourteen *pūrvas* manifested. First, there was *mati* (sensory) and *śruta* (auditory) *jñāna*, and then, in a short time, he became the possessor of the four *jñānas*. From where did so much *jñāna* come? Did it come from the discourse of *Bhagavāna*? Did it come by focusing on *nimitta*?

A *jīva* may have ordinary *mati-śruta jñāna* and subsequently with efforts and focus manifests *kevaljñāna*, within forty-eight minutes. Then, from where did so much growth come? Here also, before listening, *jñāna* is deficient; on hearing words and speech, *jñāna* increases. Does this increase come from speech?

An ignorant says that all *ātmās* are replete with pure *substance-guṇas* (substance-attribute), and the growth is seen in the manifestation of modification. Whenever *nimitta* is present, it increases; when it is absent, it does not increase.

jñānī says it is not so. This increase does not come because of auspicious attachment and non-self substance. There is an internal storehouse of *jñāna's* efficacy, which manifests due to effort. Waves of high tide of *jñāna* toss up from the depth of the sentient ocean.

pravacana samudra biṇḍu meṇ, uchṭī āve jaise |
pūrva caudaha ki labdhi kā. udaharaṇa bhī taise (Śrīmad Rājachandra)

What is the reason for high tides in an ocean? Was it because there were heavy rains? Was it because many rivers converge into the sea? No. However, many rivers converge, and although much rain may occur, the sea's high tide is still not dependent on external water. The high tide occurs at the centre of the ocean.

By the same logic, the high tide of *jñāna* bounces from the centre of sentient nature. *ātmā* is of a sentient and blissful nature. By focusing on it, the efficacies present within manifest. It does not increase due to external speech, *bhagavāna* or guru, or any kind of auspicious

attachment. It does not have the support of attachment or hearing. Those waves of *jñāna* arise and manifest from the ocean of internal efficacious nature.

When *jñāna* is increasing, at that time, external substances are merely *upacāra* (in name only) –

Someone says that reading scriptures increases *jñāna*. Scriptures also write that *jñāna* increases when a disciple reads with humility. Reading under the guidance of a guru also increases *jñāna*. Even KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācārya has said that with the benevolence of the guru, he has attained the grandeur of *jñāna*. All these are conventional statements. When *jñāna* increases from his pure nature because of himself, then guru, scriptures, etc., are called *nimitta* by *upacāra* (in name only). These are external *nimitta*. In fact, *jñāna* arises from within.

Question: If *jñāna* arises from within, then which type of support is there from the temple, idol, Samayasāra, etc.?

Answer: Listen! All these things do not come due to *ātmā*, and *ātmā* does not take their support. When a *jīva* has an auspicious attachment, he focuses on these substances. When he increases his *jñāna* himself, these substances are then called *nimitta*.

Nature of *upayoga* –

ātmā does the activity of knowing through the senses is not called the *ātmā*; similarly, one who believes himself to be a virtuous person, or a sinner is not called an *ātmā*. In the same way, *upayoga*, which leaves the support of his pure, knowing-seeing nature and takes the support of non-self, meaning *deva-śāstra-guru*, etc., external *nimitta*, or of speech or attachment, is not called *upayoga*.

An *ātmā* that focuses on his non-sensory nature, leaving the focus on the senses, and knows himself to be pure and free of *puṇya-pāpa* is only an *ātmā*. In the same way, leaving the support of *deva-śāstra-guru*, speech, auspicious attachment, and infinite substances, one who focuses his *upayoga* within his knowing nature is only called *upayoga*.

In this eighth point, the meaning of *alīṅgrahāṇa* is thus – a = not, *līṅga* = psychic activity (*upayoga*), *grahāṇa* = to get from outside, meaning increase in *upayoga* of *jñāna* does not come from outside. Such is the nature of *jñeya* in the form of *upayoga*. Hence, *ātmā* does not bring *jñāna* from outside; It should be known that the self is such a self-knowable.

Ninth *bola* (point)

As *liṅga*, meaning attribute named *upayoga*, cannot be taken away (cannot be moved from another) therefore, it is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, ‘*ātmā*’s *jñāna* cannot be taken away’ such a meaning is derived.

Misconception of an ignorant regarding *upayoga* –

An ignorant person believes that his son has created discord in the house; hence, his *jñāna* has deviated. If the body is sick, then *jñāna* is reduced. While sitting in meditation, someone came to hit with a sword, hence, his *upayoga* faltered. The self was keen to meditate, but could not do so as the spouse and son created a cacophony. An ignorant person indulges in many such misconceptions about *upayoga* that the *upayoga* of the self gets deviated due to the surrounding noise. At the time of *pariṣaha* (afflictions), *upayoga* does not work. When *sattvika* food is consumed, *upayoga* remains good, but consuming a poor meal impairs *upayoga*. While hearing abuses, which feel like insect bites, *upayoga* moves away. If the body is strong, then *upayoga* remains strong.

No one can take away the wealth of *upayoga* –

All these are misconceptions of the ignorant. There is a total absence of external insentient and sentient substances in the *ātmā*. How can they harm the *upayoga* of *ātmā*? It can never harm. It is not the nature of *upayoga* of *jñāna* that it would increase during favorable circumstances and reduce during unfavorable circumstances. Plus, it is not so that if insentient *karma* is feeble, then *upayoga* increases, and when it is strong, *upayoga* is inferior.

It is said that a thief stole or took certain items. Similarly, can this wealth in the form of *upayoga* be stolen by anyone? No. The wealth of *jñāna upayoga* cannot be taken away or stolen by anyone.

apratihata (uninterrupted) *upayoga* –

The nature of *jñāna upayoga* is that the non-self cannot harm it because the non-self substance is incapable of doing anything in *jñāna*. However, here, the discussion is not about the *upayoga* of *jñāna*, which is modified as inferior due to the weakness of *rāga*. This has not been called *upayoga*. Because *upayoga* takes the auspices of the sentient nature and works accordingly, that *upayoga* does not have attachment, then how can it be inferior? ***upayoga*, with the support of the self, is one with *ātmā*, which is called *upayoga* here.** How can the non-self take away *upayoga*, which even the self cannot? *upayoga*, which moves away, is not taken as *upayoga* here but as something that increases by taking

the auspices and being one with the sentient; such an uninterrupted *upayoga* has been called *upayoga*.

That which is stuck in *nimitta* and *rāga* is not *upayoga* –

Those *jīvas* who do not understand their nature are not *ātmā. upayoga*, which does not take the auspice of self-substance and wanders in non-self, is not called *upayoga*. The way *ātmā* is *anādi-ananta*, not because of anyone else; similarly, *upayoga* cannot be brought from, increased, or decreased due to external causes. *upayoga*, which does not leave the auspice of substance and does not take the auspice of non-self, only that is *upayoga*. ***upayoga*'s nature does not leave the auspice of substance, meaning it increases with being one within nature, and does not take the auspice of non-self, meaning it is never taken away.** One that stops at *nimitta* and *rāga* is not *upayoga* at all.

***upayoga* is a modification. Who can take away 'that which exists'?**

There are three substances in this universe: substance-attribute-modification. The way substance is a knowable, attribute is knowable; similarly, modification is also knowable. *upayoga* is the modification of the attribute of *jñāna*, which is also knowable. This chapter is on knowables. In this, modification-*jñeya* (knowable-modification) is explained. In the seventh point, it was said that the modification of *jñāna* does not require the support of non-self.

Knowable substance – *upayoga*, which is 'there, there, there,' why should it have the support of non-self?

Knowable substance – *upayoga*, which is 'there, there, there', how can it be brought from outside?

Knowable substance – which is 'there, there, there,' how can anyone take it away?

In the seventh point, it was said that *upayoga*, which is there, cannot have the auspice of non-self. In the eighth point, it was said that it cannot be brought from outside, and in the ninth point, it was said that no one can take it away. The way substance exists, attribute exists, in the same way modification also exists. Hence, *jñāna* is in the form of modification of *upayoga*. Who can take it away? If anyone says it can be taken away, its existence will not remain. The belief in its existence does not remain. Hence, if it is believed that modification exists, then the doubt that it can be taken away will not remain.

Fifth era or adversity cannot take away *jñāna upayoga* –

The nature of the knowable modification is such that it cannot be brought by *nimitta* or from outside. It does not leave the auspice of the self, and it is not so that someone can take it away. What is the activity of *jñāna*? *jñāna*'s work is not to take the support of knowables; its work is not to arise from outside, and it cannot become deficient because of others. This is the nature of this knowable.

jīvas of this world say that, due to being born in this fifth era, *upayoga* is inferior, but this is a false statement. It is not the nature of *upayoga* to become inferior. An ignorant person believes his prestige is destroyed by losing wealth or experiencing adversity. But what has been destroyed? The thoughts that prestige was there till wealth and favourable circumstances existed, and with adversity, prestige is destroyed, all these are newly created imagination. **The nature of the modification of *jñāna* is not that it will get destroyed under adverse circumstances.**

If any *jīva* falls in succession from the eleventh *guṇasthāna* to become one sensed being, then that *jīva*'s *jñāna-upayoga* is not called *upayoga*. ***upayoga*, which turns within, towards the *ātmā*, is called *upayoga*.** One that remains with non-self and attachment is not called *upayoga*. ***upayoga*'s nature is not to get hit by the non-self and not to move away from the self, but to be at one with the self.**

In this ninth point, the meaning of *alīṅgrahana* is thus – *a* = not, *liṅga* = *upayoga*, *grahana* = to be taken away by non-self. This means *upayoga* cannot be taken away by the non-self. Thus, *ātmā*'s *jñāna* cannot be moved, which is the nature of *upayoga*. *upayoga* is also knowable. Oh, disciple! You know your knowable, which is in the form of *upayoga*.

Tenth *bola* (point)

In whose *liṅga*, i.e., the characteristic by the name of *upayoga* has no blemish, meaning like the sun, it has no blemishes, is *alīṅgrahana*; thus, *ātmā*'s nature is pure *upayoga*, such a meaning is derived.

Substance-*guṇa* is eternally pure, but as explained in this point, there is no blemish even in *upayoga*. It is said the moon is blemished, but there is no blot on the sun. The way there is no blemish in the sun. Similarly, *upayoga* is also free of blemishes like the sun.

Songs of self-nature are only the hymnology of God –

The shape of a deer can be seen in the moon. On seeing it, Padmānaṇḍi Ācārya Bhagavāna, setting his words in an endearing tune, sings the praises of *Bhagavāna*. He says, " O *Bhagavāna*, O Lord! *devīs* of *Caṇḍraloka*, sing your praises, with the accompaniment of *sītāra*. It is so melodious and filled with reverence that even the deer goes there to hear it". *devīs*, *apsarās* (celestial dancers), *devas*, all sing in the devotion of *Bhagavāna*, and from the *Madhyaloka* (middle world), the deer has gone there. So, the *nirgrantha* (without knots of passions/ passionless) *munis* sing in praise of this pure nature of self, which is the song of *Bhagavāna* as well. **Because from the view of *niscaya*, there is no difference between the nature of self and the nature of *Bhagavāna***

What is *upayoga*?

Here, the discussion is of *śuddhopayoga*. There is no blemish in *śuddhopayoga*. *upayoga*, which increases with focus on the non-self and is destroyed by staying in the non-self, is not called *upayoga*. Dispositions of charity, piety, desire, and anger are not *ātmā*. It is *un-ātmā*, the disposition of *adharma*. They are not dispositions of *dharma*. This impure *upayoga* is not called *upayoga* at all. An ignorant person believes that a blemish is his *upayoga* – but it is a delusion.

It is said that the way the substance is pure, the attribute is pure; in the same way, modification of *jñāna* is pure. Self's knowing-seeing nature is pure in that the modification which becomes one, that modification is called *upayoga*, and the pure-natured *ātmā* has been called *ātmā*.

For a *jñānī*, the presence of attachment in the present is due to weakness. *upayoga* related to attachment has also not been called *upayoga*. Purity arises from embracing one's pure nature. That purity is called *upayoga*.

In this tenth point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is thus – *a* = not, *liṅga* = *upayoga*, *grahaṇa* = blemish. This means one that does not have a blemish, and whose *upayoga* is such a characteristic. Such a pure nature is *ātmā*; such a self-knowable should be known.

Eleventh *bola* (point)

From the *liṅga*, meaning through the characteristic named *upayoga*, that is, the one who does not have *grahaṇa* of non-living *karma*, is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* is disconnected from physical *karma*; such a meaning is derived.

upayoga does not accept physical karmic matter; so it should be known -

upayoga does not accept *dravya-karma* (physical karmic matter), and it is not *nimitta* in the inflow of physical karmic matter, so it is said here.

***śuddhopayoga* does not even have a *nimitta-naimittika* relationship with insentient karma -**

Question: It is mentioned in the texts that because of passion, *sthiti baṇḍha* (duration of *karmas*), *anubhāga baṇḍha* (intensity of karma) occurs, and *prakṛiti baṇḍha* (type of bondage) and *pradeśa baṇḍha* (quantity of *karmas*) occur because of *yog* (vibration of space points of *ātmā*). Because of this, insentient *karmas* arrive. Whereas it is said here that physical karmic matter is not even *nimitta* in *upayoga*, then what is the reason?

Answer: *yog* (vibrational activity) and *kaṣāya* (passions) are forms of distorted modifications, and they are not called *ātmā*. **In the tenth point, it was said that there is no defilement in *upayoga*.** When there is no defilement of *upayoga*, how can *upayoga* accept the physical karmic matter that comes due to its *nimitta*? In which way can *upayoga* be *nimitta* to physical karmic matter? This means it does not accept, and similarly, it is not *nimitta*. Defilement is in the form of *nimitta* when insentient *karmas* come because of themselves in the same space as *ātmā*. But when there is no defilement in *upayoga*, the *nimitta-naimittika* relationship, which is present between defilement and insentient *karma*, is not present in *upayoga*. **Here, the *nimitta-naimittika* relation is removed. *śuddhopayoga* does not have such a *nimitta-naimittika* relationship.**

The way, general substance, and attribute of *ātmā* do not accept insentient *karma*; similarly, pure psychic activity also does not accept *karma*. Here, the topic being discussed is not about accepting karma, but the substance-attribute is not *nimitta* in the physical karmic matter which came because of its own self, and neither is *śuddhopayoga* the *nimitta*.

Question: It is mentioned in the texts that *jīva virya ki sphurana grahaṇa kare jada dhūpa* (*jīva* is the manifestation of the efficacy to accept the obscuration of insentience). However, here it is rejected that with the contrary effort, *ātmā* embraces the insentient. What is the explanation?

Answer: There, the impure modification of *jīva* is being proved. With *jīvas* adverse efforts, he has a *nimitta-naimittika* relation with insentient *karma*. There, it is not to say that impure modification of *jīva* accepts touches or attracts karma, but to show the ***nimitta-naimittika* relation between *aśuddha upādāna* and insentient *karma*.** Here, the explanation is of ***śuddhopayoga*, in which defilement is absent.** Hence, it does not attract *karma*, or there is no *nimitta-naimittika* relationship, so it is said.

***sādhaka jīva* primarily focuses on *śuddhopayoga* every *samaya* –**

Thus, complete *ātmā* is pure substance, pure *guṇa*, and pure *upayoga*. The associated modification of *nimitta-naimittika* relationship is called *unātmā*; it is not *ātmā*. It is mentioned many times in Gommatasāra what type of bondage a *jīva* in the fourth stage of evolution has, as well as what type the one in the sixth stage of evolution has. All these are mentioned to explain the kind of *nimitta-naimittika* relationship between *aśuddha upādāna* and insentient *karma*. But *śuddhopayoga* present in that stage has no relationship with insentient *karma*. There is very little impurity in the state of a seeker. It is taken as secondary, and *śuddhopayoga*, which leans towards nature, is taken as primary and impurity is said to be non-*ātmā*. This is about the seeker. To a seeker, the focus is primarily on the self, who is the pure nature of the knower-seer. He has no importance and takes as secondary the dispositions of auspicious-inauspicious modification. He does not see them as primary. **If impure modification is taken as primary, for even one *samaya*, he does not remain a seeker and becomes a *mithyādrṣṭi*.** A seeker always sees as primary the modification of the pure knower, which is directed towards the pure self, and which is unseparated from the pure nature of self.

From the point of *upayoga lakṣaṇa* (attribute) and *ātmā lakṣya* (object of focus), a synopsis of five points is given -

ātmā is a substance, and *upayoga* is its modification, or *ātmā* is *lakṣya* (object of focus) and *upayoga* is its *lakṣaṇa* (characteristic). *lakṣaṇa* cannot be without *lakṣya*, and *lakṣya* cannot be without *lakṣaṇa*. *ātmā* is a substance that has the capability to be known, and *upayoga* is its *lakṣaṇa*, through which *ātmā* can be known.

1. In the seventh point, an attribute named *upayoga* takes the support of *lakṣya*, which is the *ātmā*; hence, it does not take the support of a non-self substance.
2. In the eighth point, an attribute named *upayoga* comes from an object named *ātmā*; hence, *jñāna* does not come from a non-self substance.
3. In the ninth point, *lakṣaṇa* named *upayoga*, takes the auspices of *ātmā*, which is *lakṣya*. Hence, *jñāna* cannot be taken away by the non-self.
4. In the tenth point, *lakṣaṇa*, named *upayoga*, concentrates on *lakṣya*, the *ātmā*, and does not concentrate on non-self substances. Hence, it has no impurity.
5. In the eleventh point, *lakṣaṇa*, named *upayoga*, chooses (*grahaṇa*) *lakṣya ātmā* only. However, it does not choose non-self substances, such as *karma*, etc. Hence, it is uncorrected.

In this eleventh point, the meaning of *alīṅgrahāṇa* is as follows: a = not, *liṅga* = *upayoga*, *grahāṇa* = not receiving particulate *karma*, meaning *upayoga* does not attract particulate *karma*. Hence, *ātmā* is unconnected to physical karmic matter.

Thus, the self's *jñāna-upayoga* is also knowable. That knowable does not accept particulate *karma*; *Ācārya Bhagavāna* is commanding that one who contains *upayoga lakṣaṇa*, such an *ātmā* does not seize *pudgala karma* (physical karmic matter)—such is the self-knowable, you know him accordingly.

To know the knowable just the way they are is the reason for *samyag darśana-samyag jñāna*, from which dharma and peace manifest.

ātmā's *upayoga* is the activity of *jñāna*, and there is no intake of physical karmic matter in that. *upayoga*, which is directed towards the self, is called *upayoga* here. One who looks outwards has the disposition of *punya-pāpa*. The result of *punya-pāpa* is not *ātmā* but an inflow of *karma*, which is impurity; it is not the nature of *ātmā*. *ātmā* does not attract *karma* through *upayoga lakṣaṇa*. That which does not leave the focus of the self is called *upayoga*.

***jñāna upayoga* does not have the support of non-self --**

In the seventh point, it was stated that *jñāna upayoga* does not take the support of knowables. *upayoga* has the support of the self-knowable/*ātmā* substance. The self is devoid of the non-self knowable. In that case, support can never be taken from those who are absent. Hence, *ātmā* does not have the support of those knowables. It takes the support of the self, which is called *upayoga*, and that which takes the support of a non-self substance is not called *upayoga*.

***jñāna upayoga* cannot be brought from outside –**

In the eighth point, it was stated that *upayoga* cannot be brought from an external substance. *upayoga* that digresses towards external substances is not called *upayoga*; it is not *ātmā*. There is an absence of external substances and auspicious and inauspicious states in *ātmā*. Hence, *upayoga* cannot be brought from auspicious-inauspicious states and external substances.

***jñāna-upayoga* cannot be taken away -**

In the ninth point, it was stated that the activity done by remaining self-oriented is *upayoga*. *jñāna* is of *ātmā*. Hence, no other substance can take it away. Other substances are absent in *ātmā*. Hence, *jñāna* cannot be taken away. It should be known that *ātmā* is with such an attribute of *upayoga*.

There is no impurity in *jñāna upayoga* –

In the tenth point, it was said that there is no impurity in *jñāna upayoga*, which is focused/directed towards the self and is at one with *ātmā*, is called *upayoga*. *upayoga* is of *ātmā*, which is a mass of infinite attributes like *jñāna*, *darśana*, *cāritra*, etc. *jñāna* is of *ātmā*. And auspicious-inauspicious activities are not *ātmā*. When *jñāna upayoga* looks towards the self, then it is called self-substance; if it diverges towards auspicious-inauspicious, then it is not called self-substance. Looking inwards is the activity of *dharma*; looking outwards is the activity of *adharma*. The way there is no impurity is the sun, similarly, there is no impurity in *śuddhopayoga*.

***jñāna upayoga* does not accept *karma* –**

In the eleventh point, it was said that *upayoga* is of the self; how can it accept the non-self? Or in what way can it be a *nimitta* when accepting the non-self? It just cannot be. One that is *nimitta* in digressing towards non-self and bonds *karma* is not the *upayoga* of the self. But one that carries out the activities of *śraddhā*, *jñāna*, and serenity is *upayoga*. *ātmā* can be recognized by *upayoga lakṣaṇa*. One who leaves the self-oriented state raises impure dispositions in *adharma* and is a *nimitta* in attracting *karma*; they are not called *upayoga* of *ātmā*. ***upayoga*, which raises *dharma* in the form of being one with *samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritra*, is called *ātmā's upayoga*.**

Twelfth *bola* (point)

One which is not perceived by *liṅga* or by senses, or does not have repeated pleasure of senses, is *alīṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* does not repeatedly enjoy the senses. Such a meaning is derived. ***ātmā* does not experience sensual enjoyment but enjoys the self, such a self-knowable should be known-**

***ātmā's* inherent nature is a sentient knower-seer. In that, peace and bliss exist.** Senses, body, *laddu*, bread, lentils, rice, vegetables, etc., substances are insentient. They have touch, taste, smell, and colour; they are different from *ātmā*. External substances are absent in *ātmā* and are devoid of *ātmā*. Hence, *ātmā* does not experience those external substances. **How can the substance experience that which is not present in it?** *ātmā* does not have senses as senses are insentient; hence, saying that *ātmā* has sensual enjoyment is false. Dispositions digressing towards senses for sensual enjoyment are *āśrava-bandha tattvas*, and not *ātmātattva*. *ātmā* does not experience physical sensual enjoyment but does experience joy and sorrow. That joy and sorrow are absent in the pure *jīva tattva*; hence, it is not called *ātmā*.

A seeker has the primary importance of the focus, which is towards the self; hence, he is the enjoyer of self.

In the eleventh point, it was stated that an impure disposition is not *ātmā*, but *ātmā* with a pure disposition, in the form of belief-knowledge, is the only state called *ātmā*. He does not cognise material *karma*. Taking instability in the form of attachment-aversion as secondary, the view of self-nature is taken as primary. **One who is inclined toward nature does not have the bondage of *karma*. With this logic, *ātmā* is the knowing-seeing pure nature. There is peace, happiness, and bliss in him.** An ignorant *jīva* does not experience external substance even by facing towards senses, but the delusional disposition of ‘I experience non-self substance’ is not called *ātmā*, because it is not the eternal nature of *ātmā*. The one who leaves an external focus and turns the focus towards the self, savours the pure joy and knowing that is unconnected to the senses, is *ātmā*. **Though a *samyakdr̥ṣṭi* may have the feeble disposition of mirth and enjoyment, he does not focus on them. His focus is inclined towards his nature. His focus is primarily towards the pure experience of knowledge, bliss, etc. Hence, he does not experience an impure disposition. To believe in such an *ātmā* is *dharma*.**

Leaving the sweetness of the sentient, peaceful nectar and going towards *punya* is akin to eating leftovers like a beggar -

Speech is the insentient state; it is neither good nor bad. There is no suitability-adversity in the formed substances of touch, taste, and smell. An ignorant *jīva* has good-bad beliefs in food substances, believes them to be suitable or adverse, and has the disposition to experience them, but that is his illusion. The disposition of experiencing non-self substance is not the nature of *ātmā*. A householder in the worldly state consumes the best food in his house; a *jīva* who eats leftovers is called a beggar. In the same way, *ātmā* is a storehouse replete with everlasting, infinite sentient efficacies of knowledge, bliss, happiness, etc. Leaving interest in circumstances and auspicious-inauspicious, looking towards nature, a *jīva* opens his sentient treasure, and from that, he gets fresh sweetness every *samaya* in the form of the pure modification, and he experiences that. **That *dharmātmā jīva* is called rich, the owner of sentient wealth. But a *jīva* who leaves the experience of his nature, has the desire to enjoy his body, desire to enjoy eating, experiences a disposition of charity-piety, focuses outside, and experiences extreme adversity.** This is like leaving fresh sweetmeats and eating leftovers like a beggar. He is not the owner of his self-nature but is a beggar. In other words, that *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* does not have *dharma*.

In this twelfth point, the meaning of *alīṅgrahāṇa* is thus – a = not, *liṅga* = through senses, *grahāṇa* = continuous experience of senses; in other words, *ātmā* does not have continuous experience of senses through sensory organs, such a meaning is derived. This statement is from the view of *nāsti* (non-existence). From the viewpoint of *asti* (existence), *ātmā* experiences his pure modification of knowledge, belief, bliss, efforts, etc.- this meaning is derived. Thus, *ātmā* is self-knowable, and to rever him the way he is, is *samyaktva*, meaning the cause of *dharma*.

Oh! The greatly powerful Amṛtcaṇḍra Ācāryadeva has extracted twenty points from a one-word *alīṅgrahāṇa* and revealed them. Externally and internally possession-less, enlightened *muni* swung between the sixth and seventh *guṇasthānas*. Externally, he had a naked *digambara* state; internally, he was in a state free from the stickiness of ownership and attachment. Ācāryadeva has revealed these twenty points while resting within the sentient *deva*, stable in the sentient forest.

Thirteenth *bola* (point)

On who does not assume the state of *jivatva* (state of living) by way of *liṅga* (marks/signs) or is not taken by way of mind, senses, etc, that is *alīṅgrahāṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* cannot be determined by semen and menstruation; such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* cannot exist because of insentient *prāṇas* (state of living); This self-knowable should be known**

Five senses, three *bala* (power of mind, speech, body), breath, and age – are the ten *prāṇas*, but *jīva* does not live because of them. All ten *prāṇas* are insentient, and *ātmā* is an eternal sentient *prāṇa*. Insentient *prāṇas* are absent in *ātmā*; hence, *ātmā* does not live because of the insentient *prāṇas*.

Ignorant's confusion regarding *prāṇa* –

The ignorant believe that till breath and age last, he is alive; if mind-speech-body is present, then he lives; if five senses are working well, one can live; till speech aries correctly, one is said to be *jīva*. If the mind is weak, then *jīva* can work less. But all these are confusions. Because the mind, speech, and body are all insentient substances, *ātmā* is not alive because of them. And an ignorant person believes that –

*pahalā sukha nirogī kāyā, dujā sukha ho ghar main māyā.
teejā sukha kulawanti nārī, cautha sukha putra āgyākārī.*

The first pleasure is the disease-free body; the second pleasure is the house. The third pleasure is a good wife; the fourth pleasure is the obedient son. This way, an ignorant person believes in the joy of the body, son, wife, etc., which is an illusion. Here, five senses, etc., insentient substances have been excluded; if a *jīva* does not remain alive because of these, how can substances like son, wife, food, etc., which are separate from the ten *prāṇas*, be the cause of happiness? They are not the reason for joy. An ignorant person believes money to be *prāṇa*, but this is a gross illusion. The ten *prāṇas* are *ajīva tattva*. *ajīva* is knowable of *jīva*; hence, *jīva* is not alive due to the ten *prāṇas*.

***ātmā* remains alive due to *cetanā* (sentient) *prāṇas* –**

Thus, *ātmā* is not the result of the sperm and egg of the father and mother, and is not manifested by them. *ātmā* is not ten *prāṇas*, etc., which are explanations from the view of non-existence (*nāsti*). Then who is *ātmā*? What is it? ***ātmā* eternally lives due to his sentient *prāṇa* and follows his supreme understanding (*paramabodha*) and bliss in life.** Since time immemorial, one has focused on the ten *prāṇas* and believed that the *jīva* is alive due to them. That belief should be discarded, and the focus should be on the self, which is the nature of sentient *prāṇa*.

In this thirteenth point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is thus – a = not, *liṅga* = senses, mind, *grahaṇa* = to hold *jīvatva*. In other words, *ātmā* does not retain *jīvatva* through the senses and the mind. Understanding and believing in the self-knowable is the cause of *dharma*.

Fourteenth *bola* (point)

One who does not cognize the shape of a male, etc., genital organs is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, *ātmā* is not of mere temporal means; such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* does not cognize inert senses; such a self-knowable should be known -**

jīva does not recognize the shape of the senses or of the body. **The shape of a man, a female, and a eunuch's body, which can be seen, are all states of *pudgalas*.** All these shapes are absent in *ātmā*, and *ātmā* is absent in those shapes. It is not possible to recognise that which is in a state of absence in the substance. Hence, *ātmā* does not cognise the shape of sensory organs.

Ignorant *jīva* believes *ātmā* to be merely an instrument for attaining worldly means -

An ignorant mother says that she has given birth to a son, and the man believes that because of him, the son was born. The son's body is devoid of the son's *ātmā*, so the parents are *nimitta* in the shape of the son's body; how is this possible? Plus, *ātmā* is devoid of sensory organs, so there is no question of them being *nimitta*. Even then, the father feels proud at the birth of a son, and the mother feels proud at the birth of a daughter; such is the illusion of ignorance.

***ātmā* is not merely for worldly means –**

ātmā does not recognise every *samaya*'s modification of sensory organs. Believing that parents were there in the past, so generations of families continued, is an illusion. Who can make manifest the modification of non-self? No one. The state of the body's shape is because of itself, and the state of the senses is because of them. *ātmā* does not accept them. There is an absence of the non-self-knowable in *ātmā*. Hence, *ātmā* is not merely of such worldly means that it continues the lineage.

***ātmā* is a non-worldly instrument in the arising of passionless modification -**

What is *ātmā*? He is not a worldly instrument but an exceptional non-worldly instrument. ***ātmā* is by nature the sentient, knower-seer, pure self. He is the originator of the unblemished modification of true faith-knowledge-conduct,** but not the originator of worldly modifications. This way, *ātmā* gives birth to the unblemished modification. Eternal, pure *ātmā* is an instrument of such passionless modification. Hence, he is said to be a non-worldly instrument.

In this fourteenth point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is thus – a = not, *liṅga* = shape of sensory organs of a man, etc., *grahaṇa* (to hold). *ātmā* does not have the sensory organs of a man, etc.; hence, *ātmā* is not merely of worldly means. *Ācārya Bhagavāna* says that **leave the auspice of insentient senses and have belief-knowledge that the self is with pure blissful nature and is a sentient knower-seer. By believing and knowing him and being equanimous in it, modification will manifest in the form of infinite knowledge, infinite belief, infinite bliss, and infinite efforts.** Hence, *ātmā* is a non-worldly instrument. Thus, *ātmā* is not merely a worldly instrument but a non-worldly one; knowledge-belief of such self-knowable is the reason for *dharma*.

Fifteenth *bola* (point)

Through *liṅga*, in other words, the non-genital appearance that cannot be cognized, meaning which is not pervasive in the *loka*, is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* is not the form of an instrument as famed by the hypocrites, one which is pervasive in the *loka*. Such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* is not pervasive in the *loka*; such a self-knowable should be known -**

Many others believe in the ideology that *ātmā* is all-pervasive in the *loka*. A few others believe that when *ātmā* is detached from impurities, meaning it remains free, it pervades the whole *loka*. The way a bird remains as it is when its wings are cut, it does not move;

similarly, this *ātmā* pervades the *loka* when its wings in the form of *puṇya-pāpa* are cut. He does not have an upward movement due to his nature from the *vyavahāra* point of view; many hypocrites believe so. He is confined within an area until there is impurity, but his area becomes unlimited after being pure. Many heretics believe this, but it is a falsity.

***ātmā* stays within his innumerable *kṣetra* –**

Each *ātmā* stays in a distinct body during transmigration; in the same way, after liberation, he remains separate. He does not pervade the *loka*. It is not his nature to leave his innumerable space points and pervade the *loka*. After *ātmā* becomes pure, he stays within his innumerable space points; his shape is a little less than that of the last body. From *niscaya*'s point of view, he stays within his innumerable space points. Further, because of his tendency to move upwards, he is at the apex of the *loka*.

People of other opinions believe that all beings together make one *ātmā* and do not remain distinct after *mokṣa*. But such a belief is false. If all beings together become one *ātmā*, one cannot experience one's pure, independent nature. Each *ātmā* is a mass of belief, knowledge, conduct, etc. Each body is distinct. Thus, there are infinite *ātmās*; all beings together do not make one *ātmā*. Further, after a *jīva* becomes pure, from the view of *niscaya*, he remains within his innumerable *pradeśas*, and from the view of *vyavahāra*, because of his nature of moving upwards, he sits at the apex of the *loka*. Hence, the belief of other dissenters is opposite to the nature of substance. *jīva* stays within his innumerable space points and does not pervade all over the *loka* – this is said to be *anekānta*.

In this fifteenth point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is thus – a = not, *liṅga* = through non-genital appearance, *grahaṇa* = pervading in the *loka*. In other words, *ātmā* is not spread all over the *loka*; such a self-knowable should be known. Thus, the belief and knowledge that the self-*ātmā* does not pervade in the *loka* but indeed remains in the form of his innumerable space points is the reason for *dharma*.

Sixteenth *bola* (point)

Who does not cognize genders, meaning is not female, male, neuter gender is *aliṅgrahaṇa*; thus, ‘by body and disposition, *ātmā* is not a female, male, or eunuch’ such a meaning is derived. ***ātmā* is not a female, male, or eunuch by body and disposition; know this accordingly –**

ātmā is devoid of body. In the fourteenth point, it was said that the shape of a male, etc., senses is not in the *ātmā*. Here, it is said that the bodies of females, males, and eunuchs are absent in *ātmā* because it is insentient, is *ajīva tattva*, and *ātmā* is *jīva tattva*.

The impure disposition of gender is absent in the eternal nature –

Missing the experience of the pure nature of self, which is in the form of pure joy, when the desire to experience the body, which is non-self, arises, then that is inauspicious thoughts, in the form of belief in gender. That is the inauspicious *tattva*. *ātmā* is a *jīva* substance. Hence, such a disposition of gender is absent in *ātmā*'s nature. Thus, *ātmā* is devoid of body and the disposition of gender. But if someone says that the body of a male, female, etc., is physical gender and the impure disposition occurring in *ātmā* is a disposition of gender, it is not so. This is a delusion, and that statement is false. Here, it is stated that **in the mundane state, when he deviates from his pure nature, at that time whichever belief of gender may arise, and whatever outer manifestation of physical gender maybe, but that is absent in the eternal nature of *ātmā*; in this way, belief in physical gender and thought of gender has been negated by way of the focus on the pure nature.**

***ātmā* is without gender; by focusing on him, *dharma* occurs –**

ātmā is without gender; when can it be said that such true knowledge is derived? The physical body is *ajīva*; can *samyaktva* occur by looking at it? The disposition of gender is an inauspicious substance. Can *samyaktva* be attained by looking at that? No. ***ātmā*, devoid of disposition and body of gender, is without gender. He is the enjoyer of his knower-seer state of pure bliss. By having such a self-focus and leaving non-self focus, *samyakdarśana*, and *dharma*s occur.** Self-*ātmā* is without gender. After having this belief and knowledge, if the knowing of substance *veda* (physical gender), which is *ajīva*, is done, then from the viewpoint of *vyavahāra*, his knowledge regarding *ajīva* is true. Self-*ātmā* is without gender; after such a belief and knowledge, the disposition of gender is the self's inauspicious modification. It is *pāpa tattva*. If this is known, then, from the view of *vyavahāra*, his knowledge of *pāpa tattva* is true. **However, an understanding of other *tattvas* will be incomplete without an accurate understanding of the *jīva tattva*.**

Ignorant believes non-self substance to be his support –

Ignorant *jīva* does not know his non-gender *ātmā*; hence, he focuses on circumstances and distorted disposition. Women say that they are weak and helpless, and what can they do? Hence, they cannot live without the support of someone. Men say they are nurturing so

many people. Ladies, families, and children are dependent on them. Eunuchs say we are born eunuchs; hence, what can they do? This way, because of the focus on circumstances of gender, they think of dependency; they can never have *dharma*.

Though a *nāraki* is a neuter gender by disposition and body, he can attain *samyagdarśana*-

jñānī says to let go focusing on circumstances. The body of a woman, man, or eunuch is not of self. When the body is not of self, where is the necessity of looking outward for the subsistence of that body? One is alive due to the support of the efficacies of self, of *jñāna*, *darśana*, etc., and the consequence of gender disposition is *pāpa tattva*; that is not the state of *jīva*; hence, abandon on its focus. *dravya veda* and *bhāva veda* do not block *samyagdarśana*. A hellish being is of neuter gender by way of body and disposition; still, his *ātmā* is without gender, eternally. By knowing so, a *nārakī*, by putting effort, can attain *dharma* in the form of *samyagdarśana*, even though he is in unfavourable circumstances. It cannot be that one in a state of being human cannot attain *samyagdarśana*; hence, the focus on gender should be forsaken, and the focus should turn towards the *ātmā*, which is without gender – this is the intent.

In this sixteenth point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is thus – a = not, *liṅga* = mark, is not of the disposition and body of a woman, man, or eunuch; meaning, *ātmā* is without gender, such a meaning is derived. *ātmā* experiences his *jñāna*, *darśana*, *sukha*, etc., but does not experience body and distorted dispositions. This way, one's *ātmā* is self-knowable; this should be known.

With this evidence, such self-knowable *ātmā* should be taken in belief and knowledge, and that is the cause of *samyagdarśana*.

dharma occurs by knowing *ātmā* the way he is and knowing his true nature. This means that since eternity, one has not seen his true nature for even a second. The belief has been contrary to the nature of *ātmā*. Hence, o *jīva*! Know *ātmā* as *aliṅgrahaṇa*. *ātmā* is not such that he will know by way of any of the senses. Since eternity, the belief has been that one can know *ātmā* through the senses. Even if it is accepted that this delusion in the form of a belief exists in the present, and senses are also present. Despite this, it has been said that the above state is not of the *ātmā*. It has also been said that *ātmā* is not that which can be known through the senses, but it is, by nature, a non-sensory knowing self. There is a delusion that knowing arises through the senses, but the *ātmā* does not know the self and

non-self through the senses. **At every point, knowledge of vyavahāra is imparted and then negated.**

ātmā is devoid of body and the disposition of gender –

The sixteenth point is re-emphasized. *ātmā* does not cognize sense organs, meaning it does not cognize male and female genders. From the view of *vyavahāra*, it can be said that the association of the body is in the form of the shape of female-male. But it is not present in *ātmā*. The belief in being feminine or masculine gender is *aupādhikabhava* (temporary/that which is outside of oneself). It is not the eternal nature of *ātmā*; it is a state of one *samaya*. Hence, leaving the knowing-seeing pure nature, believing *ātmā* to be just this is the focus of modification, it is a confusion, and ignorance. **To believe the shape of a man as *ātmā* is like believing insentient as *jīva*, and to believe *ātmā* to be the disposition of gender is like believing *pāpa tattva* as *jīva tattva*, and believing *ajīva* to be *jīva* and *pāpa* as *jīva* is *adharma*. But to have belief-knowledge that *ātmā* is devoid of body and disposition of gender, and he is pure sentient nature, is dharma, the art of living. This is the key to living peacefully.**

Seventeenth *bola* (point)

liṅgas, meaning one who does not take in the signs of *dharma*, is *alīṅgrahaṇa*; thus, '*ātmā* is devoid of external restraint of monks (*yatiliṅga*). Such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* does not accept external signs of *dharma*; such a self-knowable should be known.**

A body's naked *digambara* state is not a sign of dharma.

1. ***ātmā*'s nature is pure sentient bliss; after knowing so, having exceptional stability within is the internal state of a *muni* (*antara muni daśā*).** When an internal passionless state arises, external things, such as clothes, are absent. This means the body is naked, and peacock feathers and a pot of water are present. **If anyone believes that the state of nakedness is not there, then this is a gross mistake.**
2. But external *nimitta* – peacock feather, etc., and the state of the naked body, etc., are absent in the *ātmā*. *ātmā* does not cognize them because they are insentient substances; they occur because of themselves. *ātmā* cannot pick them up and put them down.
3. It also does not mean that the state of the *muni* is dependent on the presence of nakedness, peacock feathers, a pot of water, etc. This is because the inner *bhāvaliṅga* is the state of being a *muni*.

In this way, the understanding of *vyavahāra* is imparted through outer associations, and then it is said that this *vyavahāra* is absent in *nīścaya*. A *muni* does not believe that he can do anything in the state of the body, or he is in the naked state, or that his existence is only as much as the state of monkhood. The state of muni exists within him, and then it can be said that the state of the body is naked due to the body.

The naked state of the body is because of *ātmā*; one who believes so is not a *muni* but a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* –

A *jīva* who believes that he is the doer of the nakedness of the body has renounced clothes by choice, becomes the possessor of the body and clothes, is a gross *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*. When there is a passionless experience internally, with the absence of the three types of dispositions of attachment-aversion, then the state of the nakedness of the body is due to itself. One who does not know this and becomes the doer and maker of the action of non-self substance is foolish and ignorant; he does not know the *dharma* of *ātmā*. Disposition of acceptance and renunciation of non-self substance is *adharma*.

If someone says that external possessions are not crucial for *dharma*, it is still possible to attain dharma, regardless of one's external possessions. This belief is full of delusion. One who believes that whatever the possessions, *kevaljñāna* can arise, or being a *muni*, keeps clothes and utensils, and in that state, *kevaljñāna* is attained, then that is gross ignorance. He is not a *muni*, even externally. First, *vyavahāra* is proven. That much acceptance should be there that during a *muni* state, there is nakedness, and in the form of external materials, there is nothing except peacock feathers and a pot of water. After accepting this, it is stated that *ātmā* cannot be recognized by them.

In this seventeenth point, the meaning of *alīṅagrahaṇa* is thus – a = not, *līṅga* = external signs, *grahaṇa* = seize. In other words, *ātmā* is not recognized by external possessions. However, accepts the a pure sentient nature is the meaning to be derived. Such a self-knowable should be known and believed in, just the way *Ācārya Bhagavāna* has stated, and which is the cause of *samyagdarśana*.

Eighteenth *bola* (point)

That which does not accept through *līṅga*, or *guṇa* (attribute), or which does not have *arthāvbodha* (knowing of attributes) is *alīṅgrahaṇa*. In this way, *ātmā* is not cognized by way of distinction of attributes; it is such a pure substance, such a meaning is derived.

One's indivisible *ātmā* does not touch the division of *guṇas*; such a self-knowable should be known.

ātmā is a substance. He is a mass of infinite *guṇas*. He is not just with the attribute of *jñāna*. Indivisible *ātmā* does not touch the division of *guṇas*.

1. *ātmā* does not touch the mind, speech, and body because they are insentient. They are absent in *ātmā*. How can a detached substance be touched? If a detached substance can be touched, then *ātmā* and body will become one, but this never happens.
2. *ātmā* does not touch knowledge-obscuring, etc., insentient *karmas* because they are tangible and absent in the intangible *ātmā*. Ignorant's *ātmā* also never touches *karma* because there is an extreme absence between *ātmā* and *karma*.
3. When one moves away from the knowing-seeing nature of self, then auspicious-inauspicious perturbation arises in the modification of one *samaya*. The eternal nature has never touched them. **If the total substance were to be perturbed, then the eternal nature would be perturbed; If this were to occur, then there would never be an opportunity to be free from blemishes.**
4. *ātmā* has *jñāna*, etc., infinite *guṇas*. Even though there is a division of attributes of knowledge, belief, etc., *ātmā*, which is in the form of a mass of infinite indivisible attributes, does not touch the division of *guṇas*. *ātmā* does not accept such a division of *guṇa-guṇī* that the self is the holder of *jñāna*, and *jñāna* is the *guṇa* of the self. **If an indivisible *ātmā* touches division, he will become in the form of division. Being in that form, there will never be an opportunity to become indivisible; without the indivisible, *dharma* can never occur.**

See! Here, the subject of *samyagdarśana* is being discussed. Not truly knowing the subject of *samyagdarśana*, which is the undivided *ātmā*, the acts of vows and penance are not helpful, as they are akin to those of a child's penance. The Lord of the three *lokas*, *Tirthaṅkara Devādhīdeva*, saw the nature of the substance in *kevalajñāna* and that arose in His discourse. On knowing the nature of substance accordingly, Śrī KuṇḍaKuṇḍaĀcārya Bhagavāna experienced it and created this great *gāthā*. By having belief in this, *samyagdarśana* occurs. People believe *dharma* to be in the external substances and activities. Listen! One who does not know the nature of substance can never have *dharma*.

The subject of *samyagdarśana* is pure, undivided, and indivisible *ātmā* –

Question: What kind is of *ātmā*, which is the subject of *samyagdarśana*? Knowing it the way it is, *dharma*. If a *jīva* believes sugar to be opium, then does he have proper knowledge of sugar? Or, on believing both sugar and opium to be the same, is his knowledge of sugar

said to be proper? Or is his understanding correct if he were to believe the dirt on the sugar to be sugar?

Answer: No. It is not called true knowledge. Sugar is sugar and not opium; both are different. The dirt on sugar is not the nature of sugar. In the same way, if the body is believed to be *ātmā*, then that *jñāna* is incorrect. If the momentary blemish in the modification of *ātmā* is believed to be the eternal nature, then that *jñāna* of *ātmā* is incorrect.

The subject of *samyagdarśana* is the undivided, one *ātmā* devoid of body-mind-speech, thoughts, and devoid of the division of *guṇas*.

In these twenty points, *vyavahāra* is initially proved, then *vyavahāra* is negated, and knowledge of *niścaya* is presented. One cannot attain *dharma* just by accepting *vyavahāra* and getting stuck in it.

Even though there is a division of attributes, *ātmā* does not touch the division. In this eighteenth point, *vyavahāra* is proved and then negated. A substance can be negated if it is there, but how could there be a negation of a substance that does not exist?

There are infinite *guṇas* in an *ātmā*, including knowledge, belief, conduct, purity, *vibhutva* (efficacy of pervading the soul), and more. If anyone believes there is no division of attributes in an *ātmā*, then he does not even have a *vyavahāra* belief.

One *guṇa* is not in the form of another *guṇa* – this way, division of *guṇa* exists; even then, if a *jīva* pauses in that, *dharma* does not arise. If *ātmā* becomes the same as the division of *guṇas*, then his identity will not remain distinct. *ātmā* is a mass of eternal *guṇas*; he is a whole, and his belief, knowledge, etc., attributes are specific. **A whole does not touch the specific; the whole is in the whole, and the specific is in the specific. The specific is not in the whole, and the whole is not in the specific. If *ātmā* is a whole and touches the attribute of *jñāna*, which is specific, then the whole and the specific will become one; neither will remain separate.** Unified *ātmā* in the form of an assemblage of infinite *guṇas* does not touch just the attribute of *jñāna*. This is said to manifest faith in the pure substance. Focus is the indivisible pure substance devoid of body, karma, blemishes/perturbations, and division of *guṇas*.

Pure substance is in one form; if substance were to touch the division of attributes, then substance would not remain pure. Distinction among attributes does exist, so it has been negated. If there were no distinction, then what would have been negated? If the general

substance were to become one with the specific attribute of substance, then oneness of the general substance would not remain. So, here it is said that the nature of generality of substance has not touched the attribute of *jñāna*. Thoughts like '*ātmā* is the bearer/holder of this attribute of *jñāna*' will not give rise to *dharma*. But when it is believed that the undivided knower is in the form of oneness, then *dharma* arises.

In this eighteenth point, the meaning of *alīṅgrahaṇa* is thus – a = not, *līṅga* = attribute, *grahaṇa* = *padārtha jñāna* (knowledge of substance), and *ātmā* is the one that does not have this. In other words, *ātmā* is a pure substance which is untouched by the division of attributes. In this point, the belief that *jñāna* is an attribute and *ātmā* is the beholder of *jñāna* – such a distinction of attribute and holder of attribute has been negated, and belief in the form of oneness of *ātmā* has been given.

Ācārya Bhagavāna has said that it should be known that *ātmā*, without the distinction of attributes, is the self knowable. To impart the belief and knowledge of this self-knowledge is *dharma*.

Nineteenth *bola* (point)

That which does not take/touch the *līṅga* or modification, or that which does not have *arthāvbodha viśeṣa* (knowing of the distinctions of modification) is *alīṅgrahaṇa*; thus, '*ātmā* is a pure substance which is not touched by modifications'; such a meaning is derived.

One's everlasting *ātmā* does not touch even the momentary pure modification; such a self-knowable should be known –

ātmā is a pure substance that is not touched even by pure modification. In the eighteenth point, the word '*arthāvbodha*' was used, stating that even though *ātmā* possesses distinctions of attributes, the *ātmā*, which is one, remains untouched by these distinctions of attributes. In this way, distinction of attributes was negated and belief in the one undivided *ātmā* was established.

Here, it is stated that *ātmā* does not touch the unblemished modification of *samyakajñāna* during the state of the seeker nor the completely pure modification of the omniscient at the time of *kevalajñāna*. **The substance is not as much as a modification; by saying so, one is being asked to leave the focus on the part that is the modification and have belief in the substance that holds that part.**

Substance is general with oneness in nature. If he were to become one with the modification of one *samaya*, then both substance and modification would not remain separate. The substance would become momentary, like the modification, meaning it would not exist from eternity to infinity.

One has had an influx of impure dispositions since eternity; they have never touched *ātmā* or become one with it. **An ignorant person may believe he is completely blemished, but even at the time of his false belief, his *ātmā* is pure. If the pure substance becomes blemished, then there will be no opportunity to be free from blemishes;** however, this is not the topic of discussion here.

The concept here extends further: *ātmā* is a knower-seer, pure nature of the self, and *ātmā* does not touch or embrace the unblemished modification which arises with true belief and knowledge. But *ātmā* is a pure, eternal substance. Such is one's knowable nature. *samyak darśana-jñāna* arises on knowing the knowable nature, the way it is. This *jīva* has not heard such divine teaching since eternity. By understanding correctly and holding the correct belief, dharma arises; however, how can dharma occur in one who has never had the opportunity to listen to this? In other words, it will not happen.

Question: When it is said that the substance does not touch the modification, does it mean that the substance is without modification?

Answer: From the absolute point of view, the general substance is without modification. Here, substance should not be understood as the complete substance, as the general substance along with the specific modification, both together. **Here, the meaning of *śuddhasubstance* (pure substance) is said to be *sāmānya* (general), *sadrśa* (homogenous), *ekarūpa* (in the form of oneness), *trikāli* (through the three time phases/eternal)- *svabhāva* (pure nature).** Substance is general, and modification is specific. There is an absence of specificity in the general. On mentioning absence, it is decided that 'eternal nature does not touch the modification of one *samaya*.'

Substance with the pure nature of self is eternal, and as the unblemished modification is of one *samaya*, it is momentary. From an absolute viewpoint, if the pure substance, that is eternal, were to touch the momentary modification of *samyajjñāna* or *kevalajñāna*, then the substance will not remain permanent. In other words, the situation of the substance becoming momentary will arise. But this never happens.

Leave the focus on the momentary and focus on the eternal substance –

In the eighteenth point, it was said that indivisible *ātmā* is devoid of division; hence, indivisible *ātmā* does not touch the division of attributes. Here, in the same way, everlasting pure nature, full of knowledge and bliss, is eternal. He does not touch the momentary pure modification of one *samaya*. Thus, by saying so, **the intent is to leave the focus of momentary modification and look at the eternal, pure, uniform, indivisible substance.** *ātmā* is not as much as the pure modification, but is eternally pure. By focusing on it, *samyagdarśana* will occur. It will become entirely pure by concentrating on the eternal state of purity. This is the intent of the statement.

The meaning of *alīṅgrahana* in this nineteenth point is thus – a = not, *liṅga* = modification, *grahana* = unblemished modification of *jñāna* – one who doesn't belong to, in other words, pure substance is not as much as the unblemished modification of *jñāna*; but he is pure, homogenous, general, with oneness. The self-knowable should be known in this way. Having the belief and knowledge of self-knowability is the reason for *dharma*.

Twentieth *bola* (point)

liṅga, or the reason for the knowing of *pratyabhijñāna* (*jñāna*, which arises by connecting to the subject of recall or direct perception) or that which does not have *arthāvacodha sāmānya* (*artha* – substance; *avabodha* – perception/knowing *sāmānya* – generality), is *alīṅgrahana*. Thus, 'pure modification is not touched by *ātmā drvaya*'; such a meaning is derived.

***ātmā* is only the experience of pure modification; such a self-knowable should be known.**

It is stated that the modification of *samyagjñāna* does not touch the eternal attribute of *jñāna*; this is stated here. *liṅga* means the cause of *pratyabhijñāna*, and *grahana* means *arthāvacodha sāmānya*; in other words, eternal *jñāna guṇa*, *pratyabhijñāna*, it is this only – *jñāna* with which is in the form of a link between the past and present that is *pratyabhijñāna*. *jñāna*, which is in the form of a connection of memory and perception, is called *pratyabhijñāna*. The cause of this *pratyabhijñāna* is eternal general *guṇa*. It wants to say that – ***ātmā* is a pure modification that does not touch the general eternal *guṇa*.** modification of *samyagjñāna* is not due to the body or auspicious disposition. In the same way, it is not because of eternal *jñāna guṇa*, which is in the form of efficacy. If it is said that the modification is due to substance, then the 'state of existence' of the modification does not remain. *astitva* (causeless existence) will not remain.

In the eighteenth point, it was said that the substance *ātmā* is general, indivisible; it does not touch the division of *guṇa*, which is specific. In the nineteenth point, it was noted that the substance *ātmā* is general. It does not touch the division of modification, which is specific. The twentieth point explains a more subtle subject. The modification of *samyakjñāna* in the state of a seeker or the modification of *kevalajñāna* in *mokṣa*; both are specific. This specific is not because of the base of auspicious disposition or body, and it is also not because of the eternal uniform attribute of *jñāna*, which is present. **If it is believed that pure modification, which is specific, arises due to the support of the general, then the independence of the absolute substance does not remain. It becomes dependent. The momentary existence of the pure modification, which ‘exists,’ is annihilated. Hence, pure modification exists, but it does not touch the constant general – it does not attach to it.** Independent modification of experience does not touch the general substance because if modification touches the substance, both will become one.

Question: By saying that pure modification exists, does the auspice of modification have to be taken?

Answer: No. It does not mean that the auspice of modification has to be taken. It means to state that unblemished modification, which is specific, is not due to the support of the general substance. Absolutism is to be proved.

If the unblemished modification of *jñāna* touches the general attribute of *jñāna*, then general and specific will become one and will not remain distinct. There is an absence of a general constant in the unblemished modification. Hence, *ātmā* is such a pure modification that is not touched by the substance.

Pure modification is causeless -

On one side, there is an eternal general attribute of *jñāna*; on the other, there is pure modification of *jñāna*. Both are during the same *samaya*. There is no difference in time. The eternal attribute is absent in the modification of one *samaya*. In this way, pure modification is causeless; it is without any reason.

1. If it is said that the pure modification has manifested because of the presence of the passionless *nimitta*, then it does not remain independent. It becomes dependent.
2. If someone says that auspicious attachment is *vyavahāra*, and pure modification arises because of it, then that is also not independence; it becomes dependent.
3. ‘Eternal *jñāna* attribute is general; hence, modification of *samyagjñāna* has arisen’ is also incorrect. If this were to occur, then the pure modification that ‘exists’ would not

remain. **Here, it is said that pure modification is independent, existing, and causeless.**

4. Feeling-knowing is in modification. There is no feeling, activity, or knowing in the unmanifested, eternal general in the form of efficacy – pure modification is called *ātmā* when such an existent modification knows the *ātmā*.

One who experiences the pure modification is *ātmā*; one who experiences attachment is not *ātmā*. *ātmā* is the pure modification that manifests when the focus shifts from *nimitta*, thoughts, and division, and moves on to the sentient blissful nature. That pure modification of *saṁvara* and *nirjarā* in the form of experience is *ātmā* – such a self-knowable should be known.

Thus, truthfully knowing the self-knowable with *syādavāda* (quodammodo) is the cause of *dharma*.

In the eighteenth point, it was said that *ātmā* is a pure substance; the division of attributes does not touch him – such a self-knowable should be known.

What kind is this *ātmā*, on whose knowing, *dharma* will occur? *ātmā* is the doer of *dharma*. In doing so, does peace arise, or does it come from outside? Call it a doer or a result in the form of *dharma* – it is the same. Modification or *samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritra* is *dharma*. On knowing *ātmā*, unblemished modification occurs, meaning *dharma* occurs. This *ātmā* should be known as *alīṅgrahaṇa*. It is not suited to be known through any signs. By knowing and focusing on *ātmā*, which has been explained in twenty ways, modification of *samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritra* arises.

How does one earn five million Rupees? If the method for achieving this is explained, one will listen carefully. Even though that money is insentient, he believes it to be good and has an attachment to it. The way attachment is not in notes, similarly, it is not in *ātmā* either. An ignorant person creates new kinds of attachments. The substance *ātmā* is not contrived/made. The contrived state gives rise to new states. Upon removing it and turning the focus on the pure nature of the self, the new modification of *samyaktva* arises. Does it arise on seeing the kind of sentient nature of *ātmā*? Who is *ātmā*? These topics have been discussed in the twentieth point.

Oh, sublime! You know the *ātmā* as *alīṅgrahaṇa*, so KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācāryadeva has said. In the eighteenth point, *alīṅgrahaṇa* means a = not, *līṅga* = *guṇa*, *grahaṇa* = *arthāvabodha*, meaning *jñāna*. The meanings of *līṅga* and *grahaṇa* are different here. See! *līṅga* means *guṇas*, but *guṇa* is general; there are many *guṇas*, so which *guṇa* out of them? So, it is said

jñāna guṇa. See! The word *grahaṇa* turned out to be *jñāna guṇa*, meaning *ātmā* does not have just *jñāna guṇa*, which implies that it does not have the division of the attribute of *jñāna* and *ātmā*, as the beholder of the attribute is the pure substance *ātmā*.

1. The activity of body-mind-speech is not in *ātmā*, because it is an *ajīva* substance; *dharma* does not arise by focusing on it.
2. Dispositions of charity, piety, act, anger, etc., are external and artificial. They are not the nature of the substance. Hence, *dharma* does not occur by focusing on them.
3. *ātmā* is an indivisible substance in the form of infinite attributes. In that indivisible substance, by raising the division of ‘this is an attribute of *jñāna*,’ the substance does not remain indivisible. Focusing on such a division, *dharma* does not occur. Hence, it is said that an indivisible *ātmā* does not touch just one attribute of *jñāna* - such an *ātmā* should be known.

This is the chapter on knowable. What kind of knowable substance is the *ātmā* whose belief gives rise to *samyagdarśana*? *samyagdarśana* means initial *dharma* – *dharma* in the form of *samyagdarśana* has not manifested since eternity; how does it occur by revering the *ātmā*?

One who believes contrary of the nature of *ātmā* is a non-Jain/false believer –

1. *ātmā* is devoid of external substance; hence, a *jīva* who believes *ātmā* to be in the form of body or *karma* is a false believer.
2. Further, *ātmā* has auspicious-inauspicious dispositions; they are *pūṇya-pāpa tattva* and *āśrava tattva*, and believing them to be *jīva tattva* is a false belief.
3. *ātmā* is one indivisible substance. One who gets stuck in the divisions of the attribute of *jñāna* and *ātmā*, which is the beholder of that *jñāna*, is also a false believer.

Hence, it is said in this point that indivisible *ātmā* does not touch the attribute of *jñāna*, does not embrace it; he is with oneness, an unattached substance. *ātmā* is devoid of body-mind-speech, devoid of *karma*; he is not as much as auspicious-inauspicious modification. In the same way, he is not the one to get stuck in the division of *guṇas*. But it is pure, undivided, with oneness, and complete *ātmā*. To focus on this and have faith in it is *samyagdarśana*.

***ātmā* is devoid of the nature of non-self-**

1. Body, mind, speech, and karma are insentient substances, and other *ātmās* are absent in a single *ātmā*, meaning its nature is devoid of non-self substances.
2. Auspicious-inauspicious dispositions are not in the eternal *ātmā*. Hence, *ātmā*’s nature is devoid of them. Believing *ātmā* to be with blemishes is not a true belief.

3. *viśeṣa* (specific) is absent in *sāmānya* (general). From the *niścaya* point of view, if a general substance touches a specific, then the general will become specific. A pure substance, *ātmā*, is in the form of oneness, devoid of the division of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

In this point, the meaning of *līṅga* is *guṇa*, but there are many *guṇas*. Hence, here, the meaning of the word *grahaṇa* is *jñāna*. Indivisible *ātmā* does not touch the attribute of *jñāna*.

For eternity, an ignorant *jīva* believes that one body can stop or touch another body, or that one *ātmā* touches the body, karma, and other *ātmās*, or the eternal nature touches blemishes and the division of attributes. However, all these beliefs are riddled with delusion. They do not touch each other because, from the viewpoint of absolutism, there is an absence of one in the other.

Thus, ***ātmā* is a pure substance that is not embraced by specific *guṇas*. The substance is undivided. There is no division between the attributes and the beholder of attributes. The subject of *samyagdarśana* is the complete *ātmā* – such a meaning is derived.**

ātmā is in the form of oneness and an indivisible substance. He does not touch the specific *jñāna*. Without knowing this, dharma does not arise. *dharmā* arises from *dharmī*. By believing in an undivided uniform *ātmā*, a new modification of dharma manifests.

Division of *jñāna*, etc., *guṇas* is absent in the eternal undivided nature -

ātmā does not touch the division of *jñāna*, etc., attributes, and the division of the attributes of *jñāna* is absent in the total substance. This type of mutual absence between two substances is explained here. When a substance is absent, its absence cannot be shown. Hence, a division of *jñāna*, etc., *guṇas* is present in an *ātmā*. If anyone believes there is no division, then his *vyavahāra* is untrue. The divisible and indivisible substance exists at the same time. This way, after knowing *vyavahāra*, the absence of division of *jñāna guṇa* in the indivisible substance is explained. ***samyagdarśana* does not occur by focusing on division. It occurs by concentrating on the indivisible.**

With this, it is derived that the one which is untouched by the division of attribute and modification, that undivided *ātmā* is the self-knowable, and this should be known. By believing and knowing accordingly, *dharmā* occurs.

In the nineteenth point, it was said that *ātmā* is a pure substance not touched by modification of *jñāna*; such a knowable should be known.

līṅga means modification, which does not cognise, meaning it does not have *arthāvabodha viśeṣa* (knowledge of specific/modification), is *alīṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* is such a pure *dravya* that any specific modification does not embrace it. Such a meaning is derived.

Here, *līṅga* means modification, but there are infinite modifications. Hence, the meaning of *grahaṇa* is modification of *jñāna*. *ātmā* does not have it, it is a pure substance. **Here, it is said that *ātmā* does not have modification of *jñāna*, meaning pure substance is not as much as one modification. Thus, it is said that eternal substance is devoid of momentary modification.**

Now, with whose auspice does *samyagdarśana* arise has been stated.

1. If eternal nature takes the auspices of *nimitta*, then there is oneness of thoughts with external substance. Therefore, *samyagdarśana* does not occur.
2. If eternal nature takes the auspices of charity-piety, then *ātmā* has blemishes; therefore, the opportunity of arising of *dharma* does not occur.
3. If eternal substance is believed to be as much as pure modification, then *dharma* does not occur.
 - (1) Pure substance is eternal, and modification is momentary
 - (2) Pure substance is a whole, and modification is a part
 - (3) Pure substance is general, and modification is specific.

Assuredly, if the whole nature touches a part, then the whole and part do not remain distinct, which is contrary to the nature of a substance. Hence, *ātmā* is a pure substance that is not embraced by modification of *jñāna*.

Forgetting his undivided nature, an ignorant *jīva* thinks of the undivided state of non-self- In the way of the world, if someone has fifty million Rupees, then his son, daughter, and daughter-in-law all believe they are the owners of fifty million Rupees. If twenty-five people are in the house, one person can get a 1/25th share of the capital, but they also think they own fifty million. One does not divide because one has an interest in it. Similarly, the complete nature is such that it takes into focus the entire substance. It is not its nature to focus on the divided or incomplete state. **The substance is indivisible; he is devoid of external substance, blemishes, division of *guṇas*, and devoid of division of pure modification.** One who does not know this believes in oneness in the external circumstances, which will never be with the self. He imagines that an undivided state will

not be with this state. Those circumstances can never be his, and undividedness will never be there with them. Then, the ignorant also believe in oneness with them and expect to have peace. That is his attachment and the reason for transmigration.

One who has an interest in dharma should believe in the eternal nature -

To destroy the transmigration, one should have a belief in the undivided knowing nature of the self. *samyagdarśana* and *dharma* occurs with the auspice of nature, in which there is an absence of perturbation, which does not have the division of attributes, which is not only as much as the blemish-free modification of the self, but is in the form of eternal oneness, and which is the eternal pure permanently joyous substance.

A *jīva* who does not focus on eternal nature and believes *dharma* is just a ritual will never attain *dharma*.

1. Jain temples, etc., are insentient substances; *ātmā* cannot build them. Still, believing that *ātmā* can build them is a falsity.
2. To believe that attachment occurs due to the Jain temple or that attachment arose, so the Jain temple was built, is the reason for *mithyātva*.
3. The belief that because auspicious attachment to the Jain temple arose, so a *jīva* will attain *dharma*, is *mithyātva*.
4. If focus is kept on modification and not on the undivided substance, then *mithyātva* arises.
- 5.

The eternal, pure substance is devoid of pure specific modification of *jñāna* –

Hence, *jīvas* should know *ātmā* the way he is. In this point, the discussion is about the pure substance, which is not even touched by pure modification, meaning the current *jñāna* modification is absent in the eternal substance. But when can it be said to be absent? First, the two parts are explained, and then it is said to be absent. **Here, it is not taken that the pure modification has to be manifested in the future. This is because the absence of that which does not exist in the present cannot be said to occur. And the time at which the eternal substance is present, precisely at that time, the pure modification of *jñāna* exists, not in the past or the future. In this way, modification has been proved from the viewpoint of *vyavahāra*.** The knowing of that which exists has been done. After that, it is said, the pure modification of *jñāna* is only as much as the present modification, and there is an absence of the eternal nature in the present modification.

Pure modification is a part, and *samyagdarśana* does not occur by focusing on it. However, it occurs by concentrating on the whole. Hence, by showing the *jñāna*'s modification, which is a part, that is absent in the whole *ātmā*, the focus is on the whole pure substance. *ātmā* is general, and modification is specific. A specific is absent in general; by saying so, the focus is on the general substance.

In this point, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is – a = not, *liṅga* = modification, *grahaṇa* = *jñāna*'s modification – whose it is not, meaning *ātmā* does not even touch the pure modification of *jñāna* – he is such a pure substance, this self-knowable should be known. To believe and know this self-knowable is the reason for *dharma*.

In this twentieth point, it is said that *ātmā* is not touched by eternal substance; it is such a pure modification, and such a self-knowable should be known.

That which does not take/know the reason of *pratyabhijñāna* (*jñāna*, which arises by connecting to the subject of recall or direct perception), meaning the *liṅga* or that which does not have the *arthāvabodha sāmānya* (*artha* – substance; *avabodha* – perception/known *sāmānya* – generality), is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* is the pure modification that is not encompassed by the pure substance; this is the derived meaning.

First, the meaning of *pratyabhijñāna* is explained. *ātmā* has infinite *guṇas*; These attributes have their states every *samaya*. Attributes are permanent. *pratyabhijñāna* is the modification of *jñāna* of one *samaya*. *jñāna*, which occurs by way of association, e.g., this is the same thing that was seen earlier, is *pratyabhijñāna*. The reason for this *pratyabhijñāna* is the eternal general *jñāna*.

***ātmā* is the pure modification, not touched by eternal general *jñāna*. Unblemished modification of *jñāna* does not manifest from the base of eternal *guṇa*. Here, it is proved that – from an absolute point of view, it does not have the base of the general substance.**

See! Here, the discussion is very subtle. In the eighteenth point, it was said that the eternal general substance does not touch the division of attributes in the form of *jñāna*. *ātmā* does not have a division of the *jñāna* attribute, meaning *ātmā* is a general indivisible form, so it was said. In the nineteenth point, it was stated that *jñāna* modification is absent in the eternal general substance, meaning specific is absent in general, and general is devoid of specific. Here, in the twentieth point, it is said that eternal substance is absent in the modification of one *samaya*. Modification of the attribute of *jñāna* is not from the base of the attribute of *jñāna*. Specific is not from the base of general. Modification of one *samaya*

or *samyagjñāna* or *kevalajñāna* is absolute, not relative to any other. It does not manifest because of the support of the eternal attribute; such absoluteness is stated. Thus, *ātmā* is the pure modification, not touched by the eternal *jñāna*; this is explained here.

The subject here is not on the manifestation of the unblemished modification of *jñāna*. The subject here is the existence of pure modification. The existence of pure modification is specific. As soon as it is said that the specific exists, it is decided that it does not manifest from the base of the eternal general *jñāna*. When it is said that substance exists, it can be decided that it is not due to the non-self. First, if it is said that modification exists, then it is said that it exists due to non-self; then its existence cannot be proved. From the view of the specific, the general is non-self, because the specific is not the same as the general. If the specific is believed to be based on the base of general, then the specific cannot be proved to be unrelated to all others. To believe that specific/modification is dependent, then the state of dependency will arise, and this is the focus of modification.

From the view of substance, *ātmā* is eternally pure, and unblemished modification is manifested with its auspice. Hence, modification is devoid of the constant; this is not meant to be stated here. Here, the discussion concerns the existence of a manifested pure modification. Pure modification was not present in the past, and then it manifested under the auspices of the constant; hence, modification is devoid of the constant; if someone argues accordingly, then this argument is false; this is not the discussion here. Here, an absolute statement is being made. Pure modification was not present in the past and manifested later; such a question does not arise. If it is said that it's absolute, and then it is said that it manifests on the base of general, then the state of absolutism does not remain independent. And eternal general *jñāna* is absent in pure modification, meaning specific is devoid of general. Absence is shown in which substance? It is shown in two parts, which are present. That which is not in existence cannot be shown as absence.

The way it was said in the eighteenth point that substance is undivided, at that time, *jñāna*, etc., attributes are there; but the division of *jñāna*, etc., *guṇas* is absent in the indivisible nature. Hence, the substance does not touch *jñāna*. In the nineteenth point, it was said that attributes are general, and at the same time, *jñāna*'s pure modification is present, but pure modification of *jñāna* is absent in the general efficacious natured substance; hence, substance does not touch modification.

In the twentieth point, it is said that when pure modification is present simultaneously, eternal constant substance is present. But the general substance is absent in the pure modification of *jñāna*, meaning that the specific is devoid of the general. **Hence, pure modification does not touch the general substance.**

Pure modification is devoid of general; if specific is not devoid of general, then they both will become one; the nature of substance is not such. Specific is because of specific, not because of general.

Here, it is to be proved that the specific is absolute.

In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth points, two types are proved in the present, and then to prove their indivisibility, it is said that they do not touch each other.

In the eighteenth point, attributes are absent in the beholder of attributes; the undivided beholder of attributes is the subject of *samyagdarśana*, so it is shown.

In the nineteenth point, it is said that a general, constant knower-seer form of oneness of nature does not touch the manifested modification of true faith. It is said that a general, constant nature of oneness is the subject of true faith.

In the twentieth point, it is said that the current pure modification of *jñāna* does not touch its constant nature. Pure modification is manifested in the present. The discussion is that it is ‘there.’ The talk is not about the relativity of initially pure modification that was not there; thereafter, it focuses on the constant and will manifest. Pure modification exists, exists, and exists; the general constant also exists. But pure modification is not because of the general substance; it is because of the specific, which is devoid of the general.

1. It is not true that the pure modification is manifested because of the *nimitta* of *devaśāstra-guru*.
2. It is not true that the pure modification is manifested, and it manifests because of the presence of an auspicious disposition.
3. It is not true that pure modification is manifested, and it manifests because of the presence of the general attribute of *jñāna* in the form of efficacy.
4. It is not true that the present experience is because of past experience; Pure modification exists – it is absolute, without any reason.

Thus, when deciding so, the focus moves away from *nimitta* and auspicious dispositions. In the same way, the focus moves away from the division of specific and general and focuses on the substance, which is in the form of oneness. All attributes are *asahāya* (solitary/unaided). One attribute is absent in another attribute, this is said to be *atadbhāva* (not arising from that). The attribute of faith does not require knowledge, and the attribute of knowledge does not require faith. The way characteristics are unaided, independent, and

absolute; in the same way, manifested pure modification of *jñāna* exists, it does not require the general attribute of *jñāna* for it. Pure modification is devoid of the eternal characteristic of *jñāna*. Every modification, be it of *samyagjñāna* or *kevalajñāna*, is unaided and absolute.

Question: By saying absolute modification, is the focus to be on modification?

Answer: No. The focus is not on modification. Modification of every *samaya* exists, and it is without a reason. It does not require *nimitta* or attachment, nor does it require the general attribute of *jñāna*. This way, its absolutism is explained. The resultant form of pure modification is *ātmā*; *ātmā* itself is pure modification. By showing so, the focus is on substance. The aim of *samyagdarśana* is not the *ātmā* with the division of specific and general. Pure modification is the *ātmā*; by saying so, the focus is turned to the indivisible. With this evidence, the meaning of *aliṅgrahaṇa* is – a = not, *liṅga* = cause of *pratyabhijñāna*, *grahaṇa* = eternal general *jñāna*, meaning which does not have general *jñāna*, such an *ātmā* is *aliṅgrahaṇa*. Thus, *ātmā* is such a pure modification not touched by eternal *jñāna*. *ātmā* itself is pure modification. There is no difference between *ātmā* and pure modification; this self-knowable should be known accordingly. To know and believe in such a self-knowable *ātmā* is *dharma*.

gāthā-173

अथ कथममूर्तस्यात्मनः स्निग्धरूक्षत्वाभावाद्धन्धो भवतीति पूर्वपक्षयति –

Now, how can bondage of *amūrta ātmā* (incorporeal soul) be caused as it is without sickness-dryness? (As suggested earlier) Such a preliminary view is presented: -

**मुक्तो रुवादिगुणो बज्झदि फासेहिं अण्णमण्णेहिं ।
तव्विवरीदो अप्पा बज्झदि किध पोग्गलं कम्मं ॥ १७३ ॥**

*mutto rūvādiguṇo bajjhadi phāsehim aṇṇamaṇṇehim |
tavvivarīdo appā bajjhadi kidha poggalaṁ kammaṁ || 173 ||*

gāthā: Corporeal (material substances) being possessed of colour, etc., qualities are bound with other corporeal matters by mutual form of touch; (but) how can the self *ātmā*, having the opposite (incorporeal) qualities of *pudgala* (matter), bind with the material *karmas* (karmic matter)?

tīkā: Mutual bondage of two corporeal material substances, being associated with colour, etc., qualities and due to the aforesaid smoothness-roughness form, it is possible to understand a state of mutual bondage. But how can the bondage of *ātmā* and karmic matter be understood/recognised? Because karmic matter being associated with colour, etc., qualities can have stickiness-dryness form specific to the quality of touch, which is possible as described earlier. But as *ātmā* is without the attributes of colour, etc., it is impossible to have the particularity of smoothness-roughness, touch; hence one part is lacking [or from the two parts necessary for *bandha* (bondage), one is missing – as it is without the attribute of touch, it does not have the ability to have *bandha* (bondage)].

pravacana on gāthā-173

If a *pudgala paramāṇu* (the smallest unit of physical matter) has more than two degrees of dryness and stickiness, then it can form a bondage. The way, the bondage of that which is with four parts can occur with that which is with six parts, in the same way, if from two to infinite parts are with dryness and stickiness, then that which is with two parts more of dryness and stickiness will have a bondage with it. They form a bond due to the quality of touch, which is worth noting.

The disciple does accept that the mass of *pudgala* is formed due to its quality of dryness-stickness, and not due to the attachment-aversion of *jīva*. To clarify in detail, the disciple asks how one with a physical, corporeal form can create a bondage with one that does not have a corporeal form? *ātmā* is without the quality of touch-taste-smell, and *karma* is with touch-taste-smell. How can these two combine? In the state of transmigration, in which way does the relationship of *nimitta-naimitika* between *ātmā* and *karma* occur? This is the question put forward by the disciple.

Some would say that instead of wasting time in understanding these things, one should do the activity of *sāmāyika*, etc., and what is the problem with that? The answer is that if one does not understand the bondage of one *samaya*, then how can one understand the *ātmā* without any bondage? He will not be able to understand that. Without the understanding/knowing of the *ātmā*, which is without bondage, there can be no *sāmāyika*, etc., and neither can there be any *dharma*.

There can be no match between the passionless *deva* and those with passions; in the same way, there is no match between *ātmā* and *karma*. While revering *Bhagavāna*, it is said that, O Lord, ‘you are without passions and I (the self) am with passions, how can both match?’ If someone prays to *Bhagavāna*, He has no attachment; if someone criticises Him, he has no aversion. *jīva* who reveres Him will go to heaven, and who criticises Him will go to hell, but *Bhagavāna* does not send them there. He is passionless. Hence, how can a mundane *jīva* be like *Bhagavāna*? If *Bhagavāna* were with attachments, then we would be equal, but He is never with attachments/passions. If the self were to become passionless, then there would be equivalence.

Just as there can be no connection between one who is attached and one who is without attachments, similarly, *ātmā* does not possess the qualities of stickness and dryness; therefore, it cannot have karmic bondage. It is said to be *vikala* (imperfect) in that one part (the absence of stickness-dryness in *ātmā* is the imperfection of one part). So, how can there be a connection between the incorporeal *ātmā* and corporeal karmas? The question of this verse will be answered in verse 174.

अथैवममूर्तस्याप्यात्मानो बन्धो भवतीति सिद्धान्तयति -

Now, such a principle is decided that bondage of soul, though it is *amūrta* (incorporeal), is caused: -

**रूवादिहं रहिदो पेच्छदि जाणादि रूवमादीणि ।
दव्वाणि गुणे य जधा तह बंधो तेण जाणीहि ॥१७४ ॥**

*rūvādiehiṃ rahido pecchadi jāṇādi rūvamādīṇi |
davvāṇi guṇe ya jadha taha baṇdho teṇa jāṇīhi || 174 ||*

gāthā: Just as *ātmā*, which is without colour, etc., perceives and knows *dravyas* (material objects) and their *guṇas* (qualities/attributes) possessed of colour, etc., similarly, its bondage with them should be understood.

ṭīkā: Just as *jīva* though devoid of colour, etc., perceives (sees) and knows material objects and their qualities, in the same way, *jīva*, though bereft of colour, etc., is bound with material karmic-matter, because if it would not be so then here too (in the case of seeing-knowing), the question will inevitably arise that - “How does this *ātmā*, the self which is *amūrta* (incorporeal), see and know corporeal matter objects?

Moreover, it is not so that this point (the bondage of the incorporeal with the corporeal) is extremely difficult, so it has been explained through an example. However, so that this understanding manifests to all, whether young or old, it has been explained through an example.

Thus: - as a boy or a cowherd when he sees and knows a clay bull or a (living) bull standing away from him, there is no union with the bull; nevertheless, a relationship with seeing-knowing evolved in the form of reflection of bull (i.e. with reflected appearance of bull in his perception-knowledge) of which the outside bull (being a subject of knowledge) is *nimitta*, and is assuredly an accomplisher of *vyavahāra* (convention) in the form of relationship with the bull. Similarly, *ātmā*, being incorporeal, is without touch; he has no connection to the physical karmic matter. Even then, thoughts of attachment-aversion, etc., which have covered *upayoga* (psychic activity), there is a *nimitta*, which is the physical karmic matter, both of which remain in the same space. The relation between them is the

accomplisher of the *vyavahāra* (conventionality) in the form of *bandha* of the karmic *pudgala* matter.

bhāvārtha: How does the *ātmā*, despite being incorporeal, become bonded with material karmic matter? In response to this question, *āchārya* states, how does the *ātmā*, although incorporeal, perceive corporeal material objects? Just as it perceives corporeal material objects, similarly, it becomes bonded with material karmic matter.

Despite there being no relationship of incorporeal *ātmā* with corporeal material objects, the *vyavahāra* (convention) of the relationship of *arūpi* with *rūpi* (incorporeal with corporeal) is not contradictory. Where it is said so that *ātmā* knows material-object, there is, in fact, no relationship of *amūrtika ātmā* (incorporeal *ātmā*) with *mūrtika padārtha* (corporeal objects); its relationship is only with the knowledge modified into the reflected appearance of that material-object, and owing to the relationship only with knowledge modified into the reflected appearance of the object, *amūrtika ātmā* knows *mūrtika padārtha* - such *vyavahāra* (conventionality) of relationship of *amūrtika* with *mūrtika* is proved. In the same way, wherever it is said that a certain *ātmā* has bondage with material (karmic matter), there is, in fact, no relationship of the incorporeal *ātmā* with corporeal matter (as a matter of fact) *ātmā*'s relationship/bondage is with its attachment-aversion, etc. dispositions in which karmic matter (*pudgala karma*) is *nimitta* (instrumental) and owing to the relationship with those attachment-aversion, etc. dispositions, in which karmas are *nimitta*, “this *ātmā* is bonded with material karmic matter”-thus *vyavahāra* (convention) of bondage-form of incorporeal (*ātmā*) with corporeal karmic matter is proved.

Although there is indeed no connection of a man with wife-son-wealth, etc., all are absolutely separate from that man; but the man who has attachment of his wife-son-wealth, etc., possesses the bondage of *rāga*, and wife-son-wealth, etc., are *nimitta* in that *rāga*; so conventionally it is said that man has bondage of wife-son-wealth, etc. In the same way, although there is no connection of this soul with karmic-matter, they are totally separate from *ātmā*, but *ātmā*, undergoing attachment-aversion, etc., dispositions and karmic-matter being the *nimitta* in those dispositions; it can be said conventionally that this *ātmā* has bondage of *karma-pudgalas* (karmic-matter).

pravacana on gāthā-174

Incorporeal *ātmā* knows corporeal substances. *ātmā* knows that jaggery is sweet, salt is salty, some substance is spicy, and *neem* is bitter. By knowing the state of *pudgala*, part,

he is able to know the substance which is in the form of the one who holds the parts. Substance-attribute-modification of the incorporeal is in it, it does not know that these are its substance-attribute-modification, but *ātmā* can know them. The way *ātmā* knows and sees the corporeal substances, in the same way, in the state of *saṁsāra*, he comes into bondage with the corporeal/ physical karmas. It may be said that it is impossible for *ātmā* and corporeal substances to come into bondage. The question can also arise that, *ātmā*, despite being incorporeal, how can *ātmā* know and see corporeal substances? The way *arūpī* (incorporeal) *ātmā* knows *rūpī* (corporeal) substances, in the same way, the incorporeal *ātmā* can come into bondage with the corporeal karmas. There is no contradiction in that.

It is not that the bondage of incorporeal, with corporeal, is tough here; however, it is still explained with an example so that everyone, be it young or old, can understand through it.

A child possesses a clay bull, while an older man possesses a real bull. The clay bull is separate from the child, and the real bull is separate from the older man. Despite being separate, the clay bull is known by the child, and the older man also knows the real bull. Although the bull is known, both the child and the older man are separate. They share no relation with the bull. Just as the child is naturally endowed with the psychic activity of *jñāna-darśana-upayoga* while seeing and knowing the bull, similarly, the older man is also naturally endowed with the psychic activity of *jñāna-darśana* while knowing and seeing the bull. At that time, that object is known; however, if another thing is present instead of that object, it is not known. The knowledge of the child is the *viśayī* (knower), and the clay bull is its *viśaya* (object). The knowledge of the older man is the *viśayī* (knower), and the real bull is its *viśaya* (object). In this way, the *ātmā* has been modified into the *upayoga* of *darśana-jñāna*. Knowledge belongs to the *ātmā*, and the bull is its *nimitta* (instrumental cause). Even though knowledge and the bull are separate, a knower-knowable relation is shared.

By this same example, the *ātmā* is *arūpī* (incorporeal) and without touch; therefore, no relation is shared by the *ātmā* with karmic matter, which possesses touch and other qualities. Yet, when a *jīva* deviates from his *jñātā-draṣṭā* nature and engages in *mithyātva*, attachment, and aversion, then *karma* acts as the *nimitta* in their attachment-aversion. Therefore, a relationship is established between the *ātmā* and physical karmic matter. In this manner, the conventionality of the bondage of *ātmā* with *karma* is established. Just as

a relation is shared by *amūrta jñāna* (incorporeal knowledge) with *mūrta jñeya* (corporeal knowable), similarly, a relation is shared by the *amūrta ātmā* with *mūrta karma*.

Even though non-self substances are knowable, an ignorant person considers them to be his own and has a sense of ownership towards them. In reality, non-self substances are merely *nimitta* in *jñāna*; however, due to his sense of ownership, the ignorant makes them *nimitta* in his possessiveness. A small child experiences attachment-aversion when the bull dies. Upon the death of the bull, he believes that his bull is dead due to his sense of ownership, and he experiences attachment-aversion. An ignorant has attachment-aversion, with any change in the state of the wife, family, or money. Those things do not cause attachment-aversion, but when these are done by oneself, then that is said to be *nimitta*. Non-self substances are worthy of being known in *jñāna*; however, the ignorant considers them to be his own and, by expressing ownership of them, he makes them *nimitta* in his attachment. The object, in reality, is separate. The way a father is separate from a child. But if the child dies, the father is in grief. A cow is separate from her calf, a clay bull from a child, a poor person from his hut, or a wealthy individual from his bungalow. All these substances are distinct and knowable, worth knowing in *jñāna*. However, due to the feeling of 'mine-ness' or possessiveness, the ignorant perceives them to be his own, leading to attachment-aversion. When attachment-aversion arises, bondage of karma occurs. This is how the *ātmā* becomes associated with *karma*.

In *gāthā* 172, it is stated that when *jīva* takes the auspices of the sentient knowing-seeing nature of the self, then he attains *samyagdarśana* and, with increased steadfastness, *mokṣa* is achieved. Here, it is explained that *jīva*, which does not perceive non-self substances merely in the form of knowable but instead develops a sense of ownership over them, remains in *saṁsāra* (transmigration). The *jīva* that does not engage in his function of knowing and seeing, and instead remains with the focus which is externally oriented, inevitably experiences attachment-aversion. When attachment-aversion manifests, *jaḍa-karma* (material karma) is said to be *nimitta*. Such a *jīva* whose focus is on the modifications will always have the *nimitta-naimitika* (cause-effect) relationship with karma. This understanding is provided here.

jīva that inclines towards its *sva* (one's self) is not influenced by the instrumental cause of old *karmas*, and new *karmas* do not come in bondage. However, the old *karmas* are *nimitta* to *jīva* who focuses on modification and experiences attachment-aversion, and he has the bondage of new *karmas*. His bondage of karma is in proportion to the attachment and

aversion that he has. The ignorant deviates from his nature of *jñāna*, stops in attachment-aversion. That is indeed the *niścaya-bāṇḍha* (real, substantial bondage of *karma*). The actual occupation of space by inert karma within the same area as the *ātmā* is considered to be the *vyavahāra* (conventional) relationship. Thus, for the *jīvas* whose attention is directed towards attachment-aversion, the *vyavahāra* of bondage with karmic matter particles is established.

Here, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* has stated that all substances, including *karma*, that are known, are all *jñeyas* (knowable) in *jñāna*. The two have a relationship of *jñeya-jñāyaka* (knower and the knowable). However, the ignorant *jīva* does not accept this. Instead of remaining a knower, he believes that the non-self is his own and believes in the ownership of it. This is why attachment-aversion is *nimitta* to the *jīvas*, whose focus is on modification. In this way, it is proved that the incorporeal *ātmā* has a relation with the corporeal *karmas*.

pravacana on bhāvārtha

Despite being incorporeal, what kinds of relation does *ātmā* have with the corporeal *karmas*? *Ācārya Bhagavāna* has answered this question. The way *ātmā* knows corporeal substances in the same way, it has a relation with the corporeal karmas, which are modified in the form of attachments. Though the incorporeal *ātmā* has no actual relation with the corporeal substance, even then the *vyavahāra* of the relation of the incorporeal with the corporeal has no contradiction. It has been said that *ātmā* knows corporeal substances. From the view of *paramārtha* (supreme reality), *ātmā* has no relation with the corporeal substance. This is because *ātmā* is incorporeal and karma is corporeal. There is a complete absence of corporeality in the incorporeal. There is a mutual absence of the present modification of *pudgala* in the present modification of another *pudgala*. The *paramāṇu* of a stick can be modified into a cloth at some point. Hence, they are said to have a mutual absence in one another. But there is a state of complete absence between *ātmā* and the physical matter substance. At no point can *ātmā* ever become a physical matter substance, and vice versa. So, there is a complete state of absence between them, and hence they have no relation with each other.

In verse 172, it was said that *ātmā* cannot be known by way of any signs or marks, nor by senses. It is not such that it can be known by the senses, nor can conjecture know *ātmā*. There is no perturbation in *ātmā*. The passionless modification of one *samaya* is also not present in *ātmā*. This was told. Now it is said that *ātmā* cannot join non-self substances.

ātmā has a sense of ownership, and that sense of ownership is present in the innumerable space points of *ātmā*, for one *samaya*. Though the perturbation covers innumerable space points, the owner of perturbation is not a *samyagdr̥ṣṭi*. The focus of *samyagdarśana* is the complete, unperturbed, undivided *ātmā*. When the experience that *ātmā* is pure joyful sentient arises, then the passionless modification manifests. That occurs in the innumerable space points of *ātmā*. Even then, their time span is only one *samaya*. That modification is absent in the general permanent substance, and the general permanent is absent in the particular.

When *ātmā* was shown to be without perturbations, without the distinction of attributes and beholder of attributes, generality being without the distinction of particularity, even then, how can that *ātmā* come into the bondage of karmas? This is being clarified.

The non-corporeal *ātmā* knows the corporeal substances. This much is the only relation *ātmā* has with the corporeal substances. Despite being non-corporeal, *ātmā* knows corporeal substances. *jñāna*, which knows salty-sweet substances, does not become salty or sweet. *ātmā* has no connection to those substances. Even then, *ātmā* does have the knowing of those substances. With the connection of that *jñāna* only, the incorporeal *ātmā* knows corporeal substances. This proves the *vyvahāra* (conventionality) of the relation of *arūpī-rūpī* (incorporeal-corporeal). The way, *arhanta* or *siddha parmātmā* have no connection with the substances of the three-time phases, even then, they know the substance of the three-time phases. Here too, *vyvahāra* is proved.

When the incorporeal *ātmā* becomes ensnared by attachments and aversions, it engages in a *vyvahāra* relationship with corporeal karmas. It is said that, ‘Some *ātmā* has a connection with the corporeal karmic matter particles.’ The clarification for this is as follows. Firstly, it has been stated, ‘some *ātmā*’, indicating that it does not refer to all *ātmās*. Thus, for the *ātmā* that participates in attachment and aversion, physical karma serves as a *nimitta*. Here too, the *jīva* with attachments relates to the modification of the self. The *jīva*, who believes that his lower state has arisen due to karma, or that his *jñāna* is diminished because of *jñānāvarṇa* karma, will never find himself free from transmigration. This is because non-self and karma have existed since eternity. The *jīva* modifies his lesser *jñāna* or experiences the modification of delusion due to his error. Those modifications and the *jīva* maintain a relationship. The *jīva* does the lesser states of *jñāna-darśana-vīrya*, and attachment-aversion due to his fault, and has a relation with that only. In those lesser modifications, the physical karmic matter is *nimitta*. The lesser modification does not manifest when focus

is on the pure nature of the self. So, *ātmā* does have a relation with the corporeal karmas. This kind of *vyvahāra* in the form of bondage is proved between the corporeal form and the incorporeal form.

It is said that, in reality, a sense of ownership towards spouse and children is the reason for the bondage of *karma*. But it is not those that come into bondage. The bondage is the sense of ownership that one has.

To say that spouse and children are the reason for bondage is only in name. *ātmā* has no relation with eight karmas - *jñānāvarṇa*, etc., because they are entirely absent in *ātmā*. Despite this, the *jīva* who has ownership of non-self, believes non-self to be good or bad, deviates from the pure self, and is stuck in non-self, that *jīva*, by himself, creates *bhāva bandha* (psychic bondage) in his modification, in the form of attachment-aversion, etc. So, from the view of *vyvahāra*, it is said that the *jīva* with attachment has the bondage of spouse-child, etc.

The effort here is to give an understanding that the modification of psychic bondage, which has the relation of cause-effect, is knowable. *ātmā* is pure and unblemished, then from where would impurity come in that? There is no impurity in the pure nature of the self, and neither do physical nor karmic matter foster impurity. The impure disposition has occurred and is occurring in the modification of the self by the self, and physical karmic matter is only *nimitta* in it. This is because impurity does not arise with the focus of the self, but arises with the focus of the physical karmic matter. To believe that modification has no impurity is also incorrect, and even when impurity arises, if its presence is not accepted, then that too is not the correct *vyvahāra*. The impure modification is also knowable. It has been explained that there is a *nimitta-naimitika* relationship between the impure modification and karma.

jīva, who does not have the correct understanding of *bhāva bandha* (psychic bondage) and the modification of self, can never know his pure self. Hence, it has been said that *bhāva bandha* has a *nimitta-naimitika* relationship with *dravya bandha* (karmic bondage), and neither is a part of the pure nature of the self. The intent here is to give the understanding that *jīva* by nature is without bondage.

gāthā-175

अथ भावबन्धस्वरूपं ज्ञापयति -

Now, characteristic of psychical subjective bondage (*bhāva baṇḍha*) is made known: -

**उवओगमओ जीवो मुज्झदि रज्जेदि वा पदुस्सेदि ।
पप्पा विविधे विसये जो हि पुणो तेहिं सो बंधो ॥१७५॥**

*uvaogamao jīvo mujjhadi rajjedi vā padussedi |
pappā vividhe visae jo hi puṇo tehiṃ so baṇḍho || 175 ||*

gāthā: Soul, which is possessed of *upayoga* (psychic thought activity/manifestation of consciousness), to obtain various objects of the senses, evolves *moha* (delusion), *rāga* (attachment), or *dveṣa* (aversion), then *jīva* is bonded again by them (i.e., by *moha-rāga-dveṣa*).

ṭīkā: Primarily, *ātmā* is full of *upayoga* (manifestation of consciousness/psychic thought activity), as it is with *savikalpa* (conscious psychic activity) and *nirvikalpa* (pure psychic activity) forms of *patibhāsa-svarūpa* (nature to reflect), i.e., *ātmā* has knowledge and perception characteristic. There, *jīva*, on seeing the various types of reflected substances, evolves into *moha-rāga-dveṣa* (delusion-attachment-aversion). Like the nature of *śfatikamaṇi* (crystal), it is made impure/is distorted, into blackness, yellowness, blueness, by the *nimitta* of black, yellow, blue, accessory on which the crystal gem is placed. In the same way, *ātmā*, whose nature is made impure by *moha-rāga-dveṣa*, whose *nimitta* is non-self, such an *ātmā* creates *baṇḍha* (modifies in the form of *baṇḍha*) by itself, because *moha-rāga-dveṣa* is its *dviṭīya* (*baṇḍha* is caused between two things, then how can the self *ātmā* alone be as *baṇḍha-svarūpa* (bondage form)?

The answer to this question is that one is *ātmā* and the second is *moha-rāga-dveṣa* dispositions. So blemished is *ātmā* by these *moha-rāga-dveṣa* dispositions that *ātmā* alone has *bhāva baṇḍha* (psychic/subjective bondage).

pravacana on gāthā-175

Not knowing the nature of self, *jīva* believes the worldly substances to be good or bad and gets entangled in them. This is *bhāva baṇḍha* (psychic bondage), and this is *saṃsāra*. *saṃsāra* (transmigration) is not some substance on the outside. But *saṃsāra* is the

modification of ignorance, attachment, and aversion of the self. Ignorant believes that a healthy body is beneficial, and if it is diseased, then it is not beneficial, or that if he were to get favourable objects, it is good. It is bad to get unfavourable objects. With such thoughts of good and evil, he increases his ignorance and develops attachment and aversion. He does not believe that he has a knowing nature; non-self substances are knowable. He is entangled in the good-bad dichotomy; he has an attachment to favourable objects and an aversion to unfavourable objects.

1. It is not that because there are substances in the world, so there is *bhāva bandha* (psychical/subjective bondage). Those substances are seen in the *jñāna* of *Bhagavāna*, but *Bhagavāna* does not have *bhāva bandha*. The *jīva* who believes these to be beneficial and experiences delusion due to this has *bhāva bandha*.
2. If the common space that *jīva* was sharing with these substances were to be left, then it does not mean that the psychic bondage will go away. *dravyalingī muni* does not have any worldly possessions, yet his psychic bondage remains. This is because he harbours the belief that the non-self substances are his and he can leave them. This belief is *bhāva bandha*. If this belief has not gone, then leaving non-self substances will not remove *bhāva bandha*. *bhāva bandha* is released when the sense of ownership of nonself is left.

First, the vital point to focus on is that *ātmā* is with *upayoga*. The sentient god resides in the temple, which is the body. If a precious diamond is put in a box, that box does not become the diamond; the diamond and the box are separate. Similarly, within the body, the sentient diamond remains separate. This *ātmā* is with *upayoga* and is with the nature to know and see.

ātmā with *upayoga* signifies that *ātmā* possesses the nature to know and see. This represents the *jīva tattva* (*jīva* substance). Body and karma constitute *ajīva tattva*. The *śubha bhāva* (auspicious thoughts) of charity, compassion, and similar virtues form *punya* (meritorious) *tattva*. Conversely, the *aśubha bhāva* (inauspicious thoughts), such as violence, lies, and theft, embody the *pāpa* (demeritorious) *tattva*. Both *punya* and *pāpa* are responsible for the influx of karmas, and becoming entangled with them leads to *bhāva bandha*. Manifesting purity through belief in the self-*ātmā* is known as *saṁvara tattva* (tenet of stoppage of influx of *karmas*). As one deepens immersion within the self, purity increases. This principle is called *nirjarā* (shedding of karma), and achieving complete purity signifies *mokṣa tattva*.

How much is the *ātmā*? Is it as much as the meritorious-demeritorious psychic bondage? No. Meritorious-demeritorious psychic bondage is a blemished modification. So *ātmā* is not that much. Is it as much as the stoppage and shedding of karmas? No. Stoppage and shedding of karmas is an incomplete, unblemished modification. So *ātmā* is not that much. Then is *ātmā* as much as *mokṣa*? No. *mokṣa* is the complete state of one *samaya*. *ātmā* is not that much. Since eternity to infinity, *ātmā* is in the form of oneness, without blemish, without incompleteness, without division, complete by undivided, with *upyoga*. Here, *ātmā* is said to be *upyogamaya*, and not *upayogawālā*. By saying *upyogamaya*, means with the attribute of sentience, and by saying *upayogawālā*, it means it is the one that holds the attribute. If this is understood as a distinction between the attribute and the holder of the attribute, then, that is *vyavahāra*. Hence, when it is said that *ātmā* is undivided with *upyoga*, in the form of sentience, the form of knower and seer, is understood. To believe in this undivided *ātmā* is *samyagdarśana*.

Here, *upayoga* has been explained to be of two types –

1. *savikalpa*: *savikalpa* means to know with distinction. For example, to say that this is the body, karma, *jīva*. *ātmā*, who knows all substances, their attributes, and modifications, one by one, separately, has *savikalpa upayoga*. It is also referred to as *jñāna upayoga*, *jñāna cetanā*, *sākāra upayoga*.
2. *nirvikalpa*: In *ātmā*, there arises a state of *nirvikalpa*, which is without attachments. However, that is not applicable in this case. Here, the meaning is to know the generality, without distinction, which is *nirvikalpa*. To know the general state of existence is *nirvikalpa upayoga*. Without any distinction of, this is a body, or this is a *jīva*, etc., just to know its presence generally is *nirvikalpa upayoga*. That which is merely just a general experience is *darśana upayoga*, and that is also referred to as *darśana cetanā*, or *nirākāra upayoga*.

In this way, *ātmā* is with *jñāna* and *darśana*.

ācārya says that psychic bondage is not present in the *ātmā*, which is with *upayoga*. Insentient substances, such as the body and karma, are also not in the *ātmā*, which is with *upayoga*. Further, the auspicious-inauspicious thoughts are also not in the *ātmā*. If *bhāva baṇḍha* were to be present in *ātmā*, then *ātmā* would become one with *bhāva baṇḍha*, and then he would never be blemish-free.

The modification of compassion-charity, etc., are *punya tattva*, and he who believes that at least a little dharma is sure to arise due to them, harbours the opinion of *mithyātva*.

Ignorant, believing that the benefit-loss is in nonself, transmigrates. *ātmā* is with the nature to know and see, and it is due to its ability of *jñāna* that different objects are seen by it. The substances that are known have the nature to be known, and *ātmā* has the ability to know. But the ignorant deviates from his nature to know and creates delusional beliefs like, if people of the family are good, then it is beneficial, or if the body is diseased, then it is not good, if there is money, then it is good, and if there is poverty, then it is not good. He has attachment to conducive and beneficial substances and aversion to non-conducive and non-beneficial substances. All these substances are worth knowing in *jñāna*. But ignorant *jīva* believes them to be his own and imagines happiness and sorrow in them. This is said to be the thorn of *mithyātva*. This is said to be *saṁsāra*. This *saṁsāra* is of one *samaya*, but due to ignorance, it continues in the form of a flow.

This chapter is on knowable. *bhāva baṇḍha* or *saṁsāra* is also knowable, and they too are reflections. They are objects suitable to be known in *jñāna*. The presence of *bhāva baṇḍha* in the modification is due to ignorance. *karma* is not responsible for *bhāva baṇḍha*. In the same way, *bhāva baṇḍha* is not present in the *ātmā*, which is with *upayoga*. *bhāva baṇḍha* is the modification of attachment-aversion that arises due to the ignorance of one *samaya*. It is *adharma* and is the reason for disaster. This appropriate understanding should be given that *bhāva baṇḍha* is absent in the bondage-free *ātmā*, which is with *upayoga*. *bhāva baṇḍha* arises in the modification of the *ātmā*, which is with *upayoga*. When *bhāva baṇḍha* is destroyed, the modification of *dharma* manifests.

The desire for veneration is meritorious; however, it is a perturbation and a state of *adharma*, and therefore, it is not to be adopted. Auspicious thoughts do arise to save oneself from an inauspicious state, but auspiciousness is not to be respected, because it will rob one of peace. He who believes attachment to be accepted, and assumes them to be the reason for *dharma*, is a *mithyādṛṣṭi*. *dharma* will arise only when one believes the nature of *jīva* to be as it is. If there is a belief and knowing that *jīva* is with *upayoga*, and is by nature the knower-seer, then *dharma* manifests.

Without any proper understanding, this *jīva* has revolted against the true principles, due to which he has been born in *nigoda*, infinite times. Due to cruel thoughts and actions, he has been born in hell many times. He also venerated *Bhagavāna* in person, had intensely auspicious thoughts of performing *āratī* (devotional ritual, with a lighted lamp) with precious jewels, and was born in the ninth *Graivya* (name of a heaven). These kinds of auspicious-inauspicious thoughts and actions have been done innumerable times, but he

never evolved the belief that *ātmā* is the knower-seer self, which is with *upayoga*. Hence, *dharma* did not manifest, and his transmigration continues.

By imagining the knowables to be conducive or non-conductive, the ignorant creates psychic bondage in his modification. *ātmā* by nature is the knower-seer, and different substances reflect in the *ātmā*. All substances have the ability to be known in it. However, due to ignorance, the ignorant have the disposition of delusion. He has a delusional disposition with the belief that the body is his, or the body moves due to him, or speech is emitted due to him, or, on seeing a woman, inauspicious passions arise; seeing the idol of *bhagavāna* is beneficial to him. It should be known that the activity of these substances is due to themselves. Instead of that, he harbours the false belief that *ātmā* is the doer of non-self, and non-self substances can be beneficial or non-beneficial to *ātmā*. And due to this, he has attachment-aversion.

By having attachment to conducive situations and objects, and aversion to non-conductive situations and objects, *jīva* creates psychic bondage for himself, and that is transmigration. The rope around the cow's neck is separate from the cow. The cow was always separate, and the rope was always in the rope.

In the same way, physical karmic matter has the relation of being in the same space as *ātmā*. However, *karma* is distinct from *ātmā*. Due to ignorance, over infinite time phases, *jīva* has believed that *jīva* transmigrates due to *karma*. This delusional belief is the reason for psychic bondage.

jīva, focusing on modification, modifies as psychic bondage by itself. *ātmā* is as pure as a white crystal gem. However, when this crystal gem is placed near black, yellow, and red colours, it changes to reflect those colours according to its efficacy. The colours are deemed auxiliary cause, and the state of colour does not represent the inherent nature of the crystal. Its inherent nature is clarity. Similarly, *ātmā* is by nature the knower-seer. But when forgetting his nature, when he focuses on non-self, then auspicious-inauspicious thoughts or impurity arise. Having attachment to conducive substances, having aversion to non-conductive substances, to believe happiness in the inauspicious activity of earning money, to believe the thoughts of compassion-charity, etc., to be *dharma*, are all beliefs of *mithyātva* and are *aupādhika bhāva* (modification of non-self).

ātmā, which has been modified into such an impure state, comes into bondage by itself. Someone may say that bondage can occur when there are two substances, so how can *ātmā*, by itself, alone, form a bondage? The answer to this is that one is *ātmā* and the other is delusion-attachment. This being so, *ātmā*, which is with the impure state of delusion-attachment-aversion, turns into the nature of *bhāva bandha* by his self.

He who believes that work in the primary cause occurs due to the auxiliary cause does not have the correct understanding of the knowables. *nimitta* never modifies into auspicious or inauspicious thoughts. When *jīva* has auspicious thoughts by himself, then *bhagavāna* or the idol is said to be *nimitta*. When he has inauspicious thoughts by himself, then his spouse and children are said to be the *nimitta* in it. Non-self substances like *bhagavāna*, etc., are in non-self, and *ātmā* is in *ātmā*. If a stick rises, it does so on its own, and not due to the hand, etc. Despite this being so, if someone were to believe that the stick has risen due to the hand or due to the desire to do so, then he does not know the fundamental nature of the knowable, which is reflected in *jñāna*.

Question: Then, what does the term *preraka nimitta* (motivational auxiliary cause) mean?

Answer: These are the divisions of *nimitta*. *jīva*, who have desires, or *pudgala*, who are in motion, are said to be *preraka nimitta*. If they are stationary, then they are said to be *udasīna nimitta* (non-motivational auxiliary cause). However, this does not mean that the motivational cause affects the substance. When a pot is being made, the potter and the wheel are said to be the motivational *nimitta*. No one motivates anyone else. Every substance moves independently. When a person sitting on a horse moves up and down, he does so independently, and not because the horse is moving. Every knowable substance is capable of being reflected – it has the ability to be known in *jñāna*, and *jñāna* knows the nature of *jñeya* (knowable) just the way it is. There is nothing like conducive-non-conducive in the knowables, and the nature of the knowable is not that it can give anything to anyone.

Here, the explanation is of the reasons why an ignorant person has *bhāva bandha*. It is said that the ignorant does not know the independent nature of the knowables, due to which he has delusion-attachment-aversion. This gives rise to perturbation in his modification, which causes *bhāva bandha* and *samsāra*.

1. When *ātmā* does not know his nature and gets entangled in non-self, that is *bhāva bandha*. This is due to his fault. Even then, the ignorant person believes that he is entangled due to *karma* or non-self substance, and gives rise to *mithyātva*.

2. The one who has this psychic bondage has bondage of physical karmic matter, in *pudgala*, due to *pudgala*. It is false to believe that the bondage of physical karmic matter occurred because of the attachment of *jīva*.
3. It is delusional to believe that the bondage of physical karmic matter does not occur, and not to believe psychic bondage and physical matter bondage to be separate is also a delusion.
4. Auspicious and inauspicious disposition is psychic bondage. To be interested in it and to believe them to be the cause of happiness is delusion.
5. Psychic bondage is a perturbed state of one *samaya*; it is not eternal. To believe them to be eternal is also a delusion.

bhāva bandha is destroyed with the auspice of the *ātmā*, which is with *upayoga* (knowing). Here, explaining the nature of *bhāva bandha*, it is being told how to remove delusion and how to destroy transmigration. This *ātmā* is with *upayoga* and not as much as meritorious-demeritorious dispositions. It is not as much as the stoppage of the influx of karmas or shedding of karmas, and neither is it as much as the modification of *mokṣa*. The nature of *ātmā* with *upayoga* is not that - at present, *ātmā* does not have the manifestation of omniscience, but omniscience will arise later, because this refers to modification. *ātmā* is the knower-seer with *upayoga*, which exists from infinity to eternity, in the form of oneness. This does not mean that *upayoga* does not manifest in new ways. *ātmā* with *upayoga*, which is the knower-seer, is in the form of oneness from infinity to eternity. By having its *śraddhā-jñāna* (belief-knowing) and becoming equanimous in it, prevents the psychic bondage from arising. This is the only way it can be destroyed.

In this way, *bhāva bandha* is the perturbed modification of *ātmā*. For *ātmā*, that modification is a knowable. Its appropriate understanding has been given, and then it has been explained how to remove it.

Question: Here, someone asks if it is good to revere *bhagavāna*, and ask him to give the pure state?

Answer: This is a statement from the viewpoint of *nimitta*. *bhagavāna* is completely passionless and is immersed in his pure sentient state. He is omniscient, and he does not have compassion towards the world. This is because compassion is a form of attachment, and *bhagavāna* is without attachment. *bhagavāna* says that the pure state of the self is within the self. So, if one were to have the belief and knowing of self and become equanimous in it, then he will attain the pure state. When *jīva*, by his own effort, attains the pure state, then *bhagavāna* is said to be *nimitta* in it. Till the complete pure state is not

attained, auspicious attachments do come. At that time, it is alleged that *bhagavāna* gave the pure state.

Here, it has been said that it is the thorn of erroneous belief to think that *bhagavāna* will shower his mercy and will help one cross over the transmigration. Many believe that when one attains all the *nimittas*, such as *bhagavāna*, then *dharma* will arise. *nimitta* is a non-self substance, and *ātmā* cannot accumulate them, nor can he take them. So, the belief that non-self substances can be accumulated is incorrect. Even if, for any reason, one were to get all non-self substances, it should be understood that *ātmā* does not have either benefit or loss due to them.

Clean water cannot be obtained from a vessel filled with dirt and muck, representing meritorious and demeritorious states. Due to ignorance, the *jīva* has believed that happiness resides in non-self substances since eternity. He perceives happiness to be found in the enjoyment of the five senses. He is unaware that the *ātmā* embodies complete happiness and thinks that benefits arise from conducive substances while losses stem from inconducive ones. To this, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* asks, is the *jīva* devoid of happiness? Yet the ignorant insists that happiness lies in the non-self. When a vessel filled with mud is washed, only mud emerges, not gold. Similarly, when the focus is on non-self substances, and one believes happiness to be in moving them around, or in meritorious modification, then, from that, only the dirt of false belief will emerge. The purity of happiness will never emerge. It is a different matter to have auspicious-inauspicious thoughts, but to believe happiness to be from them is *mithyātva* and *bhāva bandha*.

The question here is how is *ātmā*'s modification of attachment-aversion *dvitīya* (second)? The answer to this is that psychic bondage is the incorporeal, perturbed modification of *ātmā*. It has not arisen from any physical matter, and neither has it arisen due to any physical matter. As impurity is in the state of *ātmā*, it obstructs the clean state and does not allow happiness to arise. That is why attachment-aversion is said to be *dvitīya*. If the nature of impurity and the eternal self were one, it would not obstruct the state of happiness. Or the eternal nature would be impure. So, from the viewpoint of the eternal nature, impurity is another substance. Bondage is between two substances, meaning the bondage is between *ātmā* and impure modification. Bondage has not occurred with any non-self substance.

The state of non-self substance is not due to *ātmā*. The temple of *Jina*, or the temple for *swādhyāya*, did not occur due to *ātmā*. The modification of those substances has arisen

according to the principles of the cosmic cycle of repetition in *pudgala*, due to their own self. Modification of non-sentient does not manifest due to the auspicious thoughts of *ātmā*. Substance-attribute-modification of non-sentient is in non-sentient, and the substance-attribute-modification of *ātmā* is in *ātmā*.

ātmā himself is *hari* (divinity) in removing *bhāva bandha*. However, the ignorant person believes that everything happens due to their presence, speech emanates because of them, and they are the reason for the body moving, or that the arrangement of the kingdom or the family is because of them, or that they earn and bring money. But, listen! The self is the prabhu, the *hari* (divine lord), and one should focus on it for at least a moment! Self is not the doer of non-self, and neither is he the doer of perturbation and impurity.

For long, one has sought *dharma* and happiness on the outside. But he has not seen the self *bhagavāna*, which is residing within. Hari is the one who destroys the great demerit of *mithyātva*, which is due to the belief that the self can do something to the non-self, and that *dharma* arises due to merit. ‘*pāpa harita iti hari*’. No other *hari* is capable of removing the demerit from oneself. *ātmā* is in the form of pure sentient happiness. One who has the belief-knowing of self, and destroys *mithyātva* with it, is himself the *hari*. *ātmā* is with the efficacy of *hari*, and only he becomes *hari* in his manifested modification. If the eye of *samyagjñāna* has not opened, then one does not know the self, *hari*. So, once the nature of the self should be recognised! This *ātmā* by himself is *hari*, and is with the *upayoga* of knowing-seeing. If their belief and knowing are done, then *bhāva bandhai* will go, and the state of *dharma* will be attained, and the state in the form of the complete *hari* will be manifested.

अथ भाव बन्धयुक्तिं द्रव्यबन्धस्वरूपं च प्रज्ञापयति

Now, with logical proof of psychic/subjective bondage (*bhāva-bandha*) and characteristic nature of substantial/objective/material bondage (*dravya-bandha*) is explained: -

भावेण जेण जीवो पेच्छदि जाणादि आगदं विसये ।
रज्जदि तेणेव पुणो बज्झदि कम्म त्ति उवदेसो ॥ १७६ ॥

bhāveṇa jeṇa jīvo pecchadi jāṇādi āgadam visaye |
rajjadi teṇeva puṇo bajjhadi kamma tti uvadeso || 176 ||

gāthā: With whatever attitude/disposition a *jīva* (soul) perceives and knows the object which comes in his knowledge, thereby he is imbued (affected) and by that (affection) karmic-matter is bound again - such is the teaching.

ṭīkā: This soul, being possessed of reflective-nature in forms of *sākāra* (differentiating quality of knowledge) and *nirākāra* (non-differentiating quality of perception), with whatever attitude/disposition either in the form delusion (*moha*) or of attachment (*rāga*) or of aversion (*dveṣa*) perceives and knows objects worth getting reflected, thereby it is imbued (affected). And whatever this affection is, it is actually *bhāva-bandha* (psychic/subjective bondage), which corresponds to smoothness and roughness. And again, through it, (newer) matter is bound. Thus, this *bhāva-bandha* is *nimitta* of *dravya-bandha*.

pravacana on gāthā-176

This *ātmā*'s nature is both *sākāra* (with distinction) and *nirākāra* (general knowing). *sākāra* means to know with the discerning between the self and the non-self. For example, to know with differentiation like – “This is a body, this is *ātmā*, this is a human being” – is called *sākāra upayoga* (perception with distinction) or *jñānopayoga* (perception of knowing). And simply observing things, in general, without making distinctions, is called *nirākāra upayoga* (non-differentiated cognition) or *darśanopayoga* (perception without distinction).

Here, it is not about the external form. The *ātmā* has its inherent shape. Every substance possesses the attribute of *pradeśatva* (spatial extension), and because of this quality, it must have some shape or the other. *ātmā* is endowed with *jñāna* (knowledge) and *darśana* (perception), and is incorporeal, and is distinct from the shape of the body. The shape of the body belongs to the body, and the shape of *ātmā* belongs to *ātmā*. The body's shape is not in *ātmā*; hence, this discussion is not about external form. Instead, it is about the inherent nature of *jñāna-darśana* (knowledge and perception) of *ātmā*.

Objects and the knowledge of those objects are not the cause of impurity. In this nature of *jñāna*, all objects are knowable, and knowing those objects is the inherent attribute of *ātmā*. Those objects or knowledge of those objects are not the cause of impurity. All substances of the three worlds are known in the *jñāna* of omniscients, yet they remain free of attachment. An *ajñānī jīva*, however, becomes deluded by those objects, and that is the cause of transmigration.

Wrong focus of *jīva* is the real cause of impurity. Just as when a person looks at objects with his eyes in a usual way, the objects appear as they are; however, when seen through black or red glasses, they appear black or red, not as they truly are. Similarly, misconceptions such as the idea that one can control others or that dharma arises from *punya* (merit) are forms of *mithyābhāva* (false beliefs). Liking conducive objects and disliking inconducive objects is attachment and aversion through delusion, which causes the *jīva* to become impure. The ignorant, forgetting the true nature of knowing and seeing, clings to the idea of merit and engages in *adharma*, thinking it to be virtuous. Just as fine food eventually turns into excrement and is discarded, in the same way, even the most refined, virtuous thoughts cannot be preserved; thus, merit too is ultimately not venerable.

Material karmic bondage occurs due to the roughness or smoothness in the *pudgala*. In this, psychic bondage is only *nimitta*. Just as roughness and smoothness in matter cause bonding, in the *jīva*, attachment and aversion are causes of bondage. When *jīva* engages in attachment-aversion, it provides the *nimitta*, and *pudgala paramāṇu*, through their own nature, form an aggregate of karmic matter, resulting in material bondage. When in *paramāṇu* the parts of dryness or stickiness become two more, they become the cause of bondage. A particle with two parts binds with one that has four parts; one with three parts binds with another having five. Aggregates of *paramāṇu*, like those forming *laḍḍū*, *roṭī*, *dāl*, *bhāta* (sweets, bread, lentils, rice, etc.), become in aggregate forms because of the addition of two extra parts. *ātmā* does not form them into aggregates; instead, *pudgala*

paramāṇu transform themselves into the form of *karma skandha* (aggregates of karmic matter) due to their own nature by joining with two extra parts, resulting in material bondage. In this process, *jīva*'s psychic bondage is merely an instrumental cause. The physical matter is not so dependent that the material bondage would occur only if there were psychic bondage. However, it is explained as an instrumental-causative relationship, where when *jīva* engages in attachment and aversion, karmic matter binds as a result.

Thus, both *bhāvabandha* and *dravyabandha* are knowable. After knowing them correctly, if the belief and knowing are done that *ātmā* is in the form of a free state, devoid of both states of bondage, then one becomes free from bondage and attains a state of bliss.

In this verse, Bhagavāna Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācārya explains the nature of *bhāvabandha* (psychic bondage).

The nature of the nine fundamental tenets has been spoken by the *bhagavāna* exactly as He perceived it. *Ācārya bhagavāna* states the same. *bhagavāna* does not have the thought of the desire to preach to other beings. In the twelfth *guṇasthāna* (spiritual stage), all conceptualizations or mental thoughts cease, and the passionless state is attained. After that, in the thirteenth *guṇasthāna* (spiritual stage), the omniscient state of all-knowing is realised. Such an omniscient knows all substances of the three worlds and three time phases — past, present, and future, including all substances, attributes, and modifications. After attaining *kevalajñāna*, the *omkāra-dhvani* (divine Om sound) arises spontaneously, without intention. Those who are spiritually capable understand it on their own, according to their inner receptivity or merit.

1. *Bhagavāna* does not think of preaching to other beings, so that they understand. This thought does not arise because He has attained the passionless state.
2. It is also not correct to say that *Bhagavāna* attained *kevalajñāna*, and then speech emanated. Because *kevalajñāna* is simply a modification of the attribute of *jñāna*, and speech is a modification of the *bhāṣā-vargaṇā* (speech-category of subtle matter).
3. It is not true that, because in the non-omniscient state, karmic matter responsible for the status of a *tīrthaṅkara* is bound and therefore speech arises; because *nāma-karma* (karma *nimitta* in body forms) and *divya-dhvani* (divine sound) are composed of different indivisible matter particles, and there is *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) between the two.

4. It is also not true to say that divine speech arises due to meritorious karma of the comprehending listeners because the meritorious karma of the listener, inanimate karma, and the *paramāṇu* of the *divya-dhvani* (divine sound) are distinct, and again, there is *anyonya-abhāva* (mutual absence) between them.
5. It is also not true that because the *divya-dhvani* was emitted, so the *jīva* understood *dharma*; because the *divyadhvani* is non-sentient and modification of *dharma-paryāya* of *jīva* is *arūpī* (without physical form); there is *atyanta-abhāva* (absolute non-connection) between the two.

Thus, first, it is said to manifest the independent *jñāna*, then the *jñāna* of the *nimitta-naimitika* relationship. When, due to the meritorious karmas of the listeners, or due to the arising of the *tīrthaṅkara-prakṛti* (karmic manifestation which is *nimitta* in the state of the *tīrthaṅkara*), when the divine sound emanates, then *jīvas* who are worthy of understanding it do so; then it is ascribed that understanding came through speech. But *Bhagavāna* is neither the doer nor the sustainer of speech. *kevalajñāna* is independent, *karma* is independent, speech is independent, and the listener's knowledge is also independent each element is entirely independent. No one is the creator or destroyer of another.

Here, the nature of *bhāva-bandha* that arises due to *divya-dhvani* is explained: this *ātmā* is a knower-seer, an awakened nature, possessing its natural attributes. Forgetting that, when he indulges in delusion-attachment-aversion, it gets entangled. This is called *bhāva-bandha*. Activities like constructing a house, bodily movements, or rituals in a temple are all modifications of *paramāṇu* caused by *paramāṇu*, and not by *ātmā*. Still, believing them to be done by *ātmā* is delusion, and that is *bhāva-bandha*.

Someone might say that nothing happened until he was absent, and work began only after he arrived. But the modification of each *paramāṇu* is independent. The *paramāṇu* exists permanently and transforms, and the variety arises in the *paramāṇu* due to itself, and not due to external causes. The actions of a house being built, movement of the body, and the burning of wood happen independently due to the nature of inert matter. The *pariṇāmī* (one who modifies) cannot be separated from its *pariṇāma* (modification). If *ātmā* were *pariṇāmī* and still caused the modifications of *jaḍa* (non-sentient, physical matter), then *ātmā* and *jaḍa* would become one, which would imply the destruction of *ātmā*. But such is not the case.

All substances are formed due to themselves, and not by *ātmā* to accept this is *syādvāda* (doctrine of quodammodo /in a certain way). But it is not *syādvāda* to say that things are

truly formed by their own causes, and conventionally formed by *ātmā*; rather, it is *mithyāvāda* (false doctrine).

1. This temple did not arise from the *śubhabhāva* (auspicious disposition) of the *ātmā*. If the temple were to be built due to an auspicious disposition, then as soon as an auspicious disposition arises, the temple should instantly be built. But this does not happen. Even when an auspicious disposition occurs, the temple may or may not be built; and if it is built, it is not built immediately. It is built in the course of its *pudgala-parāvartana* (cosmic cycle of repetitive transformation of physical matter), therefore, to believe that it is built by the *ātmā* is a delusion.
2. It is also incorrect to say that an auspicious disposition arises because the temple was built. If the temple were the cause of an auspicious disposition, then everyone should experience it, but that is not the case. Then, the auspicious disposition would become dependent on an external object (temple), and to regard it as dependent is also false, a delusion.
3. It is also not correct to say that because an auspicious disposition arose, *dharma* (right conduct) happened. Because auspicious disposition is *āsrava* (influx of *karma*), while *dharma* is *saṁvara* (stoppage of *karma*) and *nirjarā* (shedding of *karma*). From a state of impurity, a state of non-impurity cannot arise. Hence, to consider auspicious disposition as *dharma* is also a delusion.

Ah! The *jīva* does not even consider the nine fundamental realities as independent. If the manifestation of a house comes from meritorious *karma*, then the *paryāya* of *ajīva* becomes dependent. If *dharma* arises from auspicious disposition, then the *āsrava-tattva* itself transforms into stoppage and shedding of *karman*. If one believes that *jīva* experiences auspicious disposition, due to *ajīva-dravya*, then modification of *ātmā* becomes dependent. This leads to a lack of true faith in any of the realities.

The ignorant believes that if he exists, then the modifications of matter exist; if he were to be present, then all actions can take place. But he does not believe that the self is *ātmā*, and the pure, passionless modification arises within. Such a belief is incorrect. *jīva* has not truly understood the essence of the *tattva* (reality).

In truth, every action is independent. When an external *nimitta* is mentioned, it is only a figurative expression. For example, a temple is built, and if a *jīva* experiences an auspicious disposition in relation to that, one may say that the temple was built due to that auspicious

disposition, but this is only a figurative expression. When guests arrive at your home out of hospitality and they are told that they should feel at home and take whatever they need with comfort, etc., do they become the owners of that house? If a guest, assuming the house to be his, tries to claim it, would anyone actually hand it over? No, instead, the guest would be seen as foolish and possibly thrown out. Truly, this is just a statement of *vyavahāra*. The meaning of the scriptures should be understood in the same way.

In a devotional prayer, it is said ‘Oh Lord! You have liberated millions, liberate me as well.’ But does *bhagavāna* actually liberate others? No, *bhagavāna* says that *jīvas* are not impotent and they should not depend on another. He will not attain *jñāna* through the support of *bhagavāna*.

punya is not due to the temple; *dharma* does not arise from *punya* (meritorious karma). *punya* is a perturbation; it is not the nature of the self. This reality should be understood: the self cannot act upon or transform non-self substance. Through faith and knowing of one’s knowing-and-seeing nature, *dharma* arises. And through special steadfastness within, *kevalajñāna* will manifest. There is nothing of the self with the *Bhagavāna*. What is spoken in reverential devotional singing is not to be taken literally. Instead, the *jīva* who manifests *dharma* within himself after understanding the essence of the prayer—that *jīva* sees *Bhagavāna* as a *nimitta*. Just like the elephant has two types of tusks—those that are visible and those it uses to eat with. Even if the external tusks are made of gold, they serve no use in chewing food. Similarly, the words of *vyavahāra* and *nimitta* are like those external tusks; they do not serve the function of revealing the *paramārtha* (absolute truth), i.e., the path of *mokṣa*.

"Ab kyo na vicārat hai man se, kachu aura rahā un sādhana se?"

(Why do you still not reflect from within—what remains now through those external practices?)

The *jīva* did not understand the true *tattva*, and without understanding the true *tattva*, fasting, prayers, etc., have been performed many times. Due to these auspicious dispositions, *jīva* has been born up to the ninth *grāiveyaka*.

yama, niyama saṁyama āpa kiyo, punī tyāga virāga athāga liyo |
vanavāsa liyo mukha mauna raho, dṛdha āsana padma lagāya diyo || 1 ||
mana pauna nirodha svabodha kiyo, haṭha joga prayoga sūtāra bhayo |
japa bheda jape, tapa tyomhi tape, ursemhi udāsi lahi sabapem || 2 ||
saba śāstrana ke naya dhāri hiye, mata maṇdana khaṇdana bheda liye |

vaha sādhana bāra ananta kiyo, tadapi kachu hātha haju na paryo || 3 ||

Out of ignorance, the *jīva* followed the five great vows, took rigid vows, such that only certain conditions are met, then food is taken. Many times, to cultivate detachment, external possessions were renounced, and he went away into the forest, observing silence. He sat in the lotus pose for meditation, restraining his mind. Did *pranayama* obstinately. He chanted "*namo arihantāṇaṃ*", did repeated long fasts, performed austerities under the sun and heat, and remained mentally withdrawn. He studied the *śāstras*, read all eleven *aṅgas* (canonical texts), and refuted other doctrines; yet, despite his many external efforts, peace did not arise.

***aba kyoṃ na vicārat hai mana se, kachu aura rahā una sādhana se?
bina sadguru koī na bheda lahe, mukha āgala haiṃ kaha bāta kahaiṃ?***

Now, why does the mind not reflect that there could be something missing from these efforts? Without a *sadguru* (true enlightened teacher), none can realize the actual distinction and words spoken just from one's mouth cannot convey the absolute truth.

O *jīva*! Why not reflect that, beyond all these practices, one has performed various external acts. Yet those efforts have not benefited the *ātmā*. *jñānī* does not have ownership of the outer activities. Without the realization of true *tattva* (truth), even renunciation, vows, and austerities are in vain. Only in the presence and with the teachings of a true *guru* can a *jīva* understand the real nature of the substance (*ātmā*). Therefore, one must strive to understand the *tattva* according to one's eligibility through the teachings of the true guru, in his presence.

jīvas have no understanding of the real *tattva*, and they believe dispositions of *punya* itself to be *dharma* (religion). Some say that organizing a *pañca-kalyāṇaka mahotsava* (celebration of the five auspicious events in a *Tīrthaṅkara's* life) is religion. To say that one attains liberation in the eighth birth because of it is not correct. Such *pañca-kalyāṇaka* have been organized countless times, yet liberation did not occur because they are motivated by auspicious attachment, and to assume that dharma arises from auspicious attachment is a *mithyātva*. Due to such impurity, *bhāva-bandha* occurs. And because *bhāva-bandha* exists, *dravya-bandha* also takes place, where *karmas* like *jñānāvaraṇa* (knowledge-obscuring), *darśanāvaraṇa* (perception-obscuring), etc., come into bondage in the same space as *ātmā*. However, to say that bondage occurs because of impurity is

incorrect; both are independent phenomena. Just as many pebbles may fall into water, but water does not become pebble-like, nor do pebbles become water-like, and neither arises from the other. Similarly, in the worldly state, since eternity, there have been both *bhāva-bandha* and *dravya-bandha* due to karmic matter particles. Yet, neither is the cause of the other. They only share a relationship of mutual spatial coexistence. If from eternity, physical matter and consciousness have coexisted, does that mean *jaḍa* transforms *caitanya* or vice versa? No, that can never happen. Understanding that bondage of physical karmic matter exists, as a *nimitta*, and having the belief-knowing that *ātmā* is free of the psychic as well as physical karmic bondage is the reason for *dharma*.

“jina sohī hai ātmā, anya sohī hai karma”

Here, the term "*jina*" is used for the *ātmā* itself. The omniscient, eternal knower-seer pure form is the *ātmā* itself, and that is the nature of *jina* (conqueror of passions). The distorted dispositions arising from focusing on the non-self are *karma*, not the *ātmā*. The one who believes that knowledge arises through words does not accept the independence of the attribute of *jñāna*. Such a person cannot be called a *Jain*. *jñāna* arises independently, without the aid of speech.

Question: Isn't *adhigama* (scriptural learning) also called *samyagdarśana* in the *śāstras*?

Answer: One who believes that *jñāna* comes from non-self or auxiliary cause does not possess the right belief. *jñāna* arises from the self alone, and not from external *nimittas*. Even auspicious disposition arises due to the weakness of the self. *ātmā*, whose nature is *jñāna*, is an undivided substance with oneness. There is no auspicious disposition in it. By having this kind of focus on the pure nature of self and having faith and knowing in one's true nature, the manifestation of right faith arises. If, at the time of this manifestation, a *jñānī* is present, then that *samyaktva* is called *adhigamaja samyaktva* (right faith arising through instruction of the true guru). If the teaching of *jñānī* were heard earlier, and later, in his absence, with inner contemplation, *samyaktva* arises, then it is known as *nisargaja samyaktva*. Both forms of *samyaktva* arise from the self, and *jñāna* also arises from the self. However, in the case of *adhigamaja*, the presence of *jñānī* is acknowledged as a *nimitta*. One should not interpret this to mean that *samyaktva* arises from the *jñānī* in one case and from oneself in the other; instead, in both cases, *samyaktva* and *jñāna* originate from the self alone. The transformation of each substance is independent.

"utpāda-vyaya-dhauvyayuktam sat", or every substance, remains permanent and modifies. This is to be understood in both the states of transmigration and *siddha*. Even in

the state of *siddha-kevalajñāna*, etc., keep arising anew every *samaya*. Here too, *samyagdarśana* arises independently by oneself. If *samyaktva* were to arise due to a *jñānī*, then since *jñānīs* have been encountered infinitely many times, why has *samyaktva* not occurred? This illustrates that the *jīva* attains *samyaktva* solely through its own capability. *jñānī* is called a *nimitta*.

Now, from the perspective of the conventional viewpoint, *nimitta* is explained. In devotional expressions, one might say, “O Lord! Fill my bag!” But do our attributes reside with the Lord, such that He can fill our bag? It is said that the sentient, passionless *ātmā*, complete with joyful consciousness, the liberated repository, is present in the inner efficacy. When focus shifts to that, the focus on the part of meritorious-demeritorious should be left, and focus should be directed within. Then one’s bag, that is the modification of self, will be filled with purity. When *jīva* understands by himself, then *bhagavāna* is called *nimitta*. A pot is made of clay, but when *ghee* (clarified butter) is filled, it is called the pot of *ghee*. Similarly, the statement of *vyavahāra* shows associations.

In the story, it is said that when Śrī Māntunga Ācārya recited the *stuti* (hymn of praise), the locks on the door broke open. To that, it is said that *ātma* cannot perform the actions of non-sentient matter, and likewise, even the hymn of praise he recited was not an action performed by him. He is not the doer of speech, which is a form of non-sentient physical matter, or auspicious thoughts. *ātma* is of pure nature. He is the knower of the thought of the devotional singing that arises with *jñāna* of the belief-knowledge of this nature. The locks did not break due to that thought. The time for the locks to break had arrived; thus, they broke, and not due to the Ācārya’s *ātma*, nor by his speech or thoughts.

It is said that a *mantra* neutralises poison. But even then, it only happens when the time for the poison to dissipate has come. In such cases, the *mantra* is said to be *nimitta*. The *paramāṇu* of both functions is independent of each other. It is said that Śrī Vādirāja Muni composed the Ekībhāva-Stotra and cured leprosy. Even in that case, the change in the state of leprosy did not occur due to the *ātma* or *stotra*. The favourable time had arrived for the body to attain a healthy state, and so that manifestation occurred. The modification due to the *muni*’s *ātma*, his speech, his thoughts, or even due to the rise of *punya*. *nimitta* was only acknowledged to convey the moment’s condition.

The material bondage does not occur because of *bhāva-bāṇḍha*; *bhāva-bāṇḍha* is merely the *nimitta*. Ah! The true nature of substance is independent. Whoever believes that *jīva*

can perform the action of the *ajīva* (non-sentient) does not understand even the *vyavahāra* faith in the nine realities. *jīva* that remains entangled in external associations cannot distinguish between distortions and his own eternal nature. To look outward and become dependent is delusion, attachment, and aversion. That is precisely *bhāva-bāṇḍha*. When that becomes the *nimitta*, the association with insentient *karma* occurs. It is not that karmic material bondage occurred because of attachment-aversion; instead, it happens at its own time. *bhāva-bāṇḍha* is just a *nimitta*. The ignorant believe that physical karmic matter had to come because attachment occurred, but that is his delusion. When two is added to two, the result is four, and this principle is true everywhere. By the same logic, the activity of *ātmā* can be done only by *ātmā*, and the activity of non-sentient is done by non-sentient. This is a rule.

Question: Then why cannot *jīva* speak after death?

Answer: When *jīva* does not speak even in the state of living, then where is the question of his speaking after death? *jīva* and speech are both independent. *jīva* is in the form of sentience, and speech is non-sentient matter. *jīva* can have the desire to speak, but he cannot carry out the activity of the non-sentient matter, which is speech. The mass of *paramāṇus* of speech modifies into words at the time of its modification. If *jīva* has the desire to speak, then it can be called *nimitta*. But speech does not emit due to the desire of the *jīva*.

1. Many times, one may have a nightmare, and the *jīva* has the desire to speak, but he cannot.
2. A *jīva* may keep speaking while asleep. At that time, he had no desire to speak, but still, words were coming out.
3. When a person is paralyzed, he has the desire to speak, but he cannot talk. The *jīva* is present even then, but he cannot speak.
4. It is observed that people carry out actions such as a textile businessman cutting clothes while sleeping, and taking cattle for grazing while sleeping.

These examples show that both sentient and non-sentient activity is entirely independent. The living soul also does not speak. At that time, even non-sentient matter speaks on its own, and upon dying, it also does not cease speaking due to the *jīva*. In reality, *ātmā* is not the owner of speech or non-sentient.

When *jīva* is not the doer of the physical karmic matter, then how can he be the doer of external substances? In other words, he cannot be. In this verse, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* states that due to *jīva*'s focus on associations, he has delusion-attachment-aversion, and this is

bhāva-bāṇḍha, due to its *nimitta*, there is bondage of physical karmic matter. In as much as a *jīva* has attachment-aversion, etc., in that quantum he has physical karmic bondage in the form of *jñānāvarṇa*. If the intensity is strong, the bondage is intense; if it is low, then the bondage is low. This is the rule. There is never any deviation from this. Even then, the action of *karma* is not due to attachment-aversion. The physical karmic matter is due to itself, and the psychic bondage is due to itself. The *nimitta-naimitika* relationship exists, such that when there is psychic bondage, material bondage does occur. Still, attachment-aversion is not the doer of physical karmic matter. It is seen many times that the *nimitta-naimitika* relation with the external substance may not occur. This is because *jīva* may have the desire, but it is not necessary for speech to be emitted, or not to be emitted. The associated substances may come as desired or may not come as desired. i.e., it is not necessary for external substances to have a *nimitta-naimitika* relationship with the disposition of *jīva*. Even where the inescapable *nimitta-naimitika* relation between attachment and physical karmic matter exists, here also, attachment is not the doer of physical karmic matter. So, where altogether there is no existence of the *nimitta-naimitika* relation, how can *ātmā* be the doer-possessor, or bring non-self substances? That cannot be. That is why *jīva* should be given the correct understanding of the nine *tattvas*. Having the correct *jñāna* of *jñeyas* is the reason for *dharma*.

अथ पुद्गलजीवतदुभयबन्धस्वरूपं ज्ञापयति -

Now, the characteristic nature of *pudgala-bandha* (bondage of matter), *jīva-bandha* (bondage of soul), and *ubhaya-bandha* (the bondage of two together) is explained: -

**फासेहिं पोगलाणं बंधो जीवस्स रागमादीहिं ।
अण्णोण्णमवगाहो पोगलजीवप्पगो भणिदो ॥१७७॥**

*phāsehiṃ poggalāṇaṃ baṇdho jīvassa rāgamādīhiṃ |
aṇṇoṇṇamavagāho poggalajīvappago bhaṇido || 177 ||*

gāthā: Bondage of material-particles/objects is caused by their touch (smoothness-roughness), bondage of *ātmā* is caused by its attachment, etc., dispositions, and mutual immersion of the two is said to be bondage of *jīva* and *pudgala* (matter).

ṭīkā: First, here, oneness form of evolution of karmic-matter with smoothness and/or roughness form of particular touch is termed *pudgala-bandha* (bondage of matter) only; and oneness form of evolution of *jīva* with conditioned (impure) modifications of delusion, attachment, aversion forms is *jīva-bandha* (bondage of *jīva*); and specific mutually synthesised evolution caused merely by instrumentality of mutual immersion of *jīva* and karmic matter is termed *ubhaya-bandha* (bondage of two together); i.e., (*jīva* and *karma-pudgala* becomes simply instrumental in evolution/modification of one another - such a particular type of one, common-space-occupying connection is termed as *pudgala-jivātmaka-bandha*).

pravacana on gāthā-177

This is the chapter on knowable. Here, the nature of objects worth knowing in *jñāna* is being explained. What does it mean that *jīvas* come into bondage? What does it mean that bondage occurs in insentient karma? What does it mean for insentient karma to bond with a *jīva*? Here, all these discussions are mentioned.

Not knowing himself, *ātmā* has oneness in non-self substances, and has attachment for favourable substances and aversion for unfavourable substances. This psychic bondage (*bhāva-bandha*) is a perturbed, incorporeal modification.

This *jīva*, having lost his internal peace, believing happiness lies in the car and the house, transmigrates in this world. This *ātmā* is a constant substance since eternity until infinity. It does not come into being due to circumstances, nor does it destroy or mix with anything else. Happiness is in the nature of *ātmā*; the nature of *ātmā* is happiness; there cannot be sorrow in it.

Sorrow, meaning delusion, anxiety, and tension, cannot be the core nature of *ātmā*. When sorrow is not the root nature, then from where did it come? The nature of *ātmā* does not have sorrow. Still, the absence of the focus of self and focus towards modification, association, and circumstances is the cause of the rise of unnatural disposition, and that is sorrow. Non-self substance, *karma*, etc., are not the cause of sorrow, because sorrow is *ātmā*'s non-corporeal delusional modification. An ignorant person believes that sorrow arises from attachment towards the body and the loss of money, but sorrow cannot occur with a change in the non-self substance. *bhagavāna ātmā* exists and is endowed with sentience; forgetting him and thinking of happiness and sorrow in the non-self, the *ātmā* veers towards the disposition of bondage. That sorrow or mistake hasn't been done by an external substance, *karma*, wife, son, etc. Self has forgotten his internal nature, and that is the disposition of bondage.

Bondage of *pudgala* (matter particles) is the modification of the non-sentient knowable; it cannot provide benefit or loss to the sentient knowable. Three types of bondage have been explained in this verse. First, particle bondage is being explained. An ignorant person believes that wandering is due to karmic bondage, but it's a mistake. Karmic bondage is insentient modification. It is not so that insentient modification will cause one to transmigrate. Insentient modification is in the insentient and not in the self. With a non-living *paramānu* having two extra attributes of stickiness or roughness, it turns into the form of a mass. From that, the modification of the mass of *karma* occurs. It should be forgotten that transmigration is due to *karma* because *karma* is a non-living substance and is insentient. The union of stickiness and roughness results in the modification of *karma*, that is, the non-living knowable. Knowables are of two types – sentient knowable and insentient knowable. Modification of *karma* is insentient knowable; it does not harm the sentient modification. Substance-attribute-modification of *ajīva* are in *ajīva*, and Substance-attribute-modification of *jīva* are in *jīva*; because of this, modification of *ajīva* *karma* does not harm the *jīva*. This nature of non-living bondage should be known.

Now, *bhāva-bandha* is explained. Modification of unison with non-self substance meaning, modification in the form of delusion-attachment-aversion due to ignorance, is *bhāva-bandha*. All thoughts, such as 'it is good to have a favourable *nimitta*, it is terrible to have an unfavourable *nimitta*, knowledge is derived from texts, and auspicious disposition occurs because of the temple, are delusions. An ignorant person has such delusions. All the substances of the cosmos are knowable; there is no goodness or badness in them. Even then, an ignorant *jīva* divides the knowables, believing them to be good or bad. Forgetting the pure nature of self, having delusion-attachment-aversion, and having the modification of oneness with non-self is *bhāva-bandha*. The belief that the self is as much as oneness with attachment which arises in *jīva* and is as much as the part perturbed modification of passions, anger, vows, veneration, etc., is *bhāva-bandha*. Bondage cannot be to just one. One side is a sentient knower-seer, pure-natured *jīva*, and the other is the thought towards modification of delusion-attachment-aversion in favourable-unfavourable substances; both are *bhāva-bandha*. *jīva* is not harmed by the bondage of karma, but is harmed by the bondage of *bhāva-bandha*, and that is the cause of transmigration.

Temporary dispositions are not the *jīva* substance. Special care must be taken that only knowing-seeing pure nature is called a *jīva* here, and temporary auspicious-inauspicious dispositions have not been called *jīva*. They are different from *jīva*. If they are not different from a *jīva*, then the nine *tattvas* will not remain separate. False belief, inauspicious attachment-aversion is sin, auspicious disposition is virtue, both are *āstrava* and *bandha*. Bondage can never be *jīva tattva*. If bondage is believed to be *jīva*, then nine realities can never be distinct; then *jīva*'s nature will be with bondage, and then *jīva* can never be devoid of bondage.

Dharma cannot occur without knowing the nature of psychic bondage. *jīvas* have never heard such things. If one has never heard, how will one ever have a correct understanding? Different types of statements of *nimitta* are mentioned in the texts, such as knowledge is obstructed by knowledge-obscuring *karma*; four destructive *karmas* destroy the attributes of a *jīva*. However, all these statements are from the viewpoint of *vyavahāra*. There is an extreme absence of insentience in *ātmā*. Insentient *karmas* do not harm the modification of *ātmā*. The false belief that *karma* brings sorrow focuses on circumstances that cause harm. Such modification of oneness is different from the modification of the insentient. A *jīva* who believes delusion is because of *karma* cannot see that the attributes and modifications of insentient and sentient are separate. One who does not have the ability to understand that modification is independent of *jīva* does not know how to leave the focus on modifications

and turn to the pure nature of the self. One who believes that perturbation has to be according to the manifestation of *karma* is one with gross ignorance. This is because *jīva* is not attached to *karma*. By believing perturbation to be his own nature, he has focus on the modification due to which his own self entangles him. That is *adharma* and the disposition of ignorance. Psychic bondage is getting stuck in the thoughts of modification, and till this is not understood correctly, *samyagdarśana* cannot occur.

nirupādhi svabhāva (absolute nature) bonds with *aupādhika bhāva* (temporary modification), and not with *karma*. It is not that insentient *karma* has to come because there is the disposition of bondage in the modification of *jīva*. It is not that insentient *karma* arose, so modification of attachment-aversion arose. No one is because of the other. *jīva* is an absolute *tattva*, and the knowing-seeing pure nature. There is no conditionality in *ātmā*, who is the holder of efficacies, and his efficacies. Bondage is between the *nirupādhi tattva* and its conditional modification. Pure nature has a relationship with its impure modification. Unconfused nature is related to confused attachment-aversion, but not with insentient *karma* or non-self substances. Initially, this must be decided so. *jīva* is pure, unconfused, peaceful, and happy; his bondage is with unhappiness, attachment, aversion, and confusion. *ātmā*, a mass of happiness, believes happiness in the disposition of *mithyātva-rāga-dveṣa*; bondage occurs due to that.

bhedavijñāna – (1) to know non-self as different from *ātmā* is *vyavahāra bhedvijñāna* (conventional discriminative knowledge). (2) To believe impure modification is distinct from eternal pure *ātmā* is *yathārtha bhedvijñāna* (true discriminative knowledge).

This way, there are two types of discriminative knowledge, but not believing thus and believing otherwise is not discriminative knowledge.

1. *jīva*, who believes that impure dispositions occur due to *karma*, and attachment-aversion occurs due to non-self substance, is stuck in non-self substances and believes in *dharma* in renouncing external substances. This is his gross mistake. He will not have true vows and renunciation. The one who believes that with the rise of *karma*, impure dispositions will have to be done, and when impure dispositions occur, *karma* will be bonded, is also making a gross mistake. *Karma* does not generate attachment in the self. *jīva*, who understands that one has attachment due to his ability, can be called separate from non-self. Such is *vyavahāra bheda-vijñāna*. If this *vyavahāra bheda-vijñāna* leaves distortion and turns towards the pure nature, only then can it be called true.

2. Blemishes arising from the focus on the non-self are impure; this does not reflect the true nature of the self. The self is independent. Dharma does not arise from charity and piety; it also represents a disposition of *adharma*, which is the cause of bondage. These do not benefit the nature of the self. By regarding blemishes as rejectable and nature as acceptable, and by striving towards the pure nature of the self, true *bheda vijñāna* is realised, and blemishes do not stem from non-self substance. This particular *vyavahāra bheda vijñāna* is deemed true. When one understands separation superficially, perceiving the self as a blemish along with charity and piety, one remains entangled with the non-self. Hence, belief in the eternal pure nature of *ātmā* signifies genuine knowledge of distinction.

This is the chapter on knowable. There are two types of knowables from the view of self and non-self. In that there are two types of self-knowable –

1. *ātmā* is the pure substance, with *jñāna*, *darśana*, *caritra*, etc., a storehouse of pure infinite attributes. Pure absolute *tattva-jīva tattva* is a self-knowable substance.
2. Leaving the focus on the pure nature of the self, blemished dispositions in the form of delusion, attachment, and aversion occur. They do not occur in the insentient or due to the insentient. They occur due to one's own fault. That disposition of bondage is the self-knowable modification.

There are two types of non-self *jñeyas* –

1. *paramānu* is a pure substance. It is a storehouse of touch, taste, smell, colour, etc., attributes. It is a non-self-knowable substance.

Because of the attribute of touch, *paramānu* has a modification in the form of a mass. That modification does not occur due to attachment-aversion of *jīva*. Material karmic bondage is non-self-knowable. *karma* is not the *pudgala* substance, but it is the modification of the *pudgala* (non-sentient) matter substance. It occurs due to stickiness-roughness. It is the modification of the non-self-knowable. The existence of the self is in its being. Eternal *ātmā*-substance is pure, eternal knowledge-belief is pure, and attachment-aversion, etc., disposition of bondage is impure – these three are self-knowable. The existence of *karma* is in *karma*'s being. Eternal *paramānu* is pure, eternal touch, etc., attributes are pure, and states occurring due to stickiness-roughness are impure – these three are non-self knowables. The self-knowable and non-self-knowable should be known independently in this way. The result of truly knowing the knowables is the beginning of *dharma*. *jīva* who believes the temporary modification of the self, which is the self knowable, to be due to the non-self knowable karma, or due to other substances, then he has not understood either the self or non-self reality. A *jīva* who does not know how to differentiate the self from non-

self, cannot differentiate between blemishes and his eternal substance, and that he is the pure substance, he cannot distinguish the eternal substance from blemish/perturbation. Therefore, initially, a *jīva* should decide that external substances or *karma* are not the cause of delusion. But they occur due to one's own fault. Again, that delusion occurs in the modification of the self, and not in the eternal substance. *ātmā* is eternally pure – on understanding so dharma occurs, and his disposition of bondage is destroyed.

Now, *ubhayabaṇḍha* (mixed bondage) is discussed. The blemished modification and physical bondage of *jīva* have a *nimitta-naimittika* relationship when he is in the mundane state. *nimitta-naimittika* relationship cannot be between a *jīva* substance and a *pudgala* substance. This relationship occurs in the modification. *nimitta-naimittika* relationship exists between the blemished modification of *jīva* substance and the state of *pudgala paramānu* in the form of *karma*. *kartā-karma* (doer-work done) relation, or *ubhayabaṇḍha*, is not that because *jīva* has attachment, so bondage of *karma* occurs, and *karma* comes into fruition; therefore, attachment-aversion occurs. But when he has attachment at that time, *karma* is *nimitta mātra* (just a *nimitta*). The rise of old *karma* is the cause of attachment-aversion, and new *karmas* bond because of attachment-aversion – such a *nimitta-naimittika* relationship exists.

It is said that *jīva* and *pudgala karma* have *viśiṣṭa paraspara avagāha* (a special attribute to give space, mutually). Wherever a *jīva* stays, other substances like *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaṣṭikāya*, etc., are also present in the same space; but here, it is said that there is a special attribute to provide space mutually. The reason is that whenever a *jīva* has attachment, the modification of *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaṣṭikāya*, space, etc., remains unchanged due to *jīva*'s *nimitta*. But surely, *pudgala paramānu* changes into the form of *karma*. On intense attachment, intense *karma* with a long duration becomes bonded; with mellow attachment, mellow intensity *karma* with a shorter duration becomes bonded. Karma is not bound by attachment; karmic particles bond themselves. *karma* remains in the same space as a *jīva*, as per his attachment-aversion. Such a *nimitta-naimittika* relationship does not exist with *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaṣṭikāya*, etc., so it is called *viśiṣṭa paraspara avagāha*. Staying of karmic mass with a *jīva*, mutually, in the same space is called *ubhayabaṇḍha*.

Tear apart the body, etc., and external substances, and see! Is there happiness inside? An ignorant person believes happiness resides in a wife, son, money, etc., but when has he ever seen happiness in them? Is there happiness in prestige? In being a boss? In this appealing

body? It is then questioned whether, when the body is torn apart, happiness exists within it. When has happiness been observed inside a *laddoo*? Has the *laddoo* (Indian sweet) ever been broken to discover if happiness lies within? Have lentils, rice, car, or money been ripped open to check if happiness is present? Happiness cannot be found in them, as the body is merely composed of bones and muscles. Similarly, when lentils, rice, sweets, buildings, etc., are torn apart, it becomes evident that they are insentient – possessing mere touch, taste, smell, and colour. When a person examines them closely, he will realise there is no happiness anywhere within them, for those substances lack the attribute of happiness. Now, it may be said that happiness is not seen in *laddoo*, etc., but it is believed, it is assumed, that it is good to have a conducive body, good to have an attractive wife, lovely to have a beautiful house, garden, good to have sumptuous food, good to have money. One believes happiness to be in such thoughts. The question asked is, what are those thoughts? Has one ever given it a thought? Are those thoughts because of the body, etc., non-self substances, or because of the self? Will such a belief remain within the self or in the non-self substances? What is the size of the space points occupied by that belief? Does such an opinion reside in the substance-attribute of self or the modification of self? Does that opinion exist from eternity till infinity, or does it exist for just one *samaya*? Has this ever been thought about?

The space points occupied by contrary opinion are as numerous as the innumerable space points occupied by *ātmā*, and its time is one *samaya*. Oh! A *jīva* who believes in happiness, whether it is true or false, does not think properly. The sweetness of sugar is spread as much as the size of a sugar particle; in the same way, the assumed opinion due to ignorance is spread all over the innumerable space points of the *ātmā*. That opinion is not due to external substances or any other external reason. A new one originates every *samaya*. That false opinion is not because of *karma*. It is the disposition of bondage, and it can be destroyed. False opinion is destroyed, and happiness originates from focusing on nature. But *jīva* thinks otherwise. He has an attachment to the enjoyment of the five senses and believes that to be happiness. That happiness cannot be seen with the eyes. Still, he believes so. An evolved person says that happiness cannot be found there; yet, the ignorant still believes happiness to be there. At least once, the self should try to believe that happiness is not in the non-self. That belief is within the self, due to self, and stays within the innumerable space points of self, for one *samaya*. *karma* has not done that. But *nimitta-naimittika* relationship with *karma* does exist. That opinion is not the original pure nature of the self. Bliss is in the belief and knowledge of the pure nature of the self. The way, on cooling of

hot water, water attains its cool nature; in the same way, on focusing on the nature of the self, and having *śraddhā-jñāna* of it, the disposition of bondage is destroyed, and the calm, pure nature, which is like the elixir of nectar, is attained, and with that, happiness will be attained.

If a misdemeanour is caused by *karma*, then why ask for forgiveness from others? *jīva* has had attachment-aversion since eternity. Some ignorant *jīva* asks for forgiveness, saying that, as attachment-aversion is due to karma, so forgiveness should be given. But from whom does one ask for forgiveness? Self has not committed a misdemeanour; *karma* has made it happen, so what is the necessity of asking for forgiveness? To ask for forgiveness for the misdemeanour committed by *karma* is stupidity.

The form of *niścaya kṣamā* (absolute forgiveness) and *vyavahāra kṣamā* (conventional forgiveness) is explained. The conventional way to seek forgiveness is that there is regret in one's modification. Hence, one should be forgiven. To ask for atonement or pardon from non-self is thought activity, it is *vyavahāra*. This is not the true nature of forgiveness. What can be said to be *vyavahāra kṣamā*? When one has *niścaya kṣamā* within, then there can be *vyavahāra kṣamā*. One must understand that the self is the pure substance whose nature is *jñāna*, so nothing can happen in the non-self, due to the fault of the self, and the self is the one who commits the fault. On understanding this, he must turn his focus away from the non-self. The fault that occurred was of one *samaya*. It is not the self's eternal nature. The self is an ocean of forgiveness. By understanding that the disposition of aversion that arises is a flaw, when *jīva* focuses on the self-nature within him, and does not allow the fault to arise, only he has the true form of forgiveness. The question of whether the other person will forgive does not arise. He may or may not think to ask his guru for pardon, but staying within the pure nature of the self is true forgiveness. He has the appropriate understanding that the modification of self was *nimitta* in the faulty modification of others. After that, he takes the auspice of the belief and knowing of the modification of that pure nature and does not allow this to arise again. That is the true forgiveness.

Disposition of psychic bondage, bondage of karmic matter particle, and the mixed bondage, all three are modifications and are knowables. Their nature should be understood, and to believe and know that *ātmā* is devoid of all these three is *dharma*.

अथ द्रव्यबन्धस्य भावबन्धहेतुकत्वमुज्जीवयति

Now, it is stated that *dravya-bandha* (material-bondage) is caused by *bhāva-bandha* (psychic/subjective bondage): -

**सपदेसो सो अप्पा तेसु पदेसेसु पोग्गला काया ।
पविसंति जहाजोगं चिट्ठंति य जंति बज्झंति ॥१७८॥**

*Sapadeso so appā tesu padesesu poggalā kāyā |
pavisanti jahājoggaṃ ciṭṭhaṃti ya jaṃti bajjhaṃti || 178 ||*

gāthā: *ātmā* is with spatial-units and karmic matter particles permeate those spatial-units; they stay according to their ability, move away, and come into bondage with the soul.

tīkā: This *ātmā*, being possessed of innumerable *pradeśas* (space points/units), is equal to the space of the universe. In its *pradeśas* (spatial units), vibration arises depending upon *kāya-vargaṇā*, *vacana-vargaṇā*, and *mano-vargaṇā* (material particles of body, speech/voice, and mind), so accordingly, karmic matter-particles undergoing similar vibration on their own, permeate and stay with those *pradeśas* of *ātmā*. They also go away, and if *ātmā* has dispositions of delusion, attachment-aversion form, then they are bound. Hence, it is decided that *bhāva-bandha* (psychic bondage) is the cause of *dravya-bandha* (objective/material karmic-bondage).

pravacana on gāthā-178

This *ātmā* has space points equal to the size of innumerable space points of the space points of the *lokākāśa* (space of the three *lokas*). If someone says that in the texts of *nīścaya* (absolutism), *ātmā*'s innumerable space has been said so from the view of conventionalism, so there are no innumerable space points, then this is not a correct statement. *ātmā*-substance is undivided, in that there are innumerable space points. By having thoughts of such division, belief in the undivided *ātmā* does not occur. So, such a statement has been made to create faith in the undivided one *ātmā*, and the division that it has innumerable space points is negated. But if it were to be said that *ātmā* does not have innumerable space points, then that statement is also incorrect. *ātmā* truly does have an innumerable number of space points. Since it has innumerable space points, it is said to be *sapradeśī* (with space points).

yog (vibration of the space points of *ātmā*) is independent, and in that, the mind-speech-body is just an auxiliary cause. The *kāyavarganā* (mass of karmic matter which makes the body), *vacanavarganā* (mass of karmic matter which makes speech), and *manovarganā* (mass of karmic matter which makes the mind) are auxiliary causes to the vibration in the space points of *ātmā*. Mind-speech-body is a state of inanimate, insentient matter substance. Trembling is a blemished modification of the *yog* attribute. From *nigoda* till the thirteenth *gunasthāna*, even the omniscient lord has this *yog* vibration. But it is not so that because the mind-body-speech are there, vibration occurs. However, trembling occurs automatically in the state of *yog*, an attribute of *ātmā*. Then, mind-speech-body is just a *nimitta*.

Bondage of particulate matter is independent, and in that the disposition of bondage is just a *nimitta*. When there is vibration in the space points of the *ātmā*, at that time the conglomeration of karmic matter particles stays in the space points of the *ātmā* due to their own capability. But it is incorrect to believe that when there is vibration in the *ātmā*'s space points, *karmas* must come. In the same way, *ātmā*'s space points have to be in the form of vibration because of *karma*. Both are independent. *karmas* come and go on their own; vibration is just a *nimitta* in that. Vibration is the blemished modification of the attribute of *yog*.

Here, the discussion is that *karmas* bond independently due to the *nimitta* of passion. The duration and fruition of *karmas* occur because of the *nimitta* of passions. When a *jīva* forgets its knowing-seeing nature and becomes deluded towards external substances, *karmas* arise and become bonded. The duration and fruition of *karmas* occur according to their ability.

Someone may ask, did the bondage of the efficacy of time and intensity in *karma* come because of the passions? And did they not bond in the same space as *ātmā* because of this? To them, it is said that the cause of *karma* in the form of bondage being in the same space points as *ātmā* is due to itself. It is not that when passion arose, *karma* had to take the form of bondage. It is also not true that when passion is destroyed, *karma* must leave. When attachment-aversion occurs, then karmic particles come and get bonded. If someone says that karmic particles do not have the capability to come and get bonded, but because attachment-aversion occurred, they get bonded, then that is an incorrect belief. Furthermore, it is incorrect to say that - when *jīva* does not have attachment-aversion, then

karmas are released, but karma itself does not have the capability to be released. It is the capability of a matter particle to get bonded or to be released. Particulate bondage occurs according to the disposition of bondage, but both are independent.

When *ātmā* is not the doer of particulate *karma*, how can he be the doer of external substances? He simply cannot. *jñāni* states that having the dispositions of good and evil is a blemished modification of a person. The states of a hand, speech, body, money, shop, etc., are insentient modifications. There is a total absence of connection between the *ātmā* and the insentient. *ātmā* cannot do anything to the insentient. There is often a desire, yet the body does not move, and speech does not come forth. Often, thoughts arise about earning money through business, yet the reality is that money cannot be earned. So why does one possess an ego and the disposition of bondage, believing that the self has earned money? This stems from the ability of the self, the impurity of the *yog* (vibrational) attribute, and the disposition of falsity, which leads to attachment and aversion. However, because of this disposition of bondage, the state of insentient *karma* does not occur. To the extent that types of dispositions are acted upon, so too do the corresponding states and results of *karmas* manifest due to the insentient. When *ātmā*'s attachment and aversion are not the doers of those *karmas*' states, believing that they are doers of the state of body, speech, etc., is gross ignorance. Thus, the subtle discussion revolves around destroying the ego of being the doer of external substances.

Thus, the bondage of the state, fruition, and karma arise from their own causation. The nature of bondage is merely a *nimitta*. The *ātmā* is not the doer or administrator of external substances – such a true knowledge constitutes *dharma*.

gāthā-179

अथ द्रव्यबन्धहेतुत्वेन रागपरिणाममात्रस्य भावबन्धस्य निश्चयबन्धत्वं साधयति -

Now, it is proved that *bhāvabaṇḍha*, which is simply (*ātmā*'s) *rāga pariṇāma* (modification of attachment), is the cause of *dravyabaṇḍha*, it is the veritable bondage: -

**रत्तो बंधदि कम्मं मुच्चदि कम्मोहिं रागरहिदप्पा ।
एसो बंधसमासो जीवाणं जाण णिच्छयदो ॥१७९॥**

*ratto baṇḍhadi kammaṁ muccadi kammehiṁ rāgarahidappā |
eso baṇḍhasamāso jīvāṇaṁ jāṇa ṇicchayado || 179 ||*

gāthā: An attached *ātmā* (soul evolved into attachment) binds *karmas* (karmic matter), and a detached self (*ātmā*, devoid of attachment) is free from *karmas*. We should know this to be, in short, the sum and substance of the bondage of the soul in verity.

ṭīkā: When *jīva* has attachment, only then is he bound by fresh *dravya-karmas* (material karmic-matter) and is not bound when he transforms into detachment. *jīva*, which has resulted into attachment, is not released from fresh bondage of *dravya-karmas*. Only the one who has resulted into detachment is the released/liberated one. *jīva* evolved into attachment is bound by fresh *dravya karmas*. They come into contact with it, and *ātmā* is not released from old *dravya-karmas* but rather remains bonded with them; but the one who has resulted in detachment is free of the bondage of any new *dravya-karmas* which come in contact with it. He is also free of old *dravya-karmas* and is not bound by them. Therefore, it is proven that the most effective cause of *dravya-baṇḍha* (material karmic bondage) is evolution into attachment, which is the psychic bondage.

pravacana on gāthā-179

Only *jīva* with thoughts of modification bonds with particulate matter karma. *ātmā* is a pure-natured knower-observer. By not accepting this, if one thinks that he can carry out the activities of external substances, it is a false thought. An ignorant person believes that the first comfort is a disease-free body. *jīva*, who believes that pleasure is to have a disease-free body, and a sick body brings sorrow, has attachment-aversion with the disposition of falsehood, has been said to be the one with attachment. Such a *jīva*, who is with attachment, bonds with new *dravya-karma*. A *jīva* who does not believe in taking the auspice of the

knowing nature of *ātmā*, believes *dharma* is an auspicious disposition, and believes *ātmā* is to the extent of attachment. So he has the disposition of bondage and binds new *karma* particles. The extent to which a *jīva* does attachment-aversion to that extent, the particle *karmas* get bonded independently – such is the *nimitta-naimittika* relationship. But it is not so that a *jīva* has to have attachment-aversion to the extent of the rise of *karma*. An ignorant person believes that *ātmā* is a toy of *karma*. He believes that the way a puppet dances when a magician pulls the string in the same way the *jīva* dances when *karma* arises. With the rise of *nāma-karma* of a hellish state, even a *jīva* who does not desire to go to hell has to go there. This is the belief of *jīva*, whose focus is on modification. This belief of his is the cause of bondage.

Did Śrenika Rājā have the dispositions to go to hell? *āyu-karma* (karma related to age) was already bonded in the past. Therefore, an ignorant person believes he had to go to hell because of *karma*. But it is a false belief. Despite his being with the knowledge of *ātmā*, he had the ability to go to hell. Therefore, he went to hell. No *karma* takes a *jīva* to hell, etc. Every *jīva* moves everywhere according to its ability. A person focusing on circumstances sees with circumstances. He believes *deva-śāstra-guru* will make him cross the sea of transmigration. God says you will swim to the shore yourself. No one else will take you to the shore. God sermonises that you will not reach the shore because of someone else, and ill-being cannot happen to you because of someone's curse. Still, *jīva* with attachment and focus on modification believes *dharma-adharma* due to non-self and has the disposition of bondage, and because of this, the karmic particles become bonded.

A *jīva* who is *vairāgya parinat* (modified as passionless and with renunciation) with the knowing of the pure nature of self is not bound by new *karmas*. Here, the special meaning of 'vairāgya parinat' is revealed. What is *vairāgya parinat*? Is *vairāgya parinat* about leaving one's wife, children, and business to go to the forest? Is *vairāgya parinat* about fasting for six months? No, those *jīvas* are not *vairāgya parinat*. The belief that the body's activities and acts of charity and piety are beneficial to the self reflects a disposition of attachment. Abandoning the focus on *nimitta* and circumstances, as well as on merit and demerit, does not represent the nature of the self. The self is a knowing entity—an *ātmā*. A *jīva* who has this knowing and is with the firm belief of the knowing attribute of self, is *vairāgya parinat*. *ātmā* cannot emit speech or carry out the activity of the body. *bhagavāna* is not the doer of the OM sound. Speech arises as a consequence of speech.

A perceiving individual understands through his own awareness, thereby freeing himself from the circumstantial influences caused by external factors, leaving behind the attachment to the self's nature concerning the non-self. Such a *jīva* exists solely in a state of *vairagya* (asceticism). An ascetic who adheres to the twenty-eight fundamental rites displays external forbearance, lacks external anger, and as a result possesses auspicious dispositions. Nevertheless, he remains in a state of attachment, not having achieved true renunciation. Bharat Chakaravarti, despite external circumstances, did not have ownership of external activities and attachments. A renounced *jīva* holds only reverence for nature and originates from the fourth stage of evolution, being primarily free from new bondage. Many *jīvas* say to bring renunciation and sing hymns to god. Does *dharma* occur by singing a hymn to god? Now, this is explained –

1. *deva-guru* are non-self; by singing hymns, mild passions occur, but *dharma* does not occur. Therefore, praying to a true *deva-guru* is not true prayer. Merit occurs because of that. Therefore, *deva-guru* is not the god of this self *ātmā*.
2. Manifested meritorious-demeritorious states in *ātmā* are a blemish. Inflow and bondage of *karmas* take place because of praying to them, but *dharma* does not occur. However intense auspicious dispositions occur, they are not suitable for *ātmā*. Therefore, it is not worthwhile to pray for merit.
3. *kṣyopśama* (disposition with destruction cum subsidence) is a part; *dharma* does not occur praying to it. It is a *paryāya* of one *samaya*. *paryāya* of one *samaya* does not have the strength to manifest a new *paryāya*. Therefore, that modification of *kṣyopśama* is not godly. It is not worth praying to.
4. Someone says to pray to the attribute of *jñāna*! Then, the thought of separating the attribute of *jñāna* from *ātmā* arises, and concentration does not occur. The concentration of infinite attributes does not happen by concentrating on one attribute. Therefore, just one attribute of *jñāna* is not godly. Hence, it is not worthwhile to separate the attributes.
5. The *paryāya* moves towards the general pure nature; if it focuses on infinite attributes, then *dharma* occurs, leading to peace; therefore, without anticipating *nimitta*, free from blemishes, free from division of attributes, it is worth praying to the indivisible pure nature. That indivisible pure nature only is god.

Dharma does not arise from focusing on auxiliary causes, blemishes, modification, or division of attributes. *Arhaṇta Bhagavāna* is a god to himself. He is not God to our soul. If

He were the god of our soul, then with Him, this soul should also have become God. But it is not so. Glorification of *Arhaṇta* is praying to the auspicious disposition.

An ignorant person thinks that such a belief will bring calamity. But that is ignorance. *ācārya bhagavāna* is not afraid of speaking the truth, and the ignorant thinks that the revelation of the truth will bring disaster. In reality, wrong/non-beneficial will be destroyed when the truth is revealed.

Leaving the interest of *nimitta*, auspicious disposition and division of attributes, one who worships the self's opulent, indivisible pure nature, that *jīva* develops renunciation, and does not have the bondage of karma. In this way, correct belief is the reason for *dharma*.

This verse explains whether a *jīva* has bondage or not. A *jīva* that has attachment is not free from new physical karmic matter. *jīvas* of *nigoda* do not have external possessions, but have disregard for their nature. They do not have external association with a non-self substance. However, due to his intense attachment to beliefs such as the self being the body or a perturbed state, he has a profound bondage with the quantum of karmic particles. There, a *muni* who observes external vows but does not have *ātmajñāna*, may have disowned thousands of queens and adopted a *muni*'s state, complies with twenty-eight main attributes, renounces external possessions, bears afflictions, but still, he does not attain *dharma* because that *jīva* has attachment to such subtle falsity. He has bondage of infinite transmigration and is never devoid of new *dravya-karma*.

A *jīva* who modifies into the state of *vairāgya* is free from physical karmic matter. A *samkitī jīva* may have the splendour of the majesty of a kingdom, etc., but because he has the knowing and experience that associations are outside of *ātmā*, and belief of non-self being beneficial or non-beneficial is poison, that *jīva* is in the passionless state. He does not have the bondage of new karmic matter particles. Hence, he is free from new *karmas*. New karma does not stick to him. Here is the explanation from the view of existence-non-existence (*asti-nāsti*). An ignorant gets bonded, and an evolved does not get bonded. Such is the explanation from the view of *anekānta* (confluence of opposites).

Now, two types of *vairāgyas* are explained –

1. ***vairāgya* (renunciation) in belief** - Renunciation is not leaving the spouse and children, and running away into the forest. There is an absence of non-self substances in the *ātmā*, and they are not the reason for benefit or loss to the *ātmā*. Auspicious-inauspicious dispositions are deceptive; *ātmā* devoid of them is of pure sentient

blissful nature. Having such a belief-knowledge, focusing on the pure nature and revering it, is the renunciation.

2. **vairāgya (renunciation) in conduct** – leaving inauspicious disposition and having auspicious disposition, carrying out vows and penance, is not the renunciation in conduct. But auspicious-inauspicious dispositions are not in the self's nature; self is a pure, sentient, blissful nature. Initially, such a renunciation occurs in the belief, and with that, the conduct which brings intense equanimity in pure nature, which is in the form of sentience and immersion in the pure psychic activity due to the settling of karmas, is the *vairāgya* of pure conduct.

A *jīva* with belief and renunciation does not primarily have bondage. His bondage is due to instability, which is very low. He does not get bonded, so it is said from the view of belief that a *jīva* with renunciation in conduct is absorbed in his self-nature; therefore, he does not get bonded. Both old and new karmas bind an ignorant person. One who does not know true renunciation, that *jīva* focusing on modification, reveres merit-demerit, and believes *dharma* is in bodily activities. He surely bonds with new karmas; together with that, he bonds with accumulated old karmas.

It is said that when *jīva* continues with his focus on modification, he has the ability to get bonded; beliefs and thoughts which lead to bondage are present to him, even when his old karmas shed, he gets into bondage with new ones. Someone asks, by keeping fast, etc., penance, old karmas are shed, and with that, doesn't at least a bit of shedding of karmas take place? No, there is no shedding at all. One who focuses on religious rituals is bound by karmas every *samaya*. Therefore, it cannot be said that old karmas are shed. When new karmas are not bonded, then it can be said that old karmas are shed. Therefore, an ignorant *jīva* is never released of old or new karmas; he only bonds.

A *jñāni jīva* is released from old karmas. A *jñāni* knows that he cannot do anything of non-self substance, and auspicious-inauspicious disposition is not his nature. One who lacks interest in the substances of the three *lokas* and auspicious dispositions and has interest in the knowing nature does not attract new karmas. 'A *jīva* with renunciation while having a relationship is free from new *dravya karmas*' – so it is said in one chapter. Then what type of relationship exists? The explanation is that initially, in an ignorant state, thoughts of attachment arose, and subsequently, a relationship with new karmas occurred. Now, in the evolved state, new karmas are not bonded; thus, he is liberated from new karmas. It does not mean that new karma came and was released later. Similarly, it is incorrect to say that

new karma had the capability to come, but the *jīva* did not have attachment; therefore, karma ceased to arise. By being steady and focused on nature, new karmas do not arise. And old *dravya karmas* rise every *samaya* and shed every *samaya*. Furthermore, new ones are not bonded; therefore, it is said that he is free from old *dravya karmas*. In this statement, it is told from the view that, as *jñāni* does not have primarily any bondage, the little bondage which occurs due to instability is taken as secondary. A *jñāni* with exceptional stability does not have the mild bondage of instability. The explanation that he is not bound by old *karma* but is released from it is from the viewpoint of *asti-nāsti*.

The modification of attachment creates bondage of *karma*, in real terms. Focus on associations is never destroyed in the *jīva* who is interested in merit and demerit. An ignorant person believes he has to have attachment-aversion to the extent of the rise of *karma*. If this is so, then the *jīvas* of *nigoda* can never become humans. The way a crystal gem turns black by taking the auspice of non-self substance, but even at that time, the black shadow is not because of non-self substance. That shadow is the perturbed modification of self, and not the nature of self. In the same way, when *ātmā* takes the auspice of *karma*, etc., there is a blemish; non-self is not the reason for the blemish. If a non-self substance has a blemish, then the blemish will never be destroyed, and if the blemish is the self's nature, then the nature will never be free of blemish. Therefore, blemish is not the self's nature, but when a *jīva* focuses on the non-self, the disposition of bondage occurs. This concept should be understood correctly. Therefore, the *nimitta* of bondage of physical karmic matter particles is psychic bondage, meaning falsity, attachment, and aversion are truly bondage. When the true belief-knowledge is done, the independent modification of *jñāna* arises, due to which the focus moves away from *karma*. This leads to the appropriate understanding that psychic bondage is not the pure nature of the self, and the self is the eternal pure nature by himself, and that is *dharma*.

gāthā-180

अथ परिणामस्य द्रव्यबन्धसाधकतमरागविशिष्टत्वं सविशेषं प्रकटयति -

Now, the specialty of *pariṇāma* (modification) caused by *rāga* (attachment), which is the most effective cause of *dravya-bandha* (material karmic-bondage), is revealed clearly: -

परिणामादो बंधो परिणामो रागदोसमोहजुदो ।
असुहो मोहपदोसो सुहो व असुहो हवदि रागो ॥१८०॥

pariṇāmādo baṇdho pariṇāmo rāgadosamohajudo |
asuho mohapadoso suho va asuho havadi rāgo || 180 ||

gāthā: Karmic bondage is caused by *pariṇāma* (modification/disposition) which consists of *moha-rāga-dveṣa* (delusion-attachment-aversion) (in them) *moha* (delusion) and *dveṣa* (aversion) are *aśubha* (inauspicious/evil/bad); *rāga* (attachment) is *śubha* (auspicious) or *aśubha* (inauspicious).

tīkā: Firstly, *dravya-bandha* is caused by a particular modification/disposition. That evolution/disposition is particular in the way that it is composed of attachment, aversion, and delusion. Suppose it follows duality, owing to its being auspicious or inauspicious. Therein, inauspiciousness is caused by *moha* and *dveṣa* (delusion and aversion), and auspiciousness as well as inauspiciousness (both) are caused by *rāga* (attachment) because *rāga* has dual characteristics owing to its being modifications of *moha*, *dveṣa*, and *sankleṣa* (modification of depravity).

pravacana on gāthā-180

First, *dravya-bandha* occurs due to special dispositions. Here, the word *viśiṣṭa* (specific) is used. *viśiṣṭa* means that bondage of physical karmic matter does not occur due to all dispositions, but does so due to specific dispositions. Bondage does not occur due to *aviśiṣṭa*, such as pure modifications. In the same way, bondage does not occur due to the last (least part) of an impure disposition.

1. In the fourth *guṇasthāna*, the disposition of *samyak mohanīya* is not because of the karmic bondage of *darśana mohanīya*.

2. In the ninth *guṇasthāna*, the last part of anger, ego, and illusion, is not because of the nature of those bondages.
3. In the tenth *guṇasthāna*, the last part of greed, is not because of the bondage of greed.
4. In the twelfth *guṇasthāna*, the last part of inferior *jñāna-darśana* is not the reason for bondage.

If the *jaghanya* (last) modification becomes the cause of bondage, then bondage will never leave; therefore, the last part of impurity is not the cause of bondage.

External substance is not the cause of bondage. The last part of impurity and *samkit*, and purity of conduct, is not because of bondage, but impurity is the cause of the specific particles of bondage. Such specific modifications are the cause of the bondage of karmic matter particles. Bondage is not due to an external substance. *samyagdr̥ṣṭi cakravartī* has considerable wealth in terms of possessions. If possessions were the reason for bondage, then he should also have extreme bondage. A *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* who has forsaken possessions may have few belongings; then he should have low bondage. But this is not seen to happen. At the time of death, the non-self substance remains where it is, but the bondage does not leave. So, possessions are not the reason for bondage; instead, a sense of ownership is the cause of bondage. *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* has bondage, which is the reason for transmigration, and *samkitī* has low bondage, which will also be released.

Now, types of impure dispositions are described here –

1. All thoughts like *ātmā* can benefit from non-self substance. If food is not consumed, then that is fasting and dharma; if substance-space-time-modification is conducive, then it is beneficial; these are the thoughts of *moha* (delusion).
2. To be biased towards conducive substances is attachment
3. To have a dislike towards inconducive substances is aversion.

Two types of impure dispositions in the form of auspicious and inauspicious are stated –

1. **Inauspicious** – to believe religion in bodily activities, *punya*, etc., is a false disposition, and it is inauspicious. Violence, lies, theft, and other similar actions, as well as inclinations towards the subjects of the five senses, are inauspicious when they arise from focusing on family or the body. In the same way, dispositions in the form of dislike for an enemy and unfavourable circumstances are inauspicious.
2. **Auspicious** – devotion of *deva-guru-śāstra*, dispositions of *swādhyaya*, charity-piety, etc., are auspicious dispositions.

Disposition of devotion of *deva-guru-śāstra* is an auspicious attachment, but to believe them to be beneficial is a false disposition; therefore, it is inauspicious.

False belief is counted in *aśubha*. Attachment is of two types, auspicious and inauspicious, and aversion is also of two kinds. Perhaps a *samkitī* may have a meritorious aversion towards a misguided person due to dharma, but this has not been considered here. It has been taken as secondary, and aversion is understood to be of only one type: inauspicious. If one is religiously devoted and pure, then the religious disposition is auspicious. Having dispositions of disturbed attachment to external objects is an inauspicious modification. An ignorant *jīva* believes non-self *dravya-ksetra-kāla-bhāva* to be a conventional cause for *mokṣa*. This is a false belief, which is the biggest sin; it is inauspicious. An ignorant person may be seen persisting in auspicious dispositions and setting aside inauspicious dispositions. Still, without removing inauspicious false beliefs, his inauspicious disposition is never really removed because his focus is on the non-self. An ignorant person believes that the *nimitta* of non-self *dravya-ksetra-kāla-bhāva* is the reason for *ātmā*'s competence in its existence. He is asked if it is the conventional cause of *ātmā*'s competence in its existence, and then, what the *nimitta* cause is? Then how can that be called a conventional cause? People may speak something, but internally their focus is on *nimitta*. When the *mokṣamārga* (path of liberation) is the conventional cause of *mokṣa*, then how can non-self substance-space-time-disposition be the cause of liberation?

1. Non-self *dravya-ksetra-kāla-bhāva* are totally absent in the *ātmā*'s *dravya-ksetra-kaala-bhāva*; therefore, it cannot be the conventional cause of *mokṣa*. Absence of a substance cannot be amenable to liberation.
2. Auspicious disposition occurring while focusing on the non-self substance is delusional, and modification of *mokṣa* cannot manifest with delusion. Therefore, even a transcendent auspicious disposition is not the conventional cause of *mokṣa*.
3. With the experience of the pure self, the infinitesimal part which opens in the form of the pure modification of *samyag darśana-jñāna-cāritra* is also not the reason for *mokṣa*. Though it is pure, it is a part. A complete *paryāya* cannot emanate from an incomplete *paryāya*.
4. *Gaṇadhara deva* has *samyak* sensory-scriptural-clairvoyance-telepathic knowledge (*mati-śruta-avadhi and manah paryaya jñāna*). These four types of *jñānas* are not the cause of *kevalajñāna*. This is because it is the incomplete *kṣayopāśama jñāna*. From the modification of *kṣayopāśama*, the modification of *kṣāyika* cannot arise. So, the four types of *jñānas* are not the reason for *mokṣa*.

5. *ātmā* is filled with pure, sentient, blissful nature and is monolithic. *pārināmika bhāva* is of one form from eternity to infinity; when *paryāya* entirely concentrates on that, it becomes identical. Then *kevalajñāna* and the state of *mokṣa* are manifested. Therefore, pure nature is the only cause of *mokṣa*.

One who manifests the modification of liberation because of his pure nature is said to have the four *jñānas*, or these are said to be the path to *mokṣa* from the conventional viewpoint. Because those modifications were present in the past, with their annihilation, the modification of *mokṣa* occurred.

Oh! When the path to *mokṣa* has been called the conventional cause of *mokṣa*, then to believe the presence of non-self, *dravya-ksetra-kaala-bhāva*, as the conventional cause of *mokṣa* is gross ignorance, falsity.

Thus, even though a false believer has an auspicious disposition, because of false belief, he has a great inauspicious disposition, and it is the cause of the bondage of infinite transmigration. Therefore, one who really wants to avoid *pāpa* should remove his focus from non-self, leave the interest of *punya-pāpa*, and believe in the non-bonded nature. With that, the great *pāpa* in the form of *mithyātvā* is avoided, and transmigration is destroyed, and the state of *dharma* is realised.

अथ विशिष्टपरिणामविशेषमविशिष्टपरिणामं च कारणे कार्यमुपचर्य कार्यत्वेन निर्दिशति -

Now, different types of *viśiṣṭa pariṇāma* (specific modification) and *aviśiṣṭa pariṇāma* (non-specific modification) are shown in *kāraṇa* (cause) metonymically as *kārya* (effect), and it is shown in the form of *kārya*.

**सुहपरिणामो पुण्णं असुहो पावं ति भणिदमण्णेषु ।
परिणामो णण्णगदो दुक्खक्खयकारणं समये ॥१८१॥**

***suha-pariṇāmo puṇṇaṁ asuho pāvaṁ ti bhaṇidamaṇṇesu |
pariṇāmo ṇaṇṇagado dukkhakkhayakāraṇaṁ samaye ||181||***

gāthā: *śubha* (auspicious) modification towards non-self is *puṇya*, and *aśubha* (inauspicious) modification towards non-self is *pāpa*, so it has been said. That *pariṇāma* (modification) which is not go towards *para* (non-self), is during that time the reason for the annihilation of misery.

ṭīkā: Firstly, *jīva*’s *pariṇāma* (evolution) is of two kinds *pariṇāma* inclined towards *para* (non-self) substance (*para-dravya-pravartta pariṇāma*) and self-substance *sva-dravya-pravṛtta-pariṇāma* (that which is inclined towards self).

Of these, “*para-dravya-pravṛtta-pariṇāma*”, being affected by *para* (non-self) substance, is *viśiṣṭa pariṇāma* (specific modification) and “*sva-dravya-pravṛtta pariṇāma*”, not being affected by *para* (non-self) substance, is *aviśiṣṭa pariṇāma* (non-specific modification). Among these, *viśiṣṭa pariṇāma* (specific modification) is said to be of two kinds – *śubha pariṇāma* (auspicious modification) and *aśubha pariṇāma* (inauspicious modification). Of these, auspicious modification being the cause of bondage *puṇya pariṇāma* (meritorious matter) is *puṇya*, and inauspicious modification, which is the cause of the bondage of *pāpa pariṇāma*, is *pāpa*. *aviśiṣṭa pariṇāma* (non-specific modification) being *śuddha* (pure) is only one and has no other type. *aviśiṣṭa pariṇāma* being pure is one, so it has no other form. This, *aviśiṣṭa pariṇāma* over time, becomes the reason for the annihilation of the physical karmic matter, which is the reason for the misery of transmigration. It is the reason for the annihilation of the karma *pudgala* (physical karmic matter). It is *mokṣa*, as it is the reason for the annihilation of physical matter, which is the reason for transmigration.

bhāvārtha: *śubha pariṇāma*, which is inclined towards *para* (non-self), is the reason for *puṇya*, and the *aśubha pariṇāma* is the reason for *pāpa*. Due to this, if figuratively, *kāraṇa* (reason) is said to be *kārya* (work done/modification), then *śubha pariṇāma* is *puṇya*, and *aśubha pariṇāma* is *pāpa*. The *śuddha pariṇāma*, which is inclined towards the self-*ātma* substance, is the reason for *mokṣa*. So, if figuratively, *kāraṇa* (reason) is said to be *kārya* (work done/modification), then *śuddha pariṇāma* is *mokṣa*.

pravacana on gāthā 181

Firstly, *pariṇāmas* are of two types: (1) those that arise with a focus on non-self substance, and (2) those that arise with a focus on self-substance. Those *pariṇāmas* are *śuddha-aśuddha*, and with this distinction, they are said to be of two types.

1. ***aśuddha pariṇāma*** – Any modification which manifests from all non-self substance and not with a focus on *ātmā* gives rise to *vikāra* (perturbation). From feelings of *bhakti* (veneration) towards *deva-guru-śāstra*, the gentle feelings of compassion-charity, feelings arising from the focus of the family, and the feelings of violence, lies, theft, etc., are impure feelings. So, they have been said to be *viśiṣṭa vikārī pariṇāma* (special perturbed modification).
2. ***śuddha pariṇāma*** – *ātmā* is the pure sentient nature which is devoid of all non-self substances and perturbation. In the modification which arises with auspices of this *jñātā-drṣṭā* (knowing-seeing) nature, there is no dependency on non-self, so they are *aviśiṣṭa pariṇāma* or *śuddha pariṇāma* (pure modification).

aśuddha pariṇāma (impure modification), with the distinction of *śubha* (good) and *aśubha* (bad), is of two types.

1. ***śubha pariṇāma*** - Veneration towards *dev śhāstra guru*, compassion-charity-*pūjā*, etc., are *śubha pariṇāma* (auspicious modification), and the thoughts which give bondage of the *tirthaṅkara nāma karma* (a *tirthaṅkara* karma which gives birth of the *Tirthaṅkara*) are also *śubha*.
 - a) Many ignorant people believe the thoughts of gentleness or compassion, charity to be *pāpa* (undesirable), but that is untrue. Auspicious thoughts are *puṇya tattva* (axiom of auspicious thoughts), and it is separate from *pāpa tattva* (axiom of inauspicious thoughts). If *puṇya* is believed to be *pāpa*, then the tenets of *nava tattva* (nine realities) will not remain.
 - b) Many ignorant believe *nirjarā* (shedding of karma) to be occurring due to auspicious thoughts. That is also a mistake. Auspicious thoughts are the tenet of

puṇya and *āśrava-baṇḍha* tenet. He who believes *nirjarā* to be due to *baṇḍha* does not know both *nirjarā* and *baṇḍha*. So, he does not believe in the *nava tattvas* (nine realities).

- c) Many ignorant *jīvas* believe the origination of auspicious thoughts to be due to non-self or karma. But if this were to be believed, one *jīva* would change into the form of another *jīva* or non-sentient. So, they, too, do not believe in the tenets of *jīva* or *ajīva*. Their belief is also wrong.

Auspicious dispositions are not the reason for dharma but the reason for karma's bondage. Some say that *dharma* arises with the auspicious thoughts of *pañcakalyāṇaka* (consecration ceremony for a Jain temple), etc., and that he will attain liberation after eight lives. But this is incorrect. As these dispositions are in the form of *śubha*, they are the reason for the bondage of karma. If liberation were to be attained merely by spending money, then the poor person who cannot spend money will never attain *mokṣa*.

Auspicious dispositions are said to be *puṇya*. With this, there is a bondage of *sātā-vedniya karma* (pleasant feeling-producing karma), *śubha nāma karma* (which is *nimitta* in getting a good body), *ucca gotra karma* (birth in a high family), *śubha āyu* (good life span) *acchī gati* (good life form), etc., are the ethos of *puṇya* (*karma* whose state is *puṇya*). The fruit of these is the attainment of good associations. But *dharma* is not attained by them. As a result of auspicious thoughts, there is a bondage of auspicious ethos. So by transferred epithet, the reason for the work done, *śubha* is said to be *puṇya*. *puṇya* is insentient, non-living. It is said to be *puṇya* in name only. In the state of a seeker, to save himself from *aśubha*, the disposition of *śubha* does arise, and they are called *puṇya* in name. But its boundaries should be understood. The Lord of the Three Worlds, as well as the ascetic *muni*, is non-self from the view of self *ātmā*. The thoughts of *puṇya*, which arise when focus is on them, are the cause of the bondage of *puṇya*.

1. ***aśubha parināma***: Leaving the focus of the *śuddha caitanya svarūpa* (pure sentient nature), all thoughts that arise with a focus on the body are *aśubha*. The belief of self-conceit that one can do something of non-self is the thought of falsity. All thoughts of *saṁsāra* that arise by missing the pure sentient nature are *aśubha*. He who says that *aśubha bhāva* is due to the origination of karma or non-self substance has an incorrect belief. When *jīva* independently has inauspicious thoughts, then the result of that is the bondage of the *jñānāvarṇa* (knowledge obstruction karma), *darśanāvarṇa* (perception obstruction karma), *mohaniya* (faith obstructing karma), *aṅtrāya* (which creates obstruction) *asātāvedaniya* (unpleasant feeling giving karma), *aśubha āyu*

(short life), *nīca gotra* (birth in a low family), *nīcā nāma karma* (not a good body), *pāpa prakṛti* (inauspicious type of karma). That *aśubha* is non-living, insentient, and *pudgala*. Even then, figuratively speaking, *kārya* (work done) is said to be the *kāraṇa* (reason), and *aśubha* is called *pāpa*.

The nature of *śuddha pariṇāma* (pure modification) –

aviśiṣṭa pariṇāma (non-specific modification) being pure is one, so there are no distinctions in it. *ātmā* by nature is sentient and cannot do the work of the body, etc. Perturbation is momentary, and that is not *ātmā*. The way *deva-guru-śāstra* does not liberate the *ātmā*, in the same way, family, etc., do not drown the *ātmā*. Having this *samyak śraddhā-jñāna* (correct belief-knowledge) and immersing in this pure nature is *śuddha pariṇāma* (pure modification). This is only one and has no divisions or types. Here, *śuddha pariṇāma* is called *mokṣa*. In the state of seeker, when immersing in self in an ever-increasing state enhances the inner purity, at that time, there are various sequential modifications. Still, there is no division of the pure modification. Every *samaya*, the unblemished modification stays one with the substance. That is why it has been said to be the only one. When such a state of purity arises, then physical karmas, which are the reason for worldly misery, do not have new bondage, and with every *samaya*, the state of purity increases. Here, physical *karma* is said to be the reason for worldly miseries. But it is not the reason for transmigration. It is the focus of the ignorant on the modification, which is the reason for transmigration, and the bondage of *karma* is due to that. So, figuratively speaking, *karma* is the reason for transmigration. *jñānī* 's focus on modification has been destroyed, and the focus of the pure self has manifested. That is why he does not have bondage of karmas, and when all karmas are annihilated, the pure modification of *mokṣa* manifests. That is why *śuddha pariṇāma* (pure modification itself is *mokṣa*.

pravacana on bhāvārtha

Auspicious modification, which is tilted towards non-self, is the reason for the bondage of beneficial karmic matter, and inauspicious modification tilted towards the body, etc., is the reason for the bondage of non-beneficial karmic matter. Due to this, by transferring the work done on the reason, figuratively speaking, auspicious modification is said to be *puṇya*, and inauspicious modification is said to be *pāpa*. Pure modification, which arises due to the auspice of the pure sentient nature of the self, is the reason for complete liberation. So figuratively speaking, the reason is called the work done, and pure modification is called *mokṣa*.

gāthā-182

अथ जीवस्य स्वपरद्रव्यप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिसिद्धये स्वपरविभागं दर्शयति –

Now, for achieving the goal of *ātmā*'s realisation, i.e., *jīva*'s proclivity within self-substance and abstinence from other (non-self) substances, a distinction of self and non-self is exhibited: -

**भणिदा पुढविप्पमुहा जीवणिकायाध थावरा य तसा ।
अण्णा ते जीवादो जीवो वि य तेहिंदो अण्णो ॥१८२॥**

*bhaṇidā puḍhaviṇṇamuhā jīvaṇikāyādha thavarā ya tasā |
aṇṇā te jīvādo jīvo vi ya tehiṇdo aṇṇo || 182 ||*

gāthā: All embodied living beings – *sthāvara* (immovable) like the earth, etc., (one sensed) and movable-*trasa* (two to five sensed) as described in scripture, are different from *jīva*, and *jīva* is also distinct from them.

tīkā: Earth, etc., six types of embodied living beings, which are seen with the distinction of *trasa* (two to five sensed beings) and *sthāvara* (one sensed being), are different from *jīva*, due to insentience, and *jīva* is different from them due to sentience. Here, (it is said that) the six types of embodied living beings are non-self-substances to *ātmā*; *ātmā* alone is the self-substance.

pravacana on gāthā-182

prithvikāya (*jīvas* of earth), *jalakāya* (*jīvas* of water), *agnikāya* (*jīvas* of fire), and *vanaspatikāya* (*jīva* of vegetation) These five are said to be *sthāvara* (one sense), and those with two senses up to *asañjñī* (without mind) and *sañjñī* (with mind) with five senses are said to be *trasa* (with mobility who live in *trasnāli*). Their body is insentient; due to this insentience, they are separate from *jīva*. Green vegetation is called sentient. But it is not the green vegetation that is sentient; it is insentient. But *jīva* within is sentient. The body is not *jīva*. The body of green vegetation and *jīva* are separate. Only the karmic and auric bodies accompany the *jīva*. But they too are insentient because the *jīva* separates from them as well. The bodies of *nārakī*, *tiryāṇca*, *manuṣya*, and *devas* are non-living, and they are separate from *ātmā*.

jīva is distinct from them because of its nature of *jñāna-darśana*. Here, the characteristic of *jīva*'s nature is called sentience.

1. Some say that the body is the characteristic of *jīva*, but that is incorrect. This is because the body is an insentient substance, and it is separate from the substance *jīva*.
2. Some say that *jīva* has a relation of being in one space with the body. Therefore, its existence is proved, but this is also untrue. This is because it is not the characteristic of *jīva* to be in the same space as the body. *siddhas* do not have a relation to having a body in the same space. So, the characteristic of *jīva* is sentience.
3. Some say that one can do something to another/non-self *jīva* is the characteristic of the self-soul. But as this is an erroneous thought, it is untrue. With this, there will be an influx and bondage of karma, and the substance *jīva* is separate from them. If both were to be one, then the nine realities would not remain.
4. Some say that auspicious-inauspicious modification is the characteristic of *jīva*. But this is incorrect because they are *punya-pāpa tattva*, and *jīva tattva* is separate from it. If these modifications are called *jīva tattva*, then the nine realities would not remain. Perturbation arises in the modification of *jīva* when there is a focus on the non-self, and that goes away, but the knowing-seeing nature of *jīva* will remain.
5. Some say that *alpajñatā* (lesser knowledge) is the characteristic of *jīva*. But this, too, is incorrect. This is because if *alpajñatā* were the characteristic of *jīva*, then when *alpajñatā* is destroyed, the *jīva* also should be destroyed. But this does not happen.
6. Here, *jīva* is said to be of a knowing-seeing pure nature of substance, which is devoid of non-self substance, *nimitta*, *karma*, perturbation, incomplete modification. Such *jīvas* are present in different bodies, according to their ability in this *loka*. *Vedānta* believes all together are one *jīva*, but this is incorrect. *jīva* is separate because of its efficacy of sentience. Bodies of six types of *jīvas* are non-self to *ātmā*, and *ātmā* only is the self-substance.

Oh! *jīvas* do not know the pure nature of *ātmā*. Ignorant *jīvas* believe that protecting the *jīvas* of the six types of bodies is dharma. But what are the *chha kāya* (six types of bodies)? Has any thought been given to it?

1. The *chha kāyas* seen outside are *ajīva* (non-living), and the self is *jīva*. So, one cannot protect the *chha kāya* as it is the non-living reality, and that is separate from the self.
2. *jīvas*, which stays within the six types of bodies are separate from the self *jīva*. One cannot do anything to a *jīva*, which is separate from the self.

3. Thoughts of compassion are *punya tattva* (meritorious reality). The self is the knower of *punya tattva*. Therefore, that cannot be the nature of the self. To live or die depends on the state of a soul and is not dependent on the compassion of anyone. So *ātmā* cannot save any *jīva*.

Ignorant *jīva* believes that saving other *jīvas* is *dharma*. To that, it is asked if one is a part of the *chha kaya* or not? How can one have compassion towards oneself? Has he thought of how to save himself? Without one's own thought, *jīva* is hassled by the belief that he can do something in non-self, or he can have compassion, or that the body moves because of him, or that there is a manifestation of *karma*. Due to such various beliefs, one does violence to oneself. That is violence of thoughts. In other faiths, God is said to be the administrator of the universe. Jains who are in name only believe *ātmā* to be the doer of body, *karma*, etc.; therefore, there is no difference between those with other faiths and the so-called Jains; both are false believers.

ātmā cannot do anything of non-self *jīvas*. The auspicious-inauspicious thoughts do not arise due to non-self; *karma* cannot harass *jīva*. When *jīva* is at fault by himself, then *karma* is said to be *nimitta*. Perturbation is impurity. *ātmā* is without perturbation and is of pure knowing-seeing nature - experience of this sentient with belief-knowledge is non-violence.

Non-self *jīva* is saved is not *ahimsā*, and similarly, dying of non-self is not *himsā*. This is because *jīva* lives or dies as per his life span. But ignorant *jīva* believes that he can save or kill non-self *jīva*. This thought itself is the *himsā* of the sentient soul. Thoughts that he can neither kill nor save non-self, or the belief that thoughts of compassion arise within are due to the self and not due to the non-self; but that also is not the nature of self, because they are perturbations, and they have a leaning for harming the self-soul. Understanding this and keeping alive the vitality of knowledge in the knowing-seeing nature is compassion towards self, and that is *ahimsā*.

To detach from non-self substances and focus on the sentient nature of self is the fruit of having the real knowing of knowables, which is the reason for dharma and peace.

He who believes that he can save *jīvas* of six body types is not a Jain but is a false believer. *jīvas* of six types of bodies are separate from the self *ātmā*. *ātmā* cannot be compassionate towards *jīvas* of the six types of bodies, and neither can he kill them. Non-self substances are non-self knowable, and self-*ātmā* is self-knowable. The substance-space-time-modification of non-self substance is separate from self *ātmā*. How can that

substance, which is separate, do anything to any other substance? A *jīva* will be saved if he is meant to live; if he is not, he will die. But the living is not dependent on thoughts of compassion of non-self *jīva*, and its death is not due to carelessness of non-self *jīva*. *jīva* does not have the ability to move even one thumb, then how is it possible to save a non-self *jīva* in three time phases. Despite this, if a *jīva* believes that another *jīva* was saved because of his thoughts of compassion, then he is a false believer.

The state of substance is such that *jīvas* with one sense to upto five senses are non-self-knowable. Self *jīva* cannot do anything to them, and it is not so that another *jīva* will be saved because of the compassionate thoughts of the self. The reason for compassion is not non-self. In pure nature, there is no attachment to compassion. Even in the state of attachment, with knowing of pure nature, the pure nature of *jñāna* persists, and carelessness is avoided. With the auspices of the pure nature of the self, *śraddhā-jñāna* exists. So, the intended meaning of the scriptures is that one should not allow inauspicious thoughts in psychic thought activity. Though this is not about saving non-self *jīva*, from the view of *nimitta*, it is said that one must save the *jīvas* of the *chha kāya*. But its intended meaning is that one must protect one's pure nature of *jñāna* and should not allow carelessness or inauspicious thoughts to occur. When another *jīva* is meant to live, it is said that it is due to the compassion of the self-*jīva* that the other *jīva* was saved. Without this science of distinction, an ignorant person may carry out many auspicious activities, but he will never manifest *dharma*.

अथ जीवस्य स्वपरद्रव्यप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वेन स्वपरविभागज्ञानाज्ञाने अवधारयति -

Now, it is decided that the knowledge of *sva-para* (distinction of self - non-self) is the *nimitta* (instrumental cause) of *jīva* 's activity in the self-substance, and *ajñāna* (lack of true knowledge) of the distinction of *sva-para* (self-non-self) is the *nimitta* for inclination of *jīva* in the other non-self substance: -

**जो णवि जाणदि एवं परमप्पाणं सहावमासेज्ज।
कीरदि अज्झवसाणं अहं ममेदं ति मोहादो ॥१८३॥**

*jo ṇavi jāṇadi evaṃ paramappāṇaṃ sahāvamāsejja |
kīradi ajjhasāṇaṃ ahaṃ mamedāṃ ti mohādo || 183 ||*

gāthā: One who does not know the other (non-self) and the self, and does not ascertain the characteristic nature *sva-para* (nature of soul and matter), in this way; he, through delusion, creates misconceptions such that “I am this” and “this is mine” and perseveres in that.

tīkā: That *ātmā* which does not see the distinction of *sva-para* (self-non-self), with the specific sentient and insentient nature of *jīva* and *pudgala*, respectively, he, by himself, through delusion, creates the misconception and due to delusion, perseveres in the belief of other (non-self) substance as being of self and belonging to self, and believes “I am this” and “this is mine” and no one else does this for him. Therefore, (this concludes that) *nimitta* of the propensity of *jīva* towards *para dravya* (nonself substance) is the absence of *jñāna* of *sva-para*, and (without saying so) by efficacy, it is decided that *nimitta* of the propensity towards *sva-dravya* is its absence.

bhāvārtha: He who does not have the *bhedavijnāna* (discriminative knowledge) of *sva* (self) and other *para* (non-self) only he feels “I-ness” and “mine-ness” in other (non-self) substances, and the one with *bhedavijnāna* does not. Therefore, the cause of proclivity in other (non-self) substances is the absence of discriminative knowledge, and the cause of proclivity in self-substance is *bhedavijnāna* (discriminative knowledge) only.

pravacana on gāthā-183

KuṇḍaKuṇḍa Ācārya Bhagavāna and Amṛtacaṇḍra Ācārya Deva were immersed within, with the experience of the pure nature of self. They would swing between the sixth and the

seventh *guṇasthāna* (stages of evolution of *ātmā*, every moment. This state would arise thousands of times. They would be in the sixth *guṇasthāna* twice the duration of the seventh. (If they would stay more than that in the sixth, they would fall from the *guṇasthāna* and become *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*). When these *bhāvaliṅgī munis* are in the sixth *guṇasthāna* at that time, they had the thoughts of writing *śāstras*. But they do not believe they are the owners of those thoughts. Such supremely accomplished *munis* say that the writing of *śāstras*, etc., is the state of insentience, and it has occurred due to insentience. They are not the doer of this state. However, he who lacks this discriminative knowledge believes in its ownership.

Without the destruction of the root of false belief, the tree of transmigration does not get destroyed. *ātmā* is separate from the body and all other non-self *jīvas*. He who does not practise *bhedavijnāna*, that the nature of self is within the self, believes that he can speak, can have compassion towards other *jīvas*, can protect his family, his country, can attain knowledge through words, etc. He believes that the modification of insentient substance is due to sentient substance, but he does not know the distinction between self and non-self. If the branches and leaves of a tree dry up but the roots have not, then that tree will not be destroyed; similarly, *jīva* may have an auspicious disposition to save himself from an inauspicious disposition, but till *mithyātvā* in the form of the root has not dried up, till then the tree of transmigration will not be destroyed.

Modification of insentient and sentient is independent of each other. Ignorant *jīva* believes that *jīva* attains *dharma* due to the speech of *Kevalī Bhagavāna*. But from the view of absolute truth, it is not true. Speech of *Kevalī Bhagavāna* emits without any desire to do so. The *guru*, without *kevalajñāna*, does have attachment, but his words do not come out due to that *rāga*. *rāga* is the perturbed modification of the attribute of conduct, and words are the modification of *bhāṣāvargaṇā* (matter particles of speech). *jñāna* of the disciple is the modification of the attribute of *jñāna* of the disciple. No modification of anything arises due to anyone else. Every modification is independent. If attachment were due to words, then words would be the insentient doer, and attachment, which is the perturbed state of the attribute of conduct is the work done, if *jñāna* were to arise due to words. Then the insentient words would be the doer, and the arising of *jñāna* would be proved to be the work done. If words were due to attachment, then intangible attachment would be the reason, and tangible words would be the work done. But this kind of connection between sentient and insentient can never occur.

All *nimittas* are like *dharmāstikāya*; they are *akiñcitkara* (insignificant) in non-self.

Question: Then what is the meaning of *preraka nimitta* (stimulation *nimitta*)?

Answer: *preraka nimitta* shows the type of *nimitta*. For example, the wheel is turning on its own, so it is said to be *preraka*. It does not mean that the potter has stimulated another substance and modified it. In *Iṣṭaupdeśa* (a scripture), it has been said that all *nimittas* are like *dharmāstikāya*. So, it makes no difference whether it be *preraka* (stimulating) or *udāsīna* (passive). If *ātmā* could move the body, it should move *dharma* and *ākāśa dravyas* by pushing them, but it cannot do so. So, the substance which moves from one space to another due to its own *kriyāvati śakti*, in that other substances are said to be *nimitta*. And if *nimitta*, by itself, has the desire or helps in motion, then it is said to be *preraka nimitta*. ***nimitta, which is unmoving, is said to be udāsīna nimitta.*** To believe that work can be done by *nimitta* shows an absence of knowledge of distinction.

Every substance and modification exists and is independent, and it is not due to the non-self. In the stick, which is *skandha* (mass of matter particles), every matter particle is independent. Every matter particle exists by its own auspices and not due to the auspices of another matter particle. The six *kāraṅkas* (causatives), which are *kartā* (doer), *karma* (work done), *karṇa* (for whom work is done), *saṃpradāna* (that which with work is done), *apadana* (for whom work is done), *adhikaraṇa* (basis on which work is done), of every matter particle and *jīva*, are within their self, and the six causatives of nonself are within the non-self. Infinite *jīvas* of *nigoda* stay together, but they too are independent, and their six causatives are within their self. There is an absence of non-self in them. When there is an absence, what can they do to another substance? Ignorant *jīva* believes substance and attributes are pure, but modification can be by non-self. If the present part of one *samaya* is due to non-self, then the second and third parts would be dependent, and in this way, the mass of all parts – which is the whole- would also be dependent. With this belief, he does not believe in substance and attributes being independent. It is said that ‘*guṇa vikārā paryāya*, here, *vikārā*, means *pariṇamana* (modification), or *viśeṣa kārya* (specific work). If modification were the work of the non-self, then this statement would be proved incorrect. In this statement, it is said that the specific/special work of the attribute is a modification, but it does not say that the work of non-self is that modification. In the state of *Siddha*, the specific work of attributes is their modification, and the specific work of the attributes of the four substances – *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, and *kāla*- is in their own modifications. So, no modification of *jīva* or *ajiva* can ever be due to non-self. This is about the modification of the six substances. This is a general definition.

Question: If *kālalabdhi* (right time) were to come, then would not *samyaktva* arise?

Answer: Outer *kālāṇus* are non-self substances, and there is a complete absence of these in the *ātmā*. *punya* is perturbation, and *ātmā* is the pure, knowing-seeing nature. Arising of this understanding and belief is *kālalabdhi*, and that is *puruṣārtha* (right effort). Is *kāla* the master of *ātmā*, so that it would modify? *kāla* is insentient, and insentient can do nothing in the sentient.

jīvas in *nigoda* do intense ignorant psychic activity, which is the false effort in the form of ignorance. If *jīva* does auspicious activities with the desire to get a human's life, then that is a false effort of auspicious activity. Attaining *samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritra*, and the *jīva* getting the life of a human from which he attains *mokṣa*, is the true effort of *mokṣa*. *jīva* does not stay in *nigoda* due to the arising of intense *karmas*, and he does not get the life of a human because the *karmas* have reduced in intensity. True effort occurs within the self and due to the self. It is not due to karma or *kāla*.

Attachment of non-self substance is due to the absence of *bheda-vijñāna*. With this statement, it is ascertained that *jīva*, who does not have the belief and knowledge of the pure nature in the form of *jñāta-drṣṭā*, does not have the knowledge of distinction between self and non-self. *jīva* has ownership of non-self, believing the body is him. Consequently, many lives were saved because of him. Dharma will arise slowly through auspicious activities, and knowledge will arise through words, etc. But *jñānī jīva* does not have this kind of *adhyavasāna* (determination). So, it is ascertained that the focus of *jīva* towards non-self is due to the absence of *bheda-vijñāna*.

Focus on self-substance is due to the existence of *bheda-vijñāna*. *ātmā*'s nature is *jñāna*. Non-self substances are not of perturbation; it is a distorted state. The reason for the existence of the *śraddhā-jñāna* in the pure nature of *ātmā* is the presence of *bheda-vijñāna*. One with *bheda-vijñāna* provides a correct understanding of self and non-self, preventing the belief in ownership and doer-ship in non-self substances. *jīva*, with a focus on its nature, shows *nimitta* and associations as they are. The nature of *nimitta* and association is to do the activity of itself and not to do it in the *upādāna* (substantial cause). *jñānī jīva* does not believe *jñāna* to arise from association.

He who does not know the distinction between self and non-self has the belief of ownership and doer-ship of non-self substance. Ignorant believes that things were understood due to his presence. But it is not so. If understanding were to come from a non-self, then everyone

should understand. But no one can understand without one's ability. If one were to understand due to *Kevalī*, then everyone in *Mahavideha* should be able to understand, but that is not so. When he himself understands, then *kevalī* is said to be *nimitta*. However, the ignorant forgets himself and believes that the non-self does the work. The reason for this is the absence of *bheda-vijñāna*. If *ātmā* were not to do anything, would it become immobile like a mountain? No. *ātmā* is with modification and with the nature of permanence. Therefore, the nature of the substance should be understood in the way it is. Modification of attachment is due to the absence of *bheda-vijñāna*, and the reason for focusing on the self is the presence of *bheda-vijñāna*.

This way, one should manifest *bheda-vijñāna* and destroy *moha*.

gāthā-184

अथात्मनः किं कर्मेति निरूपयति -

Now, the *karma/kārya* (deed) of *ātmā* is described here: -

**कुव्वं सभावमादा हवदि हि कत्ता सगस्स भावस्स ।
पोगलदव्वमयाणं ण दु कत्ता सव्वभावाणं ॥१८४॥**

*kuvvaṃ sabhāvamādā havadi hi kattā sagassa bhāvassa |
poggaladavvamayaṇaṃ ṇa du kattā savvabhāvāṇaṃ || 184 ||*

gāthā: *ātmā*, effecting its own disposition is *kartā* (doer) of its own disposition, but it is not the doer of those which are of physical substances.

tīkā: *ātmā* indeed is the doer of its own *sva-bhāva* (evolution) because it is its own trait; As that modification is its own nature, it has the possibility of having the efficacy which can modify the *ātmā* into that state, hence it is by all means the deed of *ātmā*. Thus, *ātmā* independently evolves its nature; it is assuredly its doer, and evolution is being done by *ātmā*, and evolution occurring through *ātmā* is surely attainable; it is the work done of *ātmā*. Thus, self-modification is the work of the *ātmā*.

But, *ātmā* is not the doer of the modification of *pudgala* (physical matter) because they being the traits of non-self, it is impossible for *ātmā* to have the efficacy to modify them; hence, it is not the work of *ātmā*. (Thus) *ātmā* not doing/not affecting them, it cannot be their *kartā* (doer), and as they cannot be done by *ātmā*, they are not the deed of *ātmā*. Thus, modification of *pudgala* is not the deed of *ātmā*.

pravacana on gāthā-184

The present modification is not dependent on *karma* or *nimitta*. Firstly, *ātmā* does the modification of its own self. Here, the word ‘*prathama*’ (first) is used. It means that whether *ātmā* modifies as perturbed or unperturbed, moves from one space to another, or remains steady, all these are the modifications of *ātmā*. None is done by any *karma*. The state of modification is not so dependent that, because of the intense arising of *karmas*, one would go to *naraka* or *nigoda*, and if *karmas* were to go away completely, he would attain the state of *siddha*. Whether *jīva* goes to *naraka-nigoda* or attains the state of *siddha*, all

these are due to his own self, and not due to any other. *ātmā* itself is the doer of the modification of every *samaya*. According to its own ability, *ātmā* is the doer of the perturbed or unperturbed modification, every *samaya*. Here, this has been called *dharma*. The reference here is not to *dharma* in the form of unblemished modification. To be in a state of modification, every *samaya* is the *dharma* (nature) of *ātmā*. But insentient cannot assume this modification. *Śreṇika Rājā* went to *naraka* due to his ability and not due to *karma*. *jīva* manifests *kṣāyika samyaktva* due to his ability and not due to the presence of *kevalī*. *jīva* manifests *śruta jñāna* by himself and not due to the words of someone else. One has an attachment to business due to himself and not due to the shop or family. He does auspicious dispositions in *nigoda*, due to himself, and not because the intensity of karma is reduced.

ātmā, possessing the inherent efficacy in the form of both perturbed modifications and unperturbed modifications, is definitely the work of *ātmā*. *ātmā* itself is independently responsible for these states of being, so it is the doer. The definition of *kartā* is that he who acts independently is the doer, and that which is *iṣṭa* (work done) by the doer is *karma* (deed). When it is said that an action arises due to *nimitta* or *karma*, the doers-ship of the substance does not remain. Therefore, substance is the reason, and its deed is the modification. Whether modification is perturbed or unperturbed, *ātmā* itself is its doer.

The present modification is not due to the earlier modification, but rather to its own substance. These self-modifications are from the *ātmā*; they are attained from the *ātmā*. Hence, they are the deed of *ātmā*. Here, the word '*prāpya*' has been used; from whom is the modification *prāpya*? It is not said that it is *prāpya* (attained) from *nimitta* or *karma*, nor is it attained from the earlier modification. It is not that because earlier, a lot of auspicious thoughts were done, so he does auspicious thoughts now, or he had inauspicious thoughts, so he does inauspicious thoughts. Here, someone might argue that a *jīva* is destined for *naraka*, even if he does not currently desire to go there, due to the earlier bondage of karma of a hellish state. Is it not then inevitable that he must go to *naraka*? But wait! Before he attains the body of the life of *naraka*, there were three *samaya* in *vigrahagati* (the soul's transition from one body to another), and each of those *samaya* he modifies independently, and not due to the earlier states.

"utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya yuktaṁ saṭ" – Each substance, while remaining the same, annihilates its previous modification and originates a new modification. When the previous modification is annihilated, what effect can it have on the present modification? Just as if

origination were to occur due to *nimitta*, nothing can remain independent. Similarly, if the present modification arises because of the past modification, the present modification cannot be independent. Ah! The nature of a substance is transcendental and unique. The relationship is only between the present and the *trikālī* (eternal) substance. There is no relationship between the present and past *karmas* or with *nimitta*. Perturbed and unperturbed modifications are independent.

Question: Is *ātmā* the doer of the actions of the body and other substances?

Answer: Those whose perception is based on the *saṃyoga* (association) of substances will always see only the association. **vyavahāra (empirical truth) of *ātmā* is in the *ātmā* and not in *jaḍa*.** *niścaya*, meaning the ultimate reality, and *vyavahāra* is that which speaks of earlier modification, association, or *jñāna* of *nimitta*, but that does not mean that by *vyavahāra*, *ātmā* can carry out any activity of the body. *ātmā* possesses the modification of *ātmā*, and insentient possesses the modification of insentience. **Even from the view of *vyavahāra*, *ātmā* cannot assume the modification of non-sentient.** Movement of the body and the emission of words is the modification of insentient, and desire, as well as *bhāvyoga* (vibration of the space points of *ātmā* due to desires) is the perturbed modification of *ātmā*. *mana-vacana-kaya yoga* (vibration of space points of *ātmā*) is *nimitta*, but they are insentient. The substance, attributes and modifications of non-living are present in the non-living, and the substance, attributes, and modifications of the *arūpī cetana* (non-physical sentient) are within it. The non-physical substance cannot do anything of the physical substance. When it is time for wealth to go, even if *ātmā* strongly desires to retain it, it cannot do so. His movement, speech, and all other actions occur independently. Thus, the independent actions of physical matter substance are due to itself; this should be ascertained. One who does not understand *niścaya*, does not have the correct knowledge of *vyavahāra* statements either.

ātmā does not have the dispositions of tangible substances because *ātmā* does not have the potential to turn into a tangible form. Therefore, it is not the doer of those actions. Thus, *ātmā* is not the doer of the modification of the non-self substances, and the *ātmā* has not done those non-self substances. Therefore, they are not the deed of *ātmā*. He who realises this true knowledge will no longer have the delusion of being the doer of non-self; his attachment will be destroyed, and dharma will manifest.

gāthā-185

अथ कथमात्मनः पुद्गलपरिणामो न कर्म स्यादिति सन्देहमपनुदति -

Now, the doubt that why is *pudgala pariṇāma* is not the *karma* (deed/act) of the *ātmā* is removed: -

गेण्हदि णेव ण मुंचदि करेदि ण हि पोग्गलाणि कम्माणि ।
जीवो पोग्गलमज्झे वट्ठण्णवि सव्वकालेसु ॥१८५॥

geṇhadi ṇeva ṇa muṁcadi karedi ṇa hi poggalāṇi kammāni |
jīvo poggalamajjhe vaṭṭaṇṇavi savvakāle su || 185 ||

gāthā: The *jīva*, though existing at all times in the midst of *pudgala* (physical matter), neither accepts nor abandons, nor is the doer of material *karmas*.

tīkā: *pudgala pariṇāma* (modification of physical matter) is, in fact, not the deed *ātmā* of because it is devoid of the ability to accept or abandon other (non-self) substance. That which is seen to be the cause of the modification of another substance, like fire, which remains free from acceptance-abandonment of the mass of iron- is free from acceptance and abandonment thereof. *ātmā*, despite existing in the same space (same equal region of other substance), is, in fact, free from acceptance-abandonment of non-self substance. Hence, it is not the cause of the modification of matter particles into karmic state.

pravacana on gāthā-185

In reality, the modification of *pudgala* is not the deed of *ātmā*, and neither is the accepting or forsaking of physical karmic matter. In the *namaskāra mantra*, the first line is – ‘*Namo Arihaṇtāṇaṁ*’. The meaning of these words is that he who has destroyed the enemy in the form of *karma* – Such a *bhagavāna* is being bowed to. Has *Bhagavāna* destroyed the four destructive *karmas*? The four destructive *karmas* are insentient, and insentient *karmas* cannot be originated or destroyed by the *ātmā*. In reality, inanimate *karma* is not the enemy; instead, *bhāva karma* (thoughts and dispositions) are the true enemies. *bhāva karma* means attachment and aversion. To say, "I have destroyed attachment and aversion," is merely a figurative expression. The belief that attachment and aversion arise and that I can destroy them is wrong. Attachment and aversion cannot be destroyed by merely focusing on them; instead, when the self becomes completely steady within its pure nature, then attachment

and aversion do not arise. It is then that it is said that *Bhagavāna* has destroyed attachment and aversion. Insentient *karma* remains as insentient *karma*, and *ātmā* remains as *ātmā*. Just as a cow is in the cow, and a rope is in the rope, the rope never binds the cow; similarly, physical karmic matter never has bondage with *ātmā*. The scriptures mention that infinite-fold *karmas* are shed as the *guṇasthāna* (spiritual state) progresses. This description is from the view of the instrumental cause. When a seeker's inner purity increases, impurity does not arise. This is described as the destruction of impurity. At that point, *karma*, because of itself, sheds away from the same space of that *ātmā* – on such an occurrence, it is said that *ātmā* has shed *karma*.

When the focus shifts to the nature of the self, then the focus on external objects ceases. This is what is meant by "letting go of external objects." Even though *ātmā* is free from taking or forsaking external objects, still the ignorant believes that he renounces spouse, children, shop, family, etc. In truth, he never actually acquires those substances. One can only renounce something that has been acquired, but what has never been acquired cannot be renounced. The ignorant *ātmā*, in his deluded state, has the belief that non-self substances are his, and they bring him happiness. Upon realizing the true nature of the self, devoid of attachment, and immersing into it, the focus on non-self substances goes away, and that is said to be the forsaking of non-self substances.

He who is the modifier of whoever cannot do that without taking and forsaking that substance. Just as fire never embraces iron, similarly, therefore, fire does not leave iron. Fire is hot, and the piece of iron is cold. If fire were to take the iron, it would never separate from it; however, it becomes cool when a hot piece of iron is placed in cold water. If fire had taken the iron, it would never have cooled in water. Therefore, in reality, fire neither takes nor forsakes the iron. It is thus decided that what is seen to cause modification of that substance cannot be without the taking and forsaking of that substance. And that which is seen to be free from taking and forsaking of that substance cannot cause its modification. Similarly, *ātmā*, being devoid of any taking or forsaking of body, family, or wealth, cannot transform them. And it can neither take nor forsake them. If *ātmā* could transform wealth, it would never be free from taking and forsaking it. At the time of death, the body, family, and wealth remain here, and the *jīva* departs. This shows that *ātmā* had never taken or forsaken non-self substances. If it has neither taken nor forsaken the substance, how could it cause modification in them? Thus, it is proved that the soul cannot transform non-self substances like the body, wealth, and family."

From the perspective of *paryāyadr̥ṣṭi* (one with focus on modifications), *ātmā* is the doer of its modification, takes, and forsakes them. It is essential to understand that since the *ātmā* is the doer of its modification, it is not seen to be free from taking and forsaking these modifications. *ātmā*, in its *paryāya* (modification), accepts both auspicious and inauspicious dispositions, but by relinquishing these, it then accepts its pure nature, which is also from the perspective of *paryāyadr̥ṣṭi*. In the intrinsic nature of substance, there is no acceptance or relinquishment of auspicious or inauspicious dispositions. From the perspective of *paryāyadr̥ṣṭi*, every *samaya ātmā* is the doer of its modification. This is the reason it is said that he takes and forsakes his modification every *samaya*. In this way, the modifying *ātmā* accepts and forsakes his modification. But he neither accepts nor forsakes non-self substance.

One who believes he can accept and forsake external non-self substance will not attain true *dharma*. An ignorant *jīva*, not understanding the true nature of substances, believes that he has renounced certain material things, such as food or family, by adopting rituals and vows. In response to this, *jñānī* says that one can accept and forsake one's modification, but one cannot accept or forsake non-self substance. He does his origination-annihilation, but cannot do so of the non-self. The one who believes that he can take and forsake non-self does not even have a low intensity of passions. Without the focus on the pure nature of the self, the intensity of passions cannot be reduced. Therefore, the ignorant who believes that by renouncing external things, he has attained a lot of *dharma* is his delusion, and he will not attain *dharma*. When true *śraddhā-jñāna* of pure nature arises, when inner steadiness grows, when one attains his natural state, and when attachment becomes very subtle, then the focus does not turn towards non-self substance. Only at this point does adopting vows and practicing asceticism become meaningful. But these cannot be done by force.

Thus, it is ascertained that even though the body, karma, and other external factors are present in the same space as *ātmā*, *ātmā* is devoid of taking or forsaking them.

This is the chapter on knowable. One can modify the *svajñeya*, but cannot alter the modifications of the body, karma, or other knowables; therefore, he can neither take nor forsake them. Hence, when one must renounce attachment to non-self substance and should understand that the self causes the attachment in his *paryāya*. When he can firmly believe this and believes his nature to be free of attachments, then attachment will go, and the state of *dharma* will be realised.

gāthā-186

अथात्मनः कुतस्तर्हि पुद्गलकर्मभिरुपादानं हानं चेति निरूपयति -

Now, (if the *ātmā* does not cause modification of *pudgala* into karmic matter form, then) how is the *ātmā* bonded and released by physical karmic matter? That is described here –

**स इदाणि कत्ता सं सगपरिणामस्स दव्वजादस्स ।
आदीयदे कदाइं विमुच्चदे कम्मधूलीहिं ॥१८६॥**

*sa idāṇiṃ kattā saṃ sagapariṇāmassa davvajādassa |
ādīyade kadāī vimuccade kammadhūlīhiṃ || 186 ||*

gāthā: *ātmā* at present (in the mundane embodied state), being the doer of its own (impure) modification arising from its own *ātmā* substance, is bonded by karmic matter particles and sometimes is released from it.

ṭīkā: *ātmā*, though being free from accepting-forsaking of non-self substance, at present, in the embodied mundane state, modifies non-self substance simply as *nimitta*, and experiences doer-ship of his own modification, only being constituted out of his substance, which shares space with his own substance, and this disposition of *ātmā* being simply *nimitta*, it shares and sometimes forsakes the same space with the modification of physical karmic matter particle.

bhāvārtha: This *jīva*, at present in *saṃsāra* state (in transmigration state), modifying karmic matter as *nimitta* remains the doer of his own impure disposition (because that impure disposition originates from self-substance). It never becomes a doer of non-self substance. Thus, *jīva* being the doer of his own impure disposition, making this disposition of *jīva* as simply *nimitta*, the physical matter particle modifies into karmic matter form and bonds and stays with *jīva* in the same space in a specific state. On the maturity of its duration of bondage or pure modification of the *jīva* being *nimitta*, physical karmic matter particles are released.

pravacana on gāthā-186

The disciple's question is: If the soul is not the doer of *jaḍakarma* (physical matter particles), how does this *jaḍakarma* come into the same space of *ātmā*? The answer to this is in this verse.

ātmā is devoid of accepting or leaving non-self substances. The nature of the substance-attribute of the soul is inherently devoid of accepting or forsaking non-self substances, and modification also does not accept or forsake karma, as it is the nature of all three: the substance, attribute, and modification. Despite having such a nature, in the mundane, worldly state, due to the *nimitta* of perturbation, physical karmas get bound in the same space as *ātmā* and are sometimes released. This is clarified here.

The ignorant *jīva*, by focusing on non-self, produces impurity within itself and becomes the doer of attachment and aversion. In the worldly state, he creates perturbation due to his delusions. From *nigoda* to *deva* (i.e., all worldly souls), all living beings wander in the infinite cycle of life and death due to their self-modification and not because of karma. Here, the term *davvajādass* is used, which means "those that arise from *dravya* (substance). Some may question whether substance and attributes are pure, and if so, where does impure modification arise? It is not written that the impure modification comes from the rising of karma. Instead, it is stated that *jīva* is the doer of the impure modification that arises from its *ātmā* substance. Modification of *leśyā* (modification of passion when conjoined with vibration of space points of *ātmā*, that is coloured by the intensity of passion) is *jīva*'s own. The perturbation arises from within the self and occurs from it. The way the waves in the ocean do not rise due to the wind, but rather due to the ocean's natural properties. Similarly, *jīva* performs the modifications of *mithyātva* (erroneous belief), *avirati* (lack of vows), *pramāda* (negligence), *kaṣāya* (passion), and *yog* (vibrational activity) through his ability. *karma*, time, or external circumstances do not cause these modifications. These modifications arise from a lack of knowledge about the true self. At that time, if the focus is on non-self objects or *karma*, then they are said to be *nimitta*. It is not true that the *jīva* in *nigoda* has a highly intense manifestation of karma, so he modifies as perturbed. It is also not true that the *jīva* with five senses and mind has a lower intensity of karma, so he can make the effort of *dharma*. Those modifications arise from oneself and are not due to the non-self. In this manner, by focusing on non-self, *ātmā* itself generates distortions and becomes the doer of *mithyātva*, *raga*, *dveṣa*, etc.

By obtaining the *nimitta* of attachments, *pudgala* karma becomes bound independently. When *ātmā* modifies in the form of attachment, etc., with the *nimitta* of this modification, new karma particles come into the same space as *ātmā* and attain bondage. *ātmā* becomes bound by karma in a manner corresponding to the type of distortion it does. When modification is with intense passions, then the bondage is with intense attachment. When he has modification with mild intensity, then karma, which comes into bondage, is with

mild attachment. The bondage of karma is proportional to the extent of modification done. It is not that *pudgala* karma comes due to *nimitta* of perturbation, or because of attachment. Likewise, it is not that if attachment sheds, then karma will scatter automatically; Physical karmic matter is not dependent on others. They come due to their ability. In this world, there is infinite times more mass of karmic particles than of the *ātmās*. Of these, those that have the capability of becoming karmic forms turn accordingly and stay in the same space as *ātmā*.

Question: How does *karma* bind in proportion to the extent of attachment done by *jīva*?

Answer: Just as there is a cause-and-effect relationship between *jñāna* and *jñeya*, there is a similar relationship between attachment and *pudgala* karma. *ātmā* knows *jñeya* just as they are. But has *jñāna* manifested because of *jñeya*? No, *jñāna* arises due to the self. Though *jñāna* is independent without any help from *jñeyas*, *jñāna* knows *jñeya* exactly the way it is. Similarly, when *ātmā* has attachment-aversion, then *pudgala* karma becomes bound due to its nature. Still, the proportion of attachment-aversion is done, in that proportion karma comes into bondage. This kind of natural *nimitta-naimitika* relationship exists. The doer-work done relationship, in which attachment is the doer, and the physical karmic matter is the deed, does not exist. Karma comes into bondage by themselves. In that attachment is merely a *nimitta*. When karma scatters because of itself, then the modification of the passionless state is merely the *nimitta*.

Question: From which point of view is the time span/duration of karma said to be long?

Answer: The duration of karma is described in terms of *sadrśatā* (similarity). karma is a modification, not a substance. A modification exists only for one *samaya*. If modifications of two different *samayas* cannot stay together, how can modifications of karma of such a long duration of *samayas* persist together? *jīva* continues his contrary feelings, and as an instrumental cause of this, physical *karmas* also appear to be bound in a similar form over a long period. All such modifications are almost the same. So by way of *sthūla* (gross) *ṛjusūtra-nāya* (point of view which emphasises an object which is immediately present), grouping together the *karmas*, it is said that *jīva* has created bondage with karma for such a long period. For example, a human body is said to last for 60 or 65 years. The modification of the human body is of a single *samaya*, but because of its apparent similarity, it is said to last for 60 or 65 years. Similarly, it is said that the bondage of karma lasts for so many years.

pravacana on bhāvārtha

In the mundane state, *jīva* becomes the doer of impure modifications due to its own capability, having karma as *nimitta*. The distortions are created by the self, which makes it the doer of these distortions, but *jīva* is not the doer of non-self substance. In this manner, when *jīva* manifests impure modifications, then due to its *nimitta*, karma comes into the same space as *jīva*. However, karmas are shed due to the *nimitta* of *jīva* modifying into the pure state with its focus on passionlessness. When the deluding karma is reduced, it is not that the delusion of self is reduced and the manifestation of *samyaktva* does not result in the destruction of *darśanamoha*. There is no doer-work done relationship between them, but a *nimitta-naimitika* relationship exists. Here, the special sharing of space by transformed *pudgala*, which is karma, with *jīva* is called the acceptance of *karmapudgala* by *jīva*.

Thus, the reason for *dharma* is to know appropriately that the modification of perturbation is self-knowable and the modification of *karma* is no-self-knowable. While both are independent, they have a relationship of *nimitta-naimitika*.

gāthā-187

अथ किं कृतं पुद्गलकर्मणां वैचित्र्यमिति निरूपयति -

Now, it is described how the variety of material-*karmas* (knowledge obscuring, etc.) is produced: -

परिणमदि जदा अप्पा सुहम्हि असुहम्हि रागदोसजुदो ।
तं पविसदि कम्मरयं णाणावरणादिभावेहिं ॥१८७॥

pariṇamadi jadā appā suhamhi asuhamhi rāgadosajudo |
taṁ pavisadi kammarayaṁ ṇāṇāvaraṇādibhāvehiṁ || 187 ||

gāthā: When *ātmā* is associated/tinged with attachment and aversion, it modifies into auspicious-inauspicious evolutions, then karmic matter particle in the forms of knowledge obscuring, etc. karma, enters it.

ṭīkā: Just as the modification which arises at the time when a new cloud burst comes in contact with the earth, then other dust automatically modifies into variegated states; in the same way, at the time of *ātmā* auspicious-inauspicious modification, *karmic* matter, on their own, modify into variegated states. It is thus - just as a new cloud burst modifies when it comes in conjunction with the earth, then, at that time, other matter-particles, on their own, modify into a variegated form of green fields, mushrooms, and cochineal insects, etc. Similarly, when this soul, under the influence of attachment-aversion, modifies into *śubha* (auspicious) - *aśubha* (inauspicious) disposition, then other karmic-material particles entering into it by way of its activity of vibration, modify on their own into variegated forms of knowledge obscuring, etc., *karmic* matter.

Therefore, it is decided that the variegated form of karmic matter evolves according to its characteristic nature and not by the soul.

pravacana on gāthā-187

When new/initial rains occur, there is a modification in the form of the relationship between water and the earth. At that time, various types of vegetation emerge from the soil. Some might say that because rain came, sprouts grew, as before this, there were no sprouts. However, if the sprouts were caused by rain, then the vegetation should all be of the same kind; however, that is not the case. The rain is of one kind, yet various types of crops grow.

If rain were the cause, such diversity should not exist. This diversity indicates the independent capacity of the plants. In the same way, when auspicious and inauspicious dispositions of *ātmā* occur, various types of *karmic* matter bind due to their own nature. The peculiar variations in *karma* are due to itself and not due to *ātmā*.

When initial rains connect with the earth, then *pudgala* manifests in different forms: some are in the form of green fields, some manifest as mushroom fungi, and some as cochineal insect – all three in different forms. With the first rain, *pudgal* turns into green, white, and red forms; similarly, the *jīva*, forgetting its inherent nature of being the knower and seer, undergoes the modification of auspicious and inauspicious thoughts. Then, *pudgal* particles themselves, due to their causes, bind in various forms, such as knowledge-obscuring and perception-obscuring, etc., which are variegated forms of bondage.

By imagining knowable to be favourable or unfavourable, the ignorant is subjugated by attachment. Some might say that when there was nothing in this field earlier, how did the vegetation (green plants) suddenly appear? Was it due to the rain? Such a significant change? How could that be? How can the identical matter particles come into bondage by modifying as *jñāvarṇa* (knowledge-obscuring) and some as *sātāvedniya* (good-feeling producing karma) forms? How is that? The one with the view of associations will have his focus on the association. He believes that rain is good, land is good, so crops grow; *jīva* has thoughts, so karma comes into bondage. By having this kind of focus, he believes that if associations are favourable, then he will benefit from them. By believing so, he tries to bring them to him, and thinking that unfavourable conditions are not beneficial for him, he wants to move them away. In this way, *ajñānī jīva* imagines associations to be favourable and unfavourable, and by creating a distinction between them, he becomes subjugated to attachment and aversion, resulting in the fruit of auspicious and inauspicious states.

Just as thoughts of favourable and unfavourable do not exist in the knowables, similarly, thoughts do not exist in the nature of *jñāna*. *jñānī jīva* understands that the state of any substance cannot happen suddenly, nor does another cause it; it modifies sequentially by itself. It was time for varying modifications of knowables, so modification occurred. It is not because it rained that the state of greenery occurred. It is not so that bondage of *jñānavarṇa karma* occurred due to lesser knowledge, and *darśanāvarṇa karma* occurred due to lesser perception. At the time of modification of knowable, according to the efficacy

of that time, the matter particles come into bondage in variegated forms. When that occurs, the question of why? Should not arise.

1. There is no distinction between favourable and unfavourable in knowable substances.
2. The imagination of favourable and unfavourable is done by the ignorant, but to modify as favourable or unfavourable is not the nature of a knowable.
3. The imagination of favourable and unfavourable is not inherent in the nature of the knower. At whichever *samaya*, whatever modification of knowable manifests, *jñāna* knows exactly as that. Although *jñānī* may have an attachment, it is due to his weakness, not because of the variegated states of *jñeya*. Therefore, the focus of *jñānī* is not directed towards non-self or partial aspects but is towards the inherent nature, and he does the work of knowing every *samaya*.

Modification of *jīva* and *ajīva* sequentially occurs every *samaya*. *rotī* (Indian bread) is made not by the rolling pin nor by a maid; it occurs due to its own cause, taking different shapes and forms. *jīva* eats food, which is of one kind, but some particles are modified as blood, some as bones, some as excretion, some as urine, each modifying as per its efficacy. Similarly, the rise of karmas is varied, but it is not so that due to this, that *jīva* has thoughts and feelings of differing intensities. It is the intrinsic capability of the self that determines whether a person experiences intense or mild feelings. It is also not the case that when auspicious or inauspicious feelings arise, *karma* manifests, or vibrations of *yog* occur, resulting in an influx of matter particles. Similarly, because there are varied modifications, the states of the form of *jñānavarṇa*, etc., are not manifested in *karma*. The modification of every *samaya* is an independent reality.

1. Modification of *karma* that is to occur at any given time occurs exactly as it should, and it does not originate from the *ātmā*.
2. Just as auspicious and inauspicious modifications are due to the ability of *ātmā*, so the auspicious and inauspicious dispositions occur at their respective times. These are not the result of *karma*.

Thus, in both the *ātmā* and the *pudgalas*, independent transformation of each moment is manifesting in an orderly, sequential manner. How can the decision of such sequential modifications be made? Who can do it? Can someone who has a focus on instrumental causes and associations decide on sequential modifications? Can someone who tries to change a part to make something auspicious while avoiding the inauspicious make such a decision? No, his decision will never be correct.

When the *jīva* inclines towards its pure non-sequential nature, then the true decision of sequential modifications can be said to have been made. First, *jīva* should determine that every modification is independent. Perturbation is not due to non-self. There is no perturbation in the pure nature of the self. Pure nature is the knower and seer. In this way, removing the focus from associations and parts, if the focus is on the beholder of parts, then peace manifests.

Modification manifests sequentially every *samaya*. If one lets go the focus on the sequence and inclines instead towards the pure nature of the non-sequential in the form of knower and looker, who has its belief and knowledge, the true decision of sequential modification can be made. Without the experience of the non-sequential nature, just saying in words that whatever is to happen will be, is not the decision of sequential modification. Modification of every *samaya* is independent. They cannot be changed through the three time phases and the three *lokas*. Attachment is a distorted state; if one leaves its focus and inclines towards the knowing nature of the self, the state of true *dharma* arises. While describing the independence of the modification of every *samaya*, when it is said that perturbation is of self, it is not said to have ownership of perturbations. But it is for deciding on the unperturbed, unchanging pure nature of the self. One who accepts the modifications of one *samaya* to be independent also accepts the independent nature of the beholder of parts - which is the whole. He has a focus on the pure nature of the self, which is the true decision.

Thus, the bondage of physical material karmas occurs independently, and auspicious and inauspicious results are merely *nimitta* in it. Realizing this truth and shifting the focus away from sequential modification, while maintaining the belief in a non-sequential, pure nature, is *dharma*.

अथैक एव आत्मा बन्ध इति विभावयति -

Now, it is explained that it is *ātmā* by itself is *bandha* (bondage): -

सपदेसो सो अप्पा कसायिदो मोहसरागदोसेहिं ।
कम्मरएहिं सिलिठ्ठो बंधो त्ति परूविदो समये ॥१८८॥

sdapadesao so appā kasāyido moharāgadosehiṃ |
kammaraehiṃ siliṭṭho baṇdho tti parūvido samaye || 188 ||

gāthā: *ātmā*, which has *pradeśas* (spatial-units), when soiled/tinged with passions of *moha-rāga-dveṣa* (delusion-attachment-aversion), becomes that to which karmic-matter/dust is stuck to, and that *ātmā* is called *bandha* (bondage).

tīkā: In this world, the way cloth is with *pradeśas*, and when they are sullied by *lodhara* (mordant used to combine colours), then *majītha* (plant dye used for colouring cloth) sticks to the fabric, and it is seen to be coloured. Similarly, *ātmā*, having spatial units, when it is soiled/tinged with delusion, attachment, and aversion, gets stuck with /synthesised with karmic dust, and it should be seen, believed that it has bondage by itself, because the subject of *niścaya* (absolute truth) is the pure soul substance.

pravacana on gāthā-188

jñānī and *ajñānī* both have bondage of their dispositions and not of *karma*. The way the warp and weft of a cloth are dense, and that dense cloth with warp and weft, by itself, is dyed in different colours like *majītha*, etc. Similarly, due to the absence of belief and knowing of one's pure nature, the ignorant is coloured with delusion-attachment-aversion. *jñānī* slips from his steadiness within and gets coloured with attachment-aversion. In this way, *ātmā* is bound by his *bhāva bandha* (disposition of bondage), and not due to physical karmic matter.

mithyādr̥ṣṭi jīva ignores his efficacy, which is present through three time phases. It is due to this that he has bondage of delusion, attachment, and aversion. *jñānī* has the fault of unsteadiness. Though both have bondage, there is a difference in their bondage. However, the fault of *karma* is not found in either. *jñānī*, too, has the fault of negligence of the self.

Outer associations cannot gauge *jñānī* or *ajñānī*, but the inner state can gauge them. Someone may say that a person was doing *pūjā-bhakti*, but after understanding the true nature of the self, he gave it up, so he is not a *dharmī*. But the measure to gauge should not be outer associations or activities. A *dharmī*, many times, to have the intense experience of the pure self, may be immersed in *svādhyāya* (study of scriptures) or maybe so absorbed in deep contemplation about the pure nature of self that thoughts of worship-devotion may not arise. He may not be seeing such outer associations at that time. But it should not be singularly assumed that, at that time, he did not have a deep belief in true *deva-gurū-śāstra*. Neither *jñānī* nor *ajñānī* can do the activity of the non-self. Whether he is immersed in the joy of pure self or if he is without true effort at that time, this needs to be ascertained. Outer associations or activity cannot be the correct measure.

1. If some *jīva* hearing this bypasses the stage of having profound respect and joy of understanding divinity and starts doing inauspicious worldly conduct, then he has not understood the true nature of the substance. If he forgets the thoughts which arise along with the knowing of the pure self, and the auspicious attachment towards *deva-gurū-śāstra* which occur according to the stage of inner evolution, and despite the arising of perturbed inauspicious manifestation, he believes his modification to be as pure as that of the *siddha*, then he is a *niścayābhāsī* - a *mithyādṛṣṭi*. He does not know the true nature of the substance. He does not have any joy in the understanding of the divinity of the *deva-gurū-śāstra*.
2. The *jīva* who has the awareness of the pure nature of self, has the discernment of the modification of self, has the understanding of the deficiency-lesser state of his modification, is the one with true discernment. As he is engrossed in *svādhyāya*, if he does not join the worship-devotion, it does not mean that he is a *niścayābhāsī*. This is because whether to come into association or not is not in his hands. His inner effort is worth seeing. He has deep respect and joy in being with the true *deva-gurū-śāstra*. So if there has been any imprudence in understanding some other person or has been imprudence in the self, or in the modification of the self, then that should be removed.

3. *ajñānī* resolves with a focus on non-self, and *jñānī* resolves with a focus on self. In this way, there is a lot of difference between the two. *ajñānī* does not have the experience of self, so he believes happiness and sorrow to be from non-self. At the birth of a child, he takes ownership of it and feels happy, and at the time of disease, he has an aversion to it and wants to push it away. For a *jñānī*, it is due to one's weakness that there is a

manifestation of attachment-aversion, or desire, that arises in a situation of desire. Even then, he is aware of the pure nature of the self. He knows that there is a weakness in the modification of conduct. However, he does not believe that he can join associations. Sometimes *ajñānī* does not show aversion at the time of being diseased, does not cry at the death of his son, and says passionless words like, no one is of anyone. However, his resolution is due to associations, and he lacks the distinction between self and non-self. Due to this, his detachment is also inappropriate. A *jñānī* may be seen showing aversion at the time of disease and can be seen crying at the death of his son; even then, he has the inner knowing of the pure self. He does not believe attachment-aversion to be due to non-self. He is well aware of associations and perturbation; hence, he is a *dharmī*. This is why assessing a *jñānī* or *ajñānī* cannot be done with outer associations.

mithyādr̥ṣṭi has bondage of attachment and aversion with *mithyātva*, and *samkitī* has bondage of attachment and aversion due to imbalance. But neither have the bondage of non-self or of karma. When perturbation occurs, it is definitely in the self-substance, and whatever arises in the self-substance is without the *nimitta* of non-self, meaning, it is the perturbed substance. Notably, this is elaborated as the subject of *niścaya*. It is the *viśeṣa dravya* (specific or modifying substance), meaning, perturbed substance. In Samayasāra, it is said that perturbation is not the nature of the self, and by saying so, the focus of the *sāmānya* (general) pure substance has been focused upon. In this, the subject of *niścaya* is the *sāmānya śuddha dravya* (general pure substance). In Pravacanasāra, as the explanation from the view of *jñāna*, the perturbed modification has been said to be of *jīva* and not done by karma. Showing it to be separate from non-self in this way, it has been called the subject of *niścaya* is the perturbed substance. Therefore, it is essential to understand the perspective from which the statement is made.

So one must understand that *ātmā*, by itself, gets into bondage with his *bhāva*, and knowing this - he should have the *śraddhā-jñāna* of the pure nature of self. This is *dharma*.

अथ निश्चयव्यवहाराविरोधं दर्शयति -

Now, absence of opposition between *niścaya* (absolute reality) and *vyavahāra* (conventional) is explained: -

**एसो बंधसमासो जीवाणं निच्छयेण निदिद्धो ।
अरहंतेहिं जदीणं ववहारो अण्णहा भणिदो ॥१८९॥**

*eso baṇdhasamāso jīvāṇam ṇicchayeṇa ṇiddiṭṭho |
arahaṁtehiṁ jadīṇaṁ vavahāro aṇṇhā bhaṇido || 189 ||*

gāthā: This (in aforesaid manner) is the sum and substance of the (karmic) bondage of *jīvas* (mundane beings) from the view of *niścaya* -the absolute standpoint, as revealed by *arhaṇtadevas* (omniscient) to the ascetics; the same *vyavahāra* (conventional) standpoint is expressed otherwise.

tīkā: Only *rāga pariṇāma* (disposition of attachment) is *karma* (deed/act) of *ātmā*, it is a dual form of *punya* (merit) and *pāpa* (demerit). *ātmā* is the doer of the disposition of attachment, etc., and is the acceptor as well as forsaker of that only - this is the standpoint of *niścaya naya**, which describes the pure substance. And (that which describes) the modification of material substance to be the *karma* (deed/act) of *ātmā*, and that duality of *punya pāpa*, which is the modification of physical matter. *ātmā* is the doer; it is its acceptor and forsaker of that. This is the standpoint of *vyavahāra naya*, which describes non-pure substance.

*(*niścaya naya* indicates the modification of self-substance only; so it is said to be the describer of pure substance, and *vyavahāra naya* shows the modification of non-self substance to be the modification of *ātmā*, so it is called the describer of impure substance. Here, the statement of pure substance should be known from the view of one modification, which depends on its own substance; and the statement of impure substance should be known from the view of imposing the modification of one substance onto the other substance.

*(*niścaya naya* is *upādeya* - worth adopting/accepting, and *vyavahāra naya* is *heya* -worth rejecting not accepting)

Q: *upādeya* always takes the support of *dravya sāmānya* (generality of substance). Despite this, why is *niścaya-naya*, which accepts receiving and renouncing modification of *raga*, called *upādeya*?

A *ātmā* itself is the doer of the modification of *rāga-pariṇāma* and *vītarāga pariṇāma* (attachment-free modification) as well. State of perverse knowledge/misconception is done independently by *ātmā*, and the state of right knowledge also is done independently by *ātmā* - this true understanding includes the knowledge of *dravya sāmānya*- the substance in general. If one has correct knowledge of *viśeṣa* (distinctions) of substance, then he must necessarily know *dravya sāmānya* (substance as one) without which the correct knowing of *paryāya* is not possible. Hence, in

the aforesaid niścaya-naya, the knowledge of dravya sāmānya is included. jīva who knows that self/soul is alone in both the conditions, whether it is the path of bondage or the path of liberation, and when he correctly knows the self from the aspect of dravya-sāmānya, that jīva does not conjoin with other (non-self) substance, and by immersing his modification within dravya-sāmānya, he becomes pure/passionless. Thus, in the correct knowledge of modifications, knowledge of dravya-sāmānya is included in a certain way. In the true knowing of dravya-paryāya, experience/ knowing of that which takes supports of dravya-sāmānya is included. Hence, the aforesaid niścaya naya is said to be upādeya. [For further detail, one should see the exposition of gāthā-126].

Both these are *nayas* (knowing from a particular viewpoint). This is because substance is ascertained/experienced in both forms, as pure and as not pure. But here, *niścaya naya* (absolute standpoint) being *sādhakatama* (highest form of/the most effective effort) has been accepted. As *dravya* (substance) is pure, so the illuminator of the purity of the *dravya*, the *niścaya naya*, only is the supreme effort. But *vyavahāra naya* (conventional standpoint), being the highlighter of the impurity, is not the *sādhakatama* effort.

pravacana on gāthā-189

When *ātmā*, not recognising its nature, directs its attention towards non-self objects, he experiences the modification of attachment and aversion due to his actions. It is not that intense attachment-aversion arises because of the intense rise of *karma*, nor is it that mild attachment aversion happens due to the mild rising of *karma*. *ātmā* itself accepts and releases the modification of attachment and aversion. These modifications are divided into two types: auspicious and inauspicious.

This is the expression of the pure substance in the form *niścaya naya* (absolute/definitive viewpoint). Since *niścaya naya* merely reflects the modification of the self-substance, it is stated here as the one that explains the pure substance.

1. **The form of *niścaya naya* with the pre-dominance of *darśana* (belief):** In statements with pre-dominance of *dr̥ṣṭi* (focus), perturbed modification is said to be independent. After recognising them, if focus is to be turned towards the pure nature, then he is separated from the perturbed state and focus is turned towards the *avikārī* (unperturbed) nature. It is then said that *ātmā* does not experience attachment or aversion because, in its true nature, there is no attachment or aversion. By saying this, the focus is shifted away from attachment and aversion towards the general, pure nature of the self. Then it is said to take the auspices of oneself. There, the subject from the viewpoint of *dravya* is the ‘*sva*’ (self) or the general pure unchanging nature. Saying that *ātmā* forsakes attachments is in name only.

2. The form of *niścaya naya* from the perspective of predominance of *jñāna*:

Here, the *ajñānī jīva*'s focus is on karma and associations. To him, it is said that karma does not cause delusion or attachment-aversion, and that the self has neither accepted nor rejected external objects or karma. The self is the cause of inner modification of attachment, etc. Self is the doer of perturbed modifications independently. With this knowledge, the effort is to shift the focus away from non-self substance. In other words, here, *niścaya naya* is said to be knowing from the view of modification, which is with the auspice of the pure substance. Since the emphasis is on *jñāna*, it must be understood in the correct context.

To know that at the time of perturbation, karma is *nimitta* is called *vyavahāra naya*. Modification of *pudgala* (physical matter) is the *karma* (action) of *ātmā*. Here, this does not mean that attachment-aversion of *ātmā* can cause the state of karmic bondage; however, when *jīva* engages in attachment and aversion, karma definitely comes into bondage. Therefore, from a standpoint of *vyavahāra naya*, *ātmā* is said to be the doer of karmic bondage. There are two types of *karma*:

jñānāvarṇa ((knowledge-obscuring), *darśanāvarṇa* (perception-obscuring), *mohanīya* (deluding *karma*), *aṅtarāya* (obstructive *karma*), *asātāvedniya* (unpleasant feeling-producing *karma*), *aśubhanāma karma* (giving unpleasant body), *aśubhagati karma* (one giving bad life form), *nīcagotra* (one giving birth in a low caste), *alpāyu* (short life span), etc., are *pāpa* (inauspicious) types of *karmas*. *sātāvedanīya* (that which gives a pleasant feeling), *śubhanāmakarma* (auspicious body type), *śubhagatikarma* (good life form), *uccagotra* (high lineage), *pūrṇāyu* (long lifespan), etc., are types of *punya* (auspicious) *karmas*. *ātmā* accepts and rejects these *karmas*, is said from the view of the impure substance, and it is the statement of *vyavahāra naya*.

Question: What is the need to say such a *vyavahāra*?

Answer: *jīva*, which does not accept the physical *karmas*, is explained to him in this manner to make him understand *karma*. There can be no perturbation when the focus is on pure nature. There is no perturbation in the pure nature. However, it is explained here that the *jīva* creates perturbation by himself, with a focus on *karma* or non-self. If *karmas* were not present at the time of perturbation, then it would become the nature of the self. To say that perturbation is the fault of the modification of self is not a statement of a falsely imposed characteristic, and to say that attachment arises due to *nimitta* of *karma* is the statement of a falsely imposed characteristic. This should be understood.

1. When a *jīva* himself has perturbation, at that time, physical karmas, etc., are knowables; they exist, and one should have their knowledge.
2. It is not that because the non-self knowable substances, karmas, are present, so one has to be perturbed.

Therefore, from the view of *nīścaya*, perturbed modification of *jīva* is its self-knowable, and modifications of the karmas, which are non-self knowables, are from the view of *vyvahāra*. This correct knowledge should be understood.

Here, viewpoints from both *nayas* have been expressed because the substance appears to be both pure and impure. *ātmā* itself modifies in a perturbed state, and it is free from any correlation with either non-self or karmas, so it is called pure. When *jīva* undergoes perturbation, he accepts and releases physical karmic matter, and karmas come and go; that is said to be the impure state. But *nīścaya naya* is most effective (*sādhakatam*) because it proves independence.

Question: Someone asks how that explains the viewpoint of perturbed modification can be the highest seeker?

Answer: Oh brother! Here, the focus is on the knowledge-based statement. Perturbation arising in *jīva* is a part. *jīva* who believes that perturbations are due to external causes, for them to remove perturbation, they will not have to look towards non-self, because such a *jīva* argues that the substance and its attributes are pure, so where did the impurity in the modification come from? He believes that impurity arose due to *nimitta* or *karmas*; therefore, they are told one should have the understanding that from the viewpoint of *nīścaya*, modification of false beliefs, attachment, aversion, etc., arise from within the self, because of the self, and some non-self substance did not make it happen. This way, he who considers the part independent will not fail to direct his focus toward the beholder of the part, which is the substance.

This viewpoint is not just about stopping at a small part, but rather it is expressed as the highest means to accept the modifications as independent and move towards the one of whom the modification is.

Question: Would *jīva* have the desire to wrong himself?

Answer: He is indeed committing offences. Because *jīva* who is unaware of its inherent nature of being, which is *niraparādhī* (free from offences), is in itself an offence. He does not have the correct understanding of what constitutes an offense. When one realises that offences are happening independently, awareness of being free from offences arises. Without the realisation of pure nature, which is without offence, the offence cannot be

avoided. This is why the ignorant continue to transmigrate. Hence, only by recognising the true nature, which is free from offences, can offences be avoided.

Thus, with this correct knowing of perturbed modification, which is the absolute viewpoint, is the best instrument for moving towards the pure nature of the self; it is the only useful action.

Question: How has *niścaya naya*, which has the knowing of the modification of attachment, been said to be beneficial? According to the Samayasāra scripture, the body, karma, and *deva-guru-śāstra* are considered non-self, and the auspicious or inauspicious thoughts/feelings based on these are likened to poison, as they are not the true nature of *ātmā*. Attachment and aversion are not beneficial because they are based on *upādhi* (false perceptions). If *jīva* were to know and believe in the *nirupādhi svabhāva* (pure soul without designations), then *adharma* is destroyed, and *dharma* arises. Dharma arises with a focus on the pure nature of the self, rather than with the acceptance or forsaking of attachment or aversion; they are merely in name. It is said that it is appropriate to accept the *śuddha naya* (from the viewpoint of the pure self), which speaks of *śuddha svabhāva* (nature of pure self). Then, how can the *niscaya naya* of acceptance-renunciation in the form of modification of attachment and aversion in the Pravacanasāra be beneficial?

Answer: The perception that attachment, which is a part, is an independent reality leads one's focus on the *aṁśī* (the whole). Hence, the *niścaya naya*, which speaks of attachment, is said to be acceptable.

ātmā independently does the modification of both attachment and non-attachment. And it is the *ātmā* which does the auspicious and inauspicious modifications. There cannot be any perturbation due to physical material substance or non-self substance. A *jīva* stays in *nigoda* due to his false knowledge, and not due to intense *karma*. *jīva* falls from the eleventh *guṇasthāna* to a lower *guṇasthāna* due to his lack of effort and not due to the rising of *karma*. This proves that *jīva* does the modification of perturbation independently.

ātmā is separate from non-self substance. *punya* and *pāpa* are momentary. *ātmā* is not only as much as a modification. *ātmā* is the form of pure *chidānanda* (a form of pure consciousness and bliss) nature. It should be known that - having this kind of belief and knowledge, *ātmā* manifests the passionless modification of *samyakdarśana-jñānā-cāritra* by himself. It is not so that there is an ability to become passionless - *sruta kevalī*, Mahāvideha Kṣetra (the place where *tirthaṅkaras* are always present) is there, the intensity

of karma is low, or karma has been destroyed, the time is good, then the passionless modification will arise. *jīva* manifests the passionless modifications according to his own ability. In this way, *ātmā* by himself manifests the state of knowledge or ignorance.

Question: Bondage of karmas appropriate for getting the life of a *tīrthaṅkara* cannot happen without going near the *tīrthaṅkara*? Therefore, shouldn't one make an effort to get the appropriate *nimitta*?

Answer: This belief is full of ignorance. *jīva*, with focus on *nimitta* and auspicious attachment, is a false believer, and he will never have the bondage of becoming a *tīrthaṅkara*.

1. First, *jīva*, who believes that by going near a *tīrthaṅkara* and listening to His teachings, he can unite with a non-self substance. This is a delusion because association of a *tīrthaṅkara* does not depend on *jīva*'s auspicious attachment; it occurs independently due to the *nimitta* of past *puṇya*. To believe that the self can unite with non-self is a delusion.
2. That *jīva* believes that by going to a *tīrthaṅkara*, he will have auspicious dispositions and attain *kṣāyika samyaktva* (correct perception). But he does not believe that he will attain *kṣāyika samyaktva* by experiencing the pure nature of the self. His belief is flawed because he believes the auspicious and pure modifications are due to non-self.
3. That *jīva* desires to have bondage which will give the bondage of the birth of a *tīrthaṅkara*, or he should have auspicious dispositions appropriate for it, due to which he will have bondage of karmic matter particles. Whoever has such a fascination has the desire for physical karmic matter or has the desire for auspicious attachment, and not for non-bonding pure nature, so he has the manifestation of *mithyātva*.
4. When there is no work done in the *upādāna*, then what can *nimitta* do? *jīva* who does auspicious attachments or manifests *kṣāyika samyaktva* after going to *Bhagavāna*, *Bhagavāna* is said to be *nimitta* to that *jīva*. When work is done in *upādāna*, then non-self is alleged to be the *nimitta*. However, there is no work done in the *upādāna* of self, and his modification has not manifested the ability to allege *Bhagavāna* to be *nimitta*. Without any work in the modification of *naimitika*, who can be called the *nimitta*? The time has not yet come to call *Bhagavāna* as *nimitta*, and before that, if he believes that he can meet the *nimitta*, then that is gross delusion.

5. He who has his focus on acquiring associations, on getting bondage of *karma*, and on auspicious attachment is a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*. And a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi jīva* can never have the bondage of *karma* to be *Tirthaṅkara*. Only a *samkitī* saint can have the bondage of *Tirthaṅkara*'s life in a state of conscious psychic activity accompanied by a feeling of rejection. Therefore, in the state of *mithyātvā*, to believe that he can have the bondage of *karma* of being a *tirthaṅkara* is a state of ignorance.

In a state of weakness, due to auspicious attachments, a *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* may have the bondage to be a *tirthaṅkara* naturally. Only a *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* can have this karmic bondage. *samkitī* believes that *kevalī* is non-self to him. It is not in his hands to gain or lose His association. If there were a manifestation of the earlier auspicious attachments, then he would have this association. But he does not believe that he can have auspicious attachment or *samyagdarśana* due to *bhagavāna*. He who has belief-knowledge with experience that his pure nature is devoid of non-self, devoid of perturbations, is not just as much as a part, and his nature is the eternal, unchanging knowing self, he will attain *kṣāyika samyaktva*. He does not have the thoughts of attachment and association that he should create a karmic bondage appropriate for the life of a *tirthaṅkara*, or he should do auspicious activities appropriate to it. He believes auspicious to be rejectable. But till he is not completely immersed in his pure nature, he does get the auspicious thoughts many times that he should be complete in his own pure nature, and all other *jīvas* also should be so. The fruit of that is the karmic bondage appropriate for a *tirthaṅkara*. He believes auspicious attachment to be *adharma* and considers it forsaken. He remains the knower-observer of the auspicious attachment that arises due to weakness/negligence. *samkitī* never believes that earlier he was transmigrating due to *kudeva-kuguru-kuśāstra* (those who are not passionless), and now he has crossed over due to *vitārāgī deva-guru-śāstra*. When *jīva* has the karmic bondage for the life of *tirthaṅkara*, then the presence of *tirthaṅkara* is said to be the reason in the form of *nimitta*. But *samkitī* does not have the karmic bondage of the life of *tirthaṅkara* due to the *tirthaṅkara*, and neither is it the case that because *jīva* had to have this karmic bondage, so *tirthaṅkara* had to come. But there is a natural *nimitta-naimitika* (cause and effect) relationship that, when a *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* has the karmic bondage of the life of *tirthaṅkara* or attains *kṣāyika samyaktva*, there is the presence of *tirthaṅkara* in the form of *nimitta*.

Many *jīvas* are present in the congregation of the *tirthaṅkara*. If *samyaktva* were to arise due to *tirthaṅkara*, then everyone should manifest it. But all *jīvas* do not attain *samyaktva*,

and from the *samkitis*, only some *jīvas* have the karmic bondage of the life of *tirthaṅkara*. This correct understanding of *nimitta-naimitika* should be done.

jīvas, who believe modification to be dependent, cannot have the correct understanding of the general, pure substance. *jīva*, who believes his modification is due to non-self, how can he move away from non-self towards self? Perturbed modification, unperturbed incomplete modification, the path of *mokṣa*, and *mokṣa* are all particularities – they are a part. He who believes the part to be dependent does not believe the whole to be independent. A person who does not have the correct understanding of particularities will not have the correct understanding of generality. One who does not believe his perturbed or unperturbed modification to be independent does not believe auspicious or inauspicious part to be independent, believes that dharma will arise with the destruction of *karmas*, *kṣāyika samkit* arises if *Bhagavāna* is present, if situations are conducive then dharma will arise and if not, then dharma will not arise, association of *kuguru* will bring transmigration, and association of *suguru* will end transmigration, if guru is present then *samyagdarśana* will arise, if spouse and children are present then one has to have attachment, as this is the fifth era, *kevaljñāna* will not arise. He does not have the true *jñāna* of the independent general substance. **The decision of the cause is not made in the substance-attribute; it is made in the modification.** If the modification in which the decision has to be made is assumed to be dependent, then one will never leave its focus and make an effort to leave the focus of that modification and turn towards the self. Due to this, he will never attain *dharma*.

Only the one who believes modification to be independent will turn his focus on the one who is the holder of the modification. This is why the absolute viewpoint is considered acceptable. *niścaya naya* shows particularities that are independent. Transmigration is a perturbed modification- it is an arising modification. In the five types of modification, the *udaya bhāva* (arising modification) is its self-substance. Transmigration arises when *ātmā* does so by himself; otherwise, it does not occur if he does not do. *ātmā* is alone, be it in the path of liberation or bondage. Be it *kartā* (doer) *karma* (work done), *karana* (instrument of work) *karma phala* (fruits of *karma*), all are done by *ātmā* himself, no one else, and true *jñāna* also is attained independently by him. *jīva* who understands appropriately, the singular state of *ātmā*, be he on the path of *mokṣa* or *saṃsāra*, he does enjoin with associations, *karma*, etc., which are non-self substances, or in other words, he does not see them as with the self. *jīva*, who accepts mistakes independently, becomes one who is without mistakes. He shifts his focus from the non-self to the self. Self-substance is pure through all three-time phases, and non-self substance is absent in it. Perturbation is *upādhi*

bhāva (limiting modification), and the eternal nature is without limitations. With the focus on such a substance, *śradhhā-jñāna* manifests. With this kind of appropriate knowledge, the *jñāna* of the general substance is inherent. With the appropriate knowledge of substance-modification, the knowing of the general substance is inherently implied. So, according to the above statement, *nīścaya naya* is acceptable, meaning it is worth adopting.

Question: If modification has the auspice of substance, then will not the modification be dependent?

Answer: When it is said that modification exists, then it is by itself and not due to the substance. *viśeṣa* (modification) is due to itself and not due to *sāmānya* (general substance). The reason is that it is, but not due to any other. *sāmānya* is due to itself and not due to modification. So, modification is independent; this has been mentioned in the points covered under *aliṅgagrahaṇa*. *sāmānya* is due to itself, not because of *viśeṣa*; this has also been discussed in the past. If this is not accepted, then the general substance will be absent. Substance exists, and so does modification. This is the absolute explanation of modification.

Question: It is asked that the modification of *samyagdarśana* was not present earlier, then where did it come from?

Answer: The modification of *samyagdarśana* has not come due to *deva-guru-śāstra*. It did not manifest due to the feeble karma, nor did it manifest due to auspicious attachments. It is not due to the earlier modification either. It manifested from the substance when he turned his focus from non-self substances towards the pure nature of the self. Therefore, it originates from the substance itself. To say that the modification of dharma arose from substance is a relative statement. In this way, the relative and absolute statements should be understood in the correct perspective.

nīścaya naya illuminates the pure state, and *vyavahāra naya* illuminates the impure state. One who accepts the independence of modification will turn his focus towards the pure substance. The one who shows modification to be independent, such a *nīścaya naya*, is the supreme instrument, and hence it is acceptable. Pure *ātmā* is *sādhya* (aim) and *nīścaya naya* is its instrument.

Thus, the *naya* with the *jñāna* that perturbation is independent runs towards the pure *naya*, so it has been called the illuminator of the pure state of the substance. *nīścaya naya* is the supreme instrument. *vyavahāra naya*, which speaks of associations and *karma*, is the indicator of the impure state. It focuses on the non-self, and that creates perturbation.

Therefore, *vyavahāra naya* is not the supreme instrument. By understanding *vyavahāra naya* as rejectable and having the correct understanding of *niścaya naya*, one moves towards the general pure substance, and manifesting the correct belief and knowledge is the fruit of *niścaya naya*.

gāthā-190

अथाशुद्धनयादशुद्धात्मलाभ एवेत्यावेदयति -

Now, it is determined that by the shelter of *aśuddha naya* (impure standpoint) *aśuddha* (impure) *ātmā* is attained/realised: -

**ण चयदि जो दु ममत्तिं अहं ममेदं ति देहदविणेषु ।
सो सामण्णं चत्ता पडिवण्णो होदि उम्मगं ॥१९०॥**

*ṇa cayadi jo du mamattiṃ ahaṃ mamedam ti dehadaviṇesu |
so sāmaṇṇaṃ cattā padivaṇṇo hodi ummaggaṃ || 190 ||*

gāthā: He who does not abandon the belief of attachment towards body, wealth, etc., possessions, and believes that “I am this” and “this is mine” gives up the *śrāmaṇya* (the state of being a true seeker or monk) and goes astray/adopts the wrong path.

ṭīkā: That self *ātmā* who is not paying attention to *nīścaya-naya* (absolute standpoint) - the describer of pure *ātmā* and is infatuated with *vyavahāra naya* (conventional standpoint) the describer of impure *ātmā*, does not abandon the attitude of attachment to body, wealth, etc., other (non-self) substances. Thinking that they belong to the self, he believes that “I am this” and “this is mine”; he does not leave the sense of ownership of the body-wealth, etc., non-self substance. He gives up the path termed *śrāmaṇya* (monkhood) – which is the path of evolution into a pure self and goes astray/moves on to a wrong path, which is the evolution of an impure self. Hence, it is decided that by the auspice of *aśuddha naya* (impure standpoint), *aśuddha ātmā* is attained.

pravacana on gāthā-190

jīva, who has a sense of oneness between sentient and insentient, is on the path of transmigration. *jīva*, who believes that the body moves because of the self and attachment arises because of the body, *karma*, etc., does not know the independent nature of the substance. The belief that the body moves because of the desire of the self, if one were to go to a shop and desire so, then he can give money, etc., as charity, or that he can speak because he desires so, is the belief of oneness with insentient substance. He believes himself to be the owner of the current modification of the insentient substance and attributes his current modification to the insentient substance. His belief is deluded and is a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*. There is an extreme absence of insentient in the sentient. The body acts due

to the body, and *ātmā* acts due to *ātmā*. A being who does not accept this and instead believes that both inanimate and conscious are dependent on each other is a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* and not a Jain. He may be a *śramaṇa* (ascetic) on the outside, but if he believes that the nakedness of the body is due to *ātmā* and that this nakedness benefits *ātmā*, then he has deviated from the path of a *sadhu* and goes astray, has not remained on the true path.

Thus, with this kind of belief in oneness between the inanimate and conscious, transmigration increases. The correct knowledge of this and breaking this belief of the unity of inanimate and consciousness, seeing them both as independent, should be done.

This is the chapter on knowable. Here, the method for attaining *samyak darśana* is described, focusing on the subject of knowledge. This verse and a verse in Samayasāra contain explanations from different perspectives, so one must practice understanding all perspectives properly. Discussion of *niścaya naya*, which is the nature of the pure substances, has already been explained earlier.

ātmā, due to his faults, does not recognise his true nature of *jñāna* and creates attachments and aversions toward non-self substances. He does not do this due to any external conjunction or cause. In the explanation of knowable with the predominance of *jñāna*. *ātmā* by himself relinquishes or accepts its attachments and aversions, but he does not relinquish or take non-self substances. Thus, *ātmā* itself is the doer of his perturbed state. The *naya* which explains this is called *niścaya naya*, in which the pure substance is described. *niścaya naya* is the one that explains that the state of modification is the self-substance.

When *jīva* is in a state of perturbation, then non-self substances like karma, etc., are said to be *nimitta*. Though perturbation does not arise from those karmas or non-self substance, still to say that *jīva* has attachment and aversion due to non-self substance, or even if *jīva* neither accepts nor forsakes non-self substance, even then the *naya* which says that *jīva* accepts or renounces, karma and non-self substance, is *vyavahāra naya*, its nature is to establish the impure substance, because it shows the modification of non-self substances as that of the *ātmā*.

In the explanation with a predominance of *jñāna*, *pramāṇa jñāna* (comprehensive true knowledge) encompasses the *jñāna* of *ātmā*, along with its modifications, and the *jñāna* of non-self substance.

In the explanation with predominance of focus, in Niyamasāra, the four modifications - *upāśamika*, *kṣāyopāśamika*, *audāyika*, and *kṣāyika*—are said to be *vibhāvabhāva* (impure disposition), meaning a specific/particular state, because these states are related to the presence or absence of karma. *kṣāyika bhāva* is also associated with the annihilation of *karma*. That, too, is a momentary state. The state of *siddha* is also with origination and annihilation, and hence, it is the subject of the *naya* related to *paryāya*. Since these four modifications are states of existence, *samyak darśana* cannot arise with them as its focus. For this reason, all four are called *vibhāvabhāva*, and *pāriṇāmika bhāva*, which is present from infinity to eternity, which is the form of pure nature of self, has been made the object of focus and belief. The *naya* that knows this is said to be *niścayanaya*.

The viewpoint that understands the perturbed or unperturbed state is called *vyavahāranaya*. Furthermore, the inclusion of the eternal, pure substance and its modification is called *pramāṇa*.

In the explanation with the predominance of belief, the perturbed state is not the eternal nature of *jīva*. So, with the aim of bringing the focus on the pure substance, the explanation is given with perturbed modification being made secondary, and the general, undivided substance is said to be the objective. However, in the explanation with the predominance of *jñāna*, to separate the non-self substances from *jīva*, the perturbed state is said to be of *jīva*.

Here, in the Pravacanasāra, the *niścayanaya* provides an understanding of *ātmā*, which is distinct from non-self substance. In this way, both these explanations should be correctly understood in light of the predominance of *jñāna*.

It is said that *jīva*, who does not know *niścayanaya*, which has the nature of establishing the pure state of *ātmā* and does not regard his own faults as arising from himself but instead considers them as caused by non-self, is far from *niścayanaya*. *vyavahāranaya* shows the modification of non-self to be that of *ātmā*. Although it is a statement due to association, it is due to delusion that *jīva* believes the modification of non-self to be that of *ātmā*. When the *jīva* experiences attachment and aversion, then *vyavahāra naya* states that these dispositions arise due to the rising of *karma* and that the bondage of karma is due to attachment. Here, *vyavahāra* explains that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between attachment and *karma*. However, not understanding this, ignorant *jīva* develops delusion towards the instrumental cause and thus believes that karma arises due to attachment and

bondage of karma occurs because of attachment. When I desire, I speak, and it is my attachment that leads to the action of this cloth—this is the belief. He does not believe that modification of the self is by the self, and the modifications of the non-self are due to the non-self. He believes the self's modifications are due to non-self and non-self's modifications are because of the self, and remains ignorant of the *niścaya naya* and originates delusion in *vyavahāra naya*.

This deluded *jīva* does not accept modification of the self to be independent. He originates the delusion that "I am this, and this is mine." He believes that this body, wealth, etc., belong to the self, and it is because of them that attachment arises in the self and comes because of the self's attachments. Therefore, ignorant *jīva* believes that renouncing all these things will manifest *dharma*. The ignorant *jīva* believes that spouse and children are entrapment into transmigration; hence, one should leave them and go away into the forest; that *jīva* is steeped in aversion along with delusion. *jīva* believing that his desire for *laddus* brings them to him, and when observing fast, he missed the diet, is the belief of ownership of non-self, or is the belief that the actions of non-self are due to self. This way, he does not leave ownership of his non-self.

As mentioned in the explanation, with the predominance of belief, that modification is not the true nature of the self. The unchanging self is the true nature of the self. When this focus arises, then *śraddhā-jñāna* manifests. In that, what does the *samyakjñāna*, which has arisen along with *śraddhā*, accept? That *jñāna* determines that the perturbation of every *samaya* is due to the fault of the self and not due to some association, *nimitta*, or *karma*. Similarly, it is not true that karma must arise because of perturbation. In verse 181, from the viewpoint of *vyavahāra naya*, it was said that *ātmā* takes and renounces *karma*. But it was told to explain the association of the non-self substance.

Ācārya Bhagavāna explains that the meaning of verse 181 is not that attachment is done by *nimitta*. This kind of dependent view has not been propounded. Neither does it mean that a non-sentient can do the activity of a sentient, and vice versa. There, it was said that the perturbation that arises in the self cannot be due to the focus on the self. If that were the case, then blemishes would never be removed; therefore, blemishes occur with the focus on the non-self. The alleged statement was intended to convey an understanding of the non-self substance. The meaning of *niścaya naya* was that neither karma nor non-self substance do perturbation. If *jīva* does by himself, then it occurs; otherwise, it does not. Making one leave the focus on the association when seen from the view of the non-self shows that

perturbation is independent. With that, the understanding of the form of the *nimitta-naimitika* relationship is shown, and both are shown to be independent. Saying that perturbation is of the self was told with the intention that the focus from it is moved, and has *śraddhā-jñāna* of the pure self substance. The meaning there was that *nimitta* and associations should not be believed as the cause for perturbation.

The ignorant *jīva* imagines *dharma* and *adharma* to be based on associations and thus transmigrates in *samsāra*. From the view of *vyavahāra naya*, it is said that *nimitta* came, right? *nimitta* is there, isn't it? When *jīva* assumes the state of a *muni*, external substances are renounced. It is stated that *munis* have left spouse-children, etc., and have assumed the state of a *muni*. Upon hearing such a statement, the deluded *jīva* claims that he did not mention leaving his spouse and children. Without leaving them, is it possible to have the state of a *muni*? Listen! Because *munis* do not have that kind of attachment, their association with spouse, children, etc., does not remain. This kind of understanding of association was imparted. But how can it be said that the state of *muni* arose because he left his spouse and children? They are separate anyway. When they have not been taken, then where is the question of forsaking them? The statement of leaving their attachment was made with a focus on pure nature. As soon as that attachment goes, the focus on its *nimitta* also goes. It is said that he then left his spouse and children. When the discussion concerns leaving non-self substances and attachment, the explanation instead focuses on taking and forsaking substances. This is the delusion of *vyavahāra naya*. Ignorant *jīva* is controlled by delusion, and he believes that because he desires, the activity of eating green vegetables occurs. If attachment does not arise, then he will be able to leave it. In the stage of *mumukṣu*, with the mellowing of attachment, the desire to have alcohol, meat, honey, etc., does not arise; then the deluded *jīva* believes that because he has forsaken attachment, he could renounce these things. He does this kind of *moha*. Not believing the coming or going of these substances to be independent, he believes that he changes their modifications due to his attachment. In reality, attachment reduces with the auspice of one's own passionless, pure nature. Not believing this, he believes that attachment is reduced due to associations or because outer substances are depleted, so attachment is reduced. This *jīva* is in great delusion, and with this, his transmigration will not end.

Listen! One must decide once that he does perturbed modifications independently. It is essential to understand the underlying meaning of this statement. One must have the understanding that at the time of assuming the state of a *muni*, the naked state of the body

occurs independently, and outer associations, which are seen in different places, leave. But should not have the delusion that they left because of his passionless state.

To turn the focus of modification on the self, it is said that he himself is the independent doer of the modification of attachment or a passionless state. This will turn him away from association and *nimitta*. One should not have the modification of oneness, because he was attached to wealth, so it remained, and when his attachment went away, wealth also left. One should know that wealth exists separately due to itself, and the self is the doer of its modification. Attachment leaves with the focus on the pure nature, and the *nimitta* of attachment, non-self substance, wealth of a kingdom, clothes, etc., leave due to their own self. In reality, they are always separate. And in the state of a *muni*, they do not come in association either. So, it is said that *munis* have left them.

nimitta and associations are infinite, but they are all independent. They do not have the ability to make one commit a fault. In this way, one must move away from non-self substance and accept that one's fault has been committed by oneself. The point being stressed here is that when the modification of *jīva* is independent, then the modified *ātma* substance is also independent.

vyavahāra naya attributes one substance to another. It is essential to know this, but its focus should be left. This chapter is on knowable. So, if self-knowable occurs due to non-self-knowable and vice versa, then neither will be independent. So, the self and the non-self, both knowables, are independent. Such is the statement of both the *nayas*.

Thus, one must know the self and the non-self knowable independently and should understand that perturbation is due to the self. Then, *śraddha-jñāna* should be of the eternal nature; thereafter, with the arising of further equanimity, the pure modification of passionless conduct should be manifested. But the ignorant believes himself to be the doer of non-self. He imagines *dharma-adharma* to be related to the acceptance and rejection of non-self substance. When a statement is from *vyavahāra and nimitta*, then he believes work to be done by them. He believes his own perturbation to be dependent on the non-self. Because of this, he is unable to leave non-self and cannot have *śraddha-jñāna* of the pure nature of self. Hence, he has left the passionless path of *samyagdarśana-jñānā-cāritra* from far, or in other words, he has not attained the passionless modification. He has strayed from the pure path and is engrossed in *nimitta* and associations.

In this way, it is decided that transmigration occurs due to impure *naya* or due to focus on association.

Throughout all three-time phases, non-self substance is absent within the self. Despite this, to believe that one has left them is an erroneous belief. Ignorant *jīva* says that because he has forsaken all these substances, dharma has arisen. The *jñānī* asks him, what has he forsaken? He believes that forsaking cannot happen while one is leading a worldly life, but can happen only when one retreats into the forest. So, he is asked what he can forsake after going into the forest? Be it the forest or city, be it *nigoda* or *siddha*, be it the appropriate time or not, there is an absence of infinite *jīvas* and infinite non-sentient substances through all three-time phases. To believe that one is forsaking something which is already separate is a false belief. If it is said that the association of non-self should be left, then it is asked which non-self substance was in your association. Since eternity till today, one has not come in association with any non-self ever; even then, if you say that their association was left, then the belief is false. Since eternity, no non-self substance has come in association with the self. It is certain, however, that one can shift the focus away from the non-self. If that focus has to be moved, then focus from infinite non-sentient and infinite sentient substances has to be moved towards the pure nature of *jñānā*. By doing this, perturbation is destroyed, and a state of dharma is manifested.

Thus, in this verse, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* has said that *jīva* misunderstands the statements of *aśuddha naya* and believes in benefit or loss through association. He will attain the impure *ātmā* only. Therefore, *jīva* should not have such a false understanding, and he should focus on the *ātmā*, which is devoid of accepting or forsaking non-self substance; then the state of dharma will manifest.

gāthā-191

अथ शुद्धनयात् शुद्धात्मलाभ एवेत्यवधारयति -

Now, it is ascertained that by (the shelter of) *śuddha naya* (pure standpoint of view) *śuddha* (pure) *ātmā* is attained/realised: -

**णाहं होमि परेसिं ण मे परे संति णाणमहमेवको ।
इदि जो झायदि झाणे सो अप्पाणं हवदि झादा ॥१९१॥**

*ṇāhaṃ homi paresiṃ ṇa me pare saṃti ṇāṇamahamekko |
idi jo jhāyadi jhāṇe so appā ṇa havadi jhādā || 191 ||*

gāthā: “I do not belong to *para* (non-self)”, *para* (non-self) does not belong to me, ‘I am only one *jñānā*’. He who meditates thus, that meditator, while absorbed in his meditation, at the time of meditation is the contemplator of the self, becomes *ātmā* or *śuddhātmā*.

ṭīkā: That *ātmā*, who remains neutral/without any impediment, towards the *vyavahāra naya* (conventional viewpoint), which remains in its own subject and propagates the impure substance (that form which portrays the impure nature of substance). He who has removed *moha*, with the propagation of the *śuddha dravya*, which is in the form of *niścaya naya*, and modifies as such, dusts away the mutual *sva-svāmi sambandha* (mutual oneness and ownership) between *sva* (self) and *para* (non-self), and leaving the non-*ātmā* that ‘*śuddha jñāna* only is the one which is me’, and grasping the *ātmā* as *ātmā*, being separate from *para-dravya* (non-self substance), only the focus of *ātmā* stops all thoughts. That *ekāgra-cīntānirodha* (*ātmā*, which stops thoughts on any subject), at the time of this *ekāgra-cīntānirodha*, is in reality the *śuddhātmā*. With this, it is ascertained that *śuddhātmā* can be attained only through *śuddha naya*.

pravacana on gāthā-191

There is an absence of *sva-catustaya* [quadruple form (*dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva*) of the self] in *para-catustaya* (quadruple form of non-self), and vice versa. ‘I am *ātmā*’, infinite substances, karma, body, family, *deva-guru*, etc., are not of the self. The self is the embodiment of *jñāna*; the self cannot perform actions for the non-self, nor can anything be done to the self by the non-self. Even though non-self substances exist in the same space, they do not cause any benefit or harm to *ātmā*. *dravya* (substance) refers to that which remains constant in all three-time phases; *kṣetra* refers to the innumerable space points

covered by *ātmā*; *kāla* refers to the state of every *samaya*; and *bhāva* refers to the eternal efficacies - *jñāna*, *darśana*, *cāritra*, etc., in *ātmā* and touch, taste, smell, and color in physical matter. Each *dravya* has its own *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla*, and *bhāva*. *catuṣṭya* (fourfold nature) of self, and it is not in non-self, and *catuṣṭya* of non-self is not in self. A substance that is in the form of absence cannot cause benefit or harm to another.

Question: How does *mokṣa* occur only through human life and not through the life of a *deva*?

Answer: *mokṣa* occurs through concentration on the nature of *jñāna* and not through the human body. First of all, the bodies that appear externally as human or *deva* are not actually the *gati* (life form) of human or *deva*; they are forms of physical insentience. They are absent in the *ātmā*. Therefore, no *jīva* can attain *mokṣa* through a body. In reality, the current modification of *ātmā* in the form of *deva* is with low *puruṣārtha* (effort), which is why he does not attain *mokṣa*. There is no other reason. Even in the modification of a human, only that *jīva* attains *mokṣa* who makes an effort to attain *mokṣa*. *jīva* has attained the human form many times, yet he has not attained *mokṣa*. *jīva* who decides that he is separate from the body; thoughts are not his nature, he is the form of sentience by nature, that *jīva* immerses into his nature and attains *mokṣa*. then it is said that the *jīva* has attained *mokṣa* in the human form.

Question: How can one remain neutral and non-contradictory in *vyavahāra naya*?

Answer: *vyavahāra naya*, which propagates the impure substance, intercedes the modification of one substance to another. When a *jīva* leaves outer possessions, takes the naked state of the body, and assumes the state of a *muni*, then he who has the correct knowledge understands that this *jīva* has immersed into his pure nature of self. Then, the effort of becoming a monk occurred, and the body's naked state was experienced; however, *ātmā* is not the doer of the body's naked state. At the time of the arising of omniscience, there is the supreme *sahamṇana* (body type). Only its knowledge is provided, but *kevalajñāna* does not arise due to *sahamṇana*. Each *dravya* has its substance-space and attributes in all three time phases; its time refers to the modification that occurs every *samaya*. From *nigoda* to *siddha*, all *jīvas* and from one *paramāṇu* to the immense *mahāskandha* (vast body of matter), every entity is existent in all three time phases due to its *dravya-kṣetra* and *bhāva*, and its *kāla* or modification is due to its *dravya*. It is not dependent on *dravya*, *kṣetra*, and *bhāva* of non-self. The wise one understands the statement of the empirical viewpoint and remains neutral in it. Although there may be infinite external entities, they cannot cause benefit or harm to the self; the self is their knower. This is known as *madhyasthapanā* (a state of neutrality).

When a *jīva* who has embraced *niścayanaya* turns towards the nature of the knower is freed from delusion. *niścayanaya*, which describes the pure substance, explains that the impure modification that arises in *jīva* belongs to the *jīva*. They are not due to any karma or non-self substance. Here, *śuddha dravya* should be understood as "distinct from non-self." *jīva* who understands that there is an absence of the nature of non-self in the self, and perturbation occurs due to the self, removes delusion.

Question: How can a *jīva* who accepts perturbation as his own remove them?

Answer: Listen! Here, the statement is from the view of *jñāna*. How will one move towards his own nature if he does not first recognise himself to be distinct from non-self substances? In other words, he cannot move forward. Initially, he believed that benefit and harm were derived from the *para catuṣṭaya* and considered *samkita* due to the influence of the *deva-guru*. Now, with the establishment of *niścayanaya*, the focus shifts from non-self to self. Non-self substances are due to themselves; there is no relationship between self and them. The self is not the doer of the body, etc., as they are in their *catuṣṭaya*; therefore, they are not of the self.

This is not about the substance; it is about the present state. *dravya*, *kṣetra*, and *bhāva* are eternal through all three time phases in both the self knowable and the non-self knowable. However, their *kāla* or current state in every *samaya* is due to those substances, not due to non-self. The relationship between the substance of the owner and the owner is described as *sva-śvāmī* (self-owner). Here, this *sva-śvāmī* relationship is broken, meaning it is said that there is no such relationship between the two. My sovereignty cannot be on a non-self, nor can the sovereignty of a non-self be on me. He who decides this, his delusion is destroyed.

Question: What does it mean to say, "delusion is removed"?

Answer: When delusion arises, it is not possible to remove it at that moment. However, it can be decided that perturbations do not occur due to non-self. When one moves away from the sovereignty of the non-self and progresses towards the self, then he recognises the pure nature of his *dravya-guṇa*, and reflects that substance and attribute are pure, and the perturbed modification is the fault. Withdrawing focus from the perturbed modification, when he attains the belief-knowledge of self-knower, delusion does not arise. Then, it is said that he has removed delusion.

He who believes that *dharma* can arise from the substance, space, etc., of non-self, etc., even though he may be a part of the Jain community, is a heretic *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*. Some may argue that *dharma* arises when there is the existence of a human, or a good *saṃhanana* (body type), which will lead to *kevalajñāna*, or the fourth era, and a better *kṣetra* can result in quicker *dharma* - all this is a dependent perspective. *kevalajñāna* or the modification of *dharma* is of the *jīva*. If that modification is dependent on non-self space and non-self body, then the sovereignty of *jīva* would be the non-self. Every modification is an existing reality; despite this, if one considers a particular manifestation to be dependent, then his substance – attribute would also have to be believed as dependent. Then, the independence of the self-knowable and the non-self-knowable will not remain. In the doctrine of Viṣṇu, it is believed that *Īśvara* (God) is the doer of the world. Similarly, one who claims to be a Jain but believes that the modification of self is due to non-self, believes in his own destruction, and both are *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*.

Here, *ācārya bhagavāna* said from the view of *anekānta*. The self is due to the self and not due to the non-self. *anātmā* means a belief of oneness towards non-self. To believe that one can benefit from *nimitta* is the belief of *anātmā*. So, one should leave this belief and accept that the self is of a knowing nature. He should accept this *ātmā* as *ātmā*. *ācārya* has explained from the standpoint of *āsti-nāsti* (existence-non-existence) that one should immerse in the one that is separate from non-self. Here, the lesson is that “the *sva-śvāmī* (self-sovereign) relationship has been forsaken”. Just as dust is shaken off a cloth, *jīva* has forsaken the belief which was present in the state of *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* that he is the doer of the modification of non-self. He has released this delusion. He has given up the belief in the dust of *mithyā*. He believes that modifications of *deva-guru-śāstra* are within themselves and are not the doer of the modification of self; *ātmā* is not the possessor of the modification of the body, etc. *saṃsāra* is not in non-self substances; it is *udaya bhāva* (arising modification of karma), and therefore it is *svatattva* (own nature). Just as *saṃsāra* is not in non-self substances, in the same way, neither is it in the substance-attribute of self; it is in the modification of one *samaya*. When one has faith in the nature of *jñāna*, *mithyātva* is eliminated, and *samyakdarśana* arises. Every substance exists with *utpāda* (origination), *vyaya* (annihilation), and *dhruva* (permanence), simultaneously. In that it is not that the first *samaya* is of *utpāda*, the second of *vyaya*, and the third of *dhruva*, all three are present in the same *samaya*. Origination occurs due to the self and not due to the non-self. *jīva*, who believes in the manifestation of perturbation due to non-self, does not believe in origination. It is the specific modification of an attribute. He who does not believe modification to be independent, does not believe substance and attributes to be

independent. *jīva*, who understands this independence of substance-attribute-modification, or origination-annihilation-permanence, leaves the belief of *anātmā* and accepts the belief of self...

jīva, who decides that he is only *jñāna* and focuses on his pure nature, manifests *samyagdarśana*. *jīva*, who has manifested dharma, turns his focus on the pure nature of the self. He believes that he is only pure *jñāna*. Here, it is not just the attribute of *jñāna*, but it is understood that the self is a *piṇḍa* (aggregate of matter) of the attributes of *jñāna*, *darśana*, etc., infinite attributes. Self is the pure *caitanya* (consciousness) existence, and there is an absence of the existence of non-self in self. Here, with the emphasis on the perspective of substance, impurity is minimised/marginalised, and it is said 'only pure *jñāna* exists'—but this should not be understood to be the complete *kevalajñāna* (omniscience). Impurity or incompleteness is not the true nature of *ātmā*, and various kinds of substances are the self, nor various kinds of attachment and aversion are not self. On bringing the focus that the self is the one sentient pure nature, the blemish-free modification of *samyakdarśana-jñāna-cāritra* will manifest. Since there is harmony among its parts, that modification is indistinguishable from the *ātmā*; therefore, it is said from the standpoint of *asti* (existence) that pure knowledge is the only true essence of the self. It is the nature of *jñāna*, which knows nine *tattvas* (fundamental truths). The nature of *jñāna* who knows this is oneself. In this manner, the one who distinguishes the self from non-self substances accepts *ātmā* as the state of *ātmā* and meditates on it, manifests *samyakdarśana* and *dharma*.

When there is an interest in the nature of the self, interest in *puṇya* (merit) and *samyoga* (association) fades away. Non-self substances are in the form of absence in the *ātmā*, hence there is no need to negate them. A *mithyā-drṣṭi* believes that he can negate that which is already in a state of absence. This *jīva* cannot negate non-self, but he can negate the perception of oneness with non-self. When interest in being *jñāna* by nature arises, then interest in *puṇya* and *pāpa* fades away. Interest in *puṇya* and *pāpa* or considering *dharma* from non-self is the state of *anātmā*. When there is an interest in the nature of the self, interest in perturbations fades; then it is said that *ātmā* has abandoned perturbation and the interest in non-self substances. So, it is said that he has separated from non-self substances. Non-self substances are indeed separate, but when the focus moves away from them, then it is said so.

Focussing on the pure nature of *jñāna* in this way, to meditate on it and be at one with it, is *dhyāna* in the form of *samyagdarśana*, and that is *dharma*. To be one with pure nature and focus on it is the only way to attain the pure *ātmā*. Here, the discussion is on the state of the *dharmī jīva* and how *dhyāna* can manifest. First, he leaves his interest in non-self substances. He does not accept the relationship of self and sovereignty with non-self substance, *nimitta*, karma, and perturbation. He does not focus on the non-self. He makes nonself-substance, perturbation, etc., secondary and keeps *ātmā* as primary. He turns the focus on this and immerses in it, which is *dhyāna*.

Non-self substances, *kṣetra* (space), *saṁhanana* (type of body), and *deva-guru-śāstra* (scriptures) are not the reason for profit or loss. The outcome of the five *mahāvratas* (great vows) is *vikāra* (perturbation). One should leave his focus on them and immerse within the self. Those with a focus on non-self cannot be said to be the pure *ātmā*.

Thus, only through the perspective of *śuddha-naya*, the pure *ātmā* arises, meaning *dharma* is attained.

अथ ध्रुवत्वात् शुद्ध आत्मैवोपलम्भनीय इत्युपदिशति -

Now, it is preached that only the *śuddhātmā* (pure self/*ātmā*) is worth realising/attaining due to its permanence: -

एवं णाणप्पाणं दंसणभूदं अदिदियमहत्यं ।
ध्रुवमचलमणालंबं मण्णेऽहं अप्पगं सुद्धं ॥१९२॥

*evam ṇāṇappāṇaṁ daṁsaṇabhūdaṁ adiṁdiyamahatthaṁ |
dhuvamacalamañālaṁbaṁ maṇṇeShaṁ appagaṁ suddhaṁ || 192 ||*

gāthā: Thus, ‘I’ believe *ātmā* to be with *jñāna* (knowledge), *darśana* (perception), *atīndriya* (non-sensory) great substance, which is eternal/permanent, unwavering, independent, and pure.

ṭīkā: Pure *ātmā*, being self-existent and without a cause, is without beginning and end. It is self-established; hence, to the self *ātmā*, only *śuddhātmā* (pure soul) is permanent/constant/stable, and nothing else is permanent. *ātmā* possesses purity because it is distinct from non-self substances and is inseparable from its own attributes. This oneness of *ātmā* is because of it being 1) possessed of *jñāna* (knowledge), 2) *darśana* (perception), 3) because it being the *atīndriya* (non-sensory) great substance, 4) because it being eternal/permanent, and 5) because it being stable and independent.

Of these in (1-2), are - that which bears *jñāna* (knowledge) in itself and that which itself is *darśana* (with perception), such an *ātmā* has absolute separateness from non-identical other non-self substances and is inseparable from its own properties, hence it has a state of oneness; (3) Now senses which know its particular restricted qualities of touch-taste-smell-colour each, and modification of understanding in the form of words, he who transcends them is the one great/absolute substance is separate from knowing the qualities of touch-taste –smell-colour as well as modifications of words. Such an *ātmā* is separate from non-self substances like senses, etc., and is undivided from the knowing of touch, etc., which is its own attribute; it is inseparable from that. Hence, it is inseparable and one. (4) Similarly, due to the absence of accepting or abandoning the reflection of the modification of *jñeya*, which is in the form of annihilation in a moment (knowing of that modification which is destroying every moment), it is unwavering/stable. Such an *ātmā* is separate from non-self

substance, which is in the form of modification of *jñeya* and is undistinguished from the *jñāna*, of which this *jñeya* is *nimitta*. Hence, it has a state of oneness. (5) Similarly, *ātmā* has oneness because of its being independent due to the absence of dependence on knowable substances in its process of perpetuity - thus, it has absolute separateness from knowable other substances and is undistinguished from the *jñāna*.

Thus, *ātmā* is pure (by its eternal nature) because only sentience, only *śuddha naya* (absolute/real viewpoint) is that much only in its characteristic or the *śuddha naya*, which is sentience only describes self *ātmā* as pure only); and this pure *ātmā* alone is worth realising/attaining because of its stability/permanence; so, what to do of or bother about unstable things which are just like numerous shadows of way-side trees coming in contact with a traveller's body?

bhāvārtha: *ātmā* is one (having oneness) because of its possessing in itself (1) *jñana* (knowledge) (2) being of *darśana* (perception) (3) being the knower of all things without aid of senses - a great substance (4) being stable/constant owing to not taking or leaving modifications of other knowables and (5) being independent without taking any shelter of knowable- other substances. In this way, it is pure because it is one. Such a pure *ātmā* being *dhruva* (eternal/constant) is the only one worth realising/attaining.

pravacana on gāthā-192

Pure *ātmā* exists and is without any reason. It does not need any other substance. If they were the maker of *ātmā*, then its permanence would be destroyed, and that which is permanent has no beginning. Beginning is said about the modification of every *samaya*. If seen from the view of eternity, even modification does not have a beginning. No modification moves forward or back. *dravya* (substance) means *sāmānya* (general), and *paryāya* (modification) means *viśeṣa* (specific). They are together, not ahead or behind. Both substance and modification are since eternity; however, modification is said to be *sādi* (with a beginning) in relation to the present. With regard to the present, there is a beginning and an end of *vikāra* (perturbation), but in relation to the substance, the concept of one with a beginning does not apply. The pure sentient element is *anādi-anaṅta*. It exists independently and not because of another. It has no creator; hence, *ātmā* is *anādi-anaṅta* (with no beginning – with no end) substance which exists by itself.

Pure *ātmā* alone is *dhruva* (permanent); therefore, it is the only one worthy of taking auspice of.

1. Family, wealth, *deva-guru-śāstra*, body, *karma*, etc., are not permanent in relation to *ātmā*. Associations are temporary, as they can change. One does not attain *dharma* by taking their auspice
2. Auspicious and inauspicious dispositions arise every moment; they are impermanent. Thoughts are also not worthy of refuge. *vyavahāra ratnatraya* are also impermanent; thus, relying on them does not lead to *dharma*.
3. Only the eternal, self-existing, causeless *ātmā* is permanent; none other is. This permanent *ātmā* is the only one worthy of harbouring.

Question: Why does *jīva* not focus on the permanent?

Answer: *jīva* does not do the *puruṣārtha*; therefore, he does not develop an interest in the unchangeable. If he focuses on the permanent, then focusing on impermanent would be mitigated. *jīva* continues to develop new interests in non-self substances and modifications due to ignorance. If *jīva* turns his focus away from the external non-self and directs it towards the self, then his interest will arise. It is not that because he is in *naraka* or *nigoda*, he is unable to focus on the self. It is due to one's ignorance that the ignorant *jīva* with interest in *nimitta* has perturbed modification every *samaya*. If perplexity is to be removed, then he will have to leave the interest of *nimitta* and have the interest in the self.

Ignorant *jīva* might say that some do not know how to live life, don't know how to take care of the body, etc. He knows how to live life and maintain a healthy body. He has this kind of arrogance. But listen! One should not be arrogant! When it is time for that modification, when the body deteriorates, no one—be it Indra, kings, doctors, or anyone else—can help. The body will perish and change the next moment; what is the point of being arrogant for it? Are those associations of self, or are of someone else? They have changed due to *pudgala*, not because of the self. As long as the focus is on the body, true decision about oneself cannot be made.

Auspicious and inauspicious dispositions keep fluctuating; they are not worthy of harbouring. *ātmā* has modifications of compassion, charity, etc., which are auspicious, and modifications of desire, anger, etc., are inauspicious. Both are impure. Even though they exist in the modification of *ātmā*, they bring suffering. Their focus means the focus on the impermanent. When alighting from a vehicle, first, the foot is placed on the ground, and then the other foot is lifted. Similarly, *ātmā* is pure, stable, and of one form, like the ground. When focus is on this and accompanied by *śraddhā-jñāna*, focus shifts away from auspicious and inauspicious thoughts/feelings, the body, and other associations; then true

focus will arise. As auspicious and inauspicious thoughts fluctuate, they are not worthy of refuge. The permanent *ātmā* alone is the only true refuge.

Without knowing of the permanent nature, knowing only of the non-self is a wrong belief. If the focus is on reducing attachment, it is also focused on modifications. He does not attain *dharma*. Similarly, knowing with a focus on non-self is also wrong knowledge. If *śraddha-jñāna* is of the permanent nature, then the knowing of the non-self, which arises in the state of a seeker, is also true knowledge.

When the focus is on *ātmā* that is permanent, pure, and sentient, then *sva-para-prakāśaka jñāna* (illuminating knowledge of the self and non-self) arises. The knowing of the body and the association that arises with that is true. But the knowledge of non-self that arises with the belief of oneness with non-self is false.

Here, the belief and knowledge of pure substance are stated. Be it any time phase, any association, be it Sammeda Śikhara or Śatruñjaya, be it the land of the seventh *naraka* or the ninth *grāivyaka*, be it the fourth era or the fifth, none can give refuge. *dharma* cannot arise from the belief in temporary substances. *Dharma* arises only with the devotion of the permanent *ātmā*.

1. Non-self substances, scriptures, idols, etc., are inert; devotion to them does not lead to *dharma* because, in relation to the permanent *ātmā*, all of them are impermanent.
2. True *deva* and *guru* are sentient non-self; they are also impermanent in relation to the permanent *ātmā*, so devotion to them does not lead to *dharma*.
3. Auspicious and inauspicious dispositions are momentary, and they change; they are impermanent. Devotion to them also does not lead to *dharma*.
4. Even the pure modification of one *samaya* is momentary, and it changes. Since one modification does not arise from another, its devotion does not lead to *dharma*.
5. One's own pure *ātmā* alone is permanent; by having its devotion or meditating on it, the *dharma* of *samyak darśana – jñāna – cāritra* is manifested. When *jīva*, along with the experience of his pure form, has *niścaya bhakti* (absolute devotion/experience), then devotion of *deva-guru-śāstra* is said to be *vyavahāra bhakti*. Only *samyak darśana* is *niścaya bhakti*.

Just as a name cannot be written without knowledge of letters, similarly, *dharma* cannot be realized without knowledge of *ātmā*. Someone may claim that he has not learned to write his name, not learned to write letters, but he still wants to write his name and do business.

How is that possible? Likewise, someone may say, he has not understood the true nature of substances, and what is the need to understand it? What is the harm if he were to only practice vows and penance? To him, it is said that without understanding, your knowledge will be wasted, i.e., your knowledge will be destroyed. Here, the emphasis is on the nature of pure *ātmā* and its belief and knowledge. First, it is essential to have correct beliefs and knowledge.

The reason for *ātmā* being distinct from non-self and indivisible from its nature is oneness. Its oneness is due to five reasons –

1. *ātmā* is inherently of the nature of *jñāna*; to have attachment and non-self is not its nature, hence it is one.
2. *ātmā* is the nature of *darśana*, therefore it is one.
3. *ātmā* knows without relying on the senses; thus, due to its nature of being the great substance which transcends all sense, it is one.
4. Other substances are wavering; the auspicious and inauspicious dispositions also change. *ātmā* is immovable; thus, due to its immovability, it is one.
5. It does not take support of *nimitta*, as it is independent, so it is one.

ātmā is pure due to his oneness. Though it has the multiplicity of the focus of non-self, multiplicity does not enter the *ātmā*. The pure modification that manifests due to the focus of the pure self, though having numerous variegations/comprehensibility, is always undivided from the *ātmā*. Therefore, *ātmā* is one. When *ātmā* is called pure here, it is not for a general pure substance. Here, it is stated to be distinct from non-self substances and at one with the nature of the self. That is just one of the ways of explaining, and there is no difference of time in it. When he is stable in his pure state, he is simultaneously separate from the focus of his non-self. *ātmā* is one, so it is pure, and it is stable/permanent. The permanent *ātmā* is the one to take the auspices; dharma manifests because of this.

Question: What should one do if they are caught in worldly life?

Answer: Listen! That belief is false. No non-self substance can trap another. To believe that it is not possible to make do without certain things is also a false belief.

1. The self exists without the infinite non-self substances of the world. If the self were dependent on non-self substances, then the existence of the self should cease when they are gone, but the self remains; hence, the existence of the self is distinct from infinite substances.

2. Yes, it is true that one is not moving away from the false belief of the modification of one *samaya*, that the self cannot survive without the non-self. He is not leaving the attachment towards beneficial substances and aversion towards non-beneficial ones. Due to this, his flow of transmigration continues. Modification is of one *samaya*, and a new one arises in the second *samaya*, which he does. If he were to have the correct understanding and leave the false beliefs, then they would not occur. In reality, the modification of the self arises without the help of the non-self; false beliefs do not guide it.
3. Delusion-attachment-aversion may be present in the modification, but the self-substance remains pure. That substance has existed since eternity to this day, without any non-self substance or false beliefs.
4. Abandon the wrong belief that without auspicious and inauspicious dispositions, the self cannot function, and have belief and knowing of the pure permanent *ātmā* substance.
5. It has to be decided that the non-self substance does not need to be destroyed. The false belief that the self cannot exist without non-self substance, as well as attachment and aversion, has to be removed, with the focus on the pure nature of the self. Then, even if the current state is one of attachment, *samyagdarśana* will manifest.
6. On removing the deviant belief that - it is not possible to exist without auspicious-inauspicious dispositions, focus goes on the pure nature of the self. With that, the unsteadiness of the focus on perturbation goes away, and *cāritra* manifests, and the state of *vītarāga* increases sequentially.
7. By removing the impurity of *yog* (vibration of space points of *ātmā*), the state of *ayog* (non-vibration of the space points of *ātmā*) will manifest, and the *siddha* state will be attained.

Thus, by ascertaining the nature of the pure permanent substance in this way, the state of *samkita* and *cāritra* will manifest, and eventually, the state of *mokṣa* will arise.

What kind is the *ātmā*, which is the subject of *samyagdarśana*? By adhering to which knowable will *dharma* arise? Now, that will be discussed. *ātmā* is one due to its nature of *jñāna*, *darśana*, state of *atīndriya* (transcendence from senses), *acala* (unmoving), and completely independent. Due to its oneness, *ātmā* is pure, and a state of purity is permanence. Permanent *ātmā* is the focus of *samyag darśana*, and its belief-knowledge leads to the manifestation of pure modification. So, only the permanent *ātmā* is worth experiencing. Spouse, family, or money, none can give refuge to *ātmā*. Even *deva-guru*-

śāstra cannot give refuge. Therefore, the path of *mokṣa* is to leave their dependency, take auspices of the self, have oneness with *ātmā*, and experience it. The subject of *samyagdarśana* is the permanent *ātmā*; to separate oneself from the non-self and immerse oneself within the self is purity and permanence.

***ātmā* has a state of oneness because of its state of *jñāna* and *darśana*.** *ātmā* assumes its *jñāna* and *darśana* within itself and by itself. *deva-guru-śāstra* are non-self substances, as they are not made up of *jñāna-darśana*. So *jñāna-darśana*, does not manifest by focusing on them. *jñāna-darśana* is present in *ātmā* by itself, so they manifest. *jñāna*, *darśana* of *kevalajñānīs* is in them by their self. *jñāna*, *darśana* of self are not made up with those of *kevalī bhagavāna*. So *jñāna-darśana* of self is not present in the *jīvas* from *pañcaparmeṣṭhī* to *nigoda*, or from one *jada paramāṇu* to non-sentient *mahāskandha*. The self is not separate from the attributes of *jñāna-darśana*, which are its inherent nature, but it is separate from infinite other substances. Hence, there is oneness in the self.

Question: In the *śāstra*, is there not a chapter that says that *ātmā* takes refuge in dharma as propagated by *arhaṇta*, *siddha*, *sādhū*, *kevalī*?

Answer: These are expressions of conventionality. Non-self substances cannot give refuge. There is an absence of *pañcaparmeṣṭhī* in the *ātmā*. Manifestation of *jñāna* of *ātmā* is not based on them. Understanding this, *jīva*, who turns to his own sentient pure self, the modification of *dharma* arises in him by itself. Then it is said, from the view of *vyvahāra*, that he has taken refuge of the *pañcaparmeṣṭhī*.

Question: Then why have temples, etc., been made?

Answer: In the state of a seeker, when the desire for auspicious attachment rises in the *jīva*, then his focus goes on the non-self substance. But that non-self is not the base of *jīva*. *ādhāra-ādheya* (relation of support and supported) is within the self. *samyagdarśana* does not manifest with the support of non-self. Attributes of the self are identified with the self; attributes and the holder of those attributes are one. They are not made up of non-self. Attributes of self are not at one with those of *kevalī bhagavāna*. So *samkita* cannot manifest with the support of non-self. Self of *ātmā* is one with the state of *jñāna-darśana*. Due to this, the self is pure, and because it is pure, it is permanent. *samkita* arises with its auspices.

Here, the statement is from the predominance of *jñāna*. In this chapter, the distinction between self-substance and non-self substance is explained. Non-sentient and other sentient substances are referred to as non-self. But here, perturbation is not to be understood

as non-self. Here, from the view of *niscaya naya*, *ātmā* with perturbed modification is called the self. By understanding the correct meanings accordingly, interest in the non-self goes, and focus on the self increases. At that time, perturbation also becomes secondary. Upon seeing one's self-substance, the focus shifts to one's own attributes, and the focus of perturbation is lost. The multiplicity of perturbations that arose with the refuge of numerous *nimittas* leaves when focus goes on the self, and oneness arises. As this *jīva* is separate from non-self substance, he is without perturbation. This meaning from the view of the predominance of *jñāna* should be understood.

As *ātmā* is the supreme substance which transcends the senses, it is one. Every sense knows its distinct subject of knowing. The way a sense of touch knows touch, the sense of taste knows taste, etc., so on and so forth. When *bhāveṇḍriya* (psychic sense) knows these subjects one after another, then the focus turns on that sectional *bhāveṇḍriya*, and the multiplicity of perturbation arises. Divided *jñāna* is not the real nature of *ātmā*. *ātmā* is that supreme substance which knows attributes of touch-taste-smell-colour, as well as modifications in the form of words, all at once. *ātmā* is separate from physical senses, but it is not separate from the *jñāna* related to non-self substances. Therefore, it has a state of oneness.

Support for non-self *jñeya* gives rise to a multiplicity of attachments, and with support for self-knowable, oneness arises. The physical senses and their subjects are all non-self-knowable. *jñāna* does not arise from their base. Instead, with the auspice of non-self knowable, *jñāna* gets divided. With the focus on the senses rises the divided modification of *jñāna*. That substance is in the form of modification, but it is not the supreme substance. Only *ātmā* is the supreme substance that transcends the senses. When, with the auspices of *ātmā*, *jñāna* of *ātmā* arises, then there is oneness with *ātmā* only. Knowing through all five senses, the subject of the senses is untrue and momentary, and its auspice does not give rise to *samyagdarśana*. *jñāna*, which arises with the support of non-self substance or senses, is mixed with attachment. Its focus gives rise to multiplicity. Oneness arises with the *jñāna*, which manifests based on *ātmā*.

dharmījīva (he who is with experience of self) forms a oneness with the supreme substance which transcends senses and manifests purity. He who wants to follow dharma must have the correct belief. Physical senses and their objects are non-self; they are non-self knowable, but *jñāna*, which arises from *ātmā*, is self-knowable. The belief that *jñāna* arises due to non-self senses and other substances should be given up. *ātmā* manifests true *jñāna*

without the support of senses and other knowables. The focus of a *dharmījīva* in the incomplete goes towards non-self, and attachment also arises, but he does not believe that his *jñāna* is due to attachment to non-self. Even at that time, he has the auspice of the *ātmā*, that he is the supreme substance which transcends senses. From the viewpoint of *vyavahāra*, it is said that he takes the support of *deva-guru* and auspicious attachment. But a *dharmī* does not have its auspice. As he has oneness with the self *ātmā*, which is with *jñāna-darśana*, it is pure, permanent, and that should only be taken auspice of.

Due to its state of being *acala*, it has oneness. Body, mind, and speech are substances that change every moment. The state of these *jñeyas* arise and is destroyed every moment. The state of origination-annihilation of each of those substances is due to that substance and not because of the *ātmā*. *ātmā* neither takes nor leaves the modification of those knowable, because they are absent in the *ātmā*. *ātmā* is not the doer of the modification of the body, clothes, etc., and other substances. Body and other substances move from one space to another due to their *kriyāvatī śākti* (efficacy to move from one place to another); *ātmā* does not move them. *ātmā* is not the doer of the activity of the hand, which helps in bringing a book near or in moving the non-self. This activity is absent in *ātmā*. So, what can *ātmā* do of the substance that is absent in it? Those modifications of knowables are changing every *samaya*, and as there is an absence of their taking or renouncing in *ātmā*, it is unmoving. *ātmā* is in a detached state from those modifications of the knowable. *ātmā* is one with the *jñāna*, which arises by its own self due to the *nimitta* of modifications of the knowable.

In this way, as *ātmā* has the state of being unmoving, it has oneness. As it has oneness, it is pure, and as it is pure, it is permanent, and that permanence only is worth taking support. To have the experience of this pure self-knowable is *samyagdarśana*.

This chapter is on *jñeya*. *jñeya* refers to substances that possess the ability to be known. *ātmā* and non-self are both *jñeyas*. *ātmā* knows without becoming one with the non-self knowable, and by staying in the self. To know non-self knowable is *vyavahāra*, and knowing self-knowable is *niścaya*. Here, it is explained how the self-knowable should be known to manifest *samyagdarśana*.

Origination-annihilation occurs continuously in the modifications of other substances. Annihilation of body, food, water, etc., is due to non-self-knowable and not due to self-knowable.

svajñeya is the form of *ātmā*, and it has four types –

1. In the form of a mass of eternal efficacy, *dravya sāmānya*.
2. Its eternal efficacies - *jñāna*, *darśana*, *cāritra*, *astitva*, etc.
3. Its present state of the attribute of *jñāna* in the form of manifestation.
4. Its present efficacy of *cāritra* in the form of desire.

The non-self-knowable entity, which is *pudgala* is of three types.

1. That which is in the form of a mass of eternal efficacy, *dravyasāmānya*
2. Efficacies of touch, taste, smell, colour, etc.
3. Their state every *samaya*.

In this way, *pudgala* in the form of substance-attribute-modification is non-self-knowable.

One *ātmā* cannot do the modification of another *ātmā* or of any physical non-sentient. When a stick moves up or down, it possesses the attribute of generality; its origination and annihilation, or its movement from one space to another, are dependent on the *pudgala paramāṇu*.

1. That stick cannot move up-down due to the hand. This is because the origination-annihilation-permanence of the hand is in the hand. The stick is a non-self substance, and its origination-annihilation-permanence is in it.
2. Stick has not moved up because *ātmā* desired it. Origination of desire occurs in the self-knowable, and not in stick, etc.
3. *ātmā* does the *jñāna* of the stick moving up. But the stick has not moved up due to that *jñāna*. The origination of *jñāna* occurs in the self-knowable. Origination of the stick is in the stick. So *ātmā*, the self knowable, neither accepts nor renounces the non-self-knowable. *ātmā* neither accepts nor renounces the modification of words, books, etc. So, the modifications of words, etc., and *ātmā* are separate.
 - a) As words are non-self knowables, they do not come out due to the desire of *ātmā*.
 - b) *ātmā* has the modification of *jñāna*, but words do not come out due to that because words are non-self-knowable.
 - c) Others cannot attain *jñāna* with the thoughts of preaching in the self-*ātmā*, because thoughts of preaching are non-self knowable.
 - d) Others cannot attain *jñāna* because the self-*ātmā* has *jñāna*, because they are non-self knowable.
 - e) Another person cannot get *jñāna* by the emission of words from the self, because that is non-self knowable.

The *parmāṇu* of *bhāṣā vargaṇā* were annihilated and modified into words. This does not happen due to the presence, *jñāna*, or desire of *jīva*. That momentary activity, in the form of destruction, is the modification of *jñeya*. *ātmā* neither takes nor leaves the states of body, mind, speech, or food.

There is a state of mutual absence in the present modification of one *pudgala* in the present modification of another *pudgala*. There is a state of complete absence of the modification of one sentient in the modification of another sentient. What can that substance, which is the form of absence in the other, do?

Ignorant *jīva* believes that because he has renounced food, so *dharma* has arisen, that if he stays in the shop, then the shop will run, that *rotī* is made because of the self, and the body functions due to him. However, the modification of non-sentient physical matter is due to their own self. Their origination-annihilation-permanence is due to them. *ātmā* is not the doer of their origination-annihilation-permanence, and other substances cannot do origination-annihilation-permanence of the *ātmā*.

If it is believed that work is done because of non-self, then the principle of ‘*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya yuktaṁ saṭ*’ cannot be proved.

Question: Is *ātmā nimitta* in the modification of non-self substance?

Answer: The momentary destruction of non-self knowable exists in its own modification. What use do they have of *nimitta*? *ātmā* does not have the taking or leaving of modification of non-self substance because those modifications of *jñeya* modify every *samaya* by themselves. Then, to believe that the body moved, or words were spoken, etc., due to *ātmā* is gross ignorance. If the modification of one substance were due to another substance, then, as the origination is due to non-self, the existence of origination will not be proved. As origination is not proved, annihilation and permanence will also not be proved. And if this were to occur, then the principle of ‘*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya yuktaṁ saṭ*’ will not remain.

In this universe, origination-annihilation-permanence of every substance is due to themselves and not due to the non-self. The presence of desire and knowledge in the modification *ātmā* is not due to non-self or speech. Here, it is called momentary modification in the form of annihilation. The word ‘*pravartatā*’ is used, which means two things. ‘It is’ and ‘modifying’. This does not mean that ‘it is’ or is ‘modifying’ due to non-

self. Modification of non-self substance does not enter *ātmā*. *ātmā* neither takes nor forsakes them; they are only knowables in the *jñāna* of *ātmā*.

Question: Is it not seen that *ātmā* accepts non-self directly?

Answer: This is a delusion. Modification of physical matter is within it, and modification of *ātmā* is in itself. Do you believe in non-self knowable? Or belief like the believer of *advaita vedāntī* (believer of the concept of the undivided one whole, the way it is in *vedānta*). However, when there are numerous *advaita*, cannot exist. Infinite non-self knowables are separate and independent. The modification of those *jñeyas* in each *samaya* changes independently. This is seen very evidently. If their change is believed to be due to non-self, then the situation of all substances being one will arise, or the erroneous belief of singular *advaita* will arise. So, this is a false belief.

Question: Though from the view of *niścaya*, *ātmā* does not accept non-self, but does it not do so from the view of *vyavahāra*?

Answer: If *ātmā* were to accept non-self from the view of *vyavahāra*, then *vyavahāra* itself would become *niścaya*. But this does not happen. *niścaya* is the absolute truth, and *vyavahāra* is an assumed statement. For example, though a pot is made of clay, if ghee (clarified butter) is filled in it, it is said to be a pot of ghee. Similarly, in the modification of non-self, the desire of *jīva* is said to be the cause, but it should be understood that *jīva* can do nothing in non-self. In *Samayasāra Nātaka*, it is said that –

*eka pariṇāma ke na kartā daraba doī,
do pariṇāma eka darava na dharatu hai.*

Meaning – the two substances, *ātmā* and body, do not combine to do one modification, and *ātmā* cannot do two modifications, one of attachment and the other the state of the body. If *ātmā* were taking non-self modification from the view of *vyavahāra*, then *vyavahāra* and *niścaya* would become one, or *vyavahāra* would become *niścaya*. If this were to happen, then the very nature of substance would be destroyed. So, this cannot happen.

Some ignorant may say that initially, there were no *jñeya* in this universe, and a God made them. But to believe this is incorrect. *jñeya* substances are the existence from eternity to infinity. A so-called Jain may say that a certain *jñeya* was not present, and the state of that *jñeya* arose because of him. But if this is believed, then the eternal nature of *jñeya* will not remain. So those who believe in the existence of the state of present modification due to non-self are like the ignorant who believe in God being a doer.

In this way, modifications of *jñeyas* occur every *samaya*, and their acceptance or forsaking is absent in *ātmā*. Therefore, *ātmā* is unmoving. *ātmā* is distinct from the non-self *jñeya*. Due to this *nimitta*, it is inseparable from the *jñāna* of self, which arises due to self, or it is a state of oneness. *jñāna* arises precisely the way the state of *jñeyas* arises and not in any other way. Additionally, *jñāna* is not because of those substances. *deva-guru-śāstra* are non-self knowables. Every *samaya*, their modifications are perishable. *jñāna* of *ātmā* does not arise due to them. Even then, due to the efficacy of *ātmā*, *jñāna* arises exactly the way knowables are. Here, the statement is that *jñāna* is due to the *nimitta* of the modification of *jñeyas*. But it has not been said that *jñāna* arose due to the *upādāna* of non-self. In other words, when *jñāna* arises due to the self-*upādāna*, then the *jñeyas* present at that time are called *nimitta*. Without the work arising in *upādāna*, who will be the *nimitta*? Ignorant says that work will occur in *upādāna* after the arrival of *nimitta*. In this belief, there is a gap of time between *nimitta* and *upādāna*. But this does not happen. There is no distinction of time, like first *nimitta* and then work in *upādāna*, or first *upādāna* and then *nimitta* would come. The time at which modification occurs in *upādāna*, *nimitta*, is alleged for it. This proves that both substances are present at the same *samaya*, and cause in one does not affect the other. Even then, the *jñāna* of modifying *jñeyas* is the same as the *jñeyas*. Not more or less. Therefore, there is a distinction of *ātmā* from non-self, and there is oneness in the *jñāna* related to non-self. In this way, there is oneness in *ātmā*. Because there is oneness, it is pure, and because it is pure, it is permanent, and because it is permanent, it is worth taking auspice of.

To have the *jñāna* of self *jñeya* and thereafter to experience it is *samyagdarśana*. Oneness in self-*jñeya* is because it is with *jñāna* and *darśana*. This verse is divine. Here, it is being told how *jīva* with *bhedajñāna* (discriminative knowledge) accepts the self-*jñeya*. The self being the nature of *jñāna* – it is the doer, and *jñāna* is its work done. *deva-guru-śāstra* is not *jñāna-darśana* of the self. Therefore, the focus should be shifted from them and held equanimously on the self, *ātmā*. Then the separation of self is one, and as it is one, it is pure, arises. This distinction from non-self-knowable is *samyakjñāna*. *jñānī* believes that *jñāna-darśana* of self is not one within *deva-guru-śāstra*, and they are not within the self. Whatever has been said by separating himself from non-self is merely a way of explanation. But the self does not have to separate itself from the non-self. On experiencing that he is with *jñāna-darśana*, he is one with the self, and purity arises. At the same time, oneness with non-self goes away.

Question: Is Samayasāra, etc., not based on *jñāna*?

Answer: No, Samayasāra is not the base of *jñāna*. *jñāna-darśana* is not one with the non-self substance. Modification of *jñāna* is not due to Samayasāra, and modification of Samayasāra is not due to *jñāna*. The attribute of *jñāna-darśana*, the base of efficacy, is the nature of that general substance, which is without modification. *jñānī* thinks in modification because the flow of thoughts is not present in the substance-attribute. There is no activity in substance-attribute; they are analogous to one nature. However, the modification's nature is not the same as the general substance. When modification leans towards the pure nature, and the flow of thought arises that the self is the holder of *jñāna-darśana*, it is not due to the non-self. The base of compassion-charity, which occurs with the focus on non-self, is not the *jñāna-darśana* of self. Then, modification becomes one with the nature of the self. When it is said that "I am", it automatically means that the non-self is 'not me.' Omniscient lord, *guru*, and *śāstra* are their own support-supported. *jñāna-darśana* of self is its *ādheya*, and self is its *ādihāra*. This support-supported relationship between the two exists independently. Non-self *jñeyas* are known in *jñāna*, but they have no relationship with *jñāna*. In this way, self-*jñeya* is the doer, and unblemished modification is its work, and they are both undivided. To know this *svajñeya* and believe in it is *samyagdarsana-jñāna*.

Due to it being the supreme non-sensory substance, the self-*jñeya* has oneness. *ātmā* does not do the activity of knowing words, taste, etc., through the five senses. *ātmā* does not know self and non-self through the senses. Nothing can be accomplished with the focus on Samayasāra, *divyadhvani*, or senses. The self does not know through the senses, and neither can it be known through them. The self is the supreme substance that is imperceptible through the senses. This nature of the self, where the self-substance is the doer, and the unblemished modification is the work done, both are undivided/similar. The self is separate from the senses, etc., and undivided from itself.

***ātmā* neither takes nor leaves the *jñeya* substances.** Except for *ātmā*, body-mind-speech, *deva-guru-śāstra*, etc., are by nature destructible substances every moment. Their modification is destroyed in a moment. This proves that *ātmā* neither takes nor leaves the *jñeya* substances.

Question: *dharmī jīva* does *pūjā* of the idol, right?

Answer: At the time of doing *pūjā*, although they do say the words, but the *dharmī* knows that from the view of *nīśacya ātmā* cannot say the words and can only have attachment to

pūjā. Auspicious attachment does arise at that time, but it is not due to the idol. Auspicious attachment arises to avoid an inauspicious state. That is *puṇya*, but not dharma. He who believes dharma to be in auspicious thoughts and the activity of the body is a false believer. Modification of the idol is destroyed every *samaya*; *ātmā* can neither take nor leave it. Neither attachment nor *jñāna-darśana* is due to *nimitta*. But *jñāna-darśana* occurs with the support of the self. If this is understood, and due to weakness, little attachment does arise, but that too is negated, then that is appropriate.

Auspicious thoughts, which were meant to be at whichever time, they are the ones that will arise, and at that time, *nimitta* is present in accordance with it, and none other. If it is asked what if some other *nimitta* is present? Then this question is incorrect. This is because no sequence ever breaks. There are innumerable types of auspicious and inauspicious dispositions.

1. At the time when the auspicious thoughts of compassion arise, at that time no other auspicious thoughts come. At that time, focus goes on the *jīva* who is *nimitta* in compassion, and not on any other *nimitta*.
2. At the time when auspicious thoughts of devotion are meant to arise, that is the time it will. At that time, focus goes on the idol, which is *nimitta* in devotion, and not on any other.
3. The point at which respect of *deva-guru-śāstra* is meant to rise, at that time only that will rise and nothing else. At that time, focus will go on *deva-guru-śāstra*, who are *nimitta* in that thought of respect, and will not go on any other *nimitta*.

There is an absence of taking or leaving those modifications of *nimittas* in the *ātmā*. *jñāna* will arise precisely the way the *nimittas* are. *jñāna* does not arise due to non-self substance. Even then, at that time, *jñāna* will arise exactly the way the *nimittas* are, due to its own self. To believe that *jñāna* arises due to the modification of non-self substance is the thorn of erroneous belief. This will not be destroyed without *ātmajñāna*. The *nimitta* of a magnet may be present when removing the needle lying on the stomach, but the needle comes out independently. Similarly, *ātmā* knows independently. When *jīva* believes this, then his thorn of erroneous belief is destroyed, and dharma manifests.

When *jīva* has the correct belief, then he experiences the pure nature of the self and leaves the erroneous beliefs. Earlier, when he did not know the unmoving nature of self, he believed himself to be the doer of taking and leaving non-self substances, and believed benefit through *nimitta*. However, with the correct understanding, he believes that there is a complete state of absence between the self and non-self substances. In an incomplete

state, auspicious thoughts do arise, but that does not mean that they are due to the *nimitta* of the non-self. It is also not that for auspicious thoughts, one has to go to the *nimitta*, and auspicious thoughts do not manifest *dharma*. Body, karma, etc., are non-self substances, and the self has no relationship with them because there is a complete absence of one in the other. They are not integrated into one another, but the self is one with the *jñāna* of these. When this correct *jñāna* arises, the self experiences its pure nature every *samaya* and leaves behind *mithyātva*.

Question: If fire touches the skin and it gets burned, will it not be painful?

Answer: Here, it is vital to understand the meaning of touch. ‘Touch’ implies proximity in terms of space. The substance-space-time-modification of the body and fire are separate. There is a state of absence of one in the other. So, the word ‘touch’ does not mean that two substances have merged to become one. Even though they are near each other, their respective space points are separate, which is why both are independent. The ignorant does not know that the cold state of skin was annihilated, and the hot state originated, and the *paramāṇu* remained as it is. The word ‘association’ signifies segregation. The ignorant believes himself to be in pain if he gets a boil. But that which is in a state of absence cannot give pain. If someone were to say that he saw a horn on a rabbit, but when there is an absence of a horn on a rabbit, how can that be seen? Similarly, how can it be that the fire burnt the self? As there is an absence of modification of fire and body in the *ātmā*, they cannot cause the *ātmā* any pain. To believe pain due to them is a delusion. To believe that the body is mine and the burning of the body is the burning of the self is sorrow.

Similarly, the modification of water is cold. In that, there is an annihilation of the modification of cold, origination of the hot state, and the *paramāṇu* is permanent. The origination and annihilation are of water, but the ignorant believe that it is due to fire. Origination-annihilation of water is due to water, not fire. Did the water get heated or the fire? The fire was always hot, and when the hot state of water originated, then the fire was the *nimitta* in it. There is no difference in time. If fire were to come first and then water would get hot, then there would be a difference in time between *nimitta* and *upādāna*. But this can never happen. At that time, when the modification of being hot of the water was originating, fire was the *nimitta*.

If one current modification were to be believed to be due to non-self, then there would be a state of destruction of infinite substances. *jīva*, who sees non-self-substances in the form of associations, sees self-substance also with associations. Whereas, *jīva* who sees the self

without associations sees all non-self substances also without associations. No one can take or leave, a changing modification of non-self substance. Hot modification of fire is corporeal, and *ātmā* is non-corporeal, so how can *ātmā* get hot? One fact that remains is that the *jñāna* of earlier modification changed to the *jñāna* that the state of the body is hot. But believing that because the present *jñāna* shows that there is a state of pain in the body, so *ātmā* also is in pain, is a delusion. Change in the body or the hot modification of water can be seen evidently. However, not accepting them to be independent and believing them to be due to non-self are delusions. If even one *samaya* of modification, be it in self or non-self, is to be believed to be due to non-self, then the incidence of destruction of the substance will arise.

Saints and *munis* say that the modification of every *samaya* is independent. Every modification of substance is due to itself. *ātmā* can neither take nor leave it. *jñāna* of self is due to the nature of self, and not due to any other. He who sees from the view of this focus of pure nature manifests dharma. Modification of non-self is variegated and hence is absent in self. The self is unmoving and is one with the modification of *jñāna*, which arises from the self. As it is at one, it is pure and unmoving. One must take the auspices of this unmoving self.

Thus, he who sees with this kind of focus on the pure nature of the self manifests true *jñāna* and dharma. Therefore, self-knowledge is the doer, and passionless modification is the work done. To focus on this knowable is *samyagdarśana*.

As there is a state of independence, As is oneness in the self-knowable. There, as there is an absence of dependency on the permanent knowables (substances), *ātmā* is independent. In the fourth point, by saying ‘*acala*’, it is stated to be separate from the modification of non-self. *tīrthaṅkara*, etc., knowables are constant and eternal. But *ātmā* is not dependent on these *jñeyas*. In the lower states, the auspicious thoughts of benediction of *deva-guru* do come, and there is a dependency on *deva-guru*, but this is a statement from the viewpoint of *vyavahāra*. *dharmī jīva* does not believe auspicious thoughts to be worthy of being dependent, then *tīrthaṅkara*, etc., are non-self substance, so how can the self-knowable be dependent on them? Therefore, *ātmā* is separate from non-self substances. But he has oneness with the *jñāna*, which has arisen due to these *nimittas*, because of the self. Therefore, there is a state of oneness between cause and work done. Independent *ātmā*-self *jñeya* is a doer, and passionless modification is work done. Oneness is pure, and pure is permanent, and that permanent is worth experiencing.

Here, the solution is stated on how *ātmā* can attain peace. Due to being independent, there is oneness in *ātmā*, and that is explained in this verse. This *ātmā* is the support of the nature of knowing, which is *jñāna*. It is the support of the nature of perception, which is *darśana*. Substance is *ādhāra* (support/base), attribute is *ādheya* (that which is supported), and modification is that which determines this. In other words, it should be decided with this verse that it is stated with five points, like independence, etc., that *ātmā* has oneness.

jīva desirous of attaining *mokṣa* should definitely ascertain this much.

1. The self does not have the auspice of non-self substance; it has the auspice of only the self. The one taking auspice is the attribute, one giving auspice is the eternal substance, and thoughts continue in the modification. This way, substance-attribute-modification together make a substance.
2. Substance-attributes are since eternity; they do not think anything, but modification does think. Initially, there was one thought, and now there is another thought. So, modification changes, and substance-attribute remain constant. *ātmā* is a constantly modifying substance; it is not unchanging.
3. The erroneous belief that self-*jñeya* is due to non-self *jñeya* and vice versa was due to the self and was in the modification. That was a delusion.
4. At the time of that delusional belief, there was a dependency on the senses and non-self substance. So, senses and other *jñeyas*, such as that delusion, have been present since eternity. But they are not *advaita* (not two but one).
5. As these *jñeyas* are in the form of that which will be destroyed in a moment, they are constantly changing. Hence, they are not singularly permanent.
6. Though modification keeps changing, the permanence of substance remains. So, substance is not singularly impermanent.
7. There was the wrong belief that work occurs due to the non-self. So, in that belief, *nimitta* has to be *kudeva*, *kuguru*, *kuśāstra*.
8. The true *deva-guru-śāstra* is the one that tells the truth that *ātmā* is beyond the senses and is without any dependency.
9. Initially, there was respect for the *kudeva*, *kuguru*, *kuśāstra*. Now, one respects the true *deva-guru-śāstra* by way of the focus on the self.
10. If it is said to leave the dependency on non-self and take auspices of self, then omniscient - the one who has taken the complete auspice of self and manifested the complete pure state, should be known.

11. Till the complete auspice of that self is not attained, one should believe in the state of those who are seeking to manifest that complete state, the seekers.
12. Should believe in true *śāstras*, which state *asti-nāsti anekānta*, which is, *dharma* arises with the auspice of the self, and *dharma* does not arise with the auspice of non-self knowables.
13. Leaving the focus of *kudeva*, *kuguru*, *kuśāstra*, the words of true *deva-guru-śāstra* should be heard with respect and humility. However, as they are non-self-knowable, *dharma* does not arise from them.
14. Initially, *jīva* used to believe *jñāna* through the senses. However, with the attainment of spiritual wisdom, it is now understood that *dharma* and happiness can be achieved by focusing on nature, which transcends the senses.
15. When it is ascertained without any doubt that the self is the nature of *jñāna*, which is beyond the senses, then the oneness of the substance-attribute is understood.
16. Though there is no distinction of space between substance and attribute, there is a distinction of name, number, characteristic, and purpose. If one attribute were to manifest, that does not mean that the other attributes will manifest immediately. However, attributes of *darśana-jñāna-cāritra* do open in this order.
17. The growth of those attributes is not dependent on non-self substances. But it is the *ātmā*. The one with attributes- *ātmā* – is the *ādhāra* (base/support), and the attribute is *ādheya* (the one receiving the support).
18. When *jīva*, by itself, takes the auspice of self, then the true *deva-guru-śāstra* is said to be *nimitta* by way of superimposition.
19. *ātmā* is eternally separate from non-self knowables, and it remains separate even in the state of *siddha*. It does not enter any other.
20. *jñāna* does not arise due to non-self *jñeya* but arises because the self is itself the substance with *jñāna*.

Substance is viewed in various ways, and its expedient decision should be made.

ātmā has no dependency on non-self substance and is one with the *jñāna* related to it. Hence, *ātmā* is pure. *jīvas* must ascertain the true nature of substances and should understand this from those who propagate the truth. To him who is seeking to know the truth, it is said that the existence of the self and the non-self knowable is separate. There is no dependency on non-self knowable; senses are separate from the self, and the self does not attain *jñāna* from the senses. But the self is one with the modification of *jñāna*, which arises due to their *nimitta*. Therefore, the self is one. As it is one, it is pure, and purity is permanence. Only that is worth experiencing.

ātmā is pure in this way because the *śuddhanaya*, which is related only to the sentient, denotes *ātmā* as only pure. Only the pure nature is experienced, and only takes its auspices. *puṇya-pāpa* are not accepted, so this only one, pure *ātmā*, being unchanging, is worthy of being experienced. *karma* is destroyed every *samaya*, and its origination-annihilation is within it. *ātmā* has never accepted *karma*, so it is not required to leave them. When the focus shifts away from the non-self, the desire for *puṇya-pāpa* diminishes. Due to this, there is an increase in purity, and this pure *ātmā* is worthy of being experienced. The omniscient *deva*, *guru* with no attachments, and true *śāstra* are all impermanent. A person desirous of *mokṣa* does not take its auspice to get obstructed. For example, if a person is travelling towards his town, whether there is the shade of a mango tree or that of a banyan tree, whether there is the aroma of a rose plant or a neem plant, he is not concerned with any of these. His goal is to reach only his town. He does not stop due to the shade or smell and is only excited about reaching his town. Similarly, *jīva*, on the path of *mokṣa*, walks on it himself. To attain the state of *siddha* is his target. On his way, whether he gets favourable or unfavourable possessions, he is unconcerned with it. Leave aside *kudeva-kuguru-kuśāstra*; he does not get stuck with the *sudeva-suguru-suśāstra*, because they are non-self impermanent substances. What benefit is derived from them? On the path of *mokṣa*, be it Samaysāra or Padmapurāṇa, be it Sammedaśikhara or Songadha, be it a hut or a bungalow, be it the Omniscient *deva* or a *kudeva*, what is his relation to them? All are impermanent, and he has no benefit from them. *jīvas* on the path of *mokṣa* leave all these impermanent substances and move forward on the path of *mokṣa* with zeal.

pravacana on bhāvārtha

ātmā, by nature of *jñāna*, *darśana*, is the supreme substance that knows everything without any dependency on senses. It neither takes nor leaves *parajñeya*-modifications. The origination of *karma*, the words of *bhagavāna*, and *kevalajñāna* of *bhagavāna* are all modifications of *jñeya*. The ignorant believe that the fruits of *karma* come in the *jīva*. But this is incorrect. When *jīva* turns towards the effort of moving towards the pure self, then distinctions such as *saṅkaramaṇa* (change of type) and *udīraṇā* (coming together) are seen in the modification of *karma*. It is incorrect to say that *ātmā* has a perturbed modification because of *karma*.

Thus, it is proved that as *ātmā* being independent from any non-self, it is independent, and as it is independent, it is pure, and as it is pure, it is permanent. That permanence is worth experiencing.

gāthā-193

अथाध्रुवत्वादात्मनोऽन्यत्रोपलभनीयमित्युपदिशति -

Now, the preaching is that due to impermanence, nothing other than *ātmā* is worth realising/attaining: -

देहा वा दविणा वा सुहदुक्खा वाध सत्तुमित्तजणा ।
जीवस्स ण संति धुवा धुवोवओगप्पगो अप्पा ॥१९३॥

dehā vā daviṇā vā suhadukkhā vādha sattumittajāṇā |
jīvassa ṇa saṃti dhuvā dhuvovaogappago appā || 193 ||

gāthā: Be it body, wealth/possessions, pleasure-pain, or friends-foes, none of these are eternal/permanent. Permanent is only *ātmā*, with *upayoga* (consciousness).

ṭīkā: That which is undivided from *paradravya*, and being sullied by *paradravya*, is separate from self *dharma* (attributes), is the cause for impurity, that (except for *ātmā*) none else is permanent. Because it is *asat* (transitory), being with *hetu* (being with cause) is with beginning and an end, and it is proven to be due to another substance. *ātmā*, it is with *upayoga* (manifestation of consciousness) and is pure. It being so, despite having association with the body, as the body is impermanent, it does not acquire/associate with the body and acquires/associates with the permanent, which is the pure self.

pravacana on gāthā-193

From *nigoda* to *pañcaparameṣṭhī*, and from *parmāṇu* to non-sentient great *skandha*, all substances are separate from the self-*ātmā*. When *jīva* focuses on the self, there is no perturbation, but when his focus is on the non-self, perturbation arises. At that time, non-self substances are called *nimitta*. This is because, with their focus, impurity arises rather than purity. So, the none can give auspice to the pur self. *ātmā* is the only permanent, and only that is the one to take auspice. Non-self substances are transient, are without any reason, are with a beginning and an end, and are proved due to another. Thereby *dharma* cannot manifest to them.

1. Non-self substances are non-existent; body, wealth, etc., have a beginning and an end, and they keep changing. The omniscient Lord goes to *mokṣa*, the guru too goes away to some other place, and the books remain as they are. There is an association of non-

self substances. So, they have a beginning, and they are also separated. So, they have an end. Due to this, non-self substances are said to be non-existent/transient.

2. At the same time, those substances are with a reason, because there is a *nimitta* for associations. karma is the *nimitta* in attaining body, wealth, etc. Auspicious karma is *nimitta* in getting *deva-guru-śāstra*. Some get the association of true *deva-guru-śāstra*, while some don't. Some may acquire wealth, while others don't. All these substances come due to the *nimitta* of another. Hence, it is said that another proves them, so they are not worth taking auspice.

Ignorant is not aware of the nature of the substance. His focus is on changing the modification of non-self substances. He connects the modification of non-self substance to his modification. But it is not worth conjoining with these momentary modifications because they will change. *dharma* cannot manifest with a focus on the changing state. However, the ignorant is unaware of the independence of the self-substance and the non-self substance.

The eternal pure. *ātmā* is existent and without any reason. *dharma* will arise, focusing on this.

1. As *ātmā* is without a beginning and an end. It exists and is not an associated substance.
2. *ātmā* is without any cause; it is not attained due to any *karma* or *nimitta*. It is without reason; hence, it is proved by itself.

When *jīva* understands correctly, he believes the modification of non-self to be associated with that substance; then the state of joining the modification of self to the self *ātmā* arises. *deva-guru-śāstra* is momentary, and they are left behind. So, it is not worth taking their auspice – in this way, when modification of non-self substance is separated from the modification of self, and is ascertained, and then focus is turned on one's existence, that which is without any reason, the substance which is since eternity and will be till infinity, and who is proved by his existence, then *dharma* arises. So only the unchanging *ātmā* is worth taking the auspices of.

Here, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* has explained very clearly that if one wants to follow *dharma*, then he must remove his focus from non-self substances. All substances, from family to *deva-guru*, from *tirthaṅkara* to *siddha jīva*, from one *paramāṇu* to the non-sentient substances which are *acetana maha skandha* (great mass of insentient matter), from

worldly books to the Samayasāra śāstra, all are proved by their own existence and have a beginning and an end. The way people come from different parts, meet, and go their separate ways. Similarly, family, *deva*, and *guru* are all forms of association. Therefore, they will be left behind, and as they are proven to be non-self, they are impermanent. *dharma* and happiness cannot arise when the focus is on them. Therefore, leave their focus and focus on the constant soul! Then *dharma* and peace arise.

Despite the presence of outer associations, the *dharmī jīva* does not focus on them. He focuses solely on the permanent, pure *ātmā*. Here, the point being discussed is where the focus of a *dharmī jīva* is. Body, mind, speech, *deva-guru-śāstra*, etc., all are impermanent, so their auspices cannot be taken. In this verse, it is explained that joy and sorrow are not permanent in the *ātmā*. Here, the meaning of joy and sorrow is the auxiliary cause of joy and sorrow, like body, wealth, *deva-guru*, etc. Many people say that wealth, etc., is not obtained by the *nimitta* of karma. But that is incorrect. Here, the explanation is that with the *nimitta* of pleasure and displeasure, the attainment of associations is in accordance with those *karmas*. *dharmī jīva* thinks that whether he gets the association of a disease-free body, the kingdom of an emperor, joy of being with the *devis*, or the sorrow of hell, he does not experience any of it. His focus is on the sentient, joyful, permanent nature. Be it the title of an *Indra* or a *cakravarti*, none is his. He believes himself to be of the nature that is with *jñāna-darśana*. Even though he has wealth, body, and kingdom, he has no interest in them. His interest is only in the permanent *ātmā*.

gāthā-194

अथैवं शुद्धात्मोपलम्भात्किं स्यादिति निरूपयति -

Now, what is gained by the attainment of the pure *ātmā*? -

जो एवं जाणित्ता झादि परं अप्पगं विसुद्धप्पा।
सागारोऽणागारो खवेदि सो मोहदुग्गंठि ॥१९४॥

jo evaṃ jāṇittā jhādi paraṃ appaggaṃ visuddhappā |
sāgāroḌṇāgāro khavedi so mohaduggaṇṭhiṃ || 194 ||

tīkā: He, who, having known thus and becoming the pure *ātmā*, meditates on the highest supreme *ātmā*; whether he is with *sākāra upayoga* (differentiating quality of knowledge) or with *nirākāra upayoga* (non-differentiating quality of perception), he annihilates *moha-durgranthi*-evil knot/bondage of *moha* (delusion).

tīkā: He, who, through this aforesaid method, knows the pure, steadfast *ātmā*, by way of the pure state, has the inclination towards the pure self; due to this (or with the attainment of this pure state of *ātmā*) there is a singular experience characteristic of meditation/focus which is of the sentient supreme *ātmā* which is with infinite attributes/efficacies. Hence (by virtue of that meditation) the person actively occupied with *sākāra-upayoga* (*jñānaopayoga*) or with *aṇākāra-upayoga* (*darśanaopayoga*), both being experienced as one, the single point concentrated realization on the eternal/constant self *ātmā* is manifested, and the evil knot of *moha* (delusion) bound very tightly since eternity to mundane (transmigration) existence moves away.

Thus, it is said that unfastening the knot of delusion (unfastening of the knot in the form of *darśana moha*) is the fruit of the attainment of the pure state of *ātmā*.

pravacana on gāthā – 194

According to the method mentioned above, one who moves away from the non-self-knowable and looks towards the self-knowable, his activity is in the pure *ātmā*. *nimitta* has a beginning and end and is externally proven. Whereas *ātmā* is from eternity till infinity and self-proven by knowing so, being one with the self's knowing-seeing nature, pure *ātmā* is realized. But *ātmā* cannot be realized by tending towards *vyavahāra* and non-self substances. Non-self-substance is transient and not worth harboring; only self-*ātmā* is

worth harboring and reflecting upon. Alertness should be for the meditative; in other words, experience is the characteristic of meditation. Here, one pure *ātmā* devoid of *pūnya-pāpa*, *nimitta*, and circumstances is aimed; that experience is called meditation. Because it is a mass of infinite efficacies, from that, *kevalajñāna*, *kevaladarśana*, infinite bliss, and infinite effort are manifested. In this way, meditation is for the realization of pure *ātmā*.

Clarification of *sākāra* and *anākāra upayoga*

sākāra upayoga: - This is a body, this is a *jīva*, this is a human-sentient, knowing by way of such division is called *sākāra upayoga*.

anākāra upayoga: - this is a *jīva*, this is *ajīva* – without creating such a division, perception of being-ness is called *anākāra upayoga*.

Delusion is destroyed only by meditation — one with *sākāra* as well as *anākāra upayoga* experiences one subject. Meditation is the pursuit, and alert sentience is the characteristic. *ātmā* is only knowing-seeing pure nature. He is not the doer of non-self; attachment-aversion is not his nature. By knowing this, one who is alert towards one's constant *ātmā* and meditates, experiences, and realizes dharma, his eternal tied knot of delusion is destroyed. Focusing on nature, delusion does not rise, and then it is said that delusion is destroyed.

Here, a *mumukshu* has more responsibility. The word ‘prescribed method’ is in the verse. This method can only destroy delusion. If an ignorant person believes any other method apart from this, like dharma in *pūnya*, dharma from *nimitta*, or dharma through *deva-śāstra-guru*, these are not the correct methods. These are false methods. A discerning person has lost interest in money, body, etc., because they are not constant, and it is not worth taking their auspice. While he believes in true *deva-guru-śāstra*, he does not believe dharma arises because of them. He understands this method because dharma arises because of the self's efforts. When he puts in the effort, true *deva-guru-śāstra* is *nimitta*, but he knows dharma does not occur due to that *nimitta*.

In the same way, if a *jīva* always says material possessions are not obtained due to the *nimitta* of pleasure-producing karma, it is received on its own without any *nimitta*. Or, if someone argues that societal dispensation is not correct because of this, a poor person does not have money, whereas a wealthy person has a lot of money. But this belief is also not true.

1. Money, etc., insentient substances move from one place to another because of themselves, in that pleasure-pain-producing karmas are *nimitta*. A *jīva* who does not believe in karma in the form of *nimitta* has a false belief.
2. Two divisions are seen – wealthy and poor - in that *nimitta* is the karma of those *jīvas*. As a result, such circumstances arose. A *jīva* who believes that he can give money to someone else and create a proper societal arrangement is grossly ignorant because *ātmā* does not have the strength to change the insentient substance and remove auspicious and inauspicious karma. It is a false belief – that he can improve society's dispensation and make people happy. Even if by chance *paramānus* of insentient money are received because of the conjunction of *pūnya*, then also there is no bliss in them because bliss does not occur due to non-self-substance.

A *mumukshu jīva* believes that every *jīva* gets riches, etc., outer circumstances according to their karma. Even if there is a conjunction of pleasure-producing karma, his focus is not on it. A *jñāni* never focuses on - favorable or adverse situations, whether it is *vajravrisabhanārāca saṁhanana* (body), or regular *saṁhanana*. He concentrates on his pure nature, easily leaving interest in auspicious and inauspicious dispositions and focus on circumstances. With the increase in purity, delusion is destroyed.

Beliefs of an ignorant –

1. An ignorant *jīva* does not contemplate the self's sentient substance and focuses on the non-self-substances. He believes he can change the non-self and have bliss, but this is his illusion. Whether he believes or not, the arrangement of non-self-substance never changes. Whichever substance at whatever time has to come in the form of circumstances is undoubtedly bound to come; no one can change that.
2. An ignorant person believes in the pleasure of obtaining wealth, etc., favorable items because of the rise of *pūnya*. Believing pleasure in external substance is painful and is a state of dependency. However, an ignorant person does not feel pain in that regard.
3. An ignorant person wants to run away from adverse substances and be away from them. But what does he want to be away from? Oh! Your nature is absent from the non-self in all three time phases. From whom do you want to be away?
4. An ignorant person believes in dharma by moving away from circumstances. However, non-self substance is itself self-proven by its non-existence in the self. Whom will he remove? None of the substance has entered the self.

5. There are innumerable types of auspicious and inauspicious dispositions. Whatever kind of auspicious disposition is to rise will rise accordingly, and at that time, its relevant *nimitta* will be present. Then what will you change? Will you change the attachment? Or change the *nimitta*?

In reality, the sequence of substance is as it is. Only the notion needs to be changed. It is worthwhile to move away from non-self-substance and view the self-nature. A *dharmi jīva* thinks that non-self substance is self-evident but is not constant.

1. Whichever substance is meant to be received at a specific time will be received only then. There is no change in its sequence because they modify sequentially. A *jñāni* is just a knower.
2. A *jñāni* does not believe in happiness while having the *nimitta* of *pūnya* because he has left the auspice of non-constant.
3. A *jñāni* does not have an aversion towards adverse *nimitta* because he has left the support of non-self substances and has an interest in the self. Here, the imperfection of instability is taken as secondary.
4. A *jñāni* does not focus on the removal of non-self substances, because it is not in his hand. While focusing on his nature, his attachment reduces.
5. A *jñāni* does not focus on auspicious-inauspicious dispositions because the attitude of bringing change is being *paryāyadrīti*. By focusing on one's nature, attachments naturally fall away.

The notion of removing attachment is an illusion. When attachment has not occurred, how can it be removed? By focusing on nature, focus on the non-self moves away. With which attachment mellows by infinite parts automatically, it does not have to mellow the attachment – the state of dharma arises from such a perception. Then, there is no discussion of changing the *nimitta*, altering the circumstances, removing adverse circumstances, or creating favourable circumstances. There is no discussion on the absence of non-self or changing auspicious-inauspicious dispositions. The talk focuses on the importance of just being in nature.

This way, when a *dharmi jīva*'s focus intensifies toward nature, he achieves the pure *ātmā*. On attaining the pure *ātmā*, *dhyāna* occurs, and with *dhyāna*, delusion is destroyed.

gāthā-195

अथ मोहग्रन्थिभेदात्किं स्यादिति निरूपयति -

Now, “what happens when *moha-granthi* (evil knot of delusion/infatuation) is broken/unfastened?” This is explained: -

जो णिहदमोहगंठी रागपदोसे खवीय सामण्णे ।
होजं समसुहदुक्खो सो सोक्खं अक्खयं लहदि ॥१९५॥

jo ñihadamohagaṇṭhī rāgapadose khavīya sāmaṇṇe |
hojjaṃ samasuhadukkho so sokkhaṃ akkhayaṃ lahadī || 195 ||

gāthā: He, who has destroyed the knot of *moha* (delusion), who has annihilated *rāga-dveṣa* (attachment-aversion) and remains indifferent to pleasure and pain, evolving in the condition of a *śramaṇa* (monk), attains eternal-imperishable bliss (*sukha*).

ṭīkā: By destroying *moha-granthi* (evil knot of delusion), the annihilation of *rāga-dveṣa* (attachment-aversion) takes the place of that (knot of delusion), which is the root; and due to that, he, who counts pleasure and pain as the same, evolves into true monkhood - the characteristic of which is perfect equanimity. From that evolution (into monkhood), imperishable/endless bliss is attained/realised, the characteristic of which is the complete absence of perturbation. Thus, (it is said that) by breaking the knot of delusion, an imperishable, endless bliss form of fruit is attained.

pravacana on gāthā-195

Gain or loss occurs due to non-self substance; dharma occurs due to *pūnya*—such beliefs are the knots of delusion. On the destruction of such delusion, attachment, and aversion are destroyed. Because the root cause of attachment aversion is erroneous beliefs. Without the destruction of delusion, attachment and aversion are never destroyed. A *jīva* who believes that attachment-aversion can be reduced without proper understanding has a false belief. The way by plucking the leaves and throwing them, a tree cannot be destroyed because the leaves will grow again in the next two to three months. But when a tree's root is destroyed, the leaves dry up, and the tree will never grow again. Similarly, an ignorant *jīva*, without understanding, fasts, does penance, takes vows, then mellow passions are seen, but transmigration does not stop. Transmigration ends when this *jīva* destroys the root of the delusion of believing in gain or loss from non-self. Therefore, one who wants to destroy

attachment-aversion should initially destroy faith-deluding karma. Because without the destruction of false belief, attachment-aversion is not destroyed; without their destruction, *cāritra* does not arise, and without *cāritra*, liberation is not attained.

This chapter is on the knowable. Focusing on the non-self-knowable causes impurity, and focusing on the self-knowable destroys impurity. The self-knowable is separate from the non-self; therefore, it is one. Being one, it is pure. Being pure, it is constant, which is the only thing worth experiencing. With this, delusion is destroyed. In this way, who takes the auspice of the self-knowable and manifests *samyagdarśana*, on attaining stability, the state of *cāritra* manifests. *daṁṣaṇa mūlo dhammo* – *cāritra* is direct dharma. The root of that dharma is *samakita*. Removing the inclination from non-self-knowable, realization and knowledge of self-knowable is *samyagdarśana* and *jñāna*. In this way, a *jīva* who realizes the self and stabilizes within manifests the state of *cāritra*, and upon its manifestation, attachment and aversion are destroyed.

With this method, a *muni* destroys attachment and aversion. That *muni* assumes supreme equanimity. Characteristic of religious austerity (*srāmaṇya*); in other words, the state of being a *muni* is supreme equanimity. The manifestation of equanimity in the fourth *gunasthāna* does not imagine bliss and pain in favourable and adverse conditions. Does not believe in dharma due to the body's activities and *pūnya*. Dharma is in true realization of self-knowable – such discretion of self-knowable and non-self-knowable was already there in the fourth *gunasthāna*. But, now, in the state of monkhood, with exceptional stability, the disposition of instability does not arise. If someone inflicts pain on the body, he still does not have hatred, and if anyone applies sandalwood on the body, he does not have attachment towards him. Respect is good, disrepute is bad, a healthy body is good, and an unhealthy body is terrible – it does not allow such thoughts of instability to occur in the self's knowing nature. This is why a *muni* manifests supreme equanimity – a *muni* has such a characteristic of supreme equanimity. He remains merely a knower-seer of the external occurrence of bliss and pain. It does not allow such conduct to arise. See! This is called *muni's* state. The characteristic of *srāmaṇya* is called supreme equanimity. But it is not said that the characteristics of *srāmaṇya* are nakedness, keeping a peacock feather, following the five great vows, and having twenty-eight basic rights of a *muni*. Peacock feathers and the state of nakedness are non-self-knowable; the discussion here is not about them.

Thus, a muni achieves imperishable, indestructible happiness by having exceptional stability within. The characteristic of this happiness is the absence of anxiety. An ignorant person believes he has pleasure in money, his son-wife, and the forest, but all these are anxiety in the form of pain. In this way, a *muni* attains peaceful equanimity by engrossing in his nature and attains happiness and liberation.

Thus, leaving the focus on non-self-knowable and having belief-knowledge of self-knowable is *samyagdarśana-jñāna*. Conduct arises due to this, and equanimity in the form of conduct leads to attaining imperishable bliss.

With this distinction of the knot in the form of delusion, meaning with the destruction of *mithyātva*, indestructible bliss is attained.

gāthā-196

अथैकाग्रसञ्चेतनलक्षणं ध्यानमशुद्धत्वमात्मनो नावहतीति निश्चिनोति -

Now, it is ascertained that *dhyāna* is characterized as a single-point concentrated realisation of the eternal constant self-*ātmā*, and it does not bring impurity in the *ātmā*; -

**जो खविदमोहकलुसो विसयविरत्तो मणो णिरुंभित्ता ।
समवट्ठिदो सहावे सो अप्पाणं हवदि झादा ॥१९६॥**

*jo khavidamohakaluso visayaviratto maṇo ṇirumbhittā |
samavaṭṭhido sahāve so appā ṇaṃ havadi jhādā || 196 ||*

gāthā: He, who has destroyed the dirt/taints of delusion, has detached himself from objects of senses, has restrained his mind, and is equanimous in his own nature; he is meditating self *ātmā*.

tīkā: The self has destroyed the dirt/taints of delusion, and for whom there is an absence of attachments to the object of the senses, which is the root of the dirt of *moha*. Due to this (or due to complete detachment from desire for senses), like a bird living on a ship in the middle of the sea, due to the complete absence of changing substances as support and there being no other refuge, such thoughts/activities of mind is annihilated (i.e.in, the absence of any other ship, tree or land, etc., the bird sitting on that ship having no other refuge/resting place in the mid-ocean stops flying. Similarly, due to detachment from objects of sensual pleasures, no other substance remains as a resting place for taking refuge, and the mind/ thought activity is annihilated. Therefore, owing to the annihilation of thought activity, fickleness, whose root is the mind, also disappears, and his mind (attention) is established in his own eternal constant/nature, which is possessed of unlimited intrinsic sentience. And that being entrenched in one's own eternal sentient nature, arising in self-nature, as an unperturbed, singular concentrated realisation self, it is called *dhyāna* (meditation).

From the above exposition, it is ascertained that *dhyāna*, being well established in the self's own intrinsic nature, is *ātmā* itself as it is identical to it. Hence, it is not the cause of impurity.

pravacana on gāthā-196

Believing gain-loss due to non-self matter is *darśana-moha*, and attachment to the activity of non-self matter is *cāritra-moha*. One who has eliminated *darśana-moha* and *cāritra-moha* is free from attachment to non-self matter.

1. The root of *cāritra* (right conduct) is *samyag darśana* (right perception). The *jīva* that experiences the true nature of *jñāna*, to him *cāritra* in the form of inner joy manifest. However, without *samyag darśana*, *cāritra* does not manifest.
2. The root of attachment and aversion is *darśana-moha*. The cause of attachment-aversion is delusion, which arises from a mistaken perception of oneness with external objects. Without the removal of *darśana-moha*, attachment-aversion cannot be eliminated.
3. The root of attachment to non-self substances is delusion-attachment-aversion. The tendency toward the body, mind, speech, deities, gurus, and scriptures, apart from the *ātmā*, has two causes:
 - (A). The tendency that arises from perceiving gain and loss from non-self objects is rooted in *darśana-moha*.
 - (B). The tendency to move toward non-self objects, not perceiving gain or loss from them, but due to one's own weakness, is rooted in *cāritra-moha-rāga-dveṣa*. (delusion of conduct-attachment-aversion).

The *munis* have eliminated delusion-attachment-aversion, and hence they do not engage in the activity of the non-self. Due to the absence of attachment-aversion, they are detached from the non-self substance. The *ātmā* is self-knowing, while everything else is non-self-knowable. That self-knower, who has the belief-knowing of the pure sentient *ātmā*, removing erroneous belief, has intense immersion in the self; his focus does not go on the non-self substance, and hence his attachment and aversion are destroyed.

Just as a lone bird sitting on a ship in the middle of the ocean has no support other than the ship, and thus remains fixed there without relying on any tree or land, similarly, the *munis*, not having focus on non-self substances, are deeply engrossed in their self-state. Therefore, their mind has support of no other substance, but stays focused solely on the *ātma-dṛavya* (self-substance), and hence the activity of the mind stops. The root of restlessness is the mind, and when the mind is restrained, restlessness does not arise. Support of the mind leads to *punya* (merit) and *pāpa* (demerit), while auspice of *ātmā* leads to liberation.

Restlessness is called *bhāva-mana* (emotional mind/thoughts), and the shape of the *aśṭadala-kamala* (eight-petaled lotus) is called *dravya-mana* (physical mind). Initially, one must renounce the external supports, such as *deva*, *guru*, *śāstra*, body, family, and other non-self substances. But now, one must also renounce the support of the internal *dravya-man*, which is the form of non-self knowable. When the mind's attachment is broken, restlessness is destroyed, and with the destruction of restlessness, firm stability of the

infinite *jñāna-darśana* (knowledge and perception) of self arises. Being firmly established in the *ātmā* activity within the self and by focusing solely on the unperturbed one *ātmā*, and keeping it to the fore, brings liberation.

In this way, by making a discerning *śraddhā-jñāna* (belief and knowledge) of the distinction between the *parajñeya* (other-knowing) and *svajñeya* (self-knowing), one attains *samyakdarśana* (correct perception), leading to the destruction of *darśanamoha* (delusion in perception). After the destruction of *darśanamoha*, when one is established in *ātmā*, *cāritramoha* (delusion in conduct), i.e., attachment-aversion is also destroyed. With the destruction of delusion, attachment, and aversion, there is an absence of tendency towards non-self substances. This absence of a tendency towards non-self substance results in the cessation of the mind's restlessness. When the restlessness of the mind is absent, then the focus is on *ātmā*, and then *dhyāna* arises. Then one attains the fruit of *dhyāna*, in the form of *kevalajñāna* and the state of *siddha*. When there is concentration in the *ātmā*, it is called *dhyāna* (meditation), and the result of *dhyāna* is the attainment of *kevalajñāna* (omniscient knowledge) and the *siddhapada* (state of liberation).

Question: When the *kevali bhagavāna* has attained the perfect state and *ananta catuṣṭaya* (infinite fourfold state) and knows the objects of the three worlds and the three times simultaneously, there is nothing left for them to do. Then why is their state still referred to as *śukla-dhyāna* (pure meditation)?

Answer: Although the *arhamta* (embodied *bhagavāna*) knows all substances of the three worlds and all that pertains to the three times simultaneously, and their eighteen flaws have been destroyed, they have not yet attained the perfect self-knowing state (*svajñeya*). There still remains some impurity in their *yoga-guṇa* (attribute of movement) and *pratiṣṭhā-guṇa* (residual qualities), etc., and they still have some remaining non-destructive karmas. Hence, there is some imperfection in their self-nature. For this reason, the *Arhat* remains in the state of *dhyāna*. The state of *siddha* is a state of perfect purity and *svajñeya*, and there is no *dhyāna* there. Since *Arhamta* still has some impurities, *dhyāna* remains. To explain the true nature of such *jñeya*, the concept of the *śukla-dhyāna* of *Arhamta* is taken in the chapter on *jñeya*.

अथोपलब्धशुद्धात्मा सकलज्ञानी किं ध्यायतीति प्रश्नमासूत्रयति -

Now, the question raised in this *gāthā sūtra* (stanza) is - as to “what does the possessor of complete knowledge (omniscience) who has attained/realised the pure self (*śuddhātmā*) contemplate?

**णिहदघणघादिकम्मो पच्चक्खं सव्वभावतच्चण्हू ।
णेयंतगदो समणो ज्ञादि कमट्ठं असंदेहो ॥१९७॥**

*ṇihadaghaṇaghādikammo paccakkhaṃ savvabhāvataccaṇhū |
ṇeyamtagado samaṇo jhādi kamaṭṭhaṃ asaṃdeho || 197 ||*

gāthā: What does the *śramaṇa* (great monk), who has annihilated the dense, destructive karmic-matter, who knows directly the realities of all existing substances, who has reached the end/limit of the knowables (objects of knowledge), and who is free from doubts, meditate upon?

tikā: Mundane being/ordinary man, owing to the existence of delusion (*moha*) is full of longings and owing to having hindrance for the energy of knowledge, does not have direct knowledge, so he does not know objects in a well-defined way, clearly - thus he is seen contemplating objects of which he is desirous of, curious and in doubt of. But the revered all-knowing Lord- omniscient, owing to having destroyed the dense, destructive karmic matter, in the absence of delusion, has eradicated all longings and, in the absence of hindrances of energy of knowledge, knows all objects (realities of all existences) directly, and he has attained the end/limit of all knowables. Therefore, the omniscient Lord does not have any desire, curiosity, or doubt. How can there be objects that He desires, is curious about, or doubts? (Hence the question is) “In such a condition, what does he contemplate?”

bhāvārtha: Mundane being, owing to having existence of deluding karma, is full of longings; therefore, he has the desire of a favourable object, and owing to having existence of knowledge-obscuring karma, does not know many objects, and whichever object he knows, he does not know it distinctly, minutely-explicitly. Therefore, he has a desire/curiosity to know the unknown object. Moreover, he has doubts about the object, which is known indistinctly. It being so, contemplation about objects which he desires, is curious about and is doubtful of is not possible; but omniscient Lord, owing to absence of

deluding karma, is free from longing, so he has no desire; and owing to absence of knowledge-obscuring karma, he knows all objects and knows each and every object minutely-explicitly- completely, so he has no curiosity and no doubt; thus, He the omniscient has no desire, curiosity or doubt about any object. In these circumstances, “what does he contemplate/meditate upon?”

pravacana on gāthā-197

Because non-omniscient *jīvas* have delusion and ignorance, they have *dhyāna*.

1. A false believer who is amiable toward delusion is seen as greedy. He tries to move away from the non-self and towards the self.
2. Non-omniscient *jīvas* have an incomplete state. Its reason is knowledge deluding karma. Because of this, they cannot directly and subtly know all substances. Therefore, when there is a desire to learn about substance, then to know them, and when there is a doubt about a substance, then to decide about them, they are seen meditating. In the lower state, attachment is also present. Therefore, they are seen meditating to destroy *rāga*. We can understand the reason for meditation in the *jīvas* in the incomplete state.

This discussion was about non-omniscient, but (*arhanta*) is omniscient. He has destroyed four obscuring karmas – knowledge deluding, faith deluding, delusionary, and obstructive karmas.

1. There is the absence of delusion in God; a passionless state has arisen in him, and he has no craving.
2. The state of omniscience has arisen in him. He knows three time phases and three *lokas* in one *samaya* as if they are in the palm of a hand (*hastāmalakavat*). He knows the nature of all substances directly; he has crossed the knowables. He has no desire, no inclination, or any type of doubt. Hence, he doesn’t require *dhyāna* to fulfil the desire to know or to remove any doubt. Then why should He meditate?

A student inquires about this out of curiosity about the unique nature of *arhanata*.

Ordinary people of this world have the desire to know due to the *nimitta* of delusion, and their capability. That is why they have a passion for some substance or another, and because of their ability and *nimitta* in the form of knowledge deluding karma, they cannot know many substances. They do not know those substances subtly. Therefore, there is inquisitiveness in knowing what is not known, and there is doubt about substances that are

not known clearly. Due to this, they have *dhyāna* of substance with desire, inclination, and doubt.

Whereas there is an absence of *mohaniya karma* in the form of *nimitta* in the omniscient *bhagāvana*, and because of his capability, there is passionlessness. Therefore, in the absence of desire, omniscience has manifested, and *nimitta* in the form of knowledge deluding karma is not present. That is why *bhagāvana* knows all the substances exceptionally perfectly. Hence, he has no desire, inquisitiveness, or doubt; then, is it possible to have *dhyāna* of any substance?

See! The disciple is so worthy that he knows the nature of *arhanata*. He believes *bhagāvana* to be passionless; He has no desire and is perfect. One who thinks *bhagāvana* has a disease or eats food does not know the nature of *bhagavāna*. *bhagāvana* is free from disease, sorrow, fear, etc., all faults, and he has nothing more left to be known – after accepting this, the disciple asks whose *dhyāna* does *bhagāvana* do?

अथैतदुपलब्धशुद्धात्मा सकलज्ञानी ध्यायतीत्युत्तरमासूत्रयति -

Now, in this *gāthā-sūtra*, the answer to the question raised above (in *gāthā* 197) is given. That he who has attained/realized the *śuddhātmā* (pure self *ātmā*), He the all-knowing Lord (omniscient) meditates on/experiences *parama saukhya* (the highest/supreme bliss): -

**सव्वाबाधविजुत्तो समंतसव्वक्खसोक्खणाणङ्गो ।
भूदो अक्खातीदो ज्ञादि अणक्खो परं सोक्खं ॥१९८॥**

*savvābādhavijutto samantāsavvakkhasokkhaṇaṇaḍḍho |
bhūdo akkhātidō jhādi aṇakkho paraṃ sokkhaṃ || 198 ||*

gāthā: He (the omniscient), being free from all hindrances/obstructions, being completely rich in knowledge and bliss, being non-sensory and having no (knowing through) senses; meditates on the highest bliss (supreme happiness).

ṭīkā: When this *ātmā*, as a result of the absence of sensory activities which are abodes of obstructions to the *ātmā*'s intrinsic bliss and knowledge and are abodes of certain types of (but not of all kinds of) happiness and knowledge in certain spatial units but not in all spatial-units of *ātmā*, it itself modifies without sense-organs. Then immediately, he, being beyond comprehension of the sense-organs of others, becoming the possessor of hindrance-free intrinsic bliss and knowledge, and becoming totally free from all obstructions and quite full of all sorts of bliss and knowledge in all spatial units of *ātmā*; he is rich with complete bliss and knowledge in all spatial units of *ātmā*. Thus, the evolved *ātmā*, though there being no possibility of arising any desire, curiosity, and doubt, meditates on the highest happiness-unprecedented and being characterized by lack of perturbation, i.e., he remains engrossed and steady in experiencing a single-point concentration of self (soul) accompanied by the absence of perturbation. And such a state of self is, indeed, the attainment of *siddhatva* (disembodied omniscient state of perfection) – a manifestation of the soul's intrinsic nature of knowledge and bliss.

bhāvārtha: A question was raised in previous *gāthā*-197 that, since the all-knowing Lord (omniscient) has no desire, curiosity, or doubt about anything, then what object does he meditate on? The answer to this question is given in this *gāthā* - *dhyāna* (meditation) is to experience a single object with a concentration of attention on that particular object. The

all-knowing Lord, who is possessed of fully manifested bliss and knowledge in all spatial units of *ātmā*, experiencing the self-*ātmā*, has perception/ knowing of only one subject, along with the highest bliss; so, he meditates on the highest bliss, that is, he observes meditating on (experiencing) the highest blissful state.

pravacana on gāthā-198

kevalī bhagavāna, himself, is in the state of atīndriya (beyond senses). In the lower stages, as the focus is on the non-sentient senses, it works as an obstruction to the state of natural happiness and *jñāna*. Until then, *sukha* and *kevalajñāna* cannot occur. Senses are *nimitta* in worldly pleasures, which, from the view of absolute truth, is *dukha*. Senses are *nimitta* only in them, not in the *ātmā*'s *jñāna* and *sukha*. The focus of *bhagavāna* has shifted entirely away from the senses; although the body and insentient senses exist, they are said to be absent. Thus, *bhagavāna* dwells in a non-sensory state by himself.

kevalī bhagavāna is beyond the senses, even for others - *kevalī bhagavāna* cannot be known through the senses. Only his body and speech can be known through the senses, but they are not the nature of *Bhagavāna*. An *ātmā* who looks at his nature, which is beyond senses and mind, can know *Bhagavāna*. Seeing *Bhagavāna* externally is not seeing him. *kevalī bhagavāna* is known through *ātmā*'s *jñāna*; therefore, he is preter-sensual.

Every spatial point of *kevalī bhagavāna* is filled with knowledge and bliss – *bhagavāna* has attained a state free from obstruction, which is perfect, with absolute joy, and knowledge. In the lower stages, worldly joy was with impediment. Whereas, here, in which no obstruction occurs, such an absolute, unperplexed bliss has manifested. Meanwhile, in the incomplete state, the activity of *jñāna* can be seen in specific *pradeśas*. Now, *kevalajñāna* manifests from innumerable space points of *ātmā*. *kevalī bhagavāna*'s *ātmā* is enriched with infinite bliss and knowledge, so he has no inclination, curiosity, or doubt.

kevalī bhagavāna has śukladhyāna till the perfect state of siddha does not occur – *kevalī bhagavāna* has *śukladhyāna* till the perfect *siddha* state does not occur, because he is steady in the experience of the tranquil form on the subject of *ātmā*. Despite this being so, *kevalī bhagavāna* meditates on the supreme bliss whose characteristic is uniqueness and an unperplexed state. By staying in this state of *ātmā*, the state of *siddha* in the pure nature of *jñāna-ananda* manifests. *arhanta bhagavāna* does not need to do the *dhyāna* which is found in the mundane state. However, the supreme immense *sukha* has not yet manifested; the impurity of the *yoga* attribute remains. Impurity of the four *partijīvī guṇas* is present in His modifications. The nature to rise upwards has not yet manifested in its complete purity.

ātmā of *arhaṇta bhagavāna* does have this much incompleteness, and in the form of *nimitta*, the four non-obscuring *karmas* remain. To remove this incompleteness, He (*kevalī bhagavāna*, who has attained the thirteenth *guṇasthāna*) does not need any thought or effort like the mundane *jīva*. As *ātmā* remains stable in its own experience of self, impurity is destroyed in a sequential order, and the state of *siddha* manifests.

As *bhagavāna* is steady in the one-self, it is called *śukladhyāna*. This much impurity *bhagavāna* has due to His own self. This should be accepted. It is incorrect to say that the impurity is due to the non-obscuring *karmas*. According to the efficacy of the *upādāna* (primary cause) of that *samaya*, *kevalī bhagavāna*, who is in the thirteenth *guṇasthāna*, has not yet become *siddha*, hence He has been said to be with *dhyāna*.

When it will be called that belief in *ātmā* and *pañcaparmeṣṭhī* exists - *jīvas* who want to believe in and know about their *ātmā* and *pañcaparmeṣṭhī* have to accept the points below.

1. The state of a *muni* cannot be achieved by wearing clothes and keeping vessels, and being naked without *samyagdarśana* is also not a state of a *muni*. The manifestation of purity by play in the inner nature, together with *samyagdarśana*, along with the *digambara* state, is called the state of a *muni*.
2. *kevalajñāna* cannot manifest while being a householder or in the modification of a woman. A man's body and sky-clad *digambara* state is always there when *kevalajñāna* manifests, and there can be nothing else.
3. *kevalī bhagavāna* never experiences pain, disease, etc., does not think of imparting discourse to others, and has a perfect, passionless state both internally and externally, possessing a perfect *audārika* body without bondage. The Om *divyadhvani*, without any words, emanates without any desire.
4. All *ātmās* together cannot become one. Each *ātmā* remains distinct and independent. *ātmā* has infinite attributes, not just one. It is not so that if one attribute achieves completeness, all the other attributes will attain completeness simultaneously. The evolution of attributes occurs sequentially; we must accept this independence of attributes.
5. A substance is not solely non-dual, but it is dual-non-dual. A substance is one, yet it appears numerous from the perspective of *guṇa* and *paryāya*. In this context, *guṇas* are simultaneous, but *paryāyas* occur successively. All are characterised by *dravya-guṇa-paryāya* with *utpāda-vyaya*. By accepting this and having true faith in the self-*ātmā*, *samyagdarśana* manifests. However, it is not the case that, because

samyagdarśana has manifested, *cāritra* will develop, and the *kevalajñāna* and *siddha* states will not occur immediately; evolution proceeds sequentially.

6. With steadiness in nature, steadiness in conduct occurs, and a passionless state occurs. *jñāna-darśana-vīrya*, etc., are in infinitesimal parts; their evolution is not complete, so it must be understood.
7. Self-knowable *paryāy* in the form of infinite *jñāna*, infinite *darśana*, infinite *vīrya* have manifested; however, supreme uninterrupted bliss has still not manifested, because his many other *guṇas* have not wholly manifested. There is still impurity in the four *partijīvi guṇas*, such as the attributes of *yog* and *vaibhāvika guṇa* like *pradeśatva* (attribute of space), etc. Such incompleteness remains in the perfect state of the self-knowable. However, this is not due to non-deluding karmas. It is because of one's ability. Therefore, *śukladhyāna* is present, and it has sequential growth.
8. The perfect state is manifested only with this *śukladhyāna*. Body or karma is absent in the form of *nimitta*. One *siddha* does not merge into another *siddha*. There, *paryāyas* are changing every *samaya*. *siddhas* are enjoying natural bliss and never return to transmigration. This way, *paryāya* of self-knowable is complete and perfect in the *siddha* state.

It is said that – by having such true knowledge and belief manifesting *samyagdarśana*, in the self-*ātmā*, true belief in the *pañcaparmeṣṭhī* occurs – so it is said. This way, one should understand different methods of narration. It is said in Samayasāra that the one who has manifested *samyagdarśana*, by having correct belief, has become a *siddha*, and indulgence of a *jñānī* is the cause of shedding *karmas*. There, conduct is considered secondary, and the statement is primarily based on the view of belief. Here, in Pravacanasāra, the statements are primarily from the viewpoint of *jñāna*. So, it is said that even after the manifestation of *kevalajñāna*, impurity remains. Here, knowledge of the *Arhaṇta*'s knowable *paryāya* is imparted. Therefore, it is said that, in the thirteenth *guṇasthāna*, because of the presence of impurity of *yog guṇa*, etc., there is impurity in the self-knowable *paryāya*. *śukladhyāna* is said to destroy the impurities and manifest the *siddha* state. This chapter is on knowable; hence, correct knowledge of knowable *paryāya* is imparted.

bhāvārtha

What work does *bhagavāna* have of *dhyāna*? This *gāthā* replies to this question. It states that the experience of the foremost subject is *dhyāna*. Omniscient *Bhagavāna* is replete with bliss and knowledge in all the *pradeśas* of *ātmā*. Experiencing only his *ātmā* in a blissful form, he has blissful *dhyāna* and meditates on supreme happiness.

gāthā-199

अथायमेव शुद्धात्मोपलम्भलक्षणो मोक्षस्य मार्ग इत्यवधारयति -

Now, it is determined that this is the path of liberation - characteristic of which is the attainment of pure self (soul): -

एवं जिणा जिणिंदा सिद्धा मगं समुत्तिदा समणा ।
जादा णमोत्थो तेसिं तस्स य णिव्वाणमगस्स ॥१९९॥

*evaṃ jinaṃ jiniṇḍa siddhā maggaṃ samuṭṭhidā samanā |
jādā ṇamottho tesim tassa ya ṇivvāṇamaggassa || 199 ||*

gāthā: My obeisance to that path of *nirvāṇa* (liberation) and to them who have followed it and attained the status of *jinās* (the conqueror), of *jineṇdras* (the great *tirthaṅkaras*), of *siddhas* (disembodied omniscient) and *śramanas* (sky-clad *digambara* jain monks).

tīkā: All those ordinary men who have the last embodied state, the great spiritual teachers—*tirthaṅkaras/jineṇdras*, having the last embodied state and the true aspirants of liberation (not having the last embodied state) have attained the disembodied *siddha* state by following the path to liberation through the aforesaid process of engrossment in the eternal pure self (*ātmā*) reality (*śuddhātma pravṛtti*), but it is not so that they might have attained the *siddha* state by any other process. Therefore, it is determined that there is only this one path to liberation and no other path exists. So now enough of this elaboration!

Ācārya pays obeisance in the form of *noāgamabāva-namaskāra* in which the difference between the *bhāvya* (object of adoration) and *bhāvaka* (adorer) is superseded by *śuddhopayoga* to those *siddhas* who are completely engrossed in pure self-reality, and to that path of liberation which is in the form of the process of engrossment in pure self-reality (*śuddhātma tattva pravṛtti*). The path of liberation is determined/realised; due to the action of the same being carried out, and we (*ācāryas*) are observing it/moving on it.

pravacana on gāthā -199

Belief, knowledge, and engrossment in the pure *ātmā* is the only single path to liberation, and none other – all omniscient gods, *tirthaṅkaras*, and monks who have only one life to complete, have acquired the path to liberation by following the process of the inclination towards the pure *ātmā* and attained the status of *siddha* through this process.

ātmā cannot carry out the activity of the body, mind, and speech. Auspicious and inauspicious dispositions are impurities, whereas *ātmā* is devoid of impurities and has the nature of bliss. The only steps to liberation are internal realisation, experience, knowing of self, and being internally steady. The Tattvārtha Sūtra states that *samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritra* is a path to liberation. All three of these are included in the engrossment of pure self-reality. Infinite *siddhas*, omniscient, and monks have acquired the *siddha* state by only this sole path; It is not that they have acquired it by the body's activity or auspicious dispositions. Playing within nature by retiring from auspicious-inauspicious dispositions is the only method to liberation, and none other. This method was followed in the fourth era and is now followed in this fifth era. There is no other method for the fifth era. Whether it is Mahāvīdeha kṣetra, Bharat kṣetra, or any other kṣetra, the method for *mokṣa* is the same universally.

Amṛtacaṇḍra ācārya has composed a marvellous exposition. Staying in the body and distinct from attachment, *bhagavāna ātmā* achieves a liberated state through inner belief. Dispositions of charity, piety, pilgrimage, etc., liberate no one; but out of ignorance, many *jīvas* say that while doing *vyavahāra*, *niścaya* will occur – this is a false statement. *vyavahāra* means statement of a transferred epithet. When does a transferred epithet occur? When one manifests the *niścaya śraddhā*, *jñāna*, *ramanatā*, within himself, then the allegation of *vyavahāra* is on thoughts.

Water remains in its state of water, and waves arise; similarly, *ātmā* maintains itself as *ātmā* and continues to change in state. Religion arises due to *pūnya*, and the belief that benefit occurs due to non-self is a false notion. By having such a belief, knowledge, and play, that *ātmā's* nature is *jñāna*, the passionless *paryāya* occurs, meaning, on the destruction of contrary belief/knowledge, *paryāya* of true belief-knowledge-conduct arises. Tendency towards the knowing blissful nature, devoid of *pūnya-pāpa*, is the only path to liberation; there is no other path. *ācārya bhagavāna* says that enough has been spoken on this subject; hence, no more elaboration needs to be done.

Paying obeisance to the *siddhas* who have a completely pure state and the path to liberation in the form of a pure state: - The *muni* pays *no-āgambhāva* obeisance to the *Siddha bhagavānas* who remain in the pure *ātmā's* nature, and to the path of *mokṣa* in the form of *śraddhā-jñāna-cāritra*.

Pure *ātmā* is *bhāvya* – the objective, and it should be meditated upon. The modification of the self is the one who meditates on the subject, so it is *bhāvaka*. This distinction of *bhāvya-bhāvaka* has been set. The distinction that pure *ātmā* is venerable, and the self reveres, pure *ātmā* is to be worshipped, and the modification of self is worshipping has gone. Thus, the *noāgamabhāva namaskāra* occurs. *ātmā*'s nature is to be a perfect knower, and that modification in the form of *jñāna* is *bhāva namaskāra* (psychic obeisance). That *jñāna* of *ātmā* is said to be the *no-āgamabhāva namaskāra*.

Perseverance and efforts towards the path of liberation by Ācārya bhagavāna in the fifth era: - Oh! *bhāvaliṅgī muni*, who has immersed himself in the pure nature of the self, speaks with the experience of his intrinsic awareness. He says that *ātmā* has manifested the path of *mokṣa*, and his inner state of passionlessness is intensifying. He has the delight of the pure nature, which is the mass of joy, and on the outside, he has the sky-clad *digambara* state. They have no other possession except the instrument of restraint, which is the peacock feather, and a pot. Even though *ācārya* does not have *avadhi jñāna* and *manah-paryāya jñāna*, he has the belief in the path of *mokṣa*. He is ready to announce that he will become a *siddha*.

How much firmness and effort exist? He is a witness of *ātmā*. There is no need to ask *bhagavāna*. An ignorant person doubts whether he is a *jīva* or *ajīva*. When he asks *bhagavāna*, he is told that he is a *jīva*, and then he realises it.

Such a grossly ignorant soul will never attain liberation. One who has no decision regarding *jīva* and *ajīva*. How can he decide about his knowing nature? Here, *ācārya Bhagavāna* says that this path of liberation, free from faults, has descended. *jīvas* who will have belief-knowledge of their *ātmā* will manifest *samyagdarśana* and attain liberation.

If one is in the last embodied state (*carama śarira*), then in the same life, or if not in the final embodied state, one may attain liberation after a few lives. This is not an important matter. The self should engage on the path to liberation. Here, *ācārya bhagavāna* presents the path of *mokṣa* based on his own experience.

अथोपसम्पद्ये साम्यमिति पूर्वप्रतिज्ञां निर्वहन् मोक्षमार्गभूतां स्वयमपि शुद्धात्म-
प्रवृत्तिमासूत्रयति -

Now, *Ācārya*, carrying out the former pledge taken in the words – “I observe/acquire equanimity,” etc., (in the fifth *gāthā*) set forth himself on the path of liberation of *śuddhātma pravṛtti*: -

तम्हा तह जाणित्ता अप्पाणं जाणगं सभावेण ।
परिवज्जामि ममत्तिं उवट्ठिदो णिम्ममत्तम्हि ॥२००॥

tamhā taha jāṇittā appāṇaṁ jāṇagaṁ sabhāveṇa |
parivajjhāmi mamattiṁ uvaṭṭhido ṇimmamattamhi || 200 ||

gāthā: Therefore, I, thus, having conceived the self-*ātmā* to be a *jñāyaka* (knower) by its characteristic nature, abandon the notion of mine-ness and have adopted the notion of non-attachment.

ṭīkā: This, ‘I’, am *adhikārī* (qualified) for liberation, after having attained comprehensive knowledge of self-*ātmā*-reality as being possessed of knowing-nature, by process of abandoning the notion of mine-ness and adopting the notion of non-attachment, engrossed into eternal pure-*ātmā* with all effort, because it has no other work. It is thus: -

First, ‘I’ by nature the *jñāyaka* (knower) only, and as an absolute knower, the self has a naturally existing connection of knowable and knower characteristic with everything in the world, but not any other type of connection, such as that of possession and possessor. Therefore, the self does not have any attitude of ownership towards anything; rather, in all and everywhere, with respect to everything, ‘I’ (self) has an attitude of negation that prevails within.

Now, the *śuddhātma* (pure self), which, since the knower’s nature being of knowing all the knowables in one moment, knows directly as if it were carved, engraved, implanted-entered within, pinned down, drowned, contained within, reflected in *jñāna* (mirror) - the whole aggregate of things, deep, of un-understandable nature, a multitude of variegated modifications occurring successively, infinite, past, present and future - and which, even besides its assuming uniformity, (but) because of the impossibility of discrimination due to

the inevitability of the relationship of the knowable and knower, yet it never gives up the uniformity of its nature as a knower of intrinsic infinite power and which has been existing eternally in the same state of permanence, though it has been recognized otherwise by delusion - to that pure *ātmā* self (soul) as it really is, I, having eradicated delusion, realize/attain with absolutely unwaveringly.

Thus *Ācārya*, being occupied actively in the right knowledge with totally hindrance-free engrossment-the root of which is *darśana-viśuddhi* (purity of faith), despite being a *sādhū* (sky-clad monk), pays *bhāva-namaskāra* (perpetual mental obeisance) characterized with sole intentness to this evidently realized veritable pure self and also to all such supreme souls who have already realized the pure self, completely.

pravacana on gāthā-200

See! In this fifth era, two thousand years ago, Kuṇḍakuṇḍa *Ācārya* and one thousand years ago, Amṛtandra *Ācārya* were there. Though they did not have clairvoyance and telepathic knowledge, they still said, ‘I am entitled to *mokṣa*.’ An ignorant *jīva* is entitled to money, etc., and *ācārya bhagavāna* says, ‘I am entitled to *mokṣa*.’ This determination is truly inspiring! *mokṣa* does not occur in the fifth era because such a capacity is absent. Still, the self’s nature is to know; except for *ātmā*, all other substances and dispositions of charity, piety, etc., are knowables. The self is the knower of these knowables. They are seen by the self; the self is the onlooker of these knowables, and the self is the observer of the universe. The way the self is the knower, in the same way, the nature of all the *jīvas* of the universe, from *nigoda* till *kevalī*, is to be the knower. This nature to know does not come from outside, that is to say, it does not come from *deva-śāstra-guru*; it is all within. As an ignorant focuses is on association, he believes he is a human, a man, a woman, a scholar, a fool, and so on. His belief is delusional, with a focus on modification. *ātmā*’s nature is to know association and attachment; he is an idol of sentience.

ācārya bhagavāna says that he is entitled to *mokṣa*. He says that he is with the *jñāna* of the *ātmā* reality, which is with the nature of knowing, who has implemented the method of forsaking the belief of ownership and accepted complete detachment, with all the activity of the pure *ātmā* with focused endeavour.

Here it is said – with a deeply insightful understanding of the tenets. Because without the real knowledge of the *tattvas*, forsaking the belief of ownership and accepting complete

detachment cannot be attained. *jīva* substance is with the nature of knowing-seeing, and body-mind-speech are insentient substances. Disposition of charity, piety, etc., is *pūnya tattva*, and disposition of violence, lie, theft, etc., is *pāpa tattva*; *pūnya* and *pāpa* both cause *aśrava* and *bandha*. On having the correct belief of these nine tenets, *saṁvara* and *nirjarā* occur. With the increase in the internal steadfastness state of a *muni*, sequentially, the modification of *mokṣa* manifests. In this way, *jñāna* of all forsakes belief in ownership and accepts complete detachment.

See! Here, the sky-clad state of the body with the renunciation of non-self substance is not to be embraced. Because they are non-self-knowable, *ātmā* cannot accept or renounce them. Renouncing attachment is a statement from the *nāsti* viewpoint. Being engrossed in the knowing-seeing pure nature, attachment is renounced, and non-attachment is accepted.

Thus, with complete effort, the *jñānī* immerses into the experience of the pure *ātmā*, because no other activity is worth doing. *Ācārya Deva* says that none of the auspicious dispositions are worth doing. It is different that during thought activity, auspicious dispositions occur, but they are not worth doing.

By nature, the self is a knower. One has a knowable-knower relationship with all the substances of the universe. The self cannot favour the non-self, and the non-self cannot favour the self. For eternity, no one has obliged the self, and the self has not obliged everyone; he is just a knower. It is not the nature of self that just because he is an *Ācārya*, so he can protect other *munis*, *āryikās*, *śrāvakas*, *śrāvikās*, can teach students, etc. He has a knowable-knower relationship with all *jīvas* from *nigoda* to *siddha*. This relationship is also from the *vyavahāra* viewpoint. From the *niscaya* viewpoint, he knows his own *ātmā*. Non-self-knowables are automatically known while seeing the self *ātmā*. Only this much is the extent of relationship of *vyavahāra*. Besides this, there is no other relationship like *svaswāmi* (self-ownership), etc., *deva-guru* are not the lord ‘my’ lord; they are lords of themselves, and self is not the master of wife, family, etc.; They are masters of themselves. Self is not the doer of blemishes of *pūnya-pāpa*. All these substances are worth knowing, and self is the knower.

Understanding this knowing nature is the cause of *dharma-mokṣa*.

The relationship of knowable-knower between *ātmā* and non-self-substances is from the conventional point of view and not from the absolute point of view.

In this verse, Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācāryadeva says, 'I am attaining the pure *ātmā*'; the path is the same for all. The relationship that *ātmā* is the knower, and non-self-substance is knowable, is also from the conventional point of view. From an absolute viewpoint, the self has no relationship with the non-self. From an absolute viewpoint, *ātmā* is knowable, and *ātmā* is the knower; external substance and attachment-aversion are all non-self. *ātmā* is their knower from the *vyavahāra* viewpoint. There is no relation between non-self and the nature of substance; after deciding so in *jñāna* at the outset, later unblemished conduct manifests. Thus, the completeness of self-knowable substance is unquestionably announced here – all *jīvas* can attain such perfect completeness.

Thus, non-self substances and attachment are knowable, and the self is a knower – such a knowable-knower relationship is from the *vyavahāra* viewpoint. From the *nīścaya* viewpoint, there is no relationship with non-self. From the same perspective, the self knows the self-knowable. In this way, by being merely a knower, the self has only a knowable-knower relationship with non-self substances, not in terms of characteristics such as self-ownership.

1. **The relationship between the characteristic of *svaswāmi* (self-ownership) and the non-self does not exist:** Sons and daughters are non-self; they are not of self, and self is not theirs—such a relationship of self-ownership is not present. An ignorant person believes they all belong to him. However, this belief is false because they are non-self-knowables, and non-self-knowables can never resemble self-knowables. The nature of the self does not permit the self to be kind to others, cruel to others, and to retain wealth. Self is simply a self-knower and owner of self-modification—such a relation of self-ownership exists.
2. **The relationship of *tādātmya* (identical) characteristics does not exist with non-self:** Body karma, attachment aversion, etc., are non-self; they can never be identical with *ātmā*. Non-self-substances are never identified with *ātmā*; even attachment aversion occurring in *ātmā*'s modification does not identify with *ātmā*. *karmas* rise, they exist, bondage occurs, and they are still not identical to *ātmā* because the self's attribute is *jñāna*, and the attributes of others differ. The self has the sameness of nature with the nature of *jñāna*.
3. **Does not have a *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa* (characterized and characteristic) relation with non-self:** Non-self, body, etc., is characteristic, and *ātmā* can be perceived through those characteristics – such a relation of perceptible and characteristic also does not

exist. *jñāna* is the attribute, and *ātmā* is perceived; that is the true characterized-characteristic relationship.

4. **The relationship of *guru-śiṣya* does not exist with non-self *jīva*:** Self is the guru, and all these are disciples. Such a relationship between teacher and student is not within oneself. Self is an *ācārya* and *sadhu-āryikā-śrāvaka-śrāvikā* are four *sanghas*. The self, being an *ācārya*, can protect these four *sanghas*—such a relation is not within the self.

Here, the completeness of self-knowable is being shown. In Pravacanasara, in the chapter primarily from the view of knowledge, the relationship of knowable-knower is explained with the non-self. However, in the statement from the view of the belief, the knowable-knower relationship with the non-self is not accepted.

5. **There is no relationship between the *viśeṣana* (attribute) and *viśeṣya* (holder of attributes) with non-self:** - *deva-guru-śāstra* and speech are attributes, and the self is the holder of attributes; such a relationship between the self and non-self does not exist. *viśeṣana* = special attribute, *viśeṣya* = substance holding the attributes. The self, holder of attributes, cannot be known through *deva-guru-śāstra*, etc., *karma* is *viśeṣana*, and *ātmā* the *viśeṣya*- such a relation also does not exist. *jñāna*, *darśana*, etc., are the attributes of *ātmā*, and *ātmā* is the substance that is known by those attributes. Therefore, *guṇa* is *viśeṣana*, and *ātmā* is *viśeṣya*. This way, the relationship of *viśeṣana-viśeṣya* exists with the self's *guṇa*, not with the non-self.
6. **Knowable is dependent on knower, and the knower is dependent on knowables – a knowable-knower relationship is not dependent in this manner:** - The relationship that body is of self, and self is its owner, karma is of self, and the self is its owner, does not exist with non-self. It is not that the self is a knower, and because he is the knower, knowables are being known in *jñāna* – it is not so. And because knowables exist, the self is their knower. The belief that since the self is there, body-mind-speech is here, and these substances are there, so the self exists, is ignorance. With such an acceptance, the relationship of self-ownership occurs with non-self-substances. Even though it can be seen evidently that a *jīva* cannot be kind to others, keep wealth, or enjoy it, an ignorant person has an illusory belief that the body is his. A conventional relationship exists in the saying that the self can move another, the self can speak, wealth is of the self, the self can use it, the self is the knower, and all others are his knowable, the self is *pramātā*, and all else are *prameya* (knower-knowable). But from the *niscaya*

viewpoint, this relationship does not exist in nature. To believe that the body exists because of the self, the self exists because of the non-self, under the pretext of the *vyavahāra* relationship, is *mithyātva*. Knower and knowable are independent; neither is dependent on the other. To have such knowledge of independence is *dharma*.

7. **guṇa (attribute)- guṇī (holder of attribute) relationship is absent with non-self:** The *guṇa-guṇī* relationship that other substances can bring benefit to the self *ātmā*, by which he will become the holder of that attribute, is absent between the *ātmā* and non-self. It is not possible that *siddha* or *kevalī bhagavāna* can bring attributes into the self. So, the self does not have the *guṇa-guṇī* relationship with them either. The attributes of the self are infinite *jñāna-darśana-cāritra*, etc., and the self is the *guṇī* who is the conglomeration of all these attributes. This is the relation of *guṇa-guṇī*.
8. **Relationship of *vācya* (to be known)- *vācaka* (speaker) is absent with non-self:** - External substance, speech, the tongue is the *vācaka* (speaker/reader), and self is *vācya* (to be known), such *vācya-vācaka* relationship is not within the self. Speech is external, and *ātmā*'s nature cannot be known through the non-self. The nature of the self can be known only through the self.
9. **Does not have *grāhya* (one worthy of being taken)-*grāhaka* (one who takes) relationship with non-self:** - Here, the meaning of *grāhya* is worthy of being taken, and the meaning for *grāhaka* is the one who takes. Only this much has to be understood here. It does not mean that *ātmā grāhya* = with the ability of being taken, and external substance, attachment, etc., are *grāhaka* = one who takes. *ātmā* is not something that non-self and attachment can take.

In another way, *ātmā grāhaka* = one who takes/holds, and non-self-substance *grāhya* = one with the ability to be taken. But there is no such relationship that, *ātmā* can seize non-self-substance. *rāga grāhya* and *ātmā grāhaka*, meaning *ātmā* accepts *rāga* – such *grāhya-grāhaka* relationship also does not exist. *ātmā* accepts his own modification only.

10. **Does not have a *kartā* (doer)-*karma* (act) relationship with non-self:** - *ātmā* being a doer makes the body, etc., walk, and affects speech such a does-work done relationship does not exist. Thus, relationship that these are the acts, and *ātmā* is the performer; such a *kartā-karma* does not exist. Thus, *kartā-karma* relationship is not that non-self *jīva*, body, etc., doer and *karma* being the revelation of *ātmā*'s pure modification, *ātmā* doer and *rāga-dveṣa*, etc., *karma*, auspicious disposition *kartā*, and *samyagdarśana*, etc., passionless result *karma*. *ātmā* doer and pure modification *karma* – such a *kartā-karma*

relationship is within oneself only. This kind of *kartā-karma* relationship does not exist with the non-self.

11. Does not have *ādhāra* (base)-*ādheya* (taking support) relationship with non-self:

To believe that *ātmā* is the base, and body-mind-speech take its support is a misconception. The *ādhāra-ādheya* (base-taking support) relationship that *ātmā* is support, and family and relatives are taking support, meaning the family is run by the self, or that *deva-śāstra-guru* is the support, and *ātmā* takes their support, or *ātmā* is the base, and attachment-aversion takes its support, meaning attachment-aversion rises with the support of the nature of the substance, and *ātmā*'s passionless disposition takes its support, meaning *dharma* arises with the support of auspicious disposition, is absent in the *ātmā*. *ātmā* is the base, and *jñāna-darśana*, etc., attributes take his support; such a relationship exists.

12. Does not have *rakṣya-rakṣaka* (to be guarded-guardian) relationship with non-self:

- The protected-protector relationship, like father being the guardian and children being protected, does not exist. It is not so that *deva-guru* are guardians, and *śiṣya-śāstra-śāsana* needs protection. *ātmā* is the guardian, and the self's pure modification is protected; such a relationship exists.

The father of religion, *Tirthaṅkara*, tells his *mumukṣu* son that his relationship with the non-self is only to know. Thus, the relationship between self-ownership and non-self is not present. There is a natural knowable-knower relationship with it. A parent explains to his child that on the occasion of a wedding, the relatives are served meals, but neighbours are served only mild refreshments, because with them, there is only that much relationship, and not anything more.

In the same way, the eternal dharma patriarch explains to his son, desirous of attaining liberation that way, He (the eternal dharma patriarch) is the observer of the entire universe, is the knower of all substances; in the same way, the pure nature of the self is the knower. He says that they are both from the same clan, and the seeker is his young child, so why should any relationship with non-self be maintained? *bhagavāna* says that the attribute of *jñāna-darśana*, etc., and its modification only are of yours. From the absolute viewpoint, this is the only knowable-knower relationship that exists. There is only that much relationship from the conventional viewpoint that it is said that the non-self knowable is known. The relation with *deva-śāstra-guru*, wife, family, relatives, body, mind, speech, and neighbours is to know them only. Auspicious-inauspicious dispositions that occur are

also knowable, and the relationship with them is one of only knowing them. There is no relationship with the family, body, etc. There is no such relationship that the *deva-guru-śāstra* can make the self attain *dharma*. There is no relation to the rising thoughts of compassion, charity, etc. To know everything is the nature of the self.

ācārya bhagavāna announces that one should erase the delusional thought that non-self and *pūnya* are of the self.

Here, the one akin to a *Tirthankara*, the propagator of true *dharma*, Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācārya, states that all the aforementioned relations that join the self to the non-self are false. Due to these relations, the activity of the transmigration through 8.4 million life forms has been continuing, and now one must stop it. The belief that spouse-children give grief, one should fight with karma, or *deva-śāstra-guru* will benefit the self, should be forsaken. To think that one understands the child, but the child does not understand him, is the root of transmigration. This is because when was the child ever of self? The child was never of the father, and the father was never of the child; both are independent *jīvas*. The thorn of the belief that the child is of oneself, and the self is the parent, should be forsaken. All substances of the universe have the ability to be known by the self. There is no further relation with them. When this knowing nature manifests in the modification, then *dharma* arises. Then the transmigration through 8.4 million life forms comes to a halt. The only relation the self has with all substances is to know and see.

***ācārya bhagavāna* is indifferent towards all substances:** - *ācārya bhagavāna* says that he has a knowable-knower relationship with all the substances of the universe. Therefore, he has no attachment towards them; he is indifferent. Regardless of whether it is good or bad, he has no relation to any substance. If a disciple follows *dharma*, there is no benefit to *ācārya*, and if he does not follow, there is no loss to him.

When the disciple asks the revered master, saying that he, the revered master, is the pillar of *dharma*, and who will helm the order of *dharma* once he, the master, leaves for heaven? To that, *ācārya bhagavāna* answers that he has decided, since his renunciation, that he has no relation with the order of religion; the order was never dependent on him.

jīvas attain *dharma* because of their ability. The relation that the order of religion is to be guarded, and he, the master, is his guardian, such a relation does not exist. There exists a relation of knowable-knower. The knowing nature of the sentient within never modifies into non-self. If a buffalo slings mud in the water, which is lying in a pothole outside a

house, and if someone complains to the owner of the house, then the owner says that neither the buffalo nor the water is his. It is not his responsibility to take care of the buffalo. In the same way, non-self substances are destroyed due to their self, and the self has no relation with them. If someone complains to *ācārya bhagavāna* that the book is torn, a building has fallen, or a disciple has died, to that *ācārya bhagavāna* replies, when was the book his? Which disciple? That he has no disciple, and he has no relation with any non-self. He has no benefit or loss due to non-self. Here, the explanation is from the viewpoint of intense engrossment with focus. *Ācārya deva* says that he is entirely indifferent.

bhagavāna ātmā has the disposition of being a knower; his nature is to see all knowables; what are these knowables?

They occur in the form of a conglomeration of sequential, infinite-variegated modification of past-present-future.

Sequential occurrence: Modification of *deva-śāstra-guru*, wife, family, relatives, body, mind, and speech are all knowables that occur sequentially. A diseased person thinks the medicine did not arrive before, and after he desired it, it came. But it is not so. The modification of this knowable came from the sequential change of the space points. A *jīva* was not comprehending, but after the guru's sermon, he began to understand. Did this modification of understanding occur after the guru's sermon? It is not so. It happened according to its defined sequence.

It is infinite – there are infinite modifications. Whatever modifications have occurred in one substance in the past, its future modifications are infinitely more than those in the past. This way, infinite knowables are with infinite modifications.

A substance is a conglomeration of past-present-future modifications. One *jīva* who has been in *nigoda* since eternity and has never emerged from it. That *jīva* has an auspicious disposition, becomes a human with five senses, adopts the state of a muni, and attains *moksha*. What is this? A *jīva* was in *nigoda*, the previous life, and is now a human, becoming a *siddha*. These are the variegated independent modifications of the knowable of that time. An eight-year-old child becomes a monk, attains *kevalajñāna*, and becomes a *siddha*. Bramhadutt Cakravarti was a *cakravarti* one *samaya*; in the next *samaya*, he became a hellish being of the seventh hell. How are there such vast differences? Redness in the clouds during the evening vanishes immediately. However, there is no place to ask, 'What is this?' Those knowables continue to have a conglomeration of sequential, variegated modifications; there is no accident. The necklace of sequential modifications of

knowables continues to occur in a variegated form. This is only worth knowing in the self's knowable nature.

Knowable has a profound and serious nature – how and when will the knowable be? This is not known to the non-omniscient. Suddenly, changes happen in the knowable, and the non-omniscient is stunned. A healthy man of twenty years who was healthy the day before dies of heart failure the next morning. Why is this so? One developed a simple boil; when he goes to get it removed, half of his body becomes motionless. From where did this motionless state come? Is it because of circumstances? Is it because care was not taken? It is not because of the non-self-substance; the knowable's nature is profound and solemn. It changes because of itself and the way a boil is superficial, but its inner festering cannot be known from outside; in the same way, the nature of the knowable is solemn/serious. When and how they will manifest cannot be known by the ignorant. In this way, the knowables are with infinite modifications that modify sequentially. They are with the nature of vastness and profoundness. One modification of knowable, having the nature to know all knowables, they, modifying sequentially, being with a conglomeration of infinite modifications of the past-present-future, only know the substances that are with the nature of vastness and profoundness. Those substances have been etched in the knowing substance, have been inked in it, have entered it, have been nailed to it, have immersed in it, have blended in it, and are reflected in it.

ātmā knows such infinite knowables directly in one *samaya*.

Even though a non-omniscient knower knows knowable substances one by one, sequentially, this is not the original nature of the knower. *ātmā*'s nature is to directly know all the infinite variegated modifications occurring in the past-present-future in one *samaya*.

1. **Knowables are engraved** – The way letters engraved on a rock can never be erased. In the same way, infinite past-present-future modification of knowables is engraved in the knowing nature. They can never be erased.
2. **Knowables are painted** – The way a picture is painted on a wall, in the same way on the wall, in the form of the knower, the knowables are painted/inked.
3. **Knowables have immersed** – The way all objects are seen entering a mirror, in the same way, all knowables enter the knowing nature. Infinite *Kevalīs*, *Tirthaṅkaras*, and *Siddhas* enter the self's *jñāna*. The self is a knower of infinite *kevalīs*.
4. **Knowables are nailed** – The way a nail is hammered into the wall, in the same way infinite knowables are hammered into the efficacy of the sentience.
5. **Knowables are drowned** – The way a human drowns in water, in the same way, knowables of the *loka-aloka* drown in the sea of sentience.

6. **Knowables are contained** – *sva-para-prakāśaka jñāna* knows the self, and in *para prakāśaka jñāna*, all knowables are known. Thus, it seems that all these knowables are contained in the self.
7. **Knowables have reflected** – The way all objects reflect in a mirror; in the same way, all knowables are seen reflected in the knowing nature. In this way, the pure *ātmā* directly manifests all the knowables. Even in a seeker's state currently, omniscience is in the self's nature. The self *ātmā*'s nature is to know infinite knowables directly. An enlightened self believes he is capable of becoming a *siddha*.

Even though there are many reasons for the knowable-knower relationship from the conventional viewpoint, the nature of a knower is one only.

What is the pure *ātmā*? *ātmā* is the knower, and all objects are capable of being known; Therefore, it is not so that because non-self substances are not known, so *ātmā* cannot be known.

1. The belief that these knowables are mine is destroyed
2. It is not so that modifications of non-self knowables are because of the knowing nature of the self.
3. It is also not the case that the modification of the self's knowing nature is because of non-self knowables.
4. Multiformity seen in the self from the viewpoint of *vyavahāra* is not because of many knowables; but the multi-formity is seen because of the efficacy of *jñāna*, which illuminates self-non-self - to illuminate the non-self.

Thus, even though from the viewpoint of *vyavahāra*, the self is multiform, and the self's pure *ātmā* does not leave his uniformity.

In infinite life forms since eternity, the knowing form of the pure *ātmā* has remained pure. *ātmā* has been in the form of a knower for eternity. Whether a *jīva* is an ant or a spider, on the path of *mokṣa*, or in *Sarvārthasiddha Devaloka*, with incomplete *jñāna* or omniscience, king or poor, everywhere, pure *ātmā*'s nature always remains in the form of a knower. People say that adinātha bhagavāna taught seventy-two types of art to the world. *bhagavāna* says that he was just a knower even during his mundane existence. He has not taught anything to anyone. He has not improved anything. He was a knower in the past and is a knower in the present. Due to delusion, an ignorant *jīva* believes the knower to be otherwise. But he does not become otherwise.

An ignorant person, due to ignorance, believes that the knowing nature is otherwise. He believes that he earned money due to his power, but this is a false belief. The self is the knower. Money, which modifies sequentially, is in the form of knowable. It comes by itself and goes by itself.

An ignorant person believes that external circumstances will differ if an intelligent person is present. But this is a false belief. The difference lies in the belief, not in the substances or circumstances. An ignorant *jīva* has contrary beliefs due to delusions. He believes *that dharma occurs due to pūnya and/or nimitta*, which is caused by delusion. Due to such a delusional belief, self-knowable and non-self-knowable do not remain independent. In this way, even though a *jīva* may believe the self-knowable is dependent because of delusion, but the knowable has never been of non-self-form and has always been the pure *ātmā*.

ācārya deva says that he has attained the pure *ātmā*, just the way it is. Kuṇḍakuṇḍa *ācārya bhagavāna* and Amṛtacaṇḍra *ācārya* were *bhāvaliṅgī muni* (enlightened sky-clad monks) swaying between the sixth-seventh *guṇasthāna*. They used to sway between these *guṇasthāna* thousands of times. Internally, it is a state of enlightened monkhood; externally, it is a sky-clad state of a *muni* possessing only a peacock feather and a water pot used by ascetics. As explained above, such a *muni* states that the pure *ātmā*, who sees all knowables directly in one samaya, never leaves their oneness. One has remained the knower since eternity, but due to delusion, he believes it to be different. Even then, he will remain a knower always. The way the non-corporeal is, the self assumes it in the same form.

Ācāryadeva has destroyed faith-deluding *karma*. But he says that he is destroying instability and conduct deluding *karma*. It should not be understood that, because delusion is there, it is destroyed; This is the method of narration. By being steady in nature, delusion does not rise. With this statement, it should be understood that delusion has been destroyed. Self-knowable does not turn into non-self-knowable. Modification of non-self is not turned into modification of self. They remain extremely passive. One experiences the pure *ātmā*, in the form of peace, just the way it is, and attains it, or experiences this in his modification. **May there be obeisance always, to the self *ātmā* which is present and in the form of *siddha*, and may the *siddha bhagavāna* be bowed to psychically.**

Thus, the root of *samyagjñāna* is *darśana viśuddhi* (perfect belief), as *samyagdarśana* cannot arise without *darśana viśuddhi*. In this way, when *darśana viśuddhi* is along with *jñāna*, there is an unobstructed immersion and equanimity, in the nature of self-*jñāna*. As

the *Ācārya* has the state of a *muni* in the present, he says that may there be *bhāva namaskāra* (psychic obeisance) to his present state, which is with the efficacy of the *siddha*, as well as the *siddha bhagavāna*. To concentrate on the nature which is in the form of knower by itself, is said to be the characteristic of *bhāva namaskāra* (psychic obeisance). For *ācārya bhagavāna*, the knower is the pure self *ātmā*, and *bhāva namaskāra* arises when he immerses in it.

Someone questions how a *muni* in the sixth *guṇasthāna* can see himself similar to a *siddha*? **Answer:** Here, his intense effort to attain the state of *siddha* is highlighted. If, by chance, around one life of a celestial being is left, then he does not consider that as an obstruction to the attainment of *kevalajñāna* or *siddha* state because he knows that he has unobstructed engrossment, which is beyond the stage of getting obstructed. From the perspective of intense effort, the state of *siddha* has been alleged in the present. Here it is said that the *bhāva namaskāra* should always occur. The word ‘always’ indicates the intense effort in the state of *muni*. He has the modification of *samyagdarśana*, along with an unobstructed, pure modification of conduct. So it has been said ‘always’. This is a unique and hyperphysical state, in which the *muni* sees himself presently in the state of *siddha*. It has been said that the effort of the *muni* is so intense that the state of *siddha* is almost attained. In this way, *ācārya bhagavāna* consistently pays obeisance to his pure *ātmā* and *siddha bhagavānas*.

This way, the complete state self-knowable is described. To attain the perfect, pure state of self-knowable awareness in belief-knowledge is *samyagjñāna*.

Verse-10 (Sanskrit śloka-10)

(Now, the fruit of correctly studied śabdabrahma (divine words) - words revealed by omniscient Lord Jineñdra is said by this verse:-)

जैनं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयतत्त्वप्रणेत्,
स्फीतं शब्दब्रह्म सम्यग्विगाह्य ॥
संशुद्धात्मद्रव्यमात्रैकवृत्त्या,
नित्यं युक्तैः स्थीयतेऽस्माभिरेवम् ॥१०॥

jainam jñānam jñeyatattvapraṇetri,
sfitam śabdabrahma samyagvigāhya |
samśuddhātmadravyamātraikvṛtṭyā,
nityam yuktaiḥ sthīyatesmābhirevam ||10||

Meaning: Thus, having rightly immersed in the Jain doctrine (Jain tattvajñāna) in the vast śabdabrahma (words revealed by the omniscient/ divine words), delving deep into it, along with the experience of samyaktva, (submerging in it, immersing deeply into it, engrossed in it), the self is always with the one modification (modifying state), which is only the form of the pure ātmā substance.

pravacana on śloka-10

Thus, no one except the omniscient can explain the knowable reality. On the manifestation of a passionless state, omniscience is manifested, and the entire nature of the substance-reality is revealed in divyadhvani, which is called śabdabramha (divine words). Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācārya has written this text to explain that śabdabramha.

All six dravyas are independent. Each dravya has infinite guṇas. ātmā is a mass of jñāna, darśana, cāritra, etc., infinite guṇas. Every substance's state changes every samaya. Impurity arises due to the focus on non-self-substances, but this is not his true nature. Impurity is destroyed by focusing on purity.

karma, etc., substances are knowables. They have their independent ability. No self-knowable can change the non-self-knowable. In this way, this ātmā is different from each and every particle and other ātmās. The chapter on knowable discusses such independence.

Such a truthful and straightforward discussion is nowhere else to be found except in the texts of the Jain omniscient.

One should study this nature in depth, as it emanates from the *divyadhvani* of *Bhagavāna*. *Ācārya Bhagavāna* also says that *mumukṣu jīva* studies the scriptures, keeping the self in mind. The way, the milk of a lioness stays good only in a vessel made of gold; in the same way, knowledge of *dravyānuyoga* remains with the passionless *jīva* worthy of knowing. One should think and contemplate in-depth by reading and associating with the scriptures, keeping in mind that the self has taken birth in 8.4 million life forms since eternity, due to focus on the non-self.

bhagavāna ātmā is *parabramha*, and the speech explaining him is *śabdabramha*. One has carried out vows, penance, etc., in all seriousness, studied the scriptures, with a focus on non-self, but here, the word ‘*samyak*’ has been used. *samyak* means to practice the way it is, truthfully. Is it right to say that one must submerge oneself in the scriptures? Scriptures are insentient; they do not speak. Hence, the study of scriptures should be done in with the right association or a *jñānī*.

Ācāryadeva says that the essence of saying this is to remove the focus from the non-self-knowable and delusion, and to be engrossed in the self-knowable. The essence of all scriptures is passionlessness. The result of studying scriptures and focusing on the self is immersing in passionless belief and knowledge with joy.

Here, *Ācāryadeva* says that by truthfully immersing himself in the *śabdabramha*, he is engrossed only in the pure *ātmā*. He, being always with the right belief, *svasamvedana jñāna* (knowing with the experience of the true self), and conduct in the form of *svaramaṇatā* (immersing in the pure nature of the self), has extracted the essence of all scriptures. The so-called scriptures that claim *dharma* to be associated with bodily activity, auspicious thoughts, and actions are not true scriptures. *dharma* arises from the belief, knowledge, and immersion into the *ātmā*, and that is the cause of liberation. The fruit of the chapter on knowable is passionless belief-knowledge and immersing into the pure *ātmā*. One must have such a focus on the inner self and should imbibe purity. No thoughts are worth taking auspice by oneself. The self-knowable pure *ātmā* alone is worth taking the auspices of.

(Now, by singing the greatness of the liberated soul, the chapter on exposition of knowable reality is being concluded: -

Verse-11 (Sanskrit śloka-11)

ज्ञेयीकुर्वन्नजसासीमविश्वं,
ज्ञानीकुर्वन् ज्ञेयमाक्रान्तभेदम्।
आत्मीकुर्वन् ज्ञानमात्मान्यभासि,
स्फूर्जत्यात्मा ब्रह्म सम्पद्य सद्यः ॥११॥

*jñeyīkurvannasjasāsīmaviśvam,
jñānīkurvan jñeyamākrāntabhedam |
ātmīkurvan jñānamātmānyabhāsi,
sfurjatyātmā brahma sampadya sadyah ||11||*

Meaning: To attain the pure state of *ātmā* (the supreme *ātmā* substance, the state of *siddha*), and making the vast (unending) universe, the form of knowable, expeditiously, making the divisions of knowable into the form of *jñāna* (knowing various *jñeyas* in the *jñāna*), making the *sva-para-prakāśaka jñāna* (knowing that illuminates self and non-self) in the form of the *ātmā*, he manifests as the radiant light.

pravacana on śloka 11

One who attains true *jñāna* attains the state of *kevalajñāna*. *ātmā* is devoid of the activity of *punya-pāpa* – such is the state of conduct with belief, and with the completion of conduct, the state of *kevalajñāna* is attained.

One has assumed infinite life forms of hell, *nigoda*, crow, pigeon, *deva*, etc., but never had the belief that the self is the pure *cidānanda* (with sentience and joy). It is ignorance to believe that there is benefit from the activity of the body and *nimitta*, not eating *roti*, etc., means fasting, and to believe it to be *dharma*.

upavāsa (fasting) in the correct way is not wanting food while submerging oneself in the pure, blissful nature, devoid of attachment. The time required to attain liberation will be less than the time already spent in transmigration up to now.

A *jīva* who believes himself to be in the nature of bliss and engrosses entirely in the self, attains the state of *paramātmā* quickly. And only he gains knowledge of all *jīvas*, knows the *lokaloka*, and knows many types of knowables in his *jñāna*. That manifested total *jñāna*

concentrates within the self. On the manifestation of infinite *darśana-jñāna-ananda-sukha-vīrya*, *ātmā* becomes his radiant, illuminated state.

The reason for transmigration is the infinite times focus on the non-self.

An ignorant person takes care of all external substances and is constantly focused on the non-self. Due to his belief in oneness with non-self, he is attentive to a dog not eating a roti, writes names in the accounting ledger, manages the money, speaks mindfully, or takes care of the servant; he is careful to be punctual, takes care of his family and relatives. This incorrect belief ensures the continuation of transmigration.

At least once, meditate upon the *ātmā*. Then, the state of *samyak* will manifest, and the state of *kevalajñāna* will be attained. Here, *Ācārya Bhagavāna* states that the self has cared for all others, but who is his own *ātmā*? Has he ever looked that way? He has never cared for. Now, he must focus on his own pure state. Body-mind-speech are non-self, and the belief that the self can do any activity connected to them should be forsaken, because they give rise to perturbation. The knowing-seeing *bhagavāna* is enthroned within, and one must meditate on him. The state of knowing-seeing-ness should never be overlooked. If the self knows and understands the *arhaṇta*, then he will attain the state of *arhaṇta*. This is what he should focus on. Focus on the modification of every *samaya*. As soon as he has this correct belief, then the *dhyāna* in the form of *samyagdarśana* will manifest, the *śukla dhyāna* will manifest, and ultimately *kevaljñāna* will manifest. With this, the *jīva* becomes the manifested radiant illuminance.

Now, in this verse, *ācārya*, by letting us know the relation between substance and its conduct, is showing the connection of the *Jñeya Tattva Prajñāpana* of the second chapter with the *Caraṇānuṣṭhāna Sūcaka Cūlikā* (an appendix to the reality of monk's conduct) of the following third chapter:-

Verse-12 (Sanskrit śloka-12)

द्रव्यानुसारि चरणं चरणानुसारि,
द्रव्यं मिथो द्वयमिदं ननु सव्यपेक्षम् ।
तस्मान्मुमुक्षुरधिरोहतु मोक्षमार्गं,
द्रव्यं प्रतीत्य यदि वा चरणं प्रतीत्य ॥१२॥

*drāvyānusāri caranāṁ caranānusari,
dravyaṁ mitho dvayamidaṁ nanu savyapeksham|
tasmānmumukshuradhirohatu mokshamārga,
dravyam pratītya yadi vā caranāṁ pratītya ||12||*

Meaning: Conduct follows substance, and substance follows conduct; both are mutually dependent. Therefore, he who is a true aspirant of liberation should march on the path of liberation either by realising the substance or by realising conduct.

pravacana on śloka-12

Conduct is according to the substance. *ātmā* is a self-knowing luminous substance. To focus on it and be equanimous in it is *carāṇa*, meaning *cāritra* (conduct). This is according to the substance. *cāritra* (to dwell) is that which arises when, on having the *samyak śraddhā-jñāna* of *ātmā*, one takes auspices of the inner *ātmā*. Without the experience of *ātmā*, *cāritra* (true conduct) cannot occur. When understanding of the *niścaya* (absolute) arises, then the thoughts of the five great vows are said to be *cāritra*. *cāritra* of a *muni* is the state of inner equanimity. If this pure state cannot be attained, then one must aspire for it, but an erroneous/wrong state of monkhood should not be assumed. The outer actions, etc., done without the experience of the pure *dravya*, are not the true conduct. When employing a person, all their details are collected. After learning all his details, he is given employment. But here, in dharma, one does not know about the *dravya-guṇa-paryāya*, of the nature of substance.

carāṇa is according to *dravya*. Attachment automatically leaves when one believes in and knows the *dravya* and maintains steadiness according to one's capacity; without knowing the *dravya*, attachments do not truly subside.

ātmā's jñāna is through *carana*. A *jīva* who eats non-vegetarian food, drinks alcohol, indulges in dissolute behaviour, engages in black marketing, has the tendency to harm many people, acts improperly, and commits condemnable acts can never know the *ātmā*. Such a person is not worthy of being called a seeker. One who believes that he can be beneficial for himself, for that *jīva* with passionlessness, the equanimity within corresponds to the reduction of attachment.

A *jīva* who reduces attachment with true knowledge never has the thoughts of believing in *kudeva-kuguru-kuśāstra*. Thus, both dispositions are in anticipation of each other. Therefore, after having a true understanding of *ātmā*, the path of *mokṣa* can be ascended on, or the path of *mokṣa* can be ascended on by reducing attachment along with the experience of the pure self. A *jīva* with true belief-knowledge will slowly reduce attachment and move towards purity, and a total passionless state will manifest. Therefore, all who are seekers must ascend on the path of *mokṣa*.

Here ends the second *śruta skandha* of the *Tattvapradīpika* commentary authored by Śrīmad Amṛtacaṇḍra Ācārya on the Śrī Pravacanasāra, written by Śrīmad Kuṇḍakuṇḍa Ācārya

GLOSSARY

ananta avibhāga praticcheda – infinitely indivisible

bādara - gross

bhāṣā samiti - carefulness of speech

bhāveṇḍriya – psychical sense

cetana prāṇa – sentient vital force

darśana moha: deluded perception, caused by the influence of *mohaniya*

karma darśanopayoga - perception without distinction

dehādhyāsa- attachment of body

deśanālabdhi – arising of karma due to which one obtains the teachings of *bhagavāna*

dravyaprāṇa – substantial vital force

ekāgra-ciṁtānirodha – *ātmā* who stops thoughts on any subject

ekakṣetra - in the same space

jada karma – physical karmic matter

jaḍa-prāṇa – physical vital force

jñānopayoga - perception of knowing

kramabaddha- sequence-bound

mohanīya karma – faith deluding karma, which clouds the perception of *ātmā*

naimittika -- effect

nirākāra upayoga - non-differentiated cognition

nirupādhi svabhāva - pure soul without any

designation *niścaya jīvatva*- absolute existence of *jīva*

niścayābhāsī – falsely believing singularly only in absolute truth

pratijivi guṇa – those attributes of *ātmā* which manifest with the destruction of certain karma

pratyabhijñāna – *jñāna* which arises by connecting to the subject of recall or direct perception

prāyogika – applied

śabdabramha – divine sound

sādhakatama – highest effort

sādhya – aim

sādraśatā -- similarity.

sākāra upayoga - perception with distinction
śrāmaṇya – monkhood
śukladhyāna – highest form of unwavering meditation
sukṣma - subtle
svarūpa astitva – exitance of the pure nature of self
tiryaka-pracaya – horizontal existence
ūdhrva-pracaya – vertical modification
udīraṇā - coming together
vaistrasika - pure
vartanā – to modify
vigrahagati -- movement of jīva, after forsaking one body and moving to another
visallikaraṇeṇam -- subduing/destroying karma
viśeṣa dravya – substance with modification
vītarāgī: one who has shed all attachment or is free from attachment.
ṛtāṇśa - infinitesimal part
ṛtti - modification
ṛttimāna - which has occurrence
vyatireka -- posterior and former modifications
vyavahāra jivatva -- conventional consciousness/ conventional existence of jīva